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The “dragon” that graces the cover of this volume has a story that goes with it. In the summer of 1980, I was on 
the teaching staff of the Summer Institute on Medieval Philosophy held at Cornell University under the direction of Nor-
man Kretzmann and the auspices of the Council for Philosophical Studies and the National Endowment for the Humanities. 
While I was giving a series of lectures there (lectures that contribute to this volume, as it turns out), I went to my office one 
morning, and there under the door some anonymous wag from the Institute had slid the pen and ink drawing you see in the 
picture. It represents “Supposition” as a dragon, making a rude face at the viewer. The tail of the dragon is divided — not 
entirely accurately, as it turns out — into the various branches and subbranches of supposition. If the details are not alto-
gether correct, the spirit is certainly understandable. 
A few years ago, I discovered that the anonymous artist was not altogether as original as I had at first supposed. 
While glancing one day — don’t ask why — through the charming A Coloring Book of the Middle Ages (San Francisco, 
Cal.: Bellerophon Books, 1969), I turned a page and was startled to find this very creature leering out at me! The inscrip-
tions in the tail and at the bottom were not there, but otherwise it was the same creature! A note at the top of the page said 
“From the Treatise of Walter de Milemete, De Nobilitatibus Sapientiis et prudentiis Regum, Oxford, Christ Church Library, 
MS. E. 11 about 1326–27.” 
I confess I had never heard of Walter or his book, but of course I couldn’t leave it at that. After some detective 
work in the library, I found a very informative description of the manuscript in Lucy Freeman Sandler, Gothic Manuscripts 
1285–1385, (“A Survey of Manuscripts Illuminated in the British Isles”; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), volume 
II: Catalogue, pp. 91–93. It turns out that the manuscript is now identified as: Oxford, Christ Church MS 92. Master Walter 
of Milemete (fl. 1326–73), it seems, was King’s Clerk and afterwards Fellow of King’s Hall, Cambridge. His book, of 
which this manuscript is the unique copy, was designed to instruct “the soverign on his varied responsibilities in relation to 
religion, government, learning, administration, entertainment, financing of armies, and on the moral virtues appropriate to 
his kind” (Sandler, p. 91). Here is some more of Sandler’s discussion (pp. 91–92): 
Milemete wrote his book as an offering to Edward III at the end of 1326, after the deposition but be-
fore the murder of Edward II in 1327. It was intended as a companion volume to the copy of Pseudo-Aristotle's 
De secretis secretorum …, which Milemete had also prepared for Edward III. [Note: Sandler also describes this 
manuscript in her immediately following entry. It survives as London, British Library MS Add. 476]. 
An ambitious project, the text … is dominated by the decorative borders, crammed with heraldry, 
contorted hybrids, … combats between man and man, man and best, half-man and half-beast, human monstrosi-
ties, e.g. the courting wildman and wildwoman …, the axe-bearing dwarf …, hunting scenes, and tournaments. 
By a stroke of good fortune, it happens that the manuscript was actually published in 1913 in a limited-edition 
monochrome reproduction by Montague Rhodes James (well known to all searchers of manuscript catalogues). Here are 
the particulars: The Treatise of Walter de Milemete De nobilitatibus, sapientiis, et prudentiis regum Reproduced in Facsim-
ile from the Unique Manuscript Preserved at Christ Church, Oxford, together with a Selection of Pages from the Compan-
ion Manuscript of the Treatise De secretis secretorum Aristotelis, Preserved in the Library of the Earl of Leicester at 
Holkham Hall, [Oxford:] Printed for the Roxburghe Club [at the University Press, by H. Hart], 1913. M. R. James included 
a long and detailed description in an introduction to the volume. 
Apparently this limited edition was distributed only to then members of the Roxburghe Club. There is list of 
members included in the preliminary matter in the volume, and each member’s copy has his name printed in red in that list. 
It turns out that the Lilly Library at Indiana University (our rare-book library) has the copy produced for a certain Michael 
Tomkinson, Esq. And, sure enough, there on fol. 31v (p. 62), in the lower left corner, is our grinning monster. It appears in 
Ch. 7 (De regis gratitudine) of the treatise. 
Just to head off potentially awkward legal questions of copyright, I hasten to add that the “supposition dragon” 
that was slipped under my door and that graces th volume is not simply a marked-up xerographic copy of the sketch that 
appears in A Coloring Book of the Middle Ages. The latter’s jaws are slightly open, for instance, so that the upper teeth do 
not quite meet the lower ones; my dragon has his teeth clenched. No, although my dragon was obviously inspired by the 
Coloring Book, it was drawn separately. Again, there are veins in the tail of the Coloring Book’s sketch, whereas my 
dragon lacks them (to make room for the writing). Again, neither sketch shows the shadings and the backgroun pattern 
visible in the Roxburghe Club’s printed volume. 
I have absolutely no idea about the identity of the anonymous artist who was inspired to apply this drawing to 
supposition theory, but I have the original framed on the wall in my office. 
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 Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 
his book is the product of a graduate-level course I taught during the Fall 
semesters of 1972, 1976, 1987, 1991, 1996, and 2002, and of a series of 
eleven lectures I presented as a member of the faculty of the Institute on 
Medieval1 Philosophy held during the summer of 1980 at Cornell Univer-
sity.2 Things reached the point where there was no good purpose to be served by 
reading stale old lecture notes to students, when they can read them for them-
selves and we can go on to do other things in class. So here they are, for your edi-
fication and amusement. 
A.  Scope of This Book 
The purpose of this book, as its subtitle says, is to introduce readers to late 
mediaeval logic and semantic theory. By “late mediaeval,” I do not mean the 
really late period, at the end of the fifteenth century, say. Rather I mean the four-
teenth century, primarily, and only the first half of it at that. (That is “late” in 
comparison with Boethius, certainly, and even in comparison with Peter of Spain 
and William of Sherwood a century earlier.) This is the period on which I have 
concentrated the bulk of my research, so naturally it’s the period I’m best in a po-
sition to talk about. Nevertheless, to give the reader a running start, I have in-
cluded a kind of overview in Ch. 2, below, of the history of logic up to the end of 
the Middle Ages, including the periods before and after the time we will be 
mainly focusing on. 
I emphasize that this book is an introduction to the topic. It makes no 
claim to be — and in any case isn’t — an exhaustive study. I have concentrated 
on the crucial semantic notions of signification and supposition, and on the inter-
action of those notions with the theories of mental language and connotation. The 
result, I think, is a more or less self-contained package of material that is abso-
lutely essential to any further work in late mediaeval logic and semantic theory. 
                                                 
1 You might as well get used to it. I myself spell it ‘mediaeval’, with the extra ‘a’. But I 
will stoop to using the other, vulgar spelling if I am quoting or citing someone who insists on do-
ing it that way. 
2 The Institute was directed by Norman Kretzmann and sponsored by the Council for 
Philosophical Studies and the National Endowment for the Humanities. 
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Just so you will know, let me indicate some of things this book does not 
discuss in detail. Most conspicuous, perhaps, is the lack of any serious discussion 
of the theory of consequence. A lot of work was done on that notion in the Middle 
Ages, and much has been written about it in the secondary literature. But you will 
have to go elsewhere for a study of it; I treat it here only in passing. 
Again, although I have devoted far too much of my life to the mediaeval 
insolubilia- and obligationes-literatures, you will find them scarcely mentioned 
here; they are more specialized topics than what I wanted to do in this book. 
Likewise, I have said virtually nothing about the theory of “exposition,” or about 
the theory of “probationes terminorum” that grew up after c. 1350 and is associ-
ated with the name of Richard Billingham. In fact, these two theories are badly in 
need of a lot more research before we will be in a position to say anything very 
illuminating about them. 
Again, I have treated the theory of syncategoremata and the sophismata-
literature only cursorily, insofar as they fed directly into other points I wanted to 
make. Likewise, I have not discussed the extremely interesting applications of 
supposition-theory to the theory of motion and change. 
So, you see, this book is really pretty limited. Nevertheless, what you find 
in it will prepare you adequately, I think, to pursue those other topics on your 
own, should you care to do so. 
B.  The Intended Audience 
When I taught this material in the classroom, my audience was often very 
mixed. I had people from Philosophy who had a good sense of what was theoreti-
cally important and what counted as a good argument, but for whom the Middle 
Ages, and for that matter anything before Frege, was at best a vague rumor. At the 
same time, I had people from Medieval Studies, who knew the history and lore of 
the period backwards and forwards, but who had no special training in philoso-
phy. I had to accommodate both, and I have tried to continue to be accommodat-
ing in this book. So you will find that I use a minimum of logical notation, for ex-
ample, and always include a paraphrase when I do use it. Likewise, I try to moti-
vate the philosophical issues that come up, and don’t just leap into them head-
long. On the other side, you will also find little lessons about Latin syntax as well 
as commonplaces about the structure of the mediaeval university system, for ex-
ample. 
I hope no one will feel condescended to by this approach. On the other 
hand, if you do find something you don’t understand after giving it some thought, 
just read on. 
C.  What Mediaeval Logic Is Not 
Readers coming at this material from the point of view of modern logic 
may be surprised to find very few of what are sometimes called “logical results” 
— that is, theorems about interesting general logical truths. In fact, you may think 
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what we are doing isn’t really “logic” at all, but more philosophy of language, or 
even philosophy of mind or epistemology. Why then call it logic? 
The short answer to this of course is that they called it “logic,” and they 
got there first! A less contentious response would be to point out how much the 
close connection between logic and the foundations of mathematics in the recent 
period has shaped our view of what logic is, to the point of making it hard some-
times for us to think of logic in any other terms. 
But it wasn’t always that way. In particular, it wasn’t that way at all in the 
period we will be discussing. Mediaeval logic had very little to do with “theorem 
proving” and everything to do with the nature of reasoning and even of thought. 
Like it or not, that’s what you will find in this book. 
D.  Versions of This Book 
As you will see from the title page, I describe this book as “Version 1.2.” 
The original Version 1.0 was produced in 1996. A minor upgrade Version 1.1 was 
made in 2002, amounting to fixing a few typos, renegotiating some formatting 
issues, and updating the Bibliography slightly. This final Version 1.2 fixes a few 
more typos and some of the more grotesque errors — one of which had Anselm 
die at the ripe old age of 109! Although many defects remain, I will not be updat-
ing this book in the future. Regrettably, this means I will not be including refer-
ences to Fabienne Pironet’s critical edition of Buridan’s Sophismata or to my own 
complete translation of Burley’s De puritate artis logicae. Parts of the text reflect 
earlier versions of this volume, which predate the appearance of these volumes.  
E.  Translations 
Finally, for copyright purposes, all translations in this book are my own, 
even where I cite other translations for comparison. 
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 Chapter 2:  Thumbnail Sketch of 
the History of Logic to the End of 
the Middle Ages 
want to begin by giving you a little thumbnail sketch of the history of logic 
up to the end of the Middle Ages. This will be merely the sketchiest of 
sketches, and is meant only to provide background information and con-
text. No doubt it will seem a little encyclopedic in places, but read it anyway. We 
will get down to more theoretical matters in the next chapter. 
One of the standard, although by now older, histories of logic is Bocheń–
ski’s A History of Formal Logic. In that book,1 Bocheński remarks that in the his-
tory of Western logic — that is, disregarding logic in India2 — there are three 
great periods. In other words, Western logic did not develop in a more or less 
continuous process from ancient times to the present, as for example the fine arts 
perhaps did (depending on your views about the fine arts). Rather, there were 
short periods of intense activity, alternating with long periods of decline and stag-
nation. 
The main periods of activity were: 
(a) The ancient period, from roughly 350 to 200 BC. 
(b) The mediaeval period, from roughly 1100 to 1450 or so. (That’s 
the period of mediaeval activity in logic. For other purposes, the 
mediaeval period may be taken to be longer.3) 
                                                 
1 Bocheński, A History of Formal Logic, Part One, § 3, pp. 10–18. (For complete bib-
liographical information on works cited in these footnotes, see the Bibliography at the end of this 
volume.) 
2 Bocheński claims (ibid., pp. 10–11) that formal logic originated in two and only two 
places: in the West and in India. What we find in China, he says (p. 10), “is a method of discus-
sion and a sophistic” — that is, a technique for disputation and a discussion of fallacies — but 
nothing like a full-blown formal logic. Logic in other areas (for example, Islamic logic), he con-
tinues, was derivative on the logic of these two original regions. 
3 It is now beginning to be realized that the period between late mediaeval and early 
modern philosophy is not entirely as logically sterile as has often been supposed. See, for exam-
ple, Ashworth, Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period, and Ashworth, Studies in Post-
Medieval Semantics. 
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(c) The modern period, beginning with Boole, and then Peano and 
Frege, and so on. In other words, from the middle or late nine-
teenth century to the present. 
Of these three periods, the mediaeval period — the one we will be dis-
cussing in this book — is perhaps the longest.4 It ran for about 350 years, whereas 
the ancient period in logic was confined to about 150 years, and the modern pe-
riod has not yet lasted even quite that long. 
On the whole, Bocheński’s observation is correct, although lots of qualifi-
cations need to be made.5 While it is true that there are these three great periods 
of activity, one can also find isolated figures here and there between these peri-
ods. Perhaps most significant are: 
(d) Boethius (480–524/525 AD — just remember that he was alive in 
the year 500). Perhaps he shouldn’t be regarded as an exception 
because, as we shall see in a little while, although his logical work 
was tremendously important and influential, it does not seem to 
have been especially original. But the jury is still out on Boethius. 
(e) Leibniz (1646–1716). It is pretty generally agreed that Leibniz did 
some very good logical work. 
Thus: 
                                                 
4 I say “perhaps,” because one can argue about the dates. On the one hand, it is arguable 
that the major theoretical contributions to mediaeval logic were already made by 1350, and that 
the period 1350–1450, although logically active, is undistinguished. (In fact, I shall argue it my-
self. See pp. 46–50 below.) On the other hand, one might also argue that significant contributions 
were made to ancient logic right up to at least the time of Galen (129–c. 199 AD), if not later. 
5 For the most part, Bocheński was perfectly well aware of these qualifications. But see 
n. 3 above. 
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Figure 1: Main Periods in the History of Western Logic  
A.  The Early Ancient Period 
In the Middle Ages, there was a tradition according to which the pre-
Socratic philosopher Parmenides (5th century BC) invented logic while sitting on 
a rock in Egypt. 
The twelfth century author John of Salisbury (c. 1115–1180), for instance, 
while describing the history of logic in his Metalogicon (dated 1159), says6: 
Parmenides the Egyptian spent his life on a rock, in order to dis-
cover the reasonings of logic. 
And Hugh of St. Victor, a somewhat earlier twelfth century author (1096–
1141), writes in his Didascalicon (dated in the late 1120s)7: 
Egypt is the mother of the arts. From there they came to Greece, 
[and] then to Italy. Grammar was first discovered there [= in 
                                                 
6 John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, II.2, Hall ed., p. 58.21–22; Webb ed., pp. 62–63. See 
John of Salisbury, The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury, McGarry, trans., pp. 76–77. On the date, 
see McGarry’s translation, p. xix. Do not be deceived. The title of John’s book should not be 
taken to imply that it has anything at all to do with “metalogic” in the modern sense. In fact, it is a 
good question just exactly why it is called “Metalogicon” in the first place. 
7 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, III.2, Buttimer ed., p. 52. See Hugh of St. Victor, The 
Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor, Taylor trans., p. 86. (On the date of the text, see ibid., p. 3.)  
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Egypt] in the time of Osiris the husband of Isis. There too dialectic 
was first discovered by Parmenides who, avoiding cities and 
crowds, sat for quite a while on a rock and so thought out dialectic. 
Thus [the rock] is called “the rock of Parmenides.” 
A little later in the same work, Hugh tells us that old Parmenides is re-
ported to have spent fifteen years up there on his rock.8 
Around 1250, the encyclopedist Vincent of Beauvais (d. 1264) tells the 
same story, but moves Parmenides’ rock from Egypt to the Caucasus mountains 
— perhaps significantly, the traditional home of that greatest of all discoverers, 
Prometheus9: 
But one reads about Parmenides that he discovered logic on a rock 
in the Caucasus. 
I bring up this legend in order to lead into my topic. First, I hasten to reas-
sure you that there is not a word of truth in the story — except perhaps for the fact 
that Parmenides was one of the very first philosophers to have argued for his 
views, rather than just proposing a kind of vision of the way things are. In that 
sense, if you want to stretch a point, Parmenides may be said to have invented 
dialectic, or the art of argumentation.10 But there is no evidence whatever that 
Parmenides ever systematically studied and formulated the rules of argumentation 
for their own sake — which is what we more normally think of as “logic,” or at 
least as the beginning of logic. For that matter, I suppose there is no real evidence 
that Parmenides was even aware of the implicit rules of argumentation he was 
employing in presenting his position. And there is certainly no evidence that he 
ever did any of this while living on a rock in Egypt! 
Nevertheless, an explicit awareness of at least certain kinds of argument-
forms can perhaps be attributed to Parmenides’ disciple Zeno the Eleatic (5th cen-
tury BC), the famous originator of Zeno’s Paradoxes. His several paradoxes share 
to some extent a common form, and so suggest (although it is no more than a sug-
gestion) that Zeno was aware of the common form involved — namely, reductio 
(reduction to absurdity), whereby one proves a point by showing that its contra-
                                                 
8 Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, III.14, Buttimer ed., pp. 64–65: “One reads that Par-
menides the philosopher sat for fifteen years on a rock in Egypt.” See the Taylor trans., p. 97; and 
Klibansky, “The Rock of Parmenides,” p. 179. 
9 Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum historiale, III.44, p. 100. See Klibansky, “The Rock of 
Parmenides,” p. 179. For much fascinating information about the historical origins of this bizarre 
legend, see Klibansky’s article just cited. Vincent of Beauvais’ Speculum historiale is the fourth 
and last part of his mammoth Speculum quadruplex or Speculum maius. The other three parts are 
known as the Speculum naturale, the Speculum doctrinale, and the Speculum morale. In the 
Douay edition of 1624, which I am using, each part is published in a separate volume. 
10 In the Middle Ages, ‘dialectic’ meant at least two different things, depending on who 
was using the term and in what period. Sometimes it was used interchangeably with “logic” 
broadly speaking. Other times it was used more narrowly, to refer to the study of certain kinds of 
persuasive argument that need not be strictly valid and certainly not strictly demonstrative. See 
Stump, Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic. 
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dictory leads to impossible consequences. Zeno’s paradoxes, according to at least 
one interpretation, drew out the supposedly absurd consequences of a non-monist, 
non-Eleatic, view of things, and so (if they work) refuted such a view. 
Indeed Aristotle himself, who certainly ought to be an authority on such 
matters, calls Zeno “the founder of dialectic,” according to a fragment of a lost 
work quoted by the doxographer Diogenes Laertius in the third century AD.11 The 
same quotation is found earlier in Sextus Empiricus, who was active around 200 
AD, and who (unlike Diogenes) is fairly reliable on matters of quotation and his-
tory.12 
In fact, it appears to have been this remark of Aristotle’s, that Zeno was 
the “founder of dialectic,” that — by a curious twist of fate — was behind the me-
diaeval legend of Parmenides the Egyptian.13 
Nevertheless, even giving Zeno his due, it is still true that he did not origi-
nate the reflective and systematic study of logical rules and laws in their own 
right. That seems to have first been done by Aristotle (384–322 BC).14 
At the end of his little book Sophistic Refutations (an important work we 
will have occasion to refer to a little later15), Aristotle tells us16 that usually new 
discoveries have relied on the results of previous labors by others, so that, while 
the achievements of those others may be small, they are seminal. But then he 
says17: 
                                                 
11 See Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VIII.57 (Long ed., p. 419.10): “Aristotle 
in the Sophist [now lost] says Empedocles was the first to invent rhetoric, and Zeno dialectic”; and 
IX.25 (Long ed., p. 450.13): “Aristotle says [Zeno] was the inventor of dialectic, as Empedocles 
[was] of rhetoric.” (Compare the Hicks translation, vol. 2, pp. 373 & 435.) The former passage is 
also given in Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 287, § 364. The claim is cited and 
discussed in Kneale and Kneale, The Development of Logic, pp. 7–9. 
12 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos, VII.7 (Opera, Mutschmann, ed., vol. 2, p. 
4): “For Aristotle says Empedocles was the first to contrive rhetoric, of which dialectic is the 
counterpart — that is, the coequal, for it deals with the same [subject-] matter (just as the Poet 
[= Homer] called Odysseus ‘godlike’, that is ‘god-equal’). [There is some Greek word-play going 
on here. Don’t worry about it.] And Parmenides does not seem to have been inexperienced in dia-
lectic, since Aristotle again called [Parmenides’] acquaintance Zeno the founder of dialectic.” 
(Compare Bury’s translation, vol. 2, p. 5.) Books VII and VIII of the Adversus mathematicos 
(= Against the Professors) are also known as the Adversus logicos (= Against the Logicians). 
Again, they are known as Books I and II of the Adversus dogmaticos (= Against the Dogmatists). 
The latter work also contains three other books: Against the Skeptics, Against the Physicists, and 
Against the Ethicists, which are counted as Adversus mathematicos, Books IX–XI, respectively. 
I’m sorry; I didn’t make this up, Sextus seems to have been against lots of people. 
13 For the details, see Klibansky, “The Rock of Parmenides.” 
14 See Kneale and Kneale, The Development of Logic, p. 16. The crucial qualifications in 
this claim are in the words ‘reflective and systematic’. It is true, of course, that much groundwork 
had already been done before Aristotle, by Zeno and others as well. See ibid., Ch. 1 (pp. 1–22). 
Still, there is no doubt that something importantly new began with Aristotle. 
15 See pp. 12, 38–40, below. 
16 Sophistic Refutations 34, 183b17–23. 
17 Ibid., 183b34–36. 
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But in this matter [i.e., in logic] it is not that some of it had been 
thoroughly worked out beforehand while some of it had not. 
Rather, there was nothing at all! 
In other words, Aristotle is claiming, logic — as the explicit and system-
atic study of the rules and forms of argumentation — was his own invention, 
pretty much ex nihilo! Curiously enough, this boast appears to be true, even after 
all the appropriate qualifications and provisos have been taken into account. 
Logic as we know it today began with Aristotle. 
Throughout the ancient world, Aristotelian or Peripatetic logic — the 
logic of Aristotle and his followers, especially of his disciple Theophrastus (c. 
371–c. 286 BC), who was the first head of the Lyceum after Aristotle18 — was one 
main stream of logic. But there was a second main tradition of logic too, the logic 
of the Megarians and the Stoics. This tradition differed from Peripatetic logic in 
important respects. Let us look briefly at each of these two traditions in turn. But 
before we do that, here is a little diagram, just so you can keep everyone straight 
(all dates in this diagram are of course BC): 
Figure 2: The Ancient Period in Logic 
                                                 
18 On Theophrastus, see Kerferd, “Theophrastus,” and Bocheński, La logique de Théo-
phraste. We shall have more to say about Theophrastus in a little while. 
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B.  Aristotelian Logic 
First, let’s talk about Aristotelian logic. 
Aristotle wrote six logical works, which were collected and arranged in 
the first century BC by Andronicus of Rhodes, who is the man responsible for the 
arrangement of the Aristotelian writings in the form in which we have them to-
day. The collection of logical writings came to be called the Organon — Greek 
for “tool.” 
For Aristotle, you see, logic was not a demonstrative theoretical science at 
all. The demonstrative theoretical sciences, for him, were: (a) physics, or philoso-
phy of nature; (b) mathematics; and (c) metaphysics, or what he called “theol-
ogy.”19 Logic had no place in this division. Rather, from this standpoint, logic 
was a tool used by all the sciences. 
Note that to say that logic is not a science, in this special sense, is in no 
way to say it is not a rigorous discipline. The notion of a science was a very spe-
cial one for Aristotle, most fully developed in his Posterior Analytics. 
Aristotle’s six logical works were these: 
(1) Categories. This work is border-line logic; it might just as well be 
viewed as metaphysics. The book contains a discussion of Aris-
totle’s ten basic kinds of entities: substance, quantity, quality, rela-
tion, place, time, position (i.e., orientation, not the same as 
“place”), state, action and passion (i.e., being passive, the opposite 
of action). Some late ancient authors, and many mediaeval authors, 
interpreted this work as being about language, as about the ten ba-
sic kinds of terms, rather than about ten basic kinds of entities. 
William of Ockham, for example (we will talk about him a lot be-
low), considered it that way. 
(2) De interpretatione or On Interpretation. Oddly enough, this work 
is almost always referred to in the Middle Ages by its Greek title 
Peri hermeneias (the spelling varies radically — mediaeval Latins 
had absolutely no idea how to spell most Greek words, even in 
transliteration); I have never seen it referred to then as the De in-
terpretatione. Two things go on in this work: 
(a) Aristotle’s semantics — that is, his theory of the re-
lation between language and the world: the inter-
pretation of language. Hence the title. 
(b) A study of the structure of certain basic kinds of 
sentences or propositions and their interrelations: 
categorical propositions, the square of opposition, 
conversion, etc. 
                                                 
19 See, for example, the division of the sciences in Metaphysics VI, 1. 
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(3) Prior Analytics. This is certainly the most original purely logical 
work Aristotle wrote. It is also the most abstract and formal. The 
work contains Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism. The syllogism is 
a special kind of argument, using premises and conclusions that are 
propositions with a special form. We will say more about that in a 
moment. 
Note the progression in these first three works of the Organon: the Cate-
gories is about terms (at least according to some interpretations); the De interpre-
tatione is about propositions, which are made up of terms; and the Prior Analytics 
is about arguments, which are made up of propositions. This clever hierarchical 
ordering (which is no doubt the basis for Andronicus of Rhodes’ arranging them 
in this sequence) is followed in many mediaeval presentations of logic — for in-
stance, Ockham’s. 
(4) Posterior Analytics. This contains Aristotle’s theory of scientific 
demonstration in his special sense. Not all valid syllogisms are 
“demonstrative” for Aristotle — not even all sound syllogisms. It 
is the notion of “demonstration” in his special sense that Aristotle 
tries to fix in this work. In effect, it contains Aristotle’s account of 
the philosophy of science or of scientific methodology. 
(5) Topics. This is probably an early and certainly a very long work of 
Aristotle’s, in eight books. It contains a study of non-
demonstrative reasoning, and is effectively a grab-bag of how to 
conduct a good argument. 
(6) Finally, there is Aristotle’s little work, Sophistic Refutations, a 
kind of cataloguing of the various kinds of fallacies. It was origi-
nally intended to be the ninth book of the Topics, but is often 
treated separately. This little work, as we shall see, was of im-
mense importance in the development of mediaeval logic. 
In addition, among Aristotle’s logical writings I should perhaps mention 
Book Ã (= Book IV) of the Metaphysics, which is sometimes regarded as a kind of 
logical work of its own. It contains a defense of the Law of Non-Contradiction. 
Nevertheless, although it may be of some interest for us, this work was not gen-
erally regarded as part of the Organon. 
1.  Important Characteristics of Aristotelian Logic 
(1) As his work developed, Aristotle became more and more concerned 
with the notion of a “demonstrative” science. And the paradigm of a demonstra-
tive science appears to have been geometry, in something like the form in which it 
would later be developed by Euclid (fl. c. 300 BC). This special concern occupied 
Aristotle quite a bit. But not so the Stoics, as we shall see. 
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(2) Aristotle’s logic was a term logic. To explain what this means, con-
sider a syllogism in the mood known in the Middle Ages as “Barbara” (we will 
talk about these names shortly): 
Every β is an α. 
Every γ is a β. 
Therefore, every γ is an α. 
The ‘α’, ‘β’ and ‘γ’ here are variables — that is, place-holders.20 What we 
have then is a kind of schema. Any argument of the above form is a syllogism in 
“Barbara.” 
But what are the ‘α’, ‘β’ and ‘γ’ place-holders for? They are place-
holders for terms. And in that sense, Aristotle’s logic is a term-logic. For exam-
ple, 
Every animal is a substance. 
Every man is an animal. 
Therefore, every man is a substance. 
The bulk of Aristotle’s logic concerned analyzed propositions like this. 
They were “analyzed” into the following components: 
(a) a quantifier (‘every’, or ‘some’); 
(b) a subject term; 
(c) a copula (‘is’ and its various tensed and modal forms); 
(d) an optional negation (‘not’); 
(e) a predicate term. 
Aristotle’s codification of valid logical rules — for example, the rules of 
conversion and opposition in the De interpretatione, and of the syllogistic as pre-
sented in the Prior Analytics — applied for the most part only to propositions of 
this special sort, which are called categorical propositions.21 
                                                 
20 Aristotle seems to have been the first one to use variables of any kind systematically in 
the study of logic. I don’t have to tell you how important this development was. But I will any-
way: without variables, Aristotle would not have been able to achieve anything close to the level 
of generality he did in logic. 
21 Nevertheless, Aristotle very often formulates categorical propositions differently. For 
example, he will say things like “α belongs to every β” or “α is predicated of every β.” These are 
plainly meant to be equivalent to what we may regard as the “canonical” form “Every β is an α.” 
Such alternative formulations are Aristotle’s regular way of putting things in the Prior Analytics. 
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2.  Opposition, Conversion, and the Categorical 
Syllogism 
Here is a summary of virtually everything you will ever need to know — 
and much more — about categorical propositions, their oppositions and conver-
sions, and syllogisms made up of them.22 
Be warned! Some of what I will be saying here is not really “originally” 
Aristotelian, but represents a more or less standard development of Aristotelian 
doctrine in the Middle Ages and later. I will try to distinguish for you what is 
genuinely in Aristotle from what isn’t. Also, note that not all the mediaeval au-
thors we will be talking about in this book defined things exactly the way they 
will be set up here — particularly when it comes to the names of the syllogisms 
and the ways of defining the various syllogistic “figures.” In reading these people, 
you have to take these things as they come and just try to figure out what a par-
ticular author means from the context. Here we go: 
a.  Kinds of Categorical Propositions 
Where S and P are general terms (they’re supposed to suggest “subject” 
and “predicate”) and x is a singular term,23 we have the following main kinds of 
categorical propositions. In the first four cases, I have also given you (in paren-
theses) the “code name” by which the form is often referred to in modern litera-
ture. (The others don’t have such “code names.”) 
Universal Affirmative (A-form) ‘Every S is P’ 
Universal Negative (E-form) ‘No S is P’ (= ‘Every S is not P’) 
Particular Affirmative (I-form) ‘Some S is P 
Particular Negative (O-form) ‘Some S is not P’ 
Indefinite Affirmative ‘S is P’ 
Indefinite Negative ‘S is not P’ 
Singular Affirmative ‘x is P’ 
Singular Negative ‘x is not P’. 
Note that all explicitly quantified categorical propositions — that is, those 
with ‘every’, ‘no’ or ‘some’ — are of A, E, I, or O-form, and that among these 
the affirmative ones are the A and I-forms, while the negative ones are the E and 
O-forms. ‘A’ and ‘I’ are the first two vowels of Latin ‘affirmo’ (= I affirm), 
whereas ‘E’ and ‘O’ are the vowels in Latin ‘nego’ (= I deny). This is where 
those four forms got their names. And that tells you, of course, that their names 
                                                 
22 For still more about these topics, see Bird, Syllogistic And Its Extensions. 
23 I don’t mean by this just any old term that is singular in number. I mean a proper name 
(for example, ‘Socrates’), a demonstrative pronoun (‘this’ or ‘that’), or a demonstrative phrase 
(‘this man’, ‘that animal’). The contrast here is not singular term/plural term but rather singular 
term/general term. This is a fairly standard way of talking, and I will use it frequently throughout 
this book. 
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are not originally Aristotelian. (Aristotle spoke Greek, as you know, not Latin.) 
They arose much later; I don’t know exactly when. 
Categorical propositions may be classified according to their quality (af-
firmative or negative) and their quantity (universal, particular, indefinite, singu-
lar). (Again, the actual terms ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ in this usage are not origi-
nally Aristotelian.) For syllogistic purposes, although no more in everyday Greek 
or Latin than in everyday English, indefinites are always treated as particulars,24 
and singulars are treated as universals.25 Thus ‘Socrates is mortal’ is treated like 
‘Every Socrates is mortal’, and ‘Man is an animal’ is treated like ‘Some man is an 
animal’, not like ‘Every man is an animal’ (although the latter is true too in the 
case of ‘man’ and ‘animal’). Hence the A-, E-, I-, and O-forms are the four basic 
kinds of propositions used in syllogistic. 
b.  The Square of Opposition and the Laws of 
Opposition 
The so called “square of opposition,” as the actual diagram given below, 
is not to be found in Aristotle himself. But most of the doctrine codified in it can 
be found in Aristotle’s De interpretatione, Ch. 7. There Aristotle talks about the 
various ways in which categorical propositions can be “opposed” to one another. 
The particular kinds of opposition he has in mind there all hold between pairs of 
propositions related as affirmative and negative and having the same subject and 
predicate terms. (Their “quantity” may vary.) 
Arrange the basic categorical forms in a square, with the A-, E-, I-, and O-
forms in the upper left, upper right, lower left, and lower right corners, respec-
tively. Then we have: 
                                                 
24 This convention does have an authentically Aristotelian pedigree, at least for affirma-
tive propositions. See Prior Analytics I, 4, 26a28–30: “Similarly if [the premise] ΒΙ  [that is, the 
premise in which Β is the predicate and Ι is the subject — see n. 21 above] is indefinite, as long as 
it is affirmative. For there will be the same syllogism whether it is taken indefinitely or particu-
larly.” See also Prior Analytics I, 7, 29a27–29: “It is also clear that an indefinite [proposition] put 
instead of a particular affirmative will produce the same syllogism in all figures.” The general 
claim that indefinites and particulars are always interchangeable in syllogistic contexts appears to 
have been first made by Alexander of Aphrodisias, the great commentator on Aristotle from the 
third century AD. (See Alexander of Aphrodisias, Alexandri in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum 
librum I commentarium, Wallies ed., p. 30 lines 29–31: “He [Aristotle] doesn’t speak about [con-
verting] indefinites, because they are of no use for syllogisms and because they can be [regarded 
as] equal to particulars.”) See Łukasiewicz, Aristotle’s Syllogistic, p. 5. 
25 Aristotle says nothing like this, but in fact there is a certain reasonableness to it. If 
‘Socrates’ is a singular term, then Socrates is (by default) every Socrates, I suppose. (Ignore the 
fact that there might be several people named Socrates. That makes the term ‘Socrates’ an equivo-
cal term; it doesn’t prevent it from being a singular term.) Łukasiewicz, Aristotle’s Syllogistic, pp. 
5–7, suggests some interesting considerations about why Aristotle himself omitted any discussion 
of singular terms from his syllogistic. For some relevant corrections of Łukasiewicz, see Austin’s 
review of Łukasiewicz’s Aristotle’s Syllogistic, p. 396. 
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Figure 3: The Square of Opposition 
(a)  The Law of Contraries: Two contraries may be false to-
gether but never true together. (A and E, across the top line of the 
square, are contraries.) 
(b) The Law of Subcontraries: Two subcontraries may be true 
together, but never false together. (I and O, across the bottom line 
of the square, are subcontraries.26)  
(c) The Law of Contradictories: Two contradictories are never 
true together or false together; in every case one is true and the 
other false. (Contradictories are diagonally opposite one another 
on the square. Thus A and O are contradictories, and so are E and 
I.) 
(d) The Law of Subalternation: If a universal proposition is 
true, then its contradictory is false, so that the subcontrary of that 
contradictory is true. Hence, from a universal affirmative (respec-
tively, negative) to a particular affirmative (respectively, negative) 
is a valid inference. (Thus, A to I, E to O — from top to bottom 
                                                 
26 Aristotle had no special term for I/O-pairs; the term ‘subcontrary’ is a later neologism. 
But he did discuss the logical relation involved. 
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along the sides of the squares. I and O are the subalternates of the 
subalternands A and E, respectively.27) 
Notice some things about these relations. First, if the I-form is going to be 
subalternate to the A-form, then the A-form must be read with “existential im-
port.” That is, if there are no S’s, then ‘Every S is P’ has to be read as false — not 
true as on the modern reading.28 Second, the I-form ‘Some S is P’ may be false if 
there are S’s that fail to be P’s, but also if there are no S’s at all (and so a fortiori 
none that are P’s). Since the I-form is false under either of these two conditions, 
its contradictory E-form will be true under either of the same two conditions — 
and in particular, it will be true if there are no S’s at all. Thus, E-forms do not 
have existential import. But in that case, how can ‘Some S is not P’ validly follow 
from ‘No S is P’? For that matter, how can ‘Some S is not P’ be the contradictory 
of the A-form ‘Every S is P’, since both appear to have existential import and so 
are both false in case there are no S’s, thereby violating the Law of Contradicto-
ries? 
Aristotle has nothing to say about these questions. But note that they arise 
only if we allow there to be no S’s. Probably the correct way to avoid the prob-
lems is to realize that the whole theory of opposition, and for that matter the the-
ory of conversion and the whole theory of the syllogistic, were never intended to 
handle non-denoting terms. They were designed for the theory of demonstrative 
science, where we are talking about real things, after all, not fictions.29 
When later authors who did not have Aristotle’s special interest in the the-
ory of demonstrative science sought to extend this logical machinery to accom-
modate non-denoting terms, it became plain that something was going to have to 
                                                 
27 Again, Aristotle had no special term for the subalternation relation. 
28 This doctrine of “existential import” has taken a lot of silly abuse in the twentieth cen-
tury. As you may know, the modern reading of universal affirmatives construes them as quantified 
material conditionals. Thus ‘Every S is P’ becomes (x)(Sx ⊃ Px), and is true, not false, if there are 
no S’s. Hence (x)(Sx ⊃ Px) does not imply (∃x)(Sx). And that is somehow supposed to show the 
failure of existential import. But it doesn’t show anything of the sort. Think of it like this: Aristo-
telian and mediaeval logic did not quantify variables, as modern logic does, but rather terms. They 
did not say “for all x” but rather “every man” or “some dog.” The latter is, in a curious way, the 
more general procedure. To say “for all x” is like saying “every being” or “every thing.” Hence to 
restrict quantification to variables is like restricting term-quantification to only the most general, 
all-inclusive terms (‘being’, ‘thing’, etc.). In short, the subject terms in categorical propositions in 
effect play the role of specifying the domain of discourse, which need not be all beings, all things 
whatever, but may be more restricted — all dogs, all men, etc. The modern equivalent of existen-
tial import, therefore, is not: (x)(Sx ⊃ Px) ∴ (∃x)(Sx), but rather (x)(Px) ∴ (∃x)(Px). And that 
holds in standard modern logic, which is therefore just as much committed to existential import as 
traditional logic is. It is so committed insofar as the domains over which its quantifiers range (“be-
ings,” “things” in general — not just “men” or “dogs”) are required to be non-empty. If one really 
wants to get rid of existential import, in other words, the way to do it to adopt a so called “free”-
logic, in which the inference (x)(Px) ∴ (∃x)(Px) fails. (Of course none of what I have said here 
means that the use of variables ranging over the entire domain of discourse is not by far the better 
way to do things for lots of purposes — for example, in representing complicated relational state-
ments. But that has nothing to do with the question of existential import.) 
29 See p. 12, above. 
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give way. Generally, it was the O-form that was compromised. Despite its ordi-
nary sense in Greek and Latin (and in English too), the O-form ‘Some S is not P’ 
was taken as not having existential import. It was read as having the sense “Not 
every S is P,” as of course it must have if it is going to be the contradictory of the 
A-form. As a result, the affirmative propositions on the square of opposition were 
taken as having existential import, but the negative ones were not. This resolution 
was perhaps not unanimously adopted in the Middle Ages (never assume anything 
was unanimously adopted in the Middle Ages), but it is generally safe to read 
things this way unless you find positive evidence to the contrary. 
Finally, note that although the terminology of the square of opposition was 
primarily intended to apply to propositions sharing the same subject and predicate 
terms, that terminology was often extended in the Middle Ages to apply to any 
propositions related in the appropriate ways. Thus any two propositions that could 
be true together but not false together were sometimes called subcontraries, 
whether they shared the same terms or not. So too for the other relations.30 
c.  Conversion 
In Prior Analytics I, 2, Aristotle stated several rules concerning cases in 
which the subject and predicate of a categorical proposition may be reversed 
without affecting its truth value. Such rules later came to be known as the rules of 
“conversion.” Thus E-form propositions can be “converted” in this way; their 
subjects and predicates may be transposed without affecting their truth value. So 
too for I-form propositions. Later, such a straightforward interchange of subject 
and predicate, leaving all other features of the propositions intact, was said to be a 
conversion done simply (= simpliciter). 
A-form propositions cannot be simply converted like this; ‘Every S is P’ 
and ‘Every P is S’ may very well have different truth values. (Every ape is a 
mammal, but by no means all mammals are apes.) Nevertheless, A-forms imply I-
forms (by subalternation), and the latter can be simply converted. Thus a transfor-
mation from ‘Every S is P’ to ‘Some P is S’ will not always preserve truth value 
(since the former may be false even if the latter is true), but it will preserve truth 
(since if the former is true the latter will be true as well). This kind of “modified” 
conversion, in which not only are the subject and predicate transposed, but the 
quantifier is weakened from a universal to a particular quantifier — and every-
thing else is left intact — came to be known later as an accidental (= per ac-
cidens) conversion. (Note that E-forms can be converted both simply and per ac-
cidens.) 
O-form propositions can be converted in neither of these two ways, nei-
ther simply nor accidentally. ‘Some people are not Greeks’ and ‘Some Greeks are 
not people’ have very different truth values, so that O-forms cannot be converted 
simply. And since O-forms are already particular in quantity, they cannot be 
                                                 
30 Except for subalternation. To the best of my knowledge, the terminology of subal-
ternation was never extended in this way. In any case, such an extension would have amounted to 
nothing more than one-way implication. 
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“weakened” further in that regard. Hence they cannot be converted accidentally 
either. In short, O-forms cannot be converted at all.31 
The theory of conversion was not just idle pedantry on Aristotle’s part. It 
played a crucial role in his account of how all other syllogisms could be “re-
duced” to those of the first figure, as described on pp. 21–25 below. 
d.  Categorical Syllogisms 
A categorical syllogism is an argument that (a) is composed of three cate-
gorical propositions, namely, two premises and a conclusion; (b) employs three 
terms, each of which is used in exactly two of the propositions of the syllogism.32 
The three terms are called the major, the minor and the middle terms. 
i.  Major, Middle and Minor Terms 
That much is not controversial. But the proper way to define the three 
kinds of terms in a syllogism is a matter of considerable confusion, both in Aris-
totle’s late-ancient and mediaeval commentators and in the modern literature as 
well. At Prior Analytics I, 4, 26a21–23, Aristotle remarks that the minor term is 
“included” in the middle and the middle term in the major.33 This comment has 
been the source of much puzzlement. If “inclusion” is meant extensionally, Aris-
totle’s claim appears to be false for all syllogisms except those in the mood Bar-
bara that have true premises.34 (We will discuss figures and moods in a moment.) 
                                                 
31 I suppose one could reason like this: Since O-forms were finally read as the negations 
of A-forms (see p. 18, above), they should be regarded as having universal quantity; it’s just that 
the universal quantifier is inside the scope of a negation. Hence their quantity can be weakened 
after all: ‘Some S is not P’ (read as ‘Not every S is P’) can be reduced in quantity to ‘It is not the 
case that some S is P’ — which just amounts to the E-form ‘No S is P’. And the E-form, of 
course, can be simply converted. The case is just the logical dual of the conversion of A-forms 
(which is exactly what you should expect). The O-form ‘Some S is not P’ can thus be “converted” 
in this new way to ‘No P is S’. Unlike the other kinds of conversion, this new kind does not al-
ways preserve truth value — or even truth — (since the O-form proposition may be true even if 
the E-form is false), but it does preserve falsehood (if the O-form is false, the E-form is too). This 
new kind of “conversion” would then have to be regarded as a third kind, and a new name would 
have to be given to it. Yes, all this could be done — but it wasn’t. Still, note that the method of 
“indirect reduction” described on p. 23, below, appeals to exactly this kind of reasoning. Even so, 
it was not regarded as involving any kind of “conversion.” 
32 This definition nowhere appears in Aristotle. At Prior Analytics I, 1, 24b18–20, he de-
scribes a “syllogism” more broadly as “an argument (λόγος) in which, once certain things have 
been posited, something other than what was established happens of necessity from their being 
so.” But this is so general as to apply to any valid argument with more than one premise. In prac-
tice, Aristotle generally used the term much more narrowly, as described above. 
33 See also Prior Analytics I, 4, 25b32–36, where the expressions ‘major’ and ‘minor’ do 
not occur, but the middle is defined in such a way that one of the other terms of the syllogism is 
“included” in it, and it in the third term of the syllogism. 
34 For a good account of the matter, and a plausible appraisal of what it all means, see 
Austin’s review of Łukasiewicz’s Aristotle’s Syllogistic, at pp. 398–399. 
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Whatever we are to make out of that passage, the sixth century Greek 
commentator John Philoponus (pronounced with the stress on the first ‘o’: 
Philóponus) came up with another definition, one that better reflects Aristotle’s 
actual practice. According to him, the major term of a syllogism is the one that is 
the predicate in the conclusion, and the minor term is the one that is the subject in 
the conclusion.35 The middle term is then the one that doesn’t appear in the con-
clusion at all — and so appears in both premises. This characterization applies 
generally to all the figures. 
I will use Philoponus’ definition throughout the rest of this discussion. But 
please be aware that this usage was not fixed in the Middle Ages. 
The premise containing the major term is called the major premise; the 
premise containing the minor term is the minor premise. (Often in the Middle 
Ages the terms ‘major premise’ and ‘minor premise’ are used more loosely, to 
mean simply the “first premise” and the “second premise” in any two-premise 
argument, whether it is syllogistic in form or not.) 
ii.  Syllogistic Figures 
At Prior Analytics I, 23, 40b30–41a18, Aristotle describes three “figures” 
of the syllogism, defined in terms of the position of the middle term in the prem-
ises. The middle is: 
(a) First figure: the subject in the major premise, predicate in 
the minor. 
(b) Second figure: the predicate in both premises; 
(c) Third figure: the subject in both premises. 
Then Aristotle adds the odd claim that all syllogisms must fall into one or 
another of these three figures. But on combinatorial grounds alone it is clear that, 
no matter what Aristotle says, there is one further possibility: 
(d) Fourth figure: The middle is the predicate in the major 
premise, the subject in the minor. 
Aristotle recognized such syllogisms and actually gave examples of them, 
but for some mysterious reason did not think they merited a “figure” of their own. 
Other authors later were willing to grant a “fourth figure” for such cases. But 
some people resisted this. Theophrastus, for example, Aristotle’s successor in the 
Lyceum, redefined the first figure so that the middle term is the subject of one 
premise (not necessarily the major) and the predicate of the other premise (not 
                                                 
35 See John Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica Priora commentaria, Wallies, ed., p. 
67.27–29: “So we should use the following rule for the three figures, that the major is the term in 
predicate position in the conclusion, and the minor [is the term] in subject position in the conclu-
sion.” 
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necessarily the minor), and then counted syllogisms of kind (d) as belonging “in-
directly” to the first figure.36 Throughout the Middle Ages, most authors counted 
only three figures — or if they allowed a fourth, regarded it as only the first figure 
with the premises reversed.37 
iii.  Syllogistic Moods and the Theory of Reduction 
All right, now do a little mathematics. With three propositions, each of 
which may take on one of the four basic categorical forms (A, E, I, or O), there 
are 43 = 64 possible forms of syllogisms in each figure, for a grand total of 256 
possible forms in all four figures combined. These forms are called moods. 
Among them, there are six valid moods in each figure, for a total of twenty-four 
valid moods in all. Some of them can be derived from others by “subalternating” 
the conclusion. Thus, if there is a valid mood with an A-form conclusion, the 
same two premises will also yield a valid syllogism with the corresponding I-
form conclusion. (So too of course for E-form with respect to O-form conclu-
sions.) These “subalternate” moods were apparently first discussed by Ariston of 
Alexandria (c. 50 BC)38; Aristotle doesn’t mention them at all. 
The valid moods, under their mediaeval mnemonic names (which I will 
explain in a moment), are listed below (I have flagged the subalternate moods 
with a dagger (†): 
First figure: Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Barbari†, 
Celaront†. 
Second figure: Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, Cesa-
ro†, Camestrop†. 
Third figure: Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton, Bocardo, 
Ferison. 
Fourth figure: Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fre-
sison, Camenop†.39 
Now, what about these bizarre names? Well, there is a lot of information 
encoded in the seemingly nonsensical syllables. First, the sequence of vowels in 
                                                 
36 See Łukasiewicz, Aristotle’s Syllogistic, p. 97. 
37 For how it was possible to make this work out, see Ivo Thomas’ (the translator’s) note 
to Bocheński, A History of Formal Logic, p. 216. 
38 See Patzig, Aristotle’s Theory of the Syllogism, p. 130 n. 29. The relevant text is trans-
lated in Bocheński, A History of Formal Logic, p. 140 (§ 24.27). 
39 When the fourth figure moods were regarded as indirect moods of the first figure, they 
had different names: Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum. See Bird, Syllogistic 
And Its Extensions, p. 23 n. 13. Bird gives no alternative name for the subalternate mood Ca-
menop, and I do not know of one in actual use. But I suggest ‘Celantop’, which fits the pattern 
described below. Note also that these names were not entirely fixed in the Middle Ages. 
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the mnemonic name40 gives the sequence of categorical forms in the mood, in the 
order: major, minor, conclusion. Thus, the name ‘Celarent’ tells us that it is the 
name of a valid syllogism with an E-form major, an A-form minor, and an E-form 
conclusion. (It also happens to be in the first figure, but the name itself won’t tell 
you that.) 
With two exceptions (described below), valid moods not in the first figure 
can be shown to be valid if we assume the four non-subalternate moods of the 
first figure as axioms. This is done by “reducing” those other moods to one of the 
four axiomatic first-figure moods. And what is a “reduction”? It is an argument 
showing, by the rules of conversion described on pp. 18–19 above, together with 
one of the four axiomatic first-figure syllogisms, that the mood in question (the 
one to be “reduced”) is valid. The procedure for reducing to the first figure is also 
secretly there in the mnemonic names. Here is the key to unpacking it: (a) The 
initial letter of the mnemonic name is the same as the initial letter of the axiomatic 
first-figure mood to which the syllogism is to be reduced. For example, Darapti 
will be reduced to Darii. (b) The letter ‘s’ after a vowel (but not as the last letter 
of the name) means: Convert the corresponding proposition simply (that is, the 
proposition going with that vowel). (c) The letter ‘p’ after a vowel (but not as the 
last letter of the name) means: Convert the corresponding proposition per ac-
cidens. (d) When ‘s’ or ‘p’ occurs as the final letter in a name, it means that the 
conclusion of the first figure syllogism (the “target” of the reduction) must be 
converted simply or per accidens, respectively. (e) The letter ‘m’ indicates that in 
performing the reduction you should change (= mutare) the order of the premises. 
(You only have to do that if you want the major premise to come first in the “tar-
get” syllogism.) (f) Unless it is the first letter of a name (when it means that the 
mood can be reduced to Celarent), the letter ‘c’ means that the syllogism cannot 
be directly reduced to the first figure, and must be given an indirect or reductio 
proof. (This is good old reductio ad absurdum. Do not confuse it with "reduction" 
in the syllogistic sense we are now defining.) The conclusion of the new syllo-
gism will contradict (hence the ‘c’) the premise the mnemonic vowel for which is 
followed by ‘c’ in the name. (There are two moods like this; they are the two ex-
ceptions mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph. See below for a further 
explanation.) (g) The letters ‘b’ and ‘d’ (unless they are the first letters in a name, 
where they indicate the “target” mood in the first figure), and the letters ‘l’, ‘n’, 
‘t’, and ‘r’ serve only to make the name more beautiful and agreeable to the ear. 
For example, take Camestres in the second figure. It is of the form: 
    Every C is B. 
    No A is B. 
      ∴ No A is C. 
                                                 
40 Or the first three vowels, in the case of the longer names listed in n. 39 above. Note 
that, in those longer names, the fourth vowel and anything after that are irrelevant to performing 
the “reductions” described below. 
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The first letter of the name is ‘C’. So we are going to reduce Camestres to 
Celarent in the first figure. Begin by reversing the premises (because of the letter 
‘m’ in the name ‘Camestres’): 
    No A is B. 
    Every C is B. 
      ∴ No A is C. 
Next convert the E-form premise simply (because of the ‘s’ after the first 
‘e’ in ‘Camestres’). Now that we have reversed the premises, the E-form one is 
the first premise. Thus: 
    No B is A. 
    Every C is B. 
      ∴ No A is C. 
The ‘t’ and the ‘r’ in the name are there just for fun. The final ‘s’ means 
that we have to convert the conclusion simply. This gives us: 
    No B is A. 
    Every C is B. 
      ∴ No C is A. 
And that, gentle reader, is a first figure syllogism in Celarent, as you can 
verify for yourselves. Hence given Celarent as axiomatic, and given the rule of 
simple conversion, the premises of Camestres validly imply its conclusion. (We 
also reversed the premises, but that was only for looks.) 
Now that you’ve seen an example written out in full, let me give you two 
further examples in more abbreviated form. Let ‘s’ be the minor term (the subject 
of the conclusion), ‘p’ the major term (the predicate of the conclusion), and ‘m’ 
the middle term. Then here is a syllogism in Camestrop (second figure): Every p 
is m; no s is m; therefore, some s is not p. Abbreviate this: Apm; Esm; therefore, 
Osp. The ‘m’ in the name ‘Camestrop’ means: Reverse the order of the premises. 
Thus, we get: Esm; Apm; therefore, Osp. The ‘s’ in the name means: Convert the 
E-premise simply. Thus: Ems; Apm; therefore, Osp. The premises of this syllo-
gism yield the conclusion Eps in Celarent, the “target”-mood of the first figure. 
The final ‘p’ in the name ‘Camestrop’ tells us to convert the conclusion given by 
Celarent per accidens. So, converting Eps per accidens, we get Osp, which is the 
conclusion of our original syllogism. 
For our last example, consider Datisi (third figure): Amp; Ims; therefore, 
Isp. Convert the minor simply: Amp; Ism; therefore, Isp. This holds in Darii, in 
the first figure. That one was easy. 
The two exceptional cases that cannot be directly reduced in this way to 
the first figure are Baroco (second figure) and Bocardo (third figure). Note the 
‘c’s in their names. Since both begin with the letter ‘B’, they will both be “re-
duced” to Barbara in the first figure, although this new or “indirect” kind of re-
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duction involves more than what we have seen so far. Here is the technique: As-
sume the A-form premise (that is, the major premise in Baroco, the minor in Bo-
cardo). Next, assume the contradictory of the conclusion. These two assumptions 
will serve as the premises of a syllogism in Barbara with a conclusion con-
tradicting the O-form premise of the original syllogism. Hence, given the prem-
ises of the original syllogism, the contradictory of the conclusion must be false, 
and so the original conclusion must be true. Q. E. D. Note that there is no “con-
version” involved in these two exceptional cases. The proofs rely on Barbara and 
reductio ad absurdum alone.41 
This elaborate system of “reducing” the other moods directly or indirectly 
to the first figure (although not of course the names of the moods, which were a 
mediaeval contribution) represents the first deductive system in the history of 
logic. And it is a truly amazing accomplishment indeed! 
The following Latin verse lists the valid non-subalternate moods accord-
ing to which figure they are in: 
Bárbara, Célarént, Darií, Ferióque prióris. 
Césare, Cámestrés, Festíno, Baróco secúndae. 
Tértia Dáraptí, Disámis, Datísi, Felápton, 
Bocárdo, Feríson habét. Quárta ínsuper áddit 
Brámantíp, Camenés, Dimáris, Fesápo, Fresíson. 
Augustus De Morgan once remarked that these words were “more full of 
meaning than any that were ever made.”42 The classicists among you will surely 
have noticed right away that the verse scans in dactylic hexameter, but for the rest 
of you I have marked the scansion with acute accents.43 Note also that, while the 
names of the various moods do contain much information, they do not give you 
any way by themselves to determine which figure the mood is in, and so no way 
to reconstruct the actual form of the syllogism. For that, you need some other kind 
of mnemonic help, like the little verse above, which was supposed to be memo-
rized.44 
                                                 
41 Please observe why it is that these two moods cannot be “reduced” in the normal way. 
They both contain an O-form conclusion and one O-form premise, and O-form propositions can-
not be converted either simply or per accidens (see p. 18 above). Furthermore, the other premise 
in each case is an A-form proposition, and A-forms cannot be converted simply but only per ac-
cidens, into I-forms. Thus the normal method of reduction, which proceeds in terms of conversion 
(and sometimes reversing the order of the premises, which never matters), allows only one thing 
to do: convert the A-form premise. In that case all three propositions in the syllogism are particu-
lar in quantity. But it is a general fact about syllogistic reasoning that at least one of the premises 
must be universal in quantity. Hence the usual kind of “reduction” won’t work. (See also n. 31 
above.) 
42 See De Morgan, Formal Logic, p. 130. No doubt he meant “than any other that were 
ever made,” but let’s not quibble. 
43 Bird, Syllogistic And Its Extensions, p. 23, gives a somewhat different scansion, but I 
suspect it’s misprinted. In any case, I can’t figure it out as he has it. 
44 Earlier versions of such verses may be found in William of Sherwood, Introduction to 
Logic, Kretzmann, trans., p. 66 (= Grabmann, ed., p. 55; Lohr, ed., § 3.2 lines 4–7, p. 246); Lam-
bert of Auxerre, Logica, Alessio, ed., p. 118; and Peter of Spain, Tractatus (= Summulae logi-
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There were some mediaeval disagreements about the details of the set-up 
sketched above. Don’t be too concerned over these disputes, but be prepared to 
find people saying things that don’t conform to the terminology as defined above. 
3.  Last Words About Aristotle and a Few About 
Theophrastus 
There is much more that could be said about Aristotle. For example, he in-
vented modal logic. But we will not be talking about those other topics in any de-
tail in this book. And, you will be relieved to hear, we will not be saying anything 
more about syllogistic. 
Oddly enough, Aristotle, who gave us such a detailed and elaborate theory 
of the syllogism, seems not to have been interested at all in inference-patterns that 
hold for propositions of any form whatever. For example: 
    If A then B. 
    But A. 
    Therefore, B. 
Here, the ‘A’ and the ‘B’ are not place-holders for terms, but rather for 
whole propositions — and not just for special categorical propositions either, but 
for any statements at all. 
Aristotle did not study this latter kind of logical rule — that is, he did not 
develop any systematic propositional logic — although of course he used many 
such rules implicitly in his reasoning, much as Zeno had used logical rules of in-
ference without studying them in their own right. 
Such rules of propositional logic were, however, studied by Theophras-
tus.45 They were called hypothetical syllogisms, even though of course they were 
not syllogisms at all in the original Aristotelian sense of the word. They belonged 
to what we would call propositional logic. 
Despite Theophrastus, for reasons we shall see in a little while, the study 
of propositional logic, as opposed to term-logic, never caught on very much in 
Peripatetic circles. The Peripatetics tended to downplay it, and to focus instead on 
term-logic — the syllogistic, or roughly what we would call quantification theory 
in a very limited form. 
C.  Stoic Logic 
Let us turn now to Stoic logic. Probably the best single source you can 
read on this topic is the little book by Benson Mates entitled Stoic Logic. You can 
                                                                                                                                     
cales), De Rijk, ed., p. 52 (= Peter of Spain, Language in Dispute, p. 46). These authors will be 
discussed below. All come from the thirteenth century. 
45 At least such work is credited to him. We don’t have any of it. 
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find more recent work; in fact, you can find quite a lot of it.46 But Mates’ book is 
quite easy to get into, and makes for very interesting reading — both philosophi-
cally and in terms of “lore and gossip” about the Stoics, who were a very odd 
bunch indeed and about whom there is a lot of “lore and gossip” that deserves to 
be repeated, whether it is all true or not. 
The term ‘Stoic logic’ really refers to the logical doctrines of two quite 
distinct groups of people. (The groups were distinct, even though their logical 
views were more or less in the same tradition.) 
The first group was the so called Megarians — the followers of Euclid 
(= Euclides) of Megara (c. 430–c. 360 BC),47 who was a pupil of Socrates. (He is 
not to be confused with the Euclid who came up with Euclidean geometry, who 
was a different person altogether.) The “Megarians” who are relevant for logic 
are: 
(a) Eubulides — a pupil of Euclides, and reputed (in some cir-
cles at least) to have been the original discoverer of the 
Liar Paradox.48 
                                                 
46 See especially Frede, Die Stoische Logik, and the papers collected in Les Stoïciens et 
leur logique. 
47 For the dates throughout this section, I am relying on Lejewski, “Ancient Logic.” 
48 The attribution is found in Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum II, 108: “Eubulides 
the Milesian belongs to Euclides’ school. He raised many arguments in dialectic: the Liar, the 
Unnoticed, Electra, the [Man] in a Veil, the Heap, the Horns, the Bald Head.” (See the Hicks 
translation, vol. 2, p. 237. Do not worry about identifying all these puzzles. But do note that “the 
Heap” — Greek “Σωρίτης” = “Sorites” = “heap of corn” — is the puzzle behind much of the 
modern discussion of “vague predicates.”) The claim that Eubulides invented the Liar Paradox is 
repeated in Kneale and Kneale, The Development of Logic, p. 114. Besides the passage in Dio-
genes Laertius, they also give two references to Cicero at p. 114 n. 2. But the first, to De divina-
tione II, 4.11 (see Falconer, trans., pp. 381 & 383), merely mentions the paradox (along with the 
“Heap”) without stating it: “But how you might resolve the ‘Liar’, which they call the 
‘ψευδόμενον ’, or how you might refute the ‘Sorites’ (which, if necessary, one can call by the 
Latin word ‘acervalis’ [= heaped up] — but there is no need, for like ‘philosophy’ and many 
[other] Greek words, ‘Sorites’ is in common circulation in Latin speech), these too are for the dia-
lectician to say, not the diviner.” The second Ciceronian passage, Academica II, 96 (see Rackham, 
trans., pp. 387, 589, & 591) does formulate the paradox pretty explicitly: 
Surely it is the [very] foundation of dialectic that whatever is uttered — 
they call it an ‘ἀζίωμα ’, which is so to speak a ‘proposition’ — is either true 
or false. But then are [propositions like] these true or false: ‘If you say you are 
lying, and say that truly, you are lying’? You people say these [propositions] are 
‘inexplicable’, which is worse than what we call ‘uncomprehended’ and ‘unper-
ceived’. 
But I pass over this, and ask: If these cannot be explained and no ver-
dict is [to be] found for them so that you can answer whether they are true or 
false, then what happens to the definition ‘A proposition is what is either true or 
false’? When facts are assumed, let me add that some things are supposed to fol-
low from them while others, which are contrary in kind, are to be rejected. So 
how do you judge the following to be argued: ‘If you say it is now light and 
speak the truth, it is light; but you do say it is now light and do speak the truth; 
therefore, it is light’? Of course you test the form [of the argument] and say it is 
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(b) Diodorus Cronus (4th century BC). 
(c) Philo of Megara, his pupil. 
The latter two were especially significant for logic. We will discuss some 
of their doctrines in a moment. 
The second group of people referred to when we talk about “Stoic logic” 
is the Stoics proper (actually, the “Early” or “Old” Stoics — there was a later 
Stoic movement that we’re not interested in here). In particular: 
(d) Zeno of Chition (c. 336–c. 265 BC), the founder of the 
school. He is not to be confused with Zeno the Eleatic, who 
came up with Zeno’s Paradoxes. That was a much earlier 
man. 
(b) Cleanthes, his successor as head of the school. 
(c) Chrysippus (c. 279–206 BC). 
Chrysippus especially was a logician of immense stature. He is compara-
ble in importance to (and perhaps even better than) Aristotle himself. 
By a very odd twist of fate, all the original works of what we call “Stoic 
logic” are now lost. Not a single one remains in anything but the most fragmen-
tary quotations by other authors. I regard this fact as something of a historical 
mystery. What happened to these works? Why did they all disappear? Chrysippus, 
in particular, was tremendously prolific. (Diogenes Laertius reports that he wrote 
more than 705 works, although not all of them were in logic.49) But it is all gone 
now, and seems to have been gone since late antiquity. Certainly no mediaeval 
                                                                                                                                     
quite correctly argued. And so in your teaching you offer it as the “first mode of 
argumentation.” [See p. 31, below, on the five Stoic “indemonstrables.”] There-
fore, either you will approve of whatever is argued the same way, or else this art 
[of dialectic] is null and void. So see whether you approve of this conclusion: ‘If 
you say you are lying and speak the truth, you are lying; but you do say you are 
lying and do speak the truth; therefore, you are lying.’ How can you not approve 
of this, since you approved the earlier [argument] of the same form? 
These [problems] come from Chrysippus, but he did not solve them. 
For what would he do with this argument: ‘If it is light, it is light; but it is light; 
therefore, it is light’? Of course he would grant it. For the very structure of the 
[conditional] link, since you granted the former [part], forces you to grant the 
latter. So how does this differ from the other argument: ‘If you are lying, you 
are lying; but you are lying; therefore, you are lying’? You deny you are unable 
to accept or reject the former [argument]; so why the latter any the more? If art, 
if reason, if method, if in short the force of the argument is valid, it is the same 
in both cases. But they go so far as to demand that there be an exception for 
these “inexplicables.” 
Note that neither text from Cicero says anything at all about Eubulides. 
49 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum VII, 180, Long ed., pp. 378–379 lines 25–26: 
“He was so famous in dialectic that people thought if there were dialectic among the gods, it 
would be none other than Chrysippus’. While [he wrote on] an inordinate number of topics, his 
style did not go well. He was the most hard-working of anyone, as is clear from the collection of 
his writings. For they are more than seven hundred five in number.” (Compare the Hicks transla-
tion, vol. 2, p. 289.)  
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author shows any first-hand knowledge of their writings. (For one thing, they 
were in the wrong language, since the mediaeval Latins had in effect forgotten 
their Greek.) 
What we do know about Stoic logic comes second-hand, from people like: 
(a) Diogenes Laertius, whom we have met before. He was the 
third-century AD “doxographer,” who is not always to be 
trusted, but who is invaluable anyway. 
(b) Sextus Empiricus, likewise from the third century AD, 
whom we have also met before. Unlike Diogenes, Sextus 
was not just out to write droll stories about dead philoso-
phers. He was writing philosophical works of his own. Sex-
tus was an opponent of the Stoics, but was on the whole a 
fair and accurate reporter of their views. 
1.  General Characteristics of Stoic Logic 
(1) Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics — I will use this term for present pur-
poses to refer to both the Megarians and the Stoics proper — were not so inter-
ested in demonstration as Aristotle was. They were more concerned with fallacies 
and paradoxes, with refutations and forms of disputation. Of course, Aristotle too 
had written about such things but, as we have seen, his interests gradually shifted 
more and more to his own special notion of science. The Stoics kept their inter-
ests focused on these topics, and developed their studies in these areas to a very 
high degree. 
(2) Again unlike the Peripatetics, the Stoics developed a propositional 
logic to the neglect of term logic. In fact, Theophrastus’ own discussion of so 
called “hypothetical” syllogisms was perhaps influenced by Megarian logic, al-
though that is not certain. 
(3) The Stoic logicians (actually, the Megarians mainly) studied at 
length the logical properties and defining features of various propositional opera-
tors — in particular, disjunction (they knew both inclusive and exclusive disjunc-
tion), implication and modality. 
2.  Particular Doctrines 
Let us look at a few points of doctrine in some of the main representatives 
of Stoic logic. 
a.  Diodorus Cronus 
First, let’s talk briefly about Diodorus Cronus. Diodorus was the origina-
tor of a very mysterious argument called the Master Argument. 
Chapter 2: Thumbnail Sketch of the History of Logic 
 29
According to Epictetus, who is our only good source for this,50 Diodorus’ 
Master Argument was an argument that the following three claims are jointly in-
consistent: 
(1) Everything true about the past is now necessary. (In other 
words, the past is now fixed and settled, and it’s too late to 
do anything about it.) This claim links time and modality in 
a way you may find odd if you are familiar only with the 
modern logical literature (and only a part of it, at that). 
Nevertheless, it is a perfectly legitimate notion. 
(2) The impossible does not follow from the possible. This one 
doesn’t give anyone much trouble. 
(3) There is something that is possible, and yet neither is nor 
will be true. In short, there are some possibilities that will 
never be realized, no matter how long you wait. 
Now Diodorus’ Master Argument, as I said, was an argument that those 
three theses are jointly inconsistent. That’s the conclusion of the argument. But, 
unfortunately, neither Epictetus nor anyone else bothers to tell us what Diodorus’ 
argument was for that conclusion. And it is certainly not obvious what it would 
be. 
Of course, as you might expect given such a situation, lots of people have 
tried to reconstruct what Diodorus’ argument “must have been.” Some of these 
attempts are better than others — either for their philosophical interest or for their 
historical persuasiveness. Among the more interesting ones, I refer you to the dis-
cussion by Arthur Prior.51 
 In any case, whatever his argument was for the joint incompatibility of 
(1)–(3), Diodorus himself was apparently unwilling to give up either (1) or (2). 
And so he rejected thesis (3), which of course was the only thing left he could do. 
That is, he accepted the opposite thesis, namely: 
Whatever is possible either is or is going to be true. 
This claim encapsulates what has come to be called Diodorean Modality, 
one of the ways of defining the modal notions of possibility and necessity in 
terms of time. 
Diodorus also had a view about the proper interpretation of the condi-
tional. According to Sextus Empiricus,52 Diodorus held that a true conditional ‘If 
                                                 
50 Epictetus, Dissertationes II, 19.1, Shenkl ed., p. 189.9–17 (see the Oldfather transla-
tion, vol. 1, p. 359): “The Master Argument appears to have been argued from premises such as 
the following. Since these three [claims] are in general inconsistent with one another: (1) every-
thing past is necessary, (2) the impossible does not follow from the possible, and (3) the possible 
is what neither is nor will be true, Diodorus (seeing this inconsistency), used the plausibility of the 
first two to establish that nothing is possible that neither is nor will be true.” 
51 Prior, Past, Present and Future, especially § 2. 
52 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos VIII, 115 (Opera, Mutschmann ed., vol. 2, 
p. 129 — see the Bury translation, vol. 2, p. 299): “But Diodorus says a hypothetical is true that 
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p then q’ was one that neither is nor ever was capable of having a true antecedent 
and a false consequent. Given the Diodorean notion of possibility (= capability) 
that we just saw, this amounts (as you can verify for yourself) to: one that at no 
time (past, present or future) has a true antecedent and a false consequent. 
In short, for Diodorus, a conditional isn’t sometimes true and sometimes 
false. If it is ever true, it is always true. Many mediaeval logicians also held this 
about conditionals. (Note that, given the Diodorean theory of modality, this 
means that all true conditionals are necessary. Some mediaeval logicians also 
accepted this consequence.) 
b.  Philo of Megara 
Now let’s look briefly at Philo of Megara. He had an altogether different 
view of conditionals. For Philo, again according to Sextus Empiricus,53 a condi-
tional is true if and only if it does not (present tense) have a true antecedent and a 
false consequent. This, of course, just amounts to our modern notion of material 
implication. And Sextus in fact even describes for us the truth table for material 
implication. He doesn’t give it in tabular form, but there is no doubt that this is 
what he is talking about. On Philo’s view, therefore, unlike Diodorus’, a condi-
tional may change its truth value. It may be sometimes true and sometimes false. 
On the whole, the Stoics adopted the Philonean notion of implication in prefer-
ence to the Diodorean. 
c.  Chrysippus 
Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics developed the study of propositional logic to a 
high degree. Instead of using letters of the alphabet as variables, they used ordinal 
numbers. Thus, instead of talking about p and q as we do today, or about α and β 
as Aristotle had done (for terms), they spoke of “the first” and “the second.” 
These were propositional variables. 
                                                                                                                                     
neither was nor is able to begin from a truth and end up with a falsehood.” This and other relevant 
passages from Sextus are cited and translated in a convenient appendix to Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 
95–112. On references to the Adversus mathematicos, see n. 12 above. 
53 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos VIII.113–114 (Opera, Mutschmann, ed., 
vol. 2, pp. 128–129 — see the Bury translation, vol. 2, p. 297): “For instance, Philo said a hypo-
thetical is true when it does not begin from a truth and end up with a falsehood. Thus a hypotheti-
cal is true in three says, according to him, but false in [only] one way. For when it begins with a 
truth and ends up with a truth, it is true. For example ‘If it is day it is light’. When it begins from a 
falsehood and ends up with a falsehood, it is true again. For example, ‘If the earth is flying, the 
earth has wings’. So too, one beginning from a falsehood and ending up with a truth is also true. 
For example, ‘If the earth is flying, the earth exists’. But in only one way is it false, [namely] 
when it begins from a truth and ends up with a falsehood, such as with ‘If it is day, it is night’. For 
in the daytime ‘It is day’, which was the antecedent, is true, but ‘It is night’, which was the conse-
quent, is false.” See also the comment at the end of n. 52 above. 
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Chrysippus in particular is well known for having taken five propositional 
inference forms as “indemonstrable” — as primitive or basic. Here they are54: 
(1) If the first, then the second; but the first; therefore, the sec-
ond. (This is of course just our familiar modus ponens.) 
(2) If the first, then the second; but not the second; therefore, 
not the first. (Modus tollens.) 
(3) Not both the first and the second; but the first; therefore, 
not the second. 
(4) Either the first or the second; but the first; therefore, not the 
second. (This presupposes an exclusive disjunction. Inclu-
sive disjunction was known but not generally used by the 
Stoics.) 
(5) Either the first or the second; but not the second; therefore, 
the first. (Disjunctive syllogism.) 
On the basis of these five basic inference patterns, Chrysippus went on to 
demonstrate many other, derived patterns. In fact, it appears that the Stoics 
claimed that in some sense these five schemata were “complete” insofar as all 
valid inference forms can be reduced to them. The claim appears dubious on the 
face of it (no it doesn’t — it appears just plain false), but really we don’t know 
enough about Stoic logic even to be confident what exactly this claim amounted 
to. 
That’s enough for now about the doctrines of these men. Let’s move on. 
D.  Late Antiquity 
The main differences between Peripatetic logic and Stoic logic were dif-
ferences of interest and emphasis, differences of focus and style — not primarily 
substantive disagreements over matters of doctrine. But at the time it appeared 
otherwise. Perhaps because of their real disagreements in other areas, the later 
Stoics and Peripatetics saw themselves in partisan terms as holding opposing 
theories in logic as well. It is perhaps for these partisan reasons that Theophras-
tus’ work on the hypothetical syllogism was never really very influential in the 
Peripatetic tradition. It may simply have looked “too Stoic.” 
This attitude led to some pretty alarming things. Some later Peripatetics, 
for instance, tried the bizarre project of showing that Stoic propositional logic was 
“really” just disguised syllogistic after all. Later on, an even worse thing hap-
pened. Certain broad-minded people, in an ecumenical spirit, tried to reconcile the 
opposing camps by showing that their two styles of logic were really the same 
thing. In other words, propositional logic and quantification theory are really the 
same in the end! 
                                                 
54 I am relying on Mates, Stoic Logic, particularly Ch. 5, throughout this discussion. See 
also Frede, Die stoische Logik. 
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As you can tell, we are no longer talking about one of Bocheński’s three 
“peak” periods in the history of logic. We are in a period of logical decline — not 
to say “torpor” — a period of derivative, eclectic work by people who didn’t 
really know what they were talking about. In fact, after Chrysippus, there wasn’t 
much of any major logical importance done in Greek ever again. 
Nevertheless, during this period of late antiquity there were a number of 
authors who did serve to transmit some of the ancient logical doctrine to the Latin 
Middle Ages. You should at least know the following names: 
(1) Cicero (106–43 BC). He introduced many Latin translations 
for technical Greek terms. His vocabulary is not always the 
one that was adopted in the end; but he did make it possible 
for the Latin world to talk about logical matters — and, for 
that matter, philosophical matters generally — in a lan-
guage that had not previously had any real vocabulary to do 
it with. He also wrote a Topics that had some influence in 
the Latin logical tradition later on. It is quite different from 
Aristotle’s work of the same name. In addition, Cicero talks 
about Stoic logic on several occasions, and so is one of the 
precious few sources for our knowledge of that.55 
(2) Apuleius, who wrote a De interpretatione in Latin as the 
third book of his De dogmate Platonis (= On Plato’s 
Teaching), sometime in the second century AD.56 He too is 
one of our sources for the Stoics. 
(3) Then there is the Greek author Galen (129–c. 199 AD — all 
these dates will be AD from now on),57 who is primarily 
known for his medical writings. Nevertheless, he also 
wrote an Introduction to Logic that still survives and is of 
some interest.58 Galen was of the opinion that the study of 
medicine should include a thorough grounding in mathe-
matics and logic.59 This salutary advice was taken to heart 
                                                 
55 See, for example, n. 48 above. 
56 Edited and translated in Londey and Johanson. This De interpretatione is also some-
times called the De philosophia rationali (= On Rational Philosophy). Its authenticity was re-
jected in Kneale and Kneale, The Development of Logic, p. 182. (They are not the only ones to 
have doubted it.) Nevertheless, the view accepted nowadays seems to have been given by Sulli-
van, Apuleian Logic, pp. 9–14. He reviews the question carefully and decides there is no good 
reason to doubt the attribution to Apuleius. Kneale and Kneale wrote in 1962, while Sullivan’s 
book was published in 1967. Ebbesen, “Ancient Scholastic Logic As the Source for Medieval 
Scholastic Logic,” p. 106, testifies that Sullivan’s conclusion still stands. Londey and Johanson 
agree, but add further arguments (pp. 11–19). 
57 On Galen, see Gilbert, “Galen.” 
58 There is an English translation by John Spangler Kieffer. See Galen, Galen’s Institutio 
Logica. 
59 The view is perhaps not so odd as it sounds at first. Galen wanted medicine to be a sci-
ence, a theoretically organized discipline, not just an art, a more or less haphazard collection of 
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and actually put into practice in the Arab world60 and, 
through the Arabs, later on in the Latin West. It is for this 
reason that today one often finds mediaeval logical manu-
scripts and copies of early printed editions of mediaeval 
logical works in various old medical libraries.61 You will 
sometimes still hear it said that Galen was the one who 
“discovered” the fourth figure of the Aristotelian syllogism. 
But in fact he held there are three and only three figures.62 
(4) In the late second and early third century, we have Sextus 
Empiricus, whom we have met several times already. He 
wrote in Greek, and is our best source of information about 
Stoic logic — and lots of other things.63 
(5) Also Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 200), one of the all-
time great commentators on Aristotle. He too wrote in 
Greek.64 
(6) Porphyry of Tyre (c. 232–before 306),65 the pupil and biog-
rapher of Plotinus, wrote a work in Greek called Isagoge 
(= Introduction), which was intended as an introduction to 
Aristotle’s Categories. This work was destined to have a 
tremendous influence later on in the Latin Middle Ages — 
mainly with respect to the problem of universals. But, since 
it was an introduction to what was regarded as a logical 
work of Aristotle’s, it was read in that light as well.66 
Note that, with the exception of Cicero and Apuleius, all the works men-
tioned so far were in Greek — as, of course, were the original writings of the 
classical logicians themselves, both Aristotelians and Stoics. Now Greek gradu-
ally came to be forgotten in the Latin West as education declined, so that later 
Latin authors had to rely on translations and secondary reports for their knowl-
edge of ancient logic. 
                                                                                                                                     
practical skills. Think of the connection we still draw today between logic and the philosophy and 
methodology of science. For a discussion, see Frede, “On Galen’s Epistemology.” 
60 See Rescher, The Development of Arabic Logic, pp. 16, 38, 40, 53. 
61 Perhaps the influence of Galen is still with us; until recently, the School of Nursing at 
Indiana University required a course in elementary logic of all its students. This is a practice for 
which I can find no earthly reason whatever, if not the wise influence of Galen. 
62 The point is discussed in Kneale and Kneale, The Development of Logic, pp. 183–184. 
They also provide a plausible account of how this scurrilous story arose. See also Lejewski, “An-
cient Logic,” p. 520, and Łukasiewicz, Aristotle’s Syllogistic, pp. 38–40. 
63 On Sextus generally, see Hallie, “Sextus Empiricus.” 
64 On Alexander, see Lloyd, “Alexander of Aphrodisias.” 
65 See Lloyd, “Porphyry.” He says (p. 411) Porphyry “died some time in the first six 
years of the fourth century.” 
66 There is a translation by Edward W. Warren in Porphyry, Isagoge. But I have pro-
duced my own translation, which of course I like better. See Spade, Five Texts on the Mediaeval 
Problem of Universals, pp. 1–19. 
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Among these Latin translators and “transmitters,” you should know the 
following names: 
(7) Marius Victorinus, in the fourth century. Victorinus was a 
neo-Platonist who influenced Augustine. He wrote Latin 
translations of Aristotle’s Categories and De interpreta-
tione, and of Porphyry’s Isagoge. In addition, he wrote 
some treatises of his own, including a Commentary on 
Cicero’s Topics, an On Hypothetical Syllogisms, and an On 
Definitions. The last is the only one to have survived to the 
present day. Victorinus seems to have had little direct influ-
ence on the main Latin logical tradition, although perhaps 
he cannot be ignored.67 
(8) Then there is St. Augustine (354–430), arguably the most 
important and influential thinker of all time — although not 
in logic especially. There is a little work called De dialec-
tica attributed to him, although there has been some doubt 
about its authenticity. The work is of no great theoretical 
significance, but it is interesting for its evidence of Stoic 
influences. There is a recent Latin edition and English 
translation of it.68 There is also a work called The Ten 
Categories (= Decem categoriae) that was once attributed 
to Augustine, but it is a reworked translation of a Greek 
compendium of Aristotle’s Categories. It comes from the 
late fourth century.69 
(9) In the late fifth century, we come to one Martianus Capella, 
who wrote highly allegorical (and, alas, now sadly ne-
glected) On the Marriage of Philology and Mercury which 
contains a Book IV “On the Art of Dialectic.” This is really 
wild stuff, but nevertheless it served as one of the few pre-
cious sources of information for later people.70 
                                                 
67 On Victorinus, see Hadot, “Marius Victorinus,” and Hadot’s “Introduction” to Marius 
Victorinus, Traités théologiques sur la Trinité. 
68 See Augustine, De dialectica, Pinborg, ed., & Jackson, trans. 
69 See Ebbesen, “Ancient Scholastic Logic as the Source of Medieval Scholastic Logic,” 
p. 106, and the reference in n. 13 there. There is a critical edition of this text in the series Aristo-
teles Latinus, vol. I.1–5. The text has not been translated into English, so far as I know. 
70 The critical edition is by James Willis. There is an English translation in Stahl, Mar-
tianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts, vol. 2. 
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E.  Boethius 
The first really important figure in mediaeval logic is Boethius (c. 480–
524/525).71 Boethius was an extremely powerful and wealthy man, and held an 
office in the Roman government of his day loosely comparable to that of “Prime 
Minister” today. This is the same Boethius who was later jailed for treason (he 
claimed he was framed) and wrote the famous Consolation of Philosophy right 
before he was executed. 
Boethius knew Greek quite well, and set himself the impressive goal of 
translating all of Plato and all of Aristotle into Latin, writing commentaries on all 
that material, and then writing a work showing that they really said the same 
thing.72 Unfortunately, he did not live to complete this lofty task. 
In fact, except for the first half of the Timaeus, which was well known in 
the twelfth century, and except for a few other translations that had almost no cir-
culation whatever, the Middle Ages had no direct knowledge of Plato at all. Al-
most everything people knew about Plato in the Middle Ages was second-hand. It 
wasn’t until the Renaissance that the whole Platonic corpus was available to the 
Latin world. In particular, Boethius himself appears not to have translated any 
Plato, despite his good intentions. 
He did, however, translate73: 
(1) Aristotle’s Categories.74 
                                                 
71 I give the standard (although rather indefinite) date for his death. But Coster, The Iudi-
cum Quinquevirale, pp. 53–54, argues plausibly that it occurred in 526. The exact date is of some 
importance for figuring out the circumstances of Boethius’ death, but is not crucial for us. 
72 See Boethius, Commentarii in librum Περὶ ἑρμηνείας Aristotelis pars posterior, 
Meiser, ed., p. 79 line 9–p. 80 line 6: “If the more powerful favor of divinity grants it to me, this is 
[my] firm purpose: Although those people were very great talents whose labor and study trans-
lated into the Latin tongue much of what we are now treating, nevertheless they did not bring it 
into any kind of order or shape or in its arrangement to the level of the [scholarly] disciplines. 
[Hence I propose] that I turn all of Aristotle’s work — [or] whatever [of it] comes into my hands 
— into the Latin style and write commentaries in the Latin language on all of it, so that if anything 
of the subtlety of the logical art was written down by Aristotle, of the weightiness of moral 
knowledge, of the cleverness of the truth of physical matters, I will translate it and even illuminate 
it with a kind of ‘light’ of commentary. [Then,] translating all of Plato’s dialogues or even com-
menting [on them], I will bring them into Latin form. Once all this is done, I will not fail to bring 
the views of Aristotle and Plato together into a kind of harmony and show that they do not, as 
most people [think], disagree about everything but rather agree on most things, especially in phi-
losophy.” 
73 The Latin texts of Boethius’ logical works are all published in Migne, ed., Patrologiae 
cursus completus … series latina, vol. 64. (I won’t bother to cite Migne separately for each work 
listed below.) The texts there should be used with caution. I have referred below to later and more 
reliable editions where I know of them. 
74 Edited in Aristoteles Latinus, vol. I.1–5. Two redactions of Boethius’ translation are 
edited there, together with other mediaeval translations. (In general, the various volumes of the 
Aristoteles Latinus often contain several versions of a given text.) 
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(2) Aristotle’s De interpretatione,75 and 
(3) Porphyry’s Isagoge.76 
Note that these are the same three texts already translated by Victorinus a 
century or so earlier. It is important to realize that these three texts are the only 
original texts of Greek logic — in fact, almost the only original texts of Greek 
philosophy as a whole — that were generally available to the Latin West until the 
twelfth century. This is a tremendously important fact for the history of Western 
thought. 
Boethius also seems to have translated the other works in the Organon 
(except perhaps for the Posterior Analytics), but the fate of those translations is 
obscure; they did not circulate widely until much later.77 
In addition to his translations, Boethius wrote a number of logical treatises 
of his own. These are, first of all, a commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, which is no 
longer extant. There may have been a commentary on the Posterior Analytics, but 
if so it has not survived and did not have any influence.78 The same goes for a 
possible (incomplete) commentary on the Prior Analytics.79 
More important were80: 
(4) A commentary on the Categories. 
(5) Two commentaries on the De interpretatione.81 After he 
had finished his first commentary, Boethius later decided 
he had more to say. 
(6) Two commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge.82 The first of 
these commentaries was “based on” Victorinus’ translation 
of the work, but the second one was based on Boethius’ 
own translation. It is not clear just how much of Victorinus 
is preserved in the first commentary. 
(7) A work called Introduction to Categorical Syllogisms, in 
two books. 
                                                 
75 Edited in Aristoteles Latinus, vol. II.1–2. Also edited in Boethius, Commentarii in li-
brum Περὶ ἑρμηνείας Aristotelis pars prior, Meiser, ed., pp. 3–28. 
76 Edited in Aristoteles Latinus, vol. I.6–7. See also Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii 
commenta, Brandt, ed., which contains Boethius’ translation interspersed with his commentary. 
77 See Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus,” pp. 53–54. The texts are edited in Aristoteles Latinus, 
vols. III.1–4 (Prior Analytics), V.1–3 (Topics), and VI.1–3 (Sophistical Refutations). The question 
whether Boethius translated the Posterior Analytics is perhaps not yet finally settled. De Rijk, “On 
the Chronology of Boethius’ Works on Logic,” II, p. 154, says there are “serious grounds” to say 
yes; but Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus,” p. 53, has doubts. 
78 See Ebbesen, “Manlius Boethius on Aristotle’s Analytica Posteriora.” 
79 See the discussion in Obertello, Severino Boezio, vol. 1, pp. 230–232. 
80 See Chadwick, Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy; 
Gibson, Boethius: His Life, Thought, and Influence; and Obertello, Severino Boezio. 
81 Critical edition in Boethius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, 
Meiser, ed. 
82 Critical edition in Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta, Brandt, ed. 
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(8) A work On Categorical Syllogisms. The relation between 
this work and the preceding one is not certain. It has been 
conjectured that the Introduction to Categorical Syllogisms 
is an earlier version of On Categorical Syllogisms, either in 
whole or in part.83 
(9) A work On Division.84 
(10) On Hypothetical Syllogisms.85 
(11) A Commentary on Cicero’s Topics.86 (Cicero’s Topics is 
quite a different thing from Aristotle’s work of the same 
name, as the following entry will show you.) 
(12) On Topical Differences.87 That is, on the differences be-
tween Aristotle’s Topics and Cicero’s Topics.) 
The translations (1)–(3), and Boethius’ own original works (4)–(12), to-
gether constitute what later came to be called the “logica vetus” (= “Old Logic”). 
Some of the works were more influential than others. But basically, everything 
the Middle Ages knew about logic was contained in these books, up to the middle 
of the twelfth century. 
F.  The Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries 
After Boethius, basically nothing happened in logic — or at least nothing 
very noteworthy and good — until the eleventh century. Historians have noted 
that, with the turn of the millennium in 1000, there was a kind of “reawakening” 
of Europe. The Germanic tribes had settled down, the Vikings had pretty much 
stopped marauding and had become respectable. Trade began to pick up, cities 
began to grow, cathedrals began to be built. Culture began to revive too. There 
was a new interest in law and theology, and particularly in the use of reasoning or 
dialectic in theology.  
Theology was in effect being reshaped during this period. It became less 
and less a matter of Scriptural exegesis, and more and more a matter of theoriz-
                                                 
83 See the discussion in De Rijk, “On the Chronology of Boethius’ Works on Logic,” I, 
pp. 6–44. De Rijk (p. 31) regards the two as distinct works. 
84 See Loe, ed., B. Alberti Magni ord. praed. Commentarii in Librum Boethii de divi-
sione, which contains Boethius’ text as well as Albert the Great’s commentary on it. (Albert the 
Great lived from sometime before 1200 until 1280. He was a teacher of Thomas Aquinas. We will 
not have occasion to talk about him in this book, although he is an important and interesting figure 
in other respects.) Translated in Kretzmann and Stump, trans., The Cambridge Translations of 
Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, pp. 11–38. There is also an Italian translation by Pozzi in 
Boethius, Trattato sulla divisione. 
85 Critical edition, with Italian translation and commentary, in Boethius, De hypotheticis 
syllogismis, Obertello, ed. 
86 Edited by Orelli and Baiertus in Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica. Book I is also edited in 
Boethius, A Critical Edition of Boethius’ Commentary on Cicero’s Topica Bk. I, Perdamo ed. The 
whole text is translated by Stump in Boethius, Boethius’s In Ciceronis Topica. 
87 English translation by Stump in Boethius, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis. 
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ing.88 St. Anselm (1033–1109), for example, was an important figure in this re-
shaping process. This was not, of course, a change that took place without resis-
tance. 
Along with the new interest in the use of dialectic in theology, there came 
about also a new interest in dialectic in its own right. Anselm himself wrote a few 
logical things of some interest.89 
But the first really systematic logician of this period was Peter Abelard 
(1079–1142).90 Abelard was an astonishingly rich and original thinker — in logic 
and in lots of other areas as well. His achievement is all the more impressive once 
we realize that he basically had nothing more to work with than everyone else had 
had for the preceding 500 years: Aristotle’s Categories and De interpretatione 
and Porphyry’s Isagoge, together with the commentaries and other logical works 
of Boethius. 
But shortly after Abelard — and in fact, even while Abelard was still liv-
ing — new translations began to appear in Latin as part of the general “revival” of 
culture in the Latin West. In particular, the remaining works of Aristotle were 
gradually translated and began to circulate. Among the first of these was the rest 
of the Organon: The Prior and Posterior Analytics, the Topics and the Sophistic 
Refutations. Some of these had been previously translated by Boethius, but his 
translations had not circulated very widely and were effectively unknown. 
Collectively, these “new” logical works of Aristotle came to be called the 
“logica nova” (= “New Logic”), in contrast to the “logica vetus” or “Old Logic,” 
which included everything that had been previously generally available. 
G.  The Sophistic Refutations 
I want to focus now on the Aristotle’s Sophistic Refutations, the last work 
in the usual ordering of the Organon. This little work began to circulate in Latin 
translation sometime after about 1120,91 and its appearance was a crucial event in 
the history of mediaeval logic. Here’s why. 
Although the early Middle Ages did not have the Prior and Posterior Ana-
lytics in a generally available form, they knew about the syllogistic second-hand, 
                                                 
88 See, for instance, Evans, Old Arts and New Theology. 
89 Surely the most philosophically interesting of them is his dialogue De grammatico, 
which has been studied repeatedly by Desmond Paul Henry. See Henry, The De grammatico of St. 
Anselm; The Logic of St. Anselm; and Commentary on De grammatico. We will discuss this little 
dialogue later. (See Ch. 7, pp. 198–204, below.) Of less interest perhaps, but still definitely not to 
be ignored, are the “Philosophical Fragments” published by Schmitt, Ein neues unvollendetes 
Werk des hl. Anselm von Canterbury, and translated in Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. 
Anselm, Appendix I, pp. 215–245. The “Fragments” concern modal notions. They appear to have 
had no influence whatsoever. 
90 There is a large and deservedly growing literature on Abelard. Since he is really before 
the time we will be mainly discussing in this book, I won’t say much about him. But if you want 
to know more, see Tweedale, “Abelard and the Culmination of the Old Logic” and the references 
there. 
91 See Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus,” p. 46. 
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through the writings of Boethius and others. When they finally did get the actual 
text of the Prior Analytics, there wasn’t much they could do with it. Aristotle had 
pretty much done it all. The syllogistic was — to use Kant’s phrase — a “closed 
and completed body of doctrine.” There was, of course, the stuff on the modal 
syllogistic in the later parts of the Prior Analytics. But the mediaevals were in no 
position to do much with that. (In fact, even today no one is really sure what Aris-
totle was doing there.) As for the Posterior Analytics, it was so difficult and ob-
scure that it wasn’t until a somewhat later generation that the mediaevals began to 
come to terms with it. And the Topics is such a random grab-bag that there wasn’t 
much to be done with it either.92 
But then there was the Sophistic Refutations. That was a completely dif-
ferent situation altogether. The Sophistic Refutations is a little “catalogue” of 
various kinds of fallacies and what to do about them. If you have ever looked at 
the work, it is obvious that it is very sketchy and incomplete. There are lots of fal-
lacies that are not treated, those that are treated there could have been organized 
differently, and so on. 
Unlike the Posterior Analytics, which took a lot of getting used to, the So-
phistic Refutations was relatively easy to get into and to understand. There was 
nothing especially obscure about it. And unlike the Prior Analytics, there was ob-
viously a lot of work that remained to be done. Moreover, the discovery and 
avoiding of fallacies was very important in theological matters, where you had to 
keep straight what you were saying about the Trinity, and about the two natures 
but one person in Christ, and so on. In short, the Sophistic Refutations was tailor-
made for the twelfth century to go to work on. And that is exactly what hap-
pened.93 
The Sophistic Refutations, and the study of fallacy that it generated, pro-
duced a whole new logical literature. There was, for instance, the sophismata lit-
erature — as we find illustrated in Buridan’s Sophismata, one of the works we 
will be discussing later on. And the theory of “supposition,” which we will also 
be discussing at great length later on, developed out of the study of fallacies.94 
In fact, whole new kinds of treatises came to be written on what were 
eventually called “the properties of terms” — semantic properties that were im-
portant in the study of fallacies. These treatises, and the logic contained in them, 
are the peculiarly mediaeval contribution to logic. It is primarily on these topics 
that mediaeval logicians exercised their best ingenuity. It’s not all about warmed-
over syllogistic, or about the square of opposition. The exciting new work was 
elsewhere, and that is the topic of this book. 
Such “new” treatises, and the logic contained in them, came eventually to 
be called the “logica moderna” (= “Modern Logic”) or “logica modernorum”95 
                                                 
92 Actually, that isn’t quite true. What was done with it is that it was gradually absorbed 
into the theory of consequence. See Stump, “Topics: Their Development and Absorption into 
Consequences.” 
93 The most important work on this period is undoubtedly De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, 
especially vol. 1. 
94 See De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, especially vol. 2. 
95 Hence the title of De Rijk’s monumental study. 
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(= “Logic of the Moderns”), or “Terminist” logic — because they talked so much 
about the “properties of terms.” 
These developments began to take place in the middle- to late-twelfth cen-
tury, and continued to the end of the Middle Ages. 
H.  The Thirteenth Century 
In the thirteenth century, the sophismata literature began to develop more 
and more. In addition, there are four especially important authors, all of them ac-
tive around the middle of the thirteenth century, whom you should know about: 
(1) Peter of Spain, who wrote an important work generally 
called Summulae logicales (but called simply Tractatus by 
its modern editor), probably sometime in the early 1230s.96 
It was used as a kind of handbook in certain later university 
contexts. John Buridan, for instance, used it as the basis for 
his own Summulae. (We will meet Buridan soon.) Peter 
also wrote a Syncategoremata.97 Later on in life, Peter of 
Spain rose all the way to the papacy, becoming Pope John 
XXI. He died in 1277 when, after the completion of some 
new construction he had ordered at the papal quarters in 
Viterbo (not Rome at that time), he was in residence there, 
minding his own business, and the roof collapsed on him.98 
                                                 
96 On the date of the work, see De Rijk’s edition, pp. xxxvii and lvii. On its title, see 
ibid., pp. xli–xlvi. I personally question whether the name ‘Tractatus’ (= Treatise, or perhaps plu-
ral Treatises) was ever really the title of this work. It seems to me equally plausible that it was just 
a kind of generic description. The work has been translated under the title Language in Dispute by 
Francis Dinneen. But readers of that translation may want first to consult E. J. Ashworth’s review 
of it. 
97 Edited by L. M. De Rijk, with an English translation by Joke Spruyt. They give the ti-
tle as “Syncategoreumata,” which does preserve one authentically mediaeval spelling, but seems 
to me to have little else to recommend it. 
98 This happened on May 14th. He lingered for about a week before he finally died of his 
injuries on the 20th. The story is found in Ricobaldo of Ferrara’s Historia Pontificum Roma-
norum, edited in Muratori, Rerum italicarum scriptores, vol. 9, col. 181 (but I have not seen this 
edition, and am translating from the quotation in De Rijk’s introduction to Peter of Spain, Trac-
tatus, p. xl, n. 7): “While he was rejoicing in the span of the long life he bragged would continue 
into the future [he was about seventy-five years old at the time], and while he was reading in a 
new room he had prepared in the palace at Viterbo, the palace collapsed with him in it. He sur-
vived bruised and all alone for five days among the timbers and stones. Fortified by the sacra-
ments of the Church, he passed away from this world and was buried at the church of Saint Law-
rence in Viterbo.” Another, even less flattering version of the story is told in an anonymous Lives 
of the Popes preserved in a fifteenth-century Bergamo manuscript (Biblioteca Civica, Delta IV, 
34), quoted in De Rijk’s introduction to Peter of Spain, Tractatus, p. xli, n. 7: “A stupid man, he 
promised himself a long life and for a long time proclaimed that he would win out over everyone. 
But behold! While he was throwing this foolishness around, a certain new room he had built in the 
palace at Viterbo suddenly collapsed. He was found among the timbers and stones, [and] after 
receiving all the sacraments of the Church he died seven days after this cave-in, during the eighth 
month of his pontificate.” (I assume the difference between this and the preceding account on 
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(2) Roger Bacon, who wrote a Summulae dialectices (using the 
Greek form of the genitive) around 1250.99 
(3) Lambert of Auxerre, who wrote a Logica, probably be-
tween 1253 and 1257.100 
(4) William of Sherwood, who wrote an Introduction to Logic 
and a Syncategoremata in the middle of the thirteenth cen-
tury. The dates are hard to pin down any more precisely 
than that.101 
These four thirteenth-century terminist authors are sometimes known as 
summulists, because they produced compendia surveying the whole of logic 
known in their time. Such works are known as “summae” (singular = ‘summa’), 
or “summulae” (which just means “little summae”). Sherwood’s Introduction to 
Logic counts as a summa, even though it doesn’t have that title. 
In connection with Peter of Spain, I should digress for a moment on an im-
portant, but by now thoroughly discredited, theory about the origins of mediaeval 
logic. 
                                                                                                                                     
whether it was five or seven days depends on whether you count the first and last day as complete 
days. It is unlikely that people of the day were uncertain about exactly when a pope died, and it is 
equally unlikely that they failed to notice just when the roof collapsed.) You must of course have 
a ready supply of these droll stories in case you ever have to lecture on this material to easily 
bored students. Here is some more of the tale: Apparently the fatal room was some kind of “ob-
servatory.” It seems that Peter, in addition to logic, had an interest in astronomy and other scien-
tific matters — including medicine. (Note again the linkage between logic and medicine. See p. 32 
above on Galen’s influence in this regard. Note also that both accounts remark that Peter boasted 
that he would continue to live for a long time, even though he was already pretty old.) As often 
happened to such people, this earned for him the suspicion of dabbling in magic, astrology and 
other wizardry. Moreover, Peter seems somehow to have acquired an undeserved reputation for 
being unsympathetic to the concerns of the various religious orders (monks and friars, as distinct 
from the diocesan clergy). The combination of all this scurrilous gossip is probably what is re-
sponsible for the hints in the above accounts that Peter got exactly what he deserved, since he was 
arrogant and stupid and had prophesied (no doubt by illicit forms of divination) a continued long 
life for himself. On all this, see the biography of Peter in Mann and Hollnsteiner, The Lives of the 
Popes, vol. 16, pp. 31–56. The volume was published in 1932 and reports (p. 54) that traces of 
Peter’s “observatory” could still be seen in Viterbo at that time. 
99 Edited in Alain de Libera, “Les Summulae dialectices de Roger Bacon.”  
100 Lambert’s Logica has never been translated as a whole into English, or (as far as I 
know) into any other language. It has been edited by Franco Alessio as Logica (Summa Lamberti). 
The portion on the “properties of terms” had been translated in Kretzmann and Stump, The Cam-
bridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, pp. 102–162. On the date of the 
work, see De Rijk, “On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain’s Summule logicales,” IV, pp. 160–
162.  
101 Other works have sometimes been attributed to Sherwood, but in my judgment not 
very persuasively. On the dates of Sherwood’s writings, see De Rijk, “Some Thirteenth Century 
Tracts on the Game of Obligation,” III, pp. 26 & 31–32. Both the Introductiones and the Syn-
categoremata have been critically edited and translated into English: William of Sherwood, Die 
Introductiones in logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood, Grabmann ed.; “William of Sherwood, 
‘Introductiones in logicam’,” Lohr et al., ed.; “The Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood,” 
O’Donnell, ed.; William of Sherwood’s Introduction to Logic, Kretzmann, trans.; and William of 
Sherwood’s Treatise on Syncategorematic Words, Kretzmann, trans. 
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Carl Prantl, an important mid-nineteenth century German historian, wrote 
a history of logic called Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande. Although in that 
history Prantl devoted a great deal of time to mediaeval logic, and provided quo-
tations that are still useful from a large number of authors, he was by no means 
sympathetic to the Middle Ages. He thought it was a period of darkness, gloom 
and despair, and said so. In fact, it is not too strong to say that Prantl hated the 
Middle Ages! 
In particular, Prantl had a theory about the origins of terminist logic in the 
thirteenth century. He held that terminist logic arose from three sources: (a) the 
recovery of the texts of Aristotle, (b) Byzantine influences, and (c) Arabic influ-
ences.102 
His thesis about Byzantine influence rested on a peculiar theory about Pe-
ter of Spain’s Summulae logicales. For there existed (and still does exist) a Greek 
version of what appeared to be the same work. Prantl attributed this Greek work, 
entitled Synopsis, to a certain Byzantine author named Michael Psellus (b. 1020), 
and argued that Peter of Spain’s Summulae was nothing more than a translation of 
Psellus’ work. The moral of the story, of course, was one Prantl was only too fond 
of making, namely, that there was nothing in mediaeval Europe that wasn’t de-
rivative or second-rate. 
Prantl’s thesis was immediately attacked — and definitively refuted once 
and for all — at the end of the nineteenth century. It was shown that the Synopsis 
Prantl was talking about was in fact not an eleventh century work by Michael 
Psellus at all, but rather a fifteenth century work by one George Scholarius (1400–
1464), and that, far from Peter of Spain’s work’s being a translation of the Synop-
sis, it was just the other way around: the Synopsis was in fact a translation of Pe-
ter of Spain! 
I tell you this because you sometimes still see secondary sources, for the 
most part by Soviet and Eastern European authors, that don’t appear to have heard 
the news (now a century old), and still repeat Prantl’s thesis as though it were a 
view that could be taken seriously. For example, MIT press some time ago pub-
lished an English translation of a work by the Russian author N. I. Styazhkin, en-
titled History of Mathematical Logic from Leibniz to Peano, which contains an 
introductory chapter on the Middle Ages. Whatever virtues the rest of the book 
may or may not have, that first chapter is simply not to be taken seriously. Among 
other defects — and there are lots of them — it peddles Prantl’s thesis without 
any signs of shame or remorse. 
Likewise, not long ago there appeared a four-volume English translation 
of a History of Logic by the Romanian author Anton Dumitriù. It too repeats 
Prantl’s thesis as though it were true, even though Dumitriù knew and used 
Kneale and Kneale’s The Development of Logic, which definitely knew better.103 
                                                 
102 On all this, see De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. 1, p. 18. 
103 See Kneale and Kneale, The Development of Logic, p. 234. See my review of Dumi-
triù for these and other horrors. For a more realistic assessment of the relation between Byzantine 
and Latin mediaeval philosophy, see Ebbesen, “Western and Byzantine Approaches to Logic.” 
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But now back to the thirteenth century. Thomas Aquinas (1224/1225–
1274) is, I am afraid, of no real consequence to our topic. Early on, he did write a 
treatise on fallacies, and another one on modal propositions (actually, nothing 
more than a short letter). But there is nothing especially original or surprising in 
either of those works. He also produced an incomplete commentary on Aristotle’s 
De interpretatione. But again, there is little in it for our purposes, although it is of 
interest for students of Thomas more generally.104 
At the end of the thirteenth century, the great John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–
1308) wrote a number of works on logic, most of which have not been investi-
gated with the attention they deserve. There are also several important and very 
interesting works from the late thirteenth century that were falsely attributed to 
Scotus and published in the seventeenth century by Luke Wadding among the au-
thentic works. These are nowadays referred to collectively as the works of the 
“Pseudo-Scotus,” even though they are certainly not all by the same man.105 
After about 1270, something very odd happened. No one really knows 
why, but the “terminist” logic that had prevailed on both sides of the English 
Channel up to that point went into a kind of hibernation. This was most pro-
nounced on the Continent, where terminist semantic theory was virtually replaced 
by a different kind of semantics altogether, called “speculative grammar.” Specu-
lative grammar regularly appealed to what it called “modes of signifying,” and is 
therefore also sometimes called “modism.” In England, modism never especially 
caught on, and terminist logic and semantics survived. But there appears to have 
been little innovative work done there at the end of the thirteenth century. There 
are no important new Summulae of logic, for instance.106 
I.  The Fourteenth Century and Thereafter 
This situation continued until the early fourteenth century, when — bang! 
All of a sudden, terminist-style semantic theory woke up again. This happened as 
                                                 
104 I will have occasion to cite this work briefly in Chapter 3 below. For information on 
Aquinas’ writings, including available editions and translations, see Weisheipl, Friar Thomas 
d’Aquino, pp. 355–405 (“A Brief Catalogue of Authentic Works”). For the Commentary on the 
De interpretatione, see item #36 (pp. 374–375); for the On Fallacies, see item #57 (p. 386); and 
for On Modal Propositions, see item #68 (p. 392). 
105 On Pseudo-Scotus, see McDermott, “Notes on the Assertoric and Modal Proposi-
tional Logic of the Pseudo-Scotus.” The term ‘Pseudo-Scotus’ isn’t used indiscriminately for the 
author of just any old work that is falsely attributed to Scotus. In some cases, we know who the 
author really was. 
106 Jan Pinborg is the main authority on these matters. See his “The English Contribution 
to Logic before Ockham,” and “Speculative Grammar.” Also Libera, “The Oxford and Paris Tra-
ditions in Logic,” and Ebbesen, “The Dead Man Is Alive.” On speculative grammar and the 
modist tradition itself, see Pinborg, Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter, and Pin-
borg, “Die Logik der Modistae.” Some of the judgments made above need to be qualified; the 
necessary qualifications are made in the works just cited. As already mentioned, the writings of 
John Duns Scotus during this period deserve further study, but such an investigation would 
probably not affect the particular claims made here. We will not be discussing speculative gram-
mar very much in this book, mainly because I am incompetent in that area. 
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early as 1302 in England, when Walter Burley (= Burleigh), began to write im-
portant new works in the terminist tradition.107 A little later (perhaps in the 1320s 
or so), John Buridan began doing the same thing in Paris.108 Furthermore, when 
terminist semantic theory awoke from its “long winter’s nap” in the early-
fourteenth century, it was in many respects importantly different from what it had 
been earlier.109 It is the logic and semantic theory after this reawakening that is 
the topic of this book. 
In the early-fourteenth century, there are three main figures who will con-
cern us primarily: 
(1) William of Ockham (c. 1285–1347),110 a nominalist Fran-
ciscan author of tremendous importance generally — al-
though, oddly, of remarkably little influence, at least as far 
as I can tell, on many particular points of logical theory 
where you might have expected otherwise. Among his 
logical works is the big Summa logicae, parts of which 
have been translated into English.111 His work was done “in 
connection with” Oxford University. This doesn’t mean it 
was all written there — not by any means. Although he did 
lecture for a while on theology at Oxford, he went to the 
London Franciscan house in 1320 to teach and wait for an 
academic appointment at Oxford that never came. Much of 
his theoretical writing was done in London. 
(2) Walter Burley (or Burleigh, c. 1275–1344/1345), whom we 
have already met. Burley was some ten years older than 
Ockham, and was a realist in his metaphysical views. He 
wrote an important treatise On the Purity of the Art of 
Logic, which appears to have been at least in part a re-
sponse to Ockham. There are two versions of this work, a 
                                                 
107 On Burley, see Martin, “Walter Burley”; Uña Juarez, La filosofía del siglo XIV; and 
Wood, “Studies on Walter Burley.” 
108 See Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” especially pp. 187–188, and the notes 
there. 
109 Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” and Spade, “Insolubilia.” 
110 See Gál, “William of Ockham,” and Gál, “William of Ockham Died Impenitent in 
April 1347.” On the tradition that Ockham died instead in 1349, see Brampton, “Traditions Relat-
ing to the Death of William of Ockham.” For more detail on Ockham’s life, see Baudry, Guil-
laume d’Occam; Ghisalberti, Guglielmo di Ockham; and Leff, William of Ockham. Important 
General Note: In addition to the particular biographical references to late mediaeval authors I 
will be giving in these footnotes, you should know about the very useful section of “Biographies” 
toward the end of The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (pp. 853–892). The en-
tries there give you capsule summaries (a few paragraphs in length) of an author’s life and works, 
together with references to the main primary and secondary literature. If you’re just getting started 
with a particular author, this is an invaluable resource, and the first place to go. 
111 Part 1 is translated in William of Ockham, Ockham’s Theory of Terms; part 2 in Wil-
liam of Ockham, Ockham’s Theory of Propositions. I reviewed the former in Noûs 12 (1978). I 
have also translated selections from part 1 of the Summa logicae in William of Ockham, Summa 
of Logic. 
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longer treatise and a shorter one. The first part of the longer 
one contains material of particular relevance to our 
study.112 Burley also wrote a great number of other works 
that we will discuss as needed — and is a figure who de-
serves to be studied a lot more than he has been. Like Ock-
ham, Burley’s main work was done in England, in connec-
tion with Oxford University.113 
(3) On the Continent, and somewhat later, we have the famous 
John Buridan (b. 1290s–1304/1305, d. after 1358 and cer-
tainly not after 1361) at the University of Paris. The dates 
of his writings are exasperatingly hard to pin down, but he 
appears to have written from the 1320s to perhaps as late as 
1360.114 Buridan, like Ockham, was of the nominalist per-
suasion in metaphysics. His Sophismata will be an impor-
tant source for us. He also wrote a Summulae that was used 
as a textbook in certain European universities later on; we 
will be discussing this book soon. In addition, he produced 
an extraordinarily interesting Consequentiae, containing 
the first attempt since Chrysippus at a quasi-axiomatic the-
ory of inference in general.115 
Buridan spent his entire teaching career in the Faculty of Arts at the Uni-
versity of Paris, and taught many of the foremost thinkers of the next generation 
on the Continent. Among them were Albert of Saxony (d. 1390), who went on to 
become the first rector of the University of Vienna.116 Albert wrote a Sophismata 
and a work entitled Perutilis logica (= A Very Useful Logic), both of which were 
printed shortly after the invention of the printing press. We will be referring to his 
work from time to time below. 
                                                 
112 I am preparing a translation of both the longer and the shorter versions of On the Pu-
rity of the Art of Logic for the series “Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy.” In the meantime, 
consult Walter Burley, The Longer Treatise On the Purity of the Art of Logic, Tract I: “On the 
Properties of Terms.” 
113 But he did teach for a while at Paris. Once again, on Burley generally see Martin, 
“Walter Burley; Uña Juarez, La filosofía del siglo XIV; and Wood, “Studies on Walter Burley.” 
114 On Buridan’s life and works, see the invaluable study by Faral, “Jean Buridan: Maître 
ès Arts.” On his writings especially, see Faral, “Jean Buridan: Notes.” See also Ghisalberti, Gio-
vanni Buridano; and Moody, “Jean Buridan.” On Buridan’s logical writings in general (but 
mainly the Summulae), see Pinborg, The Logic of John Buridan. For more recent information on 
Buridan’s life, see the Introduction to Buridan, Johannes Buridanus, Summulae: De Praedicabili-
bus, pp. xi–xvii. 
115 I call it “quasi-axiomatic” because they’re not really axioms Buridan (or Chrysippus, 
for that matter) is using, but inference rules. But never mind; the important point is that the pres-
entation is systematic, with certain rules’ being deduced from others by means of actual stated 
proofs. It really is an impressive work! It is available in a critical Latin edition by Hubien, and in 
English translation by Peter King. See John Buridan, Tractatus de consequentiis and John Buri-
dan, John Buridan’s Logic. 
116 On Albert, see Heidingsfelder, Albert von Sachsen. 
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Another rather important pupil of Buridan’s was Marsilius of Inghen (c. 
1330–1396), who went on to become the first rector of the University of Heidel-
berg.117 
A contemporary of Buridan in Paris was Gregory of Rimini (c. 1300–
1358). His main work was done in the 1340s, his commentary on Book I of the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard in 1342.118 His importance in logic seems to have 
been in two areas, the theory of insolubilia (= semantic paradoxes like the Liar 
Paradox) and the theory of complexe significabilia. We will discuss the latter at 
length in Ch. 6 below. 
Both in England and on the Continent, the best work in this late-mediaeval 
period seems to have been before about 1350. In England, after the work of Bur-
ley and Ockham, there was a flourishing of logical studies associated with Merton 
College, Oxford, until around mid-century.119 These “Mertonians” are especially 
important in the pre-history of early modern science, and are sometimes called 
“Calculators” because of the tendency in some of them (although by no means all) 
to use mathematical techniques to solve problems in natural philosophy.120 The 
following are important in logic: 
(1) Thomas Bradwardine (c. 1295–1349). Author of a tremen-
dously important Insolubilia.121 Other logical writings have 
sometimes been attributed to him too, but this is the most 
important and influential one.122 
(2) Richard Kilvington (early 14th century – d. 1361). Author 
of an exceptionally interesting Sophismata that shows little 
                                                 
117 On Marsilius, see Ritter, Studien zur Spätscholastic: I. Marsilius von Inghen. 
118 The Sentences of Peter Lombard was a twelfth century theological work that became 
the standard textbook of theology all over Europe in the thirteenth century and later. All aspiring 
theology students had to lecture and comment on the Sentences. Many of these commentaries 
have been preserved in manuscript form, and are absolutely crucial sources for an author’s views 
on all sorts of things, philosophical as well as theological. The word ‘sentences’ in this context is 
used in something like the modern judicial sense, to mean a “verdict” or “decision” — in particu-
lar, a decision on some question raised and discussed (and answered) by Lombard. The Sentences 
is divided into four books, and each book is subdivided into several “distinctions.” References to 
an author’s commentary on the Sentences are regularly given by book and distinction number, fol-
lowed by the question or article number or other internal subdivision, depending on the particular 
author’s own style. On Gregory of Rimini, see Gál, “Gregory of Rimini”; Leff, Gregory of Rimini; 
and Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century,” “Gregory of Rimini,” and “New 
Approaches to Gregory of Rimini.” 
119 To say they were “associated” with Merton is not necessarily to say that they all had 
official positions there. 
120 See Sylla, “The Oxford Calculators,” and references there. See also Weisheipl, “Ock-
ham and Some Mertonians,” and “Repertorium Mertonense.” 
121 Edited in Roure, “La problématique des propositions insolubles.” See also Spade, 
“Insolubilia and Bradwardine’s Theory of Signification.” 
122 On Bradwardine, see Weisheipl, “Ockham and Some Mertonians,” pp. 189–195, and 
Weisheipl, “Repertorium Mertonense,” pp. 177–183. See also Nielsen, “Thomas Bradwardine’s 
Treatise on ‘Incipit’ and ‘Desinit”’; Green-Pedersen, “Bradwardine (?) on Ockham’s Doctrine of 
Consequence”; and Pinborg, “Opus Artis Logicae.” 
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trace of the mathematical techniques used by other, slightly 
later “calculators,” and is all the more interesting in that re-
spect.123 
(3) Roger Swyneshed (= Swineshead), pronounced just the 
way you fear (fl. before 1335, d. c. 1365). Author of an In-
solubilia and an extremely odd Obligationes on a peculiar 
form of disputation.124 
(4) William Heytesbury (before 1313–d. 1372/1373). Author 
of a big Sophismata, an interesting Rules for Solving Soph-
isms (= Regulae solvendi sophismata) and other works.125 
(5) Richard Billingham (fl. mid-14th century). Billingham’s 
precise dates are uncertain, but he seems to have written af-
ter Heytesbury, and was probably active around 1350. His 
main logical writing was the tremendously important 
Speculum puerorum (= Youth’s Mirror), which contains a 
novel doctrine of “proofs of propositions.”126 
Then, after about 1350, things changed dramatically. It is easy to suppose 
that the Black Plague, which swept through Oxford in 1349, broke the intellectual 
back of Oxford University by simply killing everyone off. And, while that is no 
doubt too simple an explanation,127 it certainly does appear that a major change 
took place about then. Oxford logic in the late-fourteenth century appears to be 
for the most part second-rate. This is not to say it is unsophisticated or sloppy (al-
though much of it is); it is just that the main contributions were made earlier.128 
                                                 
123 On Kilvington, see the “Introduction” to Kretzmann’s translation in Richard Kil-
vington, The Sophismata of Richard Kilvington. In addition to the Latin edition and English trans-
lation listed in the Bibliography below, see also the many articles on Kilvington by Norman 
Kretzmann listed in the Bibliography to the English translation. 
124 On Swyneshed, see Weisheipl, “Roger Swyneshed, O. S. B.” Roger Swyneshed is not 
to be confused with another person, Richard Swyneshed. Many manuscripts and early sources 
(and for that matter, several quite recent sources) fail to recognize that these are two quite distinct 
people. See the discussion ibid. I have edited and published both Swyneshed’s Insolubilia and his 
Obligationes. 
125 On Heytesbury, see Emden, A Biographical Register, vol. 2, pp. 927–928; Weisheipl, 
“Ockham and Some Mertonians,” pp. 195–199; Weisheipl, “Repertorium Mertonense,” pp. 212–
217. A fair amount of Heytesbury has been translated into English, all of it based on the not alto-
gether reliable 1494 edition. See William Heytesbury: “The Compounded and Divided Senses”; 
On Insoluble Sentences; On Maxima and Minima; “Uniform and Nonuniform Motion and the 
Merton College Mean Speed Theorem”; and “The Verbs ‘Know’ and ‘Doubt’.” Heytesbury’s 
Rules for Solving Sophisms has a total of six chapters. Of these, Chs. 1–2, 5, and part of Ch. 6 
have been translated in the texts just cited. 
126 On Billingham, see Emden, A Biographical Register, vol. 1, pp. 188–189; Weisheipl, 
“Repertorium Mertonense,” pp. 176–177; De Rijk, “Richard Billingham’s Works on Logic.” Bill-
ingham’s Speculum terminorum is edited in Maierù, “Lo Speculum puerorum.” On other texts in 
this same tradition (some of them attributed to Billingham), see De Rijk, “Another Speculum pu-
erorum”; De Rijk, “The Place of Billingham’s Speculum puerorum”; and De Rijk, Some 14th 
Century Tracts on the Probationes Terminorum. 
127 See Courtenay, “The Effect of the Black Death on English Higher Education.” 
128 See Ashworth and Spade, “Logic in Late Medieval Oxford” for details. 
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By the fifteenth century, we can’t honestly say that English logic is even 
second-rate any more; it is simply dead. We know of only a few pathetic and in-
significant figures around the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and 
after that — nothing.129 
In the fifteenth century, several earlier treatises (often in heavily revised 
redactions) gradually came to precipitate into two loose collections of works used 
for teaching purposes, one collection at Oxford and another at Cambridge. These 
were later called the Libelli sophistarum (= Little Books for Arguers). Both were 
printed in early editions in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.130 On 
the whole, the quality of logic exhibited in these Libelli is appallingly low.131 And 
although our knowledge of this period is still not very complete, there is little rea-
son to expect that additional research will make the period look much better.132 
There is perhaps an exception to this bleak picture. During the so called 
“Great Schism” (1378–1418) — when the various political and ecclesiastical fac-
tions of Europe aligned themselves behind either the Avignonese or the Roman 
claimants to the Papacy (after the Council of Pisa in 1409, there was yet a third 
competing line of Popes) — Oxford became an important destination for many 
Italian scholars who went west to study, particularly those who belonged to the 
religious order of the Hermits of St. Augustine (the so called “Austin Friars”). 
Paris, the other predominant academic center at the time, had sided with the 
wrong faction, as far as the Austin Friars were concerned. Among the Augustin-
ians who went to Oxford during this period was one Paul of Venice (1369–1429), 
sometimes called Paul Nicolettus of Venice to distinguish him from other Pauls of 
Venice who were running around then (including an older cousin, Paul Francis of 
Venice, who was at Oxford at the same time). Paul of Venice (the younger 
cousin) seems to have absorbed much knowledge of English logic while he was at 
Oxford. When he returned to Italy, he took his knowledge with him. Although 
there were other influences too, there is no doubt that Paul of Venice was an im-
portant factor in the flourishing of logical studies in Italy in the fifteenth cen-
tury.133 
On the Continent, things weren’t as bad as they were in England. It is still 
true that the best work was probably done before the mid-fourteenth century. But 
other quite respectable people produced quite respectable work later on. I have 
already mentioned, for example, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen. 
In 1372, the Parisian master Peter of Ailly (1350–1420/1421) wrote a very 
interesting pair of treatises, usually treated as one and published in the late-
fifteenth century under the title Concepts and Insolubles. The work concerns the 
                                                 
129 For what little we do know, see Ashworth and Spade, “Logic in Late Medieval Ox-
ford” again, and the references there. 
130 On the Libelli sophistarum, see De Rijk, “Logica Cantabrigiensis” and “Logica 
Oxoniensis”; and Ashworth, “The ‘Libelli Sophistarum’.” 
131 For a striking example, see Spade, “Richard Lavenham and the Cambridge Logic.” 
132 Fletcher, “The Teaching and Study of Arts at Oxford” certainly gives us little hope. 
Fletcher’s thesis is among the most complete studies of the period to date. 
133 On Paul (Nicolettus) of Venice, see the study in Perreiah, Paul of Venice: A Biblio-
graphical Study. 
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notion of “mental language” (discussed at great length below) and its connection 
with insolubilia.134 
By the end of the fourteenth century, logical studies began to flourish in 
Italy. To a great extent, this was because of a new availability there of English 
logical material from the early part of the century.135 Thus, Peter of Mantua (fl. 
1387–1400), for example, published an important Logica already showing many 
English influences before the turn of the century. Angelo of Fossombrone (fl. 
1395–1402), at the very end of the fourteenth century, wrote an Insolubilia that is 
obviously and directly based on Ch. 1 of Heytesbury’s Rules for Solving Soph-
isms.136 Around the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Paul of Venice 
(newly returned from Oxford) produced a Logica (= Logica parva or Little Logic) 
and several other logical works.137 
Paul’s students included Paul of Pergula (d. 1451/1455), who wrote a 
Logica and a treatise De sensu composito et diviso obviously based on Heytes-
bury, and Cajetan or Gaetano of Thiene (1387–1465), who wrote commentaries 
on Heytesbury and other English authors.138 Other important Italian authors in the 
fifteenth century include Battista da Fabriano (d. 1446) and Alexander Sermoneta 
(d. 1486).139 
                                                 
134 On Peter, see Peter of Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, “Introduction,” and the refer-
ences there. 
135 See Courtenay, “The Early Stages in the Introduction of Oxford Logic into Italy.” 
136 See Spade, The Mediaeval Liar, pp. 49–52. 
137 On Paul’s writings, see Perreiah, Paul of Venice: A Bibliographical Guide. There is 
an enormous work, entitled Logica magna (= Big Logic), attributed to Paul of Venice in the one 
complete surviving manuscript and in an early printed edition from 1499. This work has achieved 
some prominence in the twentieth century (largely through Bocheński’s influence) as a kind of 
late-mediaeval encyclopedia of the whole logical tradition of the Middle Ages. It is presently be-
ing edited and translated in a series of publications by Oxford University Press under the general 
rubric Pauli Veneti Logica magna, edited by Peter Geach and William Kneale. (On closer inspec-
tion, the work — although undeniably an important testimony — does not have nearly the ency-
clopedic value that has been attributed to it.) Paul’s authorship of the Logica magna seems to have 
been accepted without question or comment by most recent scholars. But it deserves close scru-
tiny. The Logica magna disagrees doctrinally with Paul’s indisputably authentic Logica parva on 
point after major point. It is hard to imagine how the same man could have written both works. It 
is therefore worth asking what positive evidence there really is for Paul’s authorship of the Logica 
magna. And if he didn’t write it, who did? The matter is thoroughly discussed in Perreiah, Paul of 
Venice: A Bibliographical Guide. Perreiah argues against the view that Paul (Nicolettus) of Ven-
ice wrote the Logica magna. He goes on to suggest that the real author was a certain Thomas of 
Coderonco (= the mysterious “Messinus” found in certain late-mediaeval manuscripts and early 
printed editions). Although there are many parts of Perreiah’s arguments I do not find compelling, 
I do find his former claim, that Paul (Nicolettus) of Venice did not write the Logica magna, worth 
taking very seriously indeed. His identification of Thomas of Coderonco as the true author I find 
plausible but not definitely established. (Perreiah does not present it as anything more.) The whole 
matter needs to be thoroughly aired. 
138 His commentaries are contained in the 1494 edition of Heytesbury. On Cajetan, see 
Valsanzibio, Vita e dottrina di Gaetano di Thiene. 
139 On the authors mentioned in this paragraph (except for Angelo of Fossombrone, for 
whom see n. 136 above), see Maierù, Terminologia logica. See also the remarks passim in Per-
reiah, Paul of Venice: A Bibliographical Guide. 
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By 1450, however, things began to change once and for all, even on the 
Continent. Scholastic logic continued for a long time afterwards, 140 to be sure, 
but the “new thing” was elsewhere — in Renaissance Humanism and such stuff. 
That is beyond the scope of this book. 
See Appendix I below for a convenient chronological table of names and 
things. 
J.  Additional Reading 
                                                 
140 As discussed, for instance, in Ashworth, Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval 
Period. 
For additional reading on the material covered in this chapter, consult the fol-
lowing items: E. J. Ashworth and Paul Vincent Spade, “Logic in Late Medieval 
Oxford”; Norman Kretzmann, “Semantics, History of,” pp. 358–375 (through 
the material on the Middle Ages); E. A. Moody, “John Buridan”; Moody, “Wil-
liam of Ockham”; Arthur N. Prior. “Logic, History of,” the following sections: 
Czesław Lejewski, “Ancient Logic” (pp. 513–520), Nicholas Rescher, “Arabic 
Logic” (pp. 525–527), E. A. Moody, “Medieval Logic” (pp. 528–534); Paul 
Vincent Spade, “Late Medieval Logic”; Spade, “Medieval Logic”; Spade, “Ori-
gins of Logic in the West.” 
 Chapter 3:  The Threefold 
Division of Language 
n this chapter, I want to talk about a basic division that almost all mediae-
val logicians drew between three kinds or “levels” of language.1 To illus-
trate this division, I will want to look at some passages in Ch. 1 of John 
Buridan’s Sophismata,2 on “signification.” I’m not mainly concerned for now 
with the notion of signification itself, although I’ll talk about it a little here, and 
will come back to it at much greater length in Chapters 5 and 6 below. For the 
moment, I’m primarily concerned with another notion that comes up in that first 
chapter of Buridan. 
A.  Some Remarks on John Buridan 
But first, let me say a little about Buridan’s career. Although it is by now 
perhaps a little dated, Moody’s short article on Buridan is quite a good introduc-
tion.3 But I want to say a few things of my own too. 
In the mediaeval university system, there were several “faculties.” A stu-
dent would begin his studies in the Arts faculty, often as young as fourteen or so. 
It was there that he would study Aristotle, and there that he would study logic. 
After several years of study in the Faculty of Arts, a student, if he was 
lucky — and bright — would become a “Master of Arts” (a “magister artium” — 
                                                 
1 I hasten to add that the “levels” of language here are not “levels” in the sense used in 
much twentieth-century philosophy of language (“object-language,” “metalanguage,” meta-
metalanguage,” etc.). The latter is derived from Tarski. See his “The Semantic Conception of 
Truth” and, more formally, his monumental “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages.” 
2 Buridan’s Sophismata was edited by T. K. Scott and published in 1977. Scott also 
translated the Sophismata in 1966, under the title Sophisms on Meaning and Truth. (Despite the 
discrepancy in their dates, his edition was the basis for the translation. There was a considerable 
delay in publishing the Latin text.) Chapter 8 of the Sophismata was re-edited and retranslated by 
George Hughes and published in 1982 under the title John Buridan on Self-Reference, with a very 
sensible and philosophically astute commentary. Hughes’ edition is a big improvement over 
Scott’s, but we really need a new, critical edition of the whole thing. (There is one in progress. 
See p. 55 below.) Scott’s translation is now out of print. I will provide my own translations of all 
the passages we need, based on Scott’s Latin edition. 
3 E. A. Moody, “John Buridan.” Faral, “Jean Buridan: Maître ès arts,” is for the more 
stout-hearted among you. 
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the origin of our M. A. degree). This would allow him to lecture and teach in the 
Arts faculty. 
But most people didn’t want to stay in the Arts faculty for very long. Two 
years or so was the norm. As a result, there was a constant turnover of staff in the 
Faculty of Arts. The reason for this was that the Arts faculty was simply the first 
stepping-stone to higher things. A student had to have gone through the Arts fac-
ulty, and done his tour of duty as a teaching “Master of Arts” there, before he 
could go on to one of the “higher” faculties: law, medicine, or especially theol-
ogy. 
So in most cases, we can say with some confidence that a mediaeval 
thinker’s writings on logic were done relatively early in his career — as a student 
or Master in the Arts faculty. This is not universally true, but it is fairly reliable as 
a general guideline. For dating an author’s works, this fact can be very useful.4 
Not so with Buridan. For some reason, Buridan never went beyond the 
Arts faculty at the University of Paris. He taught there all his professional life. It 
is much harder therefore to date his works.5 
Buridan was made Rector of the University of Paris in 1328. (This is our 
first reference to him in the surviving records.6) His teaching career therefore 
probably began several years earlier. The last mention of him as alive occurs in a 
document dated 1358. He perhaps died in the plague that year, but it is more 
likely that he died in 1361 or right before.7 In short, we have at least a thirty-five 
year span in which to place his works. 
                                                 
4 Ivan J. Mueller, the recent editor of John Wyclif’s Tractatus de universalibus, argues 
persuasively that Wyclif’s Logicae continuatio (= Continuation of the Logic, a huge “supplement” 
to his earlier Logica) is not an early work of Wyclif’s, as had long been assumed, but rather a ma-
ture work written while Wyclif was in the Faculty of Theology at Oxford. (John Wyclif, Tractatus 
de universalibus, pp. xxxvii–xxxviii and n. 57.) Some scholars have generalized Mueller’s argu-
ment and concluded that the “general guideline” I just mentioned is not a reliable one after all. 
Thus Michael J. Fitzgerald writes, 
Recent research on Wyclif, for example [Fitzgerald cites Mueller’s argument], 
provides an excellent counterexample to a myth surrounding the study of late 
scholastic logic. The myth assumes, for some reason, that theologians lost inter-
est in treating purely logical matters over the course of their academic careers… 
(Richard Brinkley, Richard Brinkley’s Theory of Sentential Reference, p. 14, 
continuation of n. 36.) 
But the circumstances of Wyclif’s life and writings are hardly typical, and do not warrant dismiss-
ing the general guideline as a “myth.” In general, one should be very hesitant about dating an au-
thor’s logical writings after his work in the Faculty of Arts unless there is solid evidence. There is 
such evidence in the case of Wyclif, but not for many other authors. On the whole, in the absence 
of any evidence one way or the other, the safer and more likely assumption is that a logical work 
belongs to an author’s career in the Faculty of Arts. That’s not infallible, but it’s a good rule of 
thumb. 
5 See, for example, the remarks in the Introduction to John Buridan, Johannes Burida-
nus, Summulae: De Praedicabilibus, pp. xv–xvii. 
6 He was made Rector again in 1340. 
7 That was the year his benifice was transferred to someone else. (See John Buridan, Jo-
hannes Buridanus, Summulae: De Praedicabilibus, p. xi.) A “benifice” was a kind of endowed 
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1.  Buridan’s Writings 
Buridan produced a number of writings on many philosophical topics. In 
logic, we have already met his Consequentiae, Summulae and Sophismata, in 
Chapter 2 above. Let me say a little more about those works now. 
Buridan’s Consequentiae is one of his works we can date with some confi-
dence. According to the best estimate, it was written in 1335.8 There is a complete 
English translation.9 
The Summulae, which probably somewhat predates the Consequentiae,10 
is a kind of student handbook of logic, and came to be quite popular in European 
universities. It appears to be a set of lectures for a course Buridan himself taught 
in logic. As it survives in the manuscripts and early printed editions,11 the Sum-
mulae consists of eight treatises. Near the beginning of the first treatise, Buridan 
sets out the plan of the work this way12: 
We shall divide this book into nine treatises. The first of them will 
be about propositions and their parts and peculiarities, the second 
about predicables,13 the third about categories, the fourth about 
supposition, the fifth about syllogisms, the sixth about dialectical 
topics, the seventh about fallacies. I shall append an eighth [trea-
tise], about divisions, definitions and demonstrations. The ninth 
[treatise] is about the practice of sophisms. But in these lectures14 I 
shall not pursue the last treatise together with the other eight. 
Jan Pinborg has plausibly remarked that the last sentence suggests that the 
Summulae as we have it is a revised course of lectures. Earlier, it seems, Buridan 
had included a section on sophisms, but now he wants to omit that section from 
the course.15 And sure enough, in the surviving manuscripts and printed editions, 
the ninth treatise is lacking. Nevertheless, we do possess it; it survives separately 
                                                                                                                                     
grant given to support academics and other worthy people. It typically consisted of the income 
from a farm or other such source. 
8 See John Buridan, Tractatus de consequentiis, p. 9. 
9 In John Buridan, John Buridan’s Logic, which also contains the Suppositiones from his 
Summulae. 
10 See John Buridan, Johannes Buridanus, Summulae: De Praedicabilibus, pp. xv–xvi. 
11 The early printed editions do not contain anything close to the authentic text of Buri-
dan. Instead, they contain text by a much later author named John Dorp, superimposed on a struc-
ture that does come from Buridan. See John Buridan, Johannes Buridanus, Summulae: De Prae-
dicabilibus, p. xiii. 
12 Translated from the text in Pinborg, The Logic of John Buridan, p. 82. 
13 That is, about Porphyry of Tyre’s five “predicables” as described in his Isagoge. They 
are: genus, difference, species, property (= proprium) and accident. On Porphyry, see Ch. 2 
above, p. 33. A translation of Porphyry’s Isagoge may be found in Spade, Five Texts on the Medi-
aeval Problem of Universals, pp. 1–19. 
14 in these lectures: in hac lectura. Literally in the singular, but Buridan is referring to his 
whole course of lectures as one big Lectura or “reading.” 
15 Pinborg, The Logic of John Buridan, p. 72. 
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in an independent manuscript tradition as Buridan’s Sophismata, which I will say 
more about in a moment.  
Buridan took as a kind of “textbook” for his lectures Peter of Spain’s 
Summulae logicales,16 and in fact part of the work is simply verbatim quotations 
from Peter of Spain’s own Summulae,17 accompanied by Buridan’s comments and 
corrections. As Buridan himself says18: 
Because of this, since I wanted to state certain common points 
about the whole of logic without dragging out the investigation too 
long, I have decided to get down especially to expounding and 
supplementing the short treatise on logic that the venerable doctor, 
master Peter of Spain, put together a while back — indeed, even 
sometimes saying and writing [things] otherwise than [what] he 
wrote and said, as it seems to me fitting. 
Buridan may well have been the first person to use Peter of Spain as a 
textbook in this way.19 
Tracts 1–2 and 6 of Buridan’s work are fairly close to the corresponding 
parts of Peter of Spain’s.20 The third tract is an abbreviated version of Peter’s. In 
the fifth treatise (on syllogistic), Buridan adds four chapters of his own on modal 
syllogistic; they make up the bulk of the treatise. Tracts 4 and 7, on supposition-
theory and fallacies, are completely different from the corresponding treatises in 
Peter of Spain. And Tract 8, on definition, division, and demonstration, does not 
correspond to anything in Peter.21  
                                                 
16 The term ‘textbook’ should not be taken too literally here. Remember that we are talk-
ing about a time more than a century before the invention of the printing press. Students could not 
just go to their campus bookstore and purchase a copy of their “textbook,” which they would then 
be expected to read on their own and around which the “master” would build his lectures. On the 
contrary, the term ‘lecture’ literally means a “reading”; the text would actually be read aloud word 
for word, so that students could write it down and thereby have a copy for themselves. “Lectures,” 
therefore, amounted to a kind of dictation. (To be sure, there were “scriptoria” associated with 
universities. Basically, these were the mediaeval equivalent of modern “copy shops” one finds 
surrounding campuses today, but with scribes instead of copy machines. Hiring the services of 
such a scriptorium was an expensive thing to do. Most students probably couldn’t afford it, and 
— even if they could — wouldn’t have resorted to a scriptorium except for very special pur-
chases.) Having said that, it is still true that Buridan built his own course around the text of Peter 
of Spain’s Summulae logicales. Read on to see what I mean. 
17 This sort of thing was quite common in the Middle Ages, and was in no way regarded 
as “plagiarism.” On the contrary, to take over another author’s work and make it your own was 
sometimes regarded as a way of honoring him. Besides, as you will see immediately below, Buri-
dan explicitly says he is using Peter of Spain, and so gives due credit even by modern standards. 
18 Translated from the Latin text in Pinborg, The Logic of John Buridan, p. 72. 
19 Ibid. 
20 By ‘corresponding’, I mean “dealing with the same topics.” The order of treatment is 
not the same in Buridan’s work as it is in Peter’s. 
21 For the claims in this paragraph, see Pinborg, The Logic of John Buridan, pp. 73–74, 
and John Buridan, Johannes Buridanus, Summulae: De Praedicabilibus, pp. xiii–xiv. 
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There is no complete English translation of Buridan’s Summulae,22 and for 
that matter there is still no reliable, critical edition of the entire Latin text. Fortu-
nately, the recently formed Buridan Society has dedicated itself to preparing and 
publishing a critical edition of the Summulae, together with a new critical edition 
of the Sophismata.23 Tracts 2–3 of the Summulae have been published so far.24 
As for Buridan’s Sophismata, the surviving version of it appears to have 
been written no earlier than the early 1340s, since it refers to the theory of com-
plexe significabilia usually associated with Gregory of Rimini, who wrote then.25 
B.  The Quaestio-Form 
The Sophismata is written in a loose quaestio-format. It is important to 
recognize this fact and what it means. The quaestio-form was developed in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries (although its roots go back much further than 
that), and it became a major literary form for mediaeval writers. In the pure form 
— perhaps most familiar from Aquinas’ Summa theologiae — the quaestio has 
five parts: 
1. Statement of the question. This is always put in the form of 
a “yes/no” question: “Whether such and such is so.” 
2. Arguments for one side. 
3. Arguments for the other side. 
4. The author’s own view. 
5. Replies to the opposing arguments. 
For example, in the passage of his Summa theologiae where Thomas 
Aquinas gives his five famous arguments for the existence of God, we find the 
following structure26: 
                                                 
22 One is being prepared by Gyula Klima on the basis of the forthcoming Buridan Soci-
ety edition as described below. 
23 Joel Biard has published a French translation of the Sophismata, with notes, based on 
the forthcoming new Latin edition of that text by Fabienne Pironet. 
24 See John Buridan, Johannes Buridanus, Summulae: De Praedicabilibus, and John 
Buridan, Johannes Buridanus, Summulae: In Praedicamenta. For a discussion of the state of the 
whole matter (before the formation of the Buridan Society), see Pinborg, The Logic of John Buri-
dan. Latin editions of short passages from the Summulae may be found ibid. Tract 4 (on supposi-
tion) has been edited in preliminary fashion by Maria Elena Reina in John Buridan, “Giovanni 
Buridano: ‘Tractatus de suppositionibus’,” and translated by Peter King in John Buridan, John 
Buridan’s Logic. 
25 On Gregory, see Ch. 2 above, p. 46. On the theory of complexe significabilia, see Ch. 
6 below, pp. 168–178.  
26 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 2, a. 3. (Read this: “Summa theologiae, part 
I, question 2, article 3.” The Summa theologiae is divided into three parts (the second into two 
subparts). Each part is divided into several “questions,” each dealing with a general topic. Then 
each “question” is discussed in several “articles.” Each “article” exhibits the quaestio-format I am 
describing here. You may find the architecture of the Summa theologiae interesting, but it is not 
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1. First the statement of the question: “Does God exist?” 
2. Then two arguments for the negative, purporting to show 
that God does not exist. The first of these is a just the prob-
lem of evil, and the second is in effect a claim that God is 
theoretically superfluous for an adequate account of the 
world. 
3. On the affirmative side, Aquinas cites a single text from 
Scripture (Exodus 3:14): “I am who am.” Since this is after 
all a summa of theology and not of philosophy, this is a 
perfectly legitimate way to argue in this context. 
4. Then comes the “corpus” or “body” of the article, signaled 
by the word ‘Respondeo’ (= I reply).27 Aquinas then pre-
sents his five arguments. I won’t rehearse them here. 
5. Finally, he replies to the two arguments given under item 
#2 above. 
The beauty of this way of writing about theoretical matters is that it forces 
you to deal explicitly with objections to your own views. Either you will have to 
take account of objections in actual circulation, in the case of a live “issue of the 
day,” or else you will at least have to anticipate objections, in the case of other 
questions. The corresponding disadvantage is that this style of writing limits you 
to “yes/no” questions, and tends to inhibit other ways of presenting your views. If 
your topic is “substance,” for example, and you are confining yourself to the 
quaestio-format, you may very well never get around to saying “All right, here is 
my theory of substance.” Instead, you will ask questions like “Is substance to be 
identified with matter?” (yes or no?), “Is it to be identified with form?” (yes or 
no?), “Is it to be identified with the composite of matter and form?” (yes or no?). 
This disadvantage is a real one in practice. Very often, a mediaeval au-
thor’s overall views on a given topic have to be pieced together from particular 
discussions in a variety of contexts. You will just have to get used to this fact. 
Buridan’s Sophismata fits this general quaestio-format, although only very 
loosely. Consider, for example, the first three sophisms he discusses in Ch. 1.28 
                                                                                                                                     
important for present purposes. We will not be using the work in this book. I bring it up only as an 
illustration.) 
27 Mediaeval manuscripts were typically written in a form of abbreviated Latin — a kind 
of shorthand. In scholastic Latin, the abbreviations were very compressed, and require special 
training to decipher. (The discipline is called “palaeography,” and no serious mediaevalist can 
avoid it.) You may be interested to know that the standard abbreviation for ‘respondeo’ was: , 
the origin of the familiar symbol we still find in drug stores and pharmacies. You see, the quaes-
tio-form was used not only in philosophical and theological disputations, but also in medicine: 
Here are the symptoms. It might be this disease, for the following reasons, in which case one 
course of treatment is appropriate. Or it might be that other disease, for these other reasons, and in 
that case a different treatment is required. The physician has to come to a decision and prescribe 
(“respondeo”) one treatment or another. The same format also lends itself perfectly to arguments 
in a court of law. 
28 Scott, ed., pp. 19–21; Scott, trans., pp. 64–66. 
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Sophism 1 is ‘Every spoken proposition29 is true’. Notice that in this case the 
sophism is not explicitly stated in the form of a “yes/no”-question at all. But the 
structure is implicit nonetheless. The real question Buridan is asking is: “Is that 
so or not?,” “Is every spoken proposition true, or is that not so?” 
After presenting the question in this slightly elliptical form, Buridan goes 
on to offer a rather obscure argument proving that it is so — every spoken propo-
sition is true. (For the moment, let’s not worry about the actual argument. Here I 
want to focus only on the form of the quaestio.) So far, then, we have steps 1–2 of 
the schema. 
Buridan doesn’t bother to give us step 3 — arguments on the other side of 
the question. Presumably this is because it’s obvious on the face of it that not 
every spoken proposition is true; some of them are false, after all. So, for conven-
ience, Buridan just skips over step 3 of the schema. 
The importance of all this is that sometimes people don’t realize that Buri-
dan (or other authors who write the same way) doesn’t always believe the argu-
ments he gives. Sometimes he is simply setting up an argument so he can refute it 
later on and in the process point out the mistake in the fallacious argument and 
thereby teach us something. 
The same thing happens with Buridan’s sophism 2 in Ch. 1 of his Sophis-
mata. Here again, we don’t have the sophism stated as an explicit “yes/no” ques-
tion but rather as a statement, ‘A horse is an ass’. The implicit question is: “Is that 
so or not?” 
Once again, Buridan gives us an obscure proof for the affirmative. But 
there is no counterargument for the negative, since he takes it for granted that 
horses aren’t asses. It is the obviousness of that fact that gives the sophism its 
edge. 
Consider also sophism 3 of Ch. 1. The sentence there is ‘God does not ex-
ist’.30 Here Buridan gives us a long proof for the affirmative, that it really is so 
that God does not exit. Thus, we have steps 1 and 2 of the schema. Then he tells 
us “The opposite is agreed to by all and must be conceded.” That little sentence 
plays the role of step 3 of the schema, the “counterarguments” — although it’s not 
much of an actual argument in this instance. 
Notice that so far none of Buridan’s three “sophisms” has gone beyond 
step 3 of the schema sketched above. In fact, Buridan sets up six sophisms in this 
way before he finally turns to his own doctrine and sets out a series of “conclu-
sions.”31 It is only here that Buridan lays out the principles of his own view, and 
                                                 
29 ‘Proposition’ in mediaeval logic does not typically mean what it does in recent phi-
losophy. For the Middle Ages, a proposition was a piece of language, a declarative sentence — 
even (depending on the author) an individual sentence-token. The word was not typically used in 
its modern sense, to mean whatever it is that is “expressed” by such a declarative sentence or sen-
tence-token. (There are some exceptions, but don’t worry about them for now.) I will be using 
‘proposition’ in its mediaeval sense throughout this book, except where I quite explicitly indicate 
otherwise. 
30 Scott translates it as ‘God is not’ (Scott, trans., p. 65). 
31 Beginning on p. 24 of Scott’s edition, p. 70 of his translation. 
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finally32 actually delivers his own verdict on each of the six sophisms in turn, and 
on the supporting arguments for or against them. In other words, the first six 
sophisms in Buridan’s Ch. 1 are not treated one after another; they are all treated 
together. 
The moral of this whole story is this. Always be sure, when you’re attrib-
uting a view to Buridan or to any other late mediaeval philosopher, that he is 
speaking for himself in the passage you are looking at, and not simply reporting 
some view he himself rejects. It is very easy to lose track of where we are in these 
discussions, especially when — as in this first chapter of Buridan — the structure 
of the discussion gets complicated. Always read around the text you are looking 
at, to see its context. 
C.  What Is A “Sophism”? 
Sophisms — in a sense we must now describe — lend themselves espe-
cially well to this kind of quaestio-format. A “sophism” in the mediaeval sense is 
not just a piece of silly “sophistry” (although that meaning was current too). It is a 
kind of problem-sentence, a sentence (often accompanied by a little story or 
“case” [= casus] to set the context) for which one can give more or less plausible 
and persuasive arguments on both sides — pro and con. Such sophisms served as 
vehicles for illustrating logical rules and distinctions. Their role was thus very 
much like that of Bertrand Russell’s more recent sentence ‘The present King of 
France is bald’, or Frege’s ‘The Morning Star is the Evening Star’. Of course, the 
real interest in Russell’s and Frege’s sentences does not lie in the planet Venus or 
in the state of the royal pate. There is a more substantive general point to be made 
in each case, and the two sentences are merely the vehicles chosen for illustrating 
it. So too in the mediaeval discussions of sophisms. There is always a theoretical 
issue that underlies the discussion, and if you don’t get it, the whole exercise will 
no doubt appear utterly fatuous.33 
It is easy to see how sophisms are tailor-made to be discussed in the 
quaestio-format. And that is what Buridan does in his Sophismata. 
                                                 
32 Beginning on p. 31 of Scott’s edition, p. 78 of his translation. 
33 For instance, there is a little treatise, attributed to William Heytesbury, called Asinine 
Sophisms (= Sophismata asinina), which begins by arguing that you are an ass. (See Wilson, Wil-
liam Heytesbury, p. 208.) It was this sort of thing that the Renaissance humanists loved to poke 
fun at. (Note that the title of this work has a double meaning both in Latin and in English. It can 
mean “Really Stupid Sophisms,” or it can mean — quite neutrally — “Sophisms about Asses,” 
which is exactly what the work is.) There has been some question about the authenticity of this 
work. But Fabienne Pironet, who has studied the question, concludes that the work is genuinely 
by Heytesbury. See Pironet, “‘The Sophismata asinina’.” 
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D.  The Relation of Writing to Speech 
Now let’s turn to Buridan’s first two “conclusions” in Ch. 1 of his 
Sophismata.34 They will lead us directly into the main topic I want to discuss in 
the present chapter. Here Buridan is speaking for himself, not just presenting an 
argument to be rejected later. Here is his first conclusion (Text (61))35: 
And the first conclusion is that written letters signify utterances36 
[that are] spoken or will be spoken. And they do not signify any 
things outside the soul, such as asses or rocks, except by means of 
the signification of utterances. 
For example, the written word dog, according to the claim in this first 
conclusion, signifies the spoken term ‘dog’. (For convenience, let us agree to use 
underlining to indicate written expressions, and single quotation marks to indicate 
spoken expressions. This convention will be followed throughout the rest of this 
book in cases where it matters.) 
Buridan gives two illustrations, which he thinks support this first conclu-
sion. Whether they really do support it or not doesn’t matter for the present. At 
any rate, they do illustrate his point, and that is enough for now. 
(1) First illustration: Teachers teach students to read and write by 
teaching them which letters go with which sounds. Thus, the writ-
ten letter b goes with the spoken consonant ‘b’, the written letter a 
with the spoken vowel ‘a’, and so on. Under the name “phonics,” 
something like this method is often still used to teach children to-
day. It makes even more sense in a language like Latin that is more 
phonetically spelled than English is. 
(2) Second illustration: Consider someone whose native tongue is 
Latin. (In fact, by the fourteenth century, there were effectively no 
native Latin speakers left. Latin was a second language, which one 
learned for certain specialized purposes: philosophical, theological, 
                                                 
34 Scott ed., pp. 24–25; Scott trans., pp. 70–71. 
35 Note: Underlined references to numbered passages refer to the collection of texts 
gathered in Appendix 2 at the end of this volume. Scott ed., p. 24; Scott trans., p. 70. For the 
words ‘by means of the’ Scott’s translation has ‘through the mediate’, which is not at all the same 
thing. The point is of some importance, because Buridan is not saying here that the signification 
sounds have is “mediated” in any way. Scott has mistranslated an active participle as a passive 
participle. The same point arises with the second conclusion. See n. 53, below. 
36 utterances = voces. There is no uniformly good English translation for this word. Basi-
cally, a vox (plural voces) is a sound produced by the vocal apparatus of an animal. It may or may 
not mean anything. ‘Word’ is both too broad and too narrow a translation, too broad because we 
talk about written words as well as spoken ones, too narrow because it suggests meaningfulness. 
‘Speech’ will work sometimes, but often suggests long-winded oratory, whereas a vox might be a 
single syllable. After long experience, I have adopted the policy of translating this word ‘utter-
ance’ and just living with it. For some mediaeval explanations of what the word means, see Texts 
(20) and (75). 
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legal, medical, diplomatic, etc.37 But this does not affect Buridan’s 
point.) In order to get Buridan’s illustration to work, you have to 
suppose he is talking about an illiterate Latin speaker. Such a per-
son, Buridan says, knows what the spoken sentence ‘A man is run-
ning’ (or rather its Latin equivalent ‘Homo est currens’) signifies, 
since he speaks Latin, after all. But he is left completely in the 
dark by the written sentence A man is running (or Homo est cur-
rens), because he is illiterate. On the basis of the illustration, Buri-
dan seems to think the reason the man doesn’t know what the writ-
ten sentence means is that he doesn’t know how to pronounce it. 
The actual statement of the first conclusion (with its reference to “written 
letters”), and the first illustration, suggest that Buridan is thinking that individual 
letters signify the correlated spoken phonemes. But in fact, Buridan wants to 
make a more general claim. It’s not just isolated letters that signify utterances, but 
rather written language as a whole that signifies spoken language. 
This is clearer in the second illustration, which operates on the level of 
whole words and sentences rather than of individual letters and phonemes. The 
point is perhaps confirmed a little later on in Buridan’s Ch. 1, where Buridan is 
explaining his eighth “conclusion” (Text (64))38: 
And so too a written term, if it does not supposit materially, neither 
supposits for itself, nor for the utterance it immediately signifies, 
… 
Do not worry for now about the terminology of “suppositing,” materially or oth-
erwise, and of “immediate” signification. We will discuss all that later. For the 
present, just note that Buridan here says that a written term immediately signifies 
an utterance. The point is that Buridan is here talking about a written term — that 
is, a whole word, not just individual letters. 
The general idea in all of this then is that written language is viewed as in 
some sense inferior to and dependent on spoken language. A written sentence, for 
example, signifies first of all the sounds you would utter if you read the sentence 
aloud. Of course, it also signifies whatever the spoken sentence signifies — but, 
as Buridan indicates at the end of his Conclusion 1 (Text (61)), that is a secondary 
and derivative kind of signification, which he says is by means of the signification 
of the spoken sentence: 
And the first conclusion is that written letters signify utterances 
[that are] spoken or will be spoken. And they do not signify any 
things outside the soul, such as asses or rocks, except by means of 
the signification of utterances. 
                                                 
37 See Murphy, “The Teaching of Latin as a Second Language in the 12th Century.” 
What he says about the twelfth century is even more true of the fourteenth. 
38 Don’t worry here about what his eighth conclusion actually is. 
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E.  What Is “Signification”? 
Without worrying too much about the details of the signification relation 
for now, we ought at least to get a rudimentary idea of what it involves. 
The Latin verb ‘significare’, and its corresponding noun ‘significatio’, are 
frequently translated by ‘to mean’ or ‘meaning’. I think this should be avoided in 
almost all technical contexts. The term ‘meaning’ is a notorious one in modern 
philosophical vocabulary. It suggests a connection perhaps with the “ordinary lan-
guage” philosophers’ doctrine that “the meaning is the use,” or with various Mon-
tague versions of meaning, or Fregean “senses,” or Quinean “stimulus-response 
meaning,” and so on. Any one of these theories may be quite respectable in its 
own right, but there are so many of them. And besides, none of them is very much 
like what the mediaevals called significatio or “signification.” 
There was a perfectly clear notion in the Middle Ages of what significa-
tion is. Authors tell us quite explicitly. We don’t gain anything by translating that 
quite clear notion into the obscure, or at least controversial, modern notion of 
“meaning.” We’ll talk more about this point later. 
Well, what was this mediaeval notion of signification that was so clear?  
There was a great disagreement in the Middle Ages about what it is that 
linguistic units signify, but there was universal agreement over the defining crite-
rion, and that is what we are interested in now. Buridan mentions this criterion in 
discussing the fourth sophism of his Ch. 1 (Text (60))39: 
For “to signify” is described as being “to establish the understand-
ing” of a thing. Hence a word is said to signify that the understand-
ing of which it establishes in us. 
Thus: 
To signify x =df. to establish an understanding of x. 
The Latin here is ‘constituere intellectum’, construed with the genitive. 
‘Understanding’ (= ‘intellectus’) in this context does not necessarily imply any 
kind of theoretical knowledge; to “understand” x, in the sense relevant here, is 
simply to have a concept of x. In the end, therefore, the general idea is that a thing 
signifies what it makes us think of. 
There are two main sources for this notion in the Middle Ages. The first 
and probably less important source — at least less important in this context — is 
St. Augustine’s De doctrina christiana (= On Christian Doctrine), II, Ch. 140: 
                                                 
39 For the word ‘establishing’, Scott translates “that which establishes,” which is not 
right. He has translated an infinitive (‘constituere’), which in Latin (as in English) also serves as 
the nominative of the gerund, as though it were an active participle. 
40 Augustine, De doctrina christiana, Martin, ed., II, c. 1, lines 5–7. Robertson’s transla-
tion (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine), p. 34, omits the ‘else’, which is important, because the 
word implies that for Augustine signification is irreflexive. I am not happy with the ‘of itself’ 
(= ‘ex se’) in this passage. If it is to be construed with the verb ‘makes’ (= ‘faciens’), it implies 
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For a sign is a thing that of itself makes something else besides the 
impression it makes on the senses come into cognition. 
Basically the same point is made in Augustine’s De dialectica, Ch. 5, al-
though that work did not circulate widely in the Middle Ages41: 
A sign is what shows both itself to the sense and something else 
besides itself to the mind. 
In the De doctrina christiana, Augustine goes on to give examples of such 
“signs.” When we see smoke, we think of fire — and so smoke “signifies” fire. 
When we see a track or footprint, we think of a person or animal that made that 
footprint — and so the footprint “signifies” the person or animal. 
So taken, the notion of signification is very broad, and is not by any means 
confined to language. Any sort of mental association will count as a signification 
relation. We see one thing; we think of something else. 
This notion of signification is of course too broad to be generally useful in 
logic and semantic theory. Ockham, for one, recognized this and distinguished 
two senses of the word ‘sign’. Here is the first one42: 
In one sense [it is taken] for everything that, when apprehended, 
makes something else come into cognition … 
This is what we might call the broad sense of ‘sign’. And it is exactly the 
sense we have just seen defined by Augustine.43 
But Ockham goes on immediately afterwards to define a more restrictive 
sense of ‘sign’.44 This more restrictive sense is the notion of a linguistic sign. I 
won’t pause over that definition now, since it contains some technical terminol-
ogy we’ll go into later. But I do want to point out now that, in Ockham’s second 
sense, a sign need not always signify something else, as Augustine and Ockham’s 
own first definition required. In other words, in the linguistic sense, a thing might 
very well be a sign of itself. That is not ruled out by the second definition Ockham 
gives. This is a small point, but it has misled some people into making big errors. 
                                                                                                                                     
that signs have their significative capacity “built in,” and that signification has nothing to do with 
human convention. This may be acceptable for the kinds of signs Augustine goes on to treat in the 
immediately following lines (I’ll discuss those in a moment), but it will hardly do for linguistic 
signs. Perhaps the ‘ex se’ is to be construed with the ‘else’, in which case ‘something else’ be-
comes ‘something other than itself’. This is the way Robertson translates it. It avoids the theoreti-
cal problem I just mentioned, but seems to me to strain the Latin. ‘Aliud ex se’ is not a locution I 
am familiar with. (The normal construction would be ‘aliud a se’.) Perhaps those who know 
Augustine’s Latin better than I do can adjudicate the matter. 
41 Augustine, De dialectica, p. 86. 
42 See William of Ockham, Summa of Logic I.1, § 11. 
43 Notice the word ‘else’. 
44Ibid., § 12. 
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Note that all this means that Ockham’s second sense of ‘sign’ is not just a 
subcase of the first. There are signs in the second sense that are not signs in the 
first sense — namely, those that are signs of themselves. 
Augustine therefore is one source for the notion of “signification” in the 
Middle Ages. But a second and much more important source for mediaeval logic 
and semantics generally is Aristotle. The relevant passage is De interpretatione 3, 
16b19–21. Here is my translation directly from the Greek (Text (4)): 
Therefore, verbs spoken by themselves are names, and signify 
something. For the speaker halts his thinking and the listener 
pauses. 
But of course few mediaeval logicians after Boethius read Greek. They 
read their Aristotle in Latin, and in particular they read the De interpretatione in 
the Latin translation of Boethius (or something pretty close to it). In the passage 
just quoted, Aristotle is talking about verbs. And he says that verbs, like nouns, 
are names. That is, they signify something. And why does he say that? Well, here 
is his reason (in my English translation of Boethius’ Latin translation, of Aris-
totle’s Greek (Text (10))): 
Indeed verbs, when uttered by themselves, are names and signify 
something. For he who says [a verb] establishes an understanding, 
and he who hears it rests. 
The part about the hearer’s “resting” is rather obscure. Presumably it 
means roughly that the hearer’s mind stops and fixes on something when he hears 
a verb. But in any case, that’s not the important part of the passage. The important 
part is the phrase ‘establishes an understanding’. Someone who utters a verb es-
tablishes an understanding. 
Boethius’ Latin here is ‘constituit intellectum’. And there you have it: the 
very phrase Buridan uses in Ch. 1, sophism 4 (Text (60)), to define signification. 
The only difference is that he puts it in the infinitival form. 
Buridan is therefore implicitly appealing to Aristotle’s notion of significa-
tion in that passage. It is an appeal his contemporaries would immediately have 
recognized. And you should come to recognize it too; the phrase ‘establish an un-
derstanding’ should tip you off whenever you see it. 
This psychologico-causal notion of signification was the predominant one 
throughout the Middle Ages. To cite just two further examples, we find it for in-
stance in the twelfth century, in Peter Abelard45: 
…universal names seem to bring about no signification of things 
— especially since in addition they establish no understanding of 
any thing. 
                                                 
45 From his Logica ingredientibus. See Peter Abelard, Peter Abelards philosophische 
Schriften, the Glosses on Porphyry, p. 18.16–17. My translation, from Spade, Five Texts on the 
Mediaeval Problem of Universals, p. 40, § 79. 
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What Abelard is saying here in effect is this: Here is a problem for you. 
Universal terms don’t seem to have any signification. Why not? Because they es-
tablish no understanding of any thing. 
The details of his argument are irrelevant here. The point is simply: 
there’s that phrase again. Even authors who don’t use those exact words neverthe-
less have pretty much the same notion of signification. Thus, for our second ex-
ample, here is a common late mediaeval definition of signification46: 
To signify is to represent (a) something or (b) some things or (c) 
somehow to a cognitive power. 
This turns out to be pretty much the same notion, although it’s broken 
down into three separate clauses to accommodate three separate cases. We’ll talk 
more about this later on when we discuss the notion of signification directly.47 
But for the present we are not really concerned with the details of the signification 
relation and what exactly it is. What we are mainly concerned with is what the 
title of this chapter calls “the threefold division of language.” 
F.  Three “Levels” of Language 
Now you may think I’ve gone off track by now. But I haven’t. What I’ve 
done so far is a kind of extended commentary on the first of Buridan’s four “con-
clusions” in Ch. 1 of his Sophismata. Let’s diagram what we’ve got at this point 
in our story. The written term man, for example, signifies the spoken term ‘man’. 
(Recall that we are using underlining to quote written expressions and single quo-
tation marks to quote spoken expressions.48) In the discussion of the eighth con-
clusion in his Ch. 1, Buridan calls this signification relation an immediate one 
(Text (64))49: 
And so too a written term, if it does not supposit materially, neither 
supposits for itself nor for the utterance it immediately signifies 
nor for the concept it signifies consequently, by means of the utter-
ance, … 
Once again, don’t worry for now about the terminology of material supposition. 
Just note the italicized words. We have then: 
 
                                                 
46 Translated from the Latin quotation in Nuchelmans, Late-Scholastic and Humanist 
Theories of the Proposition, p. 14. 
47 See Chapters 5–6, below. 
48 See p. 59, above. 
49 Part of this was quoted above, p. 60. 
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Figure 4: The Relation of Writing to Speech 
On the other hand, Buridan’s Ch. 1, conclusion 1 (Text (61)), and perhaps 
also Text (64) quoted just above (although the point is maybe not very clear in the 
latter text50), tell us that a written term may also signify other things as well — 
namely, whatever the corresponding spoken term signifies. But this is a kind of 
derived signification, and only comes about by means of the signification of the 
spoken term.51 
In conclusion 1 (Text (61)), Buridan puts the point badly. He says there 
that written terms do not signify anything outside the mind except by means of the 
signification of the spoken term. But he doesn’t mean that, because of course the 
spoken term itself is outside the mind, and the written term signifies that immedi-
ately. What he means instead is that written terms don’t signify anything (whether 
in the mind or outside the mind) other than the corresponding spoken terms, ex-
cept by means of the signification of those spoken terms.52 And, as we shall soon 
see, they do signify additional things in that mediated way. Thus we can add a 
little more to our diagram: 
                                                 
50 Nevertheless, note the words “signifies consequently,” in connection with the discus-
sion to follow. 
51 See n. 35 above, on Scott’s mistranslation of this first conclusion. 
52 Scott’s mistaken translation “except through the mediate signification of the sounds” 
(see n. 35 above) suggests it is the signification of the spoken term that is mediated. But that’s not 
what the Latin says. It is the signification of the written term that is said to be by means of (= me-
diated by) the signification of the spoken term. 
Chapter 3: The Threefold Division of Language 
 66
Figure 5: Mediate and Immediate Signification 
Now let’s look at Conclusion 2 of Buridan’s first chapter, where we get a 
third level (Text (62))53: 
The second conclusion: significative utterances signify passions54 
(that is, concepts) of the soul and not other things, except by means 
of the signification of concepts. 
In the discussion of his eighth conclusion (Text (63)), Buridan tells us that 
this signification relation between the spoken word and its corresponding concept 
is another relation of immediate signification.55 
Hence it is to be noted further that although an utterance immedi-
ately signifies a concept, nevertheless by means of the concept it is 
imposed to signify the [things] that are conceived by that concept. 
So we now have the following picture (let’s agree to use double quotation marks 
for concepts, just as we are using underlining for written terms and single quota-
tion marks for spoken terms): 
 
                                                 
53 Once again Scott has ‘except through the mediate signification’ where I have ‘except 
by means of the signification’. Again he has translated an active participle as a passive one. 
54 This is a common usage, and is not nearly as interesting as it sounds. It just means 
“things received passively.” 
55 The passage comes a little before Text (64), quoted on pp. 60 and 64 above. Note that 
here Scott has the active participle translated correctly (“through the mediation of”). 
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Figure 6: The Three Levels of Language 
The spoken term then immediately signifies the concept, and mediately 
signifies what the concept signifies. 
Of course, since the written term mediately signifies what the spoken term 
signifies, as we have already seen, and since the spoken term signifies the con-
cept, it ought to follow that the written term signifies the concept too. And that is 
so. As Buridan remarks in his discussion of his eighth conclusion (Text (64))56: 
And so too a written term, if it does not supposit materially, neither 
supposits for itself nor for the utterance it immediately signifies 
                                                 
56 The passage has already been quoted twice, on pp. 60 and 64 above, but I am here 
emphasizing different words. Note that here again Scott has the active participle translated cor-
rectly (“through the mediation of”). 
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nor for the concept it signifies as a consequence, by means of the 
utterance … 
The full schema can therefore be presented as follows (and this time let’s 
label the various relations R1 through R6, for future reference): 
 
Figure 7: The Full Schema 
What we have then here is the notion that concepts play the role of terms, 
just like spoken and written terms, only instead of being terms in spoken or writ-
ten language, concepts are terms in a kind of mental language. 
In the discussion of sophism 1 in his first Chapter, Buridan extends this 
notion to talk not just about mental terms but also about mental propositions57: 
For every spoken [proposition] signifies a mental one similar to it 
or proportionally corresponding to it… 
Again, in the reply to his first sophism, he does the same thing.58 
                                                 
57 Scott ed., p. 20; Scott trans., p. 64. Recall the caveat above (n. 29) on the mediaeval 
use of the word ‘proposition’. Don’t worry for now about the talk of “similarity” and “proportion” 
in the quotation. 
58 Scott ed., p. 31; Scott trans., p. 78. The word in square brackets is not in the Latin. But 
it is implied, unless mental proposition are going to be said to “correspond” to themselves. 
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And I say that for the truth of a spoken proposition it does not suf-
fice that it have a similar mental proposition corresponding to it in 
the mind, because that is common to every [spoken] proposition. 
So we can generalize: Spoken terms, spoken propositions, and perhaps 
units of spoken language generally, signify corresponding units of mental lan-
guage. So too, one step further removed, do the units of written language. The 
point then is this: Mental language is to be viewed as a full-blown language in its 
own right. 
G.  Variations of Terminology 
Before I go on, I want to give you some alternatives to the terminology we 
have developed so far. 
In the passage just quoted, Buridan refers to the mental proposition “corre-
sponding” to the spoken proposition. And at the end of the discussion of his con-
clusion 6, he refers to “the concept corresponding to the [spoken] expression 
‘white man’.”59 Thus relation R2 is also called a relation of correspondence. And 
the same thing can then presumably be said of relation R3, between written ex-
pressions and spoken ones, and for that matter presumably of relation R4 too, be-
tween written expressions and mental ones. 
In his conclusion 9, Buridan speaks of spoken and written terms as “sub-
ordinated” to concepts60: 
Therefore, there is to be concluded a ninth conclusion, that an ut-
terance or inscription, taken significatively and subordinated to an 
incomplex concept, supposits for the things it ultimately signifies 
— that is, for the things that are conceived by that concept … 
So R2 and R4 are also called relations of subordination. The same thing 
can be said about relation R3. (We’ll see more of this “subordination”-talk later 
on.) 
Likewise, in the same passage Buridan says that spoken and written terms 
ultimately signify what the concepts conceive.61 So relations R5 and R6 are also 
called relations of ultimate signification. 
All of these locutions you will find in other writers too. In short, the termi-
nology is rather fluid, although the picture stays the same throughout. 
                                                 
59 Scott ed., p. 27; Scott trans., p. 74. 
60 Scott ed., p. 28; Scott trans., p. 75. 
61 As we shall see, this means they ultimately signify what the concepts signify. 
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H.  More about Relations R1 through R6 
Note that mental language is as high as you go. No one in the Middle 
Ages speaks about a still “higher” level of language. As a result, relation R1 is an 
immediate signification relation. Buridan doesn’t actually say that, at least in any 
passage I have noticed, but that’s what it is. 
We have then six relations: R1 to R6, as in Figure 7 above (p. 68). The 
three relations of immediate signification (R1, R2, and R3) are basic or primitive 
relations. The other three are derived relations, and can be defined in terms of re-
lations R1 through R3. 
For example, a spoken term t bears the relation R5 of mediate signification 
to something x iff62 it bears the relation R2 of immediate signification (subordina-
tion, correspondence) to some concept c that bears the relation R1 of immediate 
signification to x. 
This kind of thing is what logicians call a “relative product,” and symbol-









(There are obviously several equivalent ways to define R6.) 
I.  The Primitive Relations 
How are the three basic or primitive relations, R1 through R3, established? 
Take R1 first. We have already seen from Conclusion 2 of his Chapter 1 (Text 
(62)), that, for Buridan, a spoken word mediately signifies what the correlative 
concept signifies. But in the discussion of Conclusion 8 (Text (63)), he puts it dif-
ferently63: 
                                                 
62 If you don’t know this little piece of notation, get used to it now. ‘Iff’ just means “if 
and only if.” It is very convenient. 
63 This was quoted above, p. 66. As you can tell, Buridan’s discussion of that eighth 
conclusion is a very rich and fertile one. This is now the fifth time we have cited one or another 
part of it. 
R5 = R2 | R1. 
R4 = R3 | R2, 
R6 = R4 | R1 
= (R3 | R2) | R1 
= R3 | (R2 | R1) 
= R3 | R5. 
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Hence it is to be noted further that although an utterance immedi-
ately signifies a concept, nevertheless by means of the concept it is 
imposed64 to signify the [things] that are conceived by that concept. 
What he previously said the concept signifies he here says is conceived by 
it. Thus it appears that a concept signifies just what it is a concept of. In other 
words, relation R1, one of the three primitive relations in our schema, is just the 
relation of conceiving. 
There is a close connection between the notion of a concept and the notion 
of an understanding. ‘Understanding’ translates the Latin fourth-declension noun 
‘intellectus’. Like the English ‘understanding’, the Latin word has at least three 
different senses: 
(1) It can mean “understanding” in the sense of intellect — the 
power or faculty of the mind by which it understands 
things. While you should be very much aware of this sense 
of the term, it is not what I want to focus on here. Or 
(2) It can mean “understanding” in the sense of what the intel-
lect does — that is, the act of understanding. In this sense, 
an “understanding” is the exercising of the power or faculty 
that is the “understanding” in sense (1). Or again 
(3) It can mean the concept or notion of the understood object. 
Thus we say, for instance, “I have an understanding of 
what you mean.” Depending on your theory of concepts, 
you might say that an “understanding” in this sense is the 
product or result of an “understanding” in sense (2).65 
Finally, Latin ‘intellectus’ can also be used not as a fourth-declension 
noun but as the passive participle of the verb ‘intellego’ (= “understand”). In 
many of its inflected forms, the participle is indistinguishable from the noun. In 
this usage ‘intellectus’ simply means “understood” — that is, the understood ob-
ject itself. 
This variety of meaning can cause confusion if you are not aware of the 
possibilities. (So do be aware of them.) 
Here is my reason for bringing this up. Recall our definition of significa-
tion.66 To signify, we said, was to establish an understanding = constituere intel-
lectum. Most interpreters in the Middle Ages took the term ‘intellectum’ here (the 
                                                 
64 We will talk about “imposition” soon. Relations R2 and R3 are relations established by 
imposition. 
65 I say that depends on your theory of concepts. Ockham, for example, eventually came 
to adopt a theory according to which concepts just are acts of understanding — “understandings” 
in sense (2) — not the objects, products or results of such acts. But he had held a different view 
earlier. 
66 See p. 61 above. 
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accusative of ‘intellectus’) in the third of the senses just listed. And quite plausi-
bly so — that reading seems to make the best sense. 
So if concepts are signs and signify what is conceived by them (as our the-
ory so far tells us), they are signs only in a funny and peculiar sense. They estab-
lish an understanding or concept of a thing only by being the understanding or 
concept of that thing. They make us think of a thing by being themselves the 
thought of the thing. 
Concepts are thus signs in a “degenerate” sense, in the way in which we 
say for instance a circle is a “degenerate” case of an ellipse. It is perhaps for this 
reason that Buridan rarely speaks of concepts as “signifying” their objects (al-
though he does it occasionally), but instead prefers to speak of them as “con-
ceiving” their objects.67 
So much for relation R1. 
Relations R2 and R3 are different. They arise by what is called “imposi-
tion” or (somewhat less frequently) “institution.” Spoken and written expressions 
were thus said to be imposed or instituted to do a certain linguistic duty. We find 
Buridan, for example, using the terminology of imposition for spoken terms in the 
discussion of his Conclusion 8 (Text (63)), and for written terms in the discussion 
of his Conclusion 168: 
This is apparent, because masters who teach children the alphabet 
teach them what [it is] such letters are imposed on …  
We’ll look more at the notion of imposition later on. 
J.  The Sources of the Doctrine 
I’ve already given you Augustine and especially Aristotle as sources for 
the definition or notion of signification we have developed so far.69 But where did 
the Middle Ages get this picture of the three-fold division of language? Once 
again, the sources are Augustine and more especially Aristotle. 
                                                 
67 See Reina in John Buridan, “Giovanni Buridano: ‘Tractatus de suppositionibus’,” pp. 
382–387. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, p. 243, says that Buridan actually denies that 
concepts signify. But we have already seen one passage (Text (62)) where Buridan explicitly says 
they do. Conclusion 7 of his Ch. 1 provides another example (Scott ed., p. 27; Scott trans., p. 74): 
“Therefore, seventh, it is to be concluded that not every complex concept that is the subject or 
predicate in a mental proposition supposits for everything it signifies …” (Do not worry about the 
term ‘supposits’ for now.) In Spade, “The Semantics of Terms” (p. 190), I conjectured that it was 
perhaps the oddity of saying that concepts “signify” that led a certain English Dominican William 
of Crathorn (fl. 1330–1332) to deny that there is a purely naturally significant mental language. 
But a closer reading of his text (In primum librum Sententiarum, q. 2, in William of Crathorn, 
Quästionen, pp. 152–205) makes me now doubt that this was motivating him. On Crathorn, see 
also Schepers, “Holkot contra dicta Crathorn,” and Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, pp. 
212–219. 
68 Scott ed., p. 24; Scott trans., p. 70. 
69 See pp. 61–63 above. 
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For Augustine, the most extended discussion is probably in Book 15 of his 
De trinitate.70 He doesn’t talk much about written language there, but he does 
speak about the relation between spoken language and thought. Here is some of 
what he says (Text (7)): 
Consequently, the word that sounds outwardly is a sign of the 
word that shines within. 
Again, he says (Text (6)): 
Thus whoever is able to understand the word, not only before it 
sounds but also before the images of its sounds are pondered in 
thought — for this is what pertains to no language (namely, none 
of those that are called national languages, of which ours is Latin) 
… 
He goes on to say that anyone who can do this can begin to understand the 
mystery of the Trinity. 
Keep in mind the point about how this “inner word” (that is, the concept) 
belongs to none of the “national” languages. We will come back to it. 
As with the definition of signification discussed earlier,71 Augustine is al-
ways in the background, but the main source is Aristotle. This time the relevant 
passage is De interpretatione 1, 16a3–8 (Text (3)) — pay special attention to the 
italicized words): 
Therefore, things in speech are symbols of passions72 in the soul, 
and things written [are symbols] of those that are in speech. And 
just as letters are not the same for all [people], neither are utteranc-
es the same. But the things of which these [utterances] are primar-
ily signs are the same for all [people, namely] passions of the soul. 
And what the latter are likenesses of — [namely,] real things — 
are also the same. 
This text circulated in the Middle Ages in Boethius’ translation, which 
came with two commentaries, a shorter and a longer one. In Texts (11)–(12), I’ve 
given you relevant texts from Boethius’ first and shorter commentary, and in 
Texts (13)–(14), I’ve given you passages from the second and longer commen-
tary. Here is my English translation of Boethius’ Latin translation of Aristotle’s 
Greek (the emphasized words correspond to the emphasized words in the passage 
above (Text (9))): 
                                                 
70 Representative passages may be found in De trinitate XV.10.19, XV.11.20, XV.12.22, 
and XV.27.50. (These are references to standard internal divisions of the text.) Ockham cites this 
discussion, for example, in his Summa of Logic I.1, § 6. 
71 See pp. 61–63 above. 
72 See n. 54 above on this term. 
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Therefore, things in speech are marks of passions73 in the soul, and 
things written [are marks] of those that are in speech. And just as 
letters are not the same for all [people], neither are utterances the 
same. But the things of which these [utterances] are primarily 
marks are the same for all [people, namely] passions of the soul. 
And what the latter are likenesses of — [namely,] real things — 
are also the same. 
They look a lot alike, don’t they? As well they should, since Boethius was 
an excruciatingly literal translator — virtually word-for-word. But notice one 
small departure in the translation. Aristotle had said that spoken words are sym-
bols (σύμβολα) of passions of the soul, as written words are of speech. But later 
on in the same passage he says that spoken sounds are signs (σημεῖα) of pas-
sions of the soul. There is some question about whether Aristotle himself meant to 
distinguish the symbol relation from the sign relation.74 But whatever Aristotle 
thought about it, notice that Boethius in his translation conflates the two, and calls 
them both relations by which one thing is a mark (nota) of another. 
Now ‘mark’ is a fair translation of Aristotle’s ‘σύμβολον’, but Boethius 
in his first commentary (Text (11)) makes it quite clear that he sees no difference 
between being a mark of something and being a sign of it. Thus any distinction 
that Aristotle might have intended is effectively obliterated by Boethius — and so 
for the subsequent mediaeval tradition. 
Just what do you suppose Aristotle means when he says that spoken 
sounds are symbols of passions of the soul? Does he mean sense-impressions, or 
memory or fantasy images, or concepts as distinct from these? Or does he mean 
all of them? Aristotle’s text is simply not clear here. 
Boethius, on the other hand, is quite clear (Text (13), from the second 
commentary). He takes Aristotle to be talking about concepts only — intellec-
tus,75 understandings. Thus, for Boethius, written words signify spoken words, 
and spoken words signify concepts. 
Boethius goes on (Texts (14)–(15)), again from the second commentary), 
to say we are not just talking here about isolated terms, but that in fact there are 
three kinds of discourse or language, and that mental discourse is divided into 
nouns and verbs just as spoken and written discourse is. And, he says, all this 
comes from the Aristotelians (the Peripatetics, as he calls them). 
This is the basis, then, for the common three-fold mediaeval division of 
language into written, spoken and mental language. 
                                                 
73 See n. 54 above on this term. 
74 On this question, you might want to consult Kretzmann, “Aristotle on Spoken Sound 
Significant by Convention.” 
75 As a fourth-declension noun, ‘intellectus’ is spelled the same in the plural as in the 
singular. But the ‘u’ is a long one in the plural, so that it is pronounced something like “intellec-
toose.” Sometimes, where the context leaves it ambiguous, a little long-mark is put over the ‘u’ in 
the plural: ‘intellectÞs. But this is merely a modern crutch for the weak, and I will not use it. 
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K.  Natural vs. Conventional Signification 
Let’s back up a moment, to Aristotle’s original passage in De interpreta-
tione 1, 16a3–8 (Text (3)). Notice that he says there that “letters” and spoken 
words (= utterances) “are not the same for all [people].” They differ, as Augustine 
would put it (Text (6)), according to the “national languages.” (I told you we 
would come back to this.76) Thus, the Greeks say “anthropos” and the Latins say 
“homo.” The Greeks write it in their script as ‘ἄνθροπος’, and the Latins in 
theirs as ‘homo’. 
On the other hand, Aristotle goes on, the concepts are the same for every-
one. They are, he says, likenesses of external objects, which external objects are 
the same for everyone. (The external world is a public one.) Concepts, then, do 
not belong to any of the “national” languages, as Augustine puts it. 
This means there is an important difference between R1 in our schema, on 
the one hand, and R2 and R3, on the other.77 R1 is a relation of likeness or similar-
ity, and so does not vary from person to person, or from culture to culture. It is an 
ontological relation, established by nature, not by chance or convention. Hence 
we will see our mediaeval authors saying that the kind of signification concepts 
have is natural signification, and that mental language is a natural language. 
On the other hand, relations R2 and R3 are not like this. They depend on 
the “nation,” on the linguistic community. Thus we will also see authors talking 
about the signification of words and inscriptions as conventional (= ad placitum, 
literally “at your pleasure”) signification. So too, we will see people refer to spo-
ken and written language as a whole as artificial or conventional, in contrast to 
mental language, which is natural. 
Be careful: In modern philosophical vocabulary, we use the these expres-
sions quite differently. Latin and Greek are artificial or conventional languages 
for the Middle Ages, whereas they are referred to as “natural” languages in mod-
ern parlance, in contrast perhaps to Esperanto, or to the notational systems of 
Principia Mathematica, say, or of Frege’s Begriffschrift, which are “artificial” 
languages. The latter would all count as artificial or conventional languages ac-
cording to the mediaeval usage too, but so would Latin and Greek, French and 
Swahili; the only natural language in the mediaeval sense is mental language. 
Don’t be confused by this difference in terminology. 
Here are some passages where we find authors making this distinction be-
tween natural and conventional signification. There is nothing special about these 
passages in particular; I just picked them as illustrations: 
(1) Richard Lavenham, Summulae logicales, para. 778: Further, it 
has to be noted that there is a twofold difference between mental 
                                                 
76 See p. 73 above. 
77 See Figure 7, p. 68 above. 
78 Translated from Spade, “Notes on Richard Lavenham’s So Called Summulae Logi-
cales.” Lavenham was a contemporary of John Wyclif, and so wrote probably in the 1360s. He 
died probably sometime after c. 1400–1403. Lavenham was the author of many works on logic 
and other topics, but was for the most part utterly derivative and unoriginal. For more on Laven-
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terms, [on the one hand,] and spoken and written ones, [on the 
other]. For the first difference is that every mental term signifies 
naturally, but every spoken or written one signifies by convention 
and not naturally insofar as it is a term79 … 
(2) Ralph Strode, Logica, tract. 1 “De arte logica”80: Among these 
[terms], some are called mental, and they are the ones that are said 
to signify naturally, as is clear from Aristotle in the first book of 
the De interpretatione.81 For by them a thing is immediately con-
ceived. Therefore, they are called “intentions,” that is, likenesses 
of things. 
(3) Peter of Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, Part I “Concepts,” §§ 
1–282: Among terms, one kind [is] mental, another spoken, [and 
yet] another written. A mental term is a concept, in other words a 
soul’s or intellective power’s act of understanding. A spoken term 
is an utterance that signifies by convention. But a written term is 
an inscription [that is] synonymous in signifying with an utterance 
that signifies by convention. So “term” in its full generality can be 
described thus: A term is a sign naturally apt83 to signify to a cog-
nitive power, by vitally changing it, (a) something or (b) some 
                                                                                                                                     
ham’s life and works, see Spade, “The Treatises On Modal Propositions and On Hypothetical 
Propositions by Richard Lavenham”; Spade, “Notes on Some Manuscripts of Logical and Physi-
cal Works by Richard Lavenham”; and Spade, “Lavenham, Richard.” 
79 insofar as it is a term: Spoken and written terms may be said to signify “naturally” in 
the very broad sense in which anything can be said to signify whatever it makes us think of. Thus 
to hear a voice behind your back will make you think of the speaker (even though you may not be 
able to identify the speaker), merely because of the causal link between sounds of that kind and 
human vocal chords, a causal link that is natural and not at all conventional. In this very broad 
sense, screams and laughs may be said to “signify” naturally too. Logic, for mediaeval authors, 
deals with signification in a more restricted sense. 
80 Translated from Oxford, Bodleian, MS Canonici Miscellaneous 219, fol. 13ra55–58. 
Since the Latin text is not readily available, here it is: “Quorum [i.e., terminorum] quidam dicun-
tur mentales, et tales sunt qui dicuntur significare naturaliter, ut patet per Aristotelem primo Peri-
hermeneias, quia per illas res immediate concipitur. Ideo dicuntur intentiones, id est, similitudines 
rerum.” Strode too was a contemporary of John Wyclif and wrote around the 1360s. Parts of his 
Logica were used as textbooks at some later universities on the Continent. Although some trea-
tises from the Logica were published in early printed editions, there has never been an edition of 
the whole thing. For more on Strode’s Logica, see Maierù, “Le MS. Oxford, Canonici Misc. 219 
et la ‘Logica’ de Strode.” 
81 The relevant passage is De interpretatione 1, 16a3–8 (Text (3)), although Strode is 
reading it in the light of a long mediaeval tradition of interpreting it. In the Middle Ages, the De 
interpretatione was divided into two “books.” The division came right after Ch. 9, the famous 
“sea battle” passage. 
82 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 2ra. See Peter of Ailly, Concepts and In-
solubles, p. 16. The passage is the opening lines of the work. On Peter of Ailly, see also Ch. 2, p. 
48, above. 
83 naturally apt: The Latin is simply ‘natum’ plus the infinitive, literally ‘born to’. Com-
pare the English colloquial usage, as in “born to lose.” 
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things or (c) somehow, [either] from the imposition that [the sign] 
actually has or else from [the sign’s] nature. 
In the above definition ‘from the imposition that [the sign] 
actually has’ occurs, on account of spoken and written terms and 
mental [ones] improperly so called,84 which signify on the basis of 
imposition. ‘Or else from [the sign’s] nature’ occurs [in the defini-
tion], on account of mental terms properly so called, which signify 
naturally. Now to “signify” is to represent to a cognitive power, by 
vitally changing it, [either] (a) something or (b) some things or (c) 
somehow.85 
L.  Subordination 
The schema we have worked out above is fairly standard throughout the 
Middle Ages, although there were some variations on certain points. 
For example, consider Ockham’s Summa of Logic I.1, § 3. There he dis-
tinguishes the three levels of language, referring to Boethius for authority (proba-
bly to Texts (14)–(15)). In § 6, he refers to Augustine — to the very passage 
about “national” languages that is by now familiar to us (Text (6)). 
In that § 6, he goes on to say that, while concepts cannot be uttered aloud, 
spoken words, which are subordinated to concepts, can be uttered aloud. And in § 
9 of the same chapter, he says written expressions are related in the same way to 
spoken expressions. The point to get in all these passages is the notion of subor-
dination. 
Ockham talks about the three-fold division in several other places too, for 
example in his Commentary on the De interpretatione (Text (35)). There, as in his 
Summa of Logic I.1, we see that while structurally Ockham’s set-up is the same as 
Aristotle’s, Boethius’, and Buridan’s, nevertheless terminologically it is out of 
line. 
Ockham calls R2 and R3 subordination relations. We’ve seen Buridan use 
this term too,86 but for Ockham subordination is not a kind of signification rela-
tion. He agrees with everyone else that written expressions are conventionally (ad 
placitum) correlated with spoken ones, and spoken ones conventionally correlated 
with mental expressions. But he denies that this correlation amounts to a signifi-
cation relation. 
This is not just a terminological point. For signification was a notion with 
a fixed meaning throughout the Middle Ages, as we have seen. By denying that 
R2 and R3 are signification relations, Ockham is making a substantive point. He is 
saying that spoken words do not make me think of concepts, and written words do 
not make me think of spoken words. I will return to this point later on. 
                                                 
84 The notion of mental language “improperly so called” will be discussed in Ch. 4 be-
low. 
85 With this last sentence, compare the late mediaeval definition quoted above, p. 64. 
86 See p. 69 above. 
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M.  Evaluation and Comparison of These Views 
Now that I’ve sketched these schemata (Ockham’s and the others’), let’s 
evaluate them and compare them with one another. 
1.  The Position of Written Language 
First of all, what about the position of written language in these schemata? 
Why is it placed below spoken language, in a kind of inferior status? 
The rationale here is the notion (which there is ample reason to doubt) that 
we don’t know how to read a language we cannot speak.87 For the most part, this 
was probably true in the Middle Ages, and the fact can be taken as evidence for 
the dominance of spoken language then. It is often said (rightly) that mediaeval 
culture was an oral culture. 
This was true not just because relatively few people could read, and there 
was no printing press yet (that was invented in the early 1450s), but — even more 
— because those people who could read usually could not read silently. 
There is an interesting passage in Augustine’s Confessions that illustrates 
this point. Augustine is talking about St. Ambrose, who had the marvelous ability 
to read without vocalizing88: 
But when he read, [his] eyes were drawn down the pages and [his] 
heart probed [their] meaning. Yet [his] voice and tongue were 
quiet. 
Augustine thought this was so odd that he goes on to speculate on why 
Ambrose would ever want to do such a thing, even granting that he could do it. 
Was it perhaps to avoid distracting those around him? Or perhaps to save his 
voice — after all, Ambrose was a well-known preacher. Finally, after exhausting 
the more obvious possibilities, Augustine in effect admits he is stumped, and says 
in desperation89: 
Nevertheless for whatever purpose he might do it, the man at least 
did it for a good one. 
                                                 
87 This is not the same claim as the one Buridan made in the second illustration of his 
Sophismata, Ch. 1, Conclusion 1. (See pp. 59–60 above.) There the man did know Latin; the rea-
son he could not read the written sentence was rather that he did not know the conventional corre-
lations between written and spoken Latin. That is, he did not know how the subordination relation 
worked there; he was illiterate, in other words. In the present case, however, we are talking about 
someone who does not know the conventional correlations between a certain spoken language and 
thought. 
88 Augustine, Confessions VI.3.3, O’Donnell ed., vol. 1, p. 60. 
89 Ibid. There’s more to the story. See O’Donnell’s commentary on this passage, ibid., 
vol. 2, p. 345. 
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But whatever they thought in the Middle Ages, written language is prob-
ably not necessarily related to spoken language in this way. Consider, for exam-
ple, Arthur Waley, the famous translator of classical Chinese texts. He did not 
know how to speak Chinese at all, and yet he could certainly read it with author-
ity. 
Or consider modern logical or mathematical notation. It is a relatively triv-
ial task to construct a formula that can be readily understood when written out but 
is very difficult to pronounce or read aloud.90 
In fact, we all know from our own experience that if you are trying to read 
quickly, then sounding out the words — even sounding them out silently without 
moving your lips — will only slow you down. Indeed, nowadays we regard it as a 
kind of abusive description of someone to say he is so stupid he can’t read with-
out moving his lips. 
So the presupposition behind the place of written language in our picture 
seems to be a false one. 
In this respect, Ockham’s theory is somewhat better than the others. He 
still, of course, maintains the genetic relation of written language to spoken lan-
guage. For him, a written expression gets its signification (what Buridan calls its 
ultimate signification) from the spoken expression. But it need not call to mind 
the spoken expression when we read it. To the latter extent his view does not 
commit him to quite so much as does the view of Boethius, Buridan and the oth-
ers. But it still implies that we cannot read a language we cannot speak. Written 
language is still subordinated to spoken language. 
I know of only two authors who quite definitely denied the genetic rela-
tion of writing to speech. One of them is Peter of Ailly91: 
 Therefore, it should be noted first that the term ‘proposi-
tion’ is used analogically for a mental proposition, a spoken [one] 
and a written [one]. It signifies the mental one before [it does] the 
spoken or written one. Hence a spoken proposition and a written 
one are subordinated to a mental one. But a spoken [proposition] 
and a written [one] do not have to be subordinated to one another92 
among themselves, as many [people] maintain. For if someone 
                                                 
90 It’s easy to do this with a judicious use of parentheses. Here’s a simple example: 
(p ⊃ (p ⊃ p)) ⊃  (p ⊃  (p ⊃ p)). Note that I’m talking about reading the notation, not spelling it. 
The expression ‘p ∨ q’ is read as “p or q”; it is spelled as “p wedge q,” or something like that. The 
expression ‘p ⊃ q’ is read as “if p then q,” or “p only if q”; it is spelled as “p horseshoe q.” It is 
interesting to observe which modern logicians read their notation and which spell it. My tentative 
hypothesis, based on close observation of my colleagues, is that the “readers” are more meta-
physically oriented (for example, interested in “formal ontology” and the like), while the “spell-
ers” have more sympathy with the notion of “uninterpreted calculi.” But I may be wrong. 
91 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 7va. See Peter of Ailly, Concepts and In-
solubles, § 93, p. 36. 
92 He doesn’t mean both ways; he means the one subordinated to the other. 
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reads a written proposition or understands it93, then [either] he un-
derstands what is ultimately signified by it or else not. If [he does] 
not, then such an inscription is not a proposition for him, and nei-
ther does the utterance corresponding to it signify anything to 
him.94 If he does [understand what is signified by the written 
proposition], then the written proposition immediately represents a 
mental one to him; it does not have to represent the spoken one. 
For Peter of Ailly, therefore, written expressions can be directly subordi-
nated to mental ones without going through any intermediary spoken expressions. 
The other author is Richard Brinkley, an English logician and theologian 
who wrote a recently discovered Summa logicae sometime between roughly 1360 
and 1373.95 Tract I of that Summa is “On terms in general” (= “De terminis in 
genere”), and in Chapter 5 of that tract, he says96: 
 From these [points made above], it is clear how what some 
people say is without truth. They say that just as a term in speech 
is subordinated to a concept in the soul, so [too] a term in writing 
is subordinated to a term in speech. For if terms were so subordi-
nated, then just as a term in speech cannot be understood or im-
posed to signify without [there being a corresponding] term in the 
soul, so [too] a term in writing could not be imposed to signify or 
be understood without [there being a corresponding] term in 
                                                 
93 I’m not sure why Peter has ‘or’ here, when ‘and’ would be more natural. Perhaps he 
means to contrast reading aloud with reading silently. After all, the upshot of his claim in this pas-
sage is that one can read silently without thinking of the associated sounds. But see n. 94 below. 
94 This last clause is obscure and seems to go against the whole point of the paragraph. 
One possibility is that Peter is thinking of reading without any vocalization at all, either aloud or 
silently. In that case, the reason the corresponding spoken proposition does not signify anything to 
the reader is just that the corresponding spoken proposition doesn’t exist, and so a fortiori doesn’t 
signify anything. On the other hand, see n. 93 above. 
95 On Brinkley, see Gál and Wood, “Richard Brinkley and his ‘Summa Logicae’.” Brink-
ley was mentioned in passing in n. 4 above. 
96 Since this first tract of the Summa has not been edited, I here give you my provisional 
edition of the relevant passage of the Latin from the two known extant manuscripts, P = Prague, 
Státní Knihovna, MS 396 (III.A.11), fols. 31ra–140ra, and L = Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 
MS 1360, fols. 1ra–105vb. (Those are the folio numbers for the Summa as a whole.) The passage 
occurs on P 34rb and L 5ra: “Ex istis patet (patet] patent ? P, patent L) quomodo non habet veri-
tatem quod (quod] qui L) aliqui ponunt dicentes quod sicut terminus in voce subordinatur concep-
tui in anima ita terminus in scripto subordinatur termino in voce. Nam si sic essent termini subor-
dinati tunc (tunc] om. L) sicut terminus in voce non posset (posset] potest ? L) intellegi nec im-
poni ad significandum sine termino in anima ita terminus in scripto (in scripto] inscriptus P) non 
(non] iter. P) posset imponi ad significandum nec intellegi sine termino in voce. Cui igitur natura 
non concessit (concessit] concessissent P) potentiam audiendi non posset (posset] potest ? L) 
aliquid addiscere.” If you don’t understand all the business in parentheses in the above passage, 
it’s called the “apparatus criticus,” and it records the variant readings in the two manuscripts. In 
most critical editions it is printed separately at the bottom of the page, but since you are already at 
the bottom of the page, I had to print it interpolated into the text itself. 
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speech. Therefore someone to whom nature did not grant the 
power of hearing would not be able to learn anything. 
Brinkley has a point, but his and Peter of Ailly’s view was decidedly a mi-
nority opinion in the Middle Ages. 
2.  The Position of Spoken Language 
Second, what about relation R2, the relation between spoken language and 
mental language? Do spoken words really signify concepts? When I hear words in 
speech, am I made to think of mental events? 
One reason for saying yes is given by Aquinas in his Commentary on the 
De interpretatione97: 
And if in fact man were naturally a solitary animal the passions of 
the soul would be enough for him. By them, he would be con-
formed98 to the things themselves in order to have knowledge of 
them in himself. But because man is naturally a political and social 
animal [instead], it was necessary that the conceptions of one man 
become known to the others. This is done by an utterance. And 
therefore it was necessary for there to be significative utterances, 
in order for men to live together with one another. Thus [people] 
who are of different languages cannot live together with one an-
other very well. 
The same idea is found in Augustine’s De doctrina christiana99: 
Now given signs100 are those living things give to one another, to 
show (as far as they are able) the motions of their spirit or any 
things they have sensed or understood. Neither is there any cause 
for our signifying — that is, for [our] giving signs — except to 
bring forth and get across to the mind of another what is going on 
in the mind of the one who gives the sign. 
                                                 
97 Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria in Aristotelis Peri Hermeneias I, c. 1, lect. 2. For a 
translation of the complete commentary, see Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle: On Interpretation. 
98 conformed: This is meant quite literally. According to Aristotelian-Thomist epistemol-
ogy, knowledge and its object share a metaphysical form. Thus to acquire knowledge is to be “in-
formed.” (That’s where we get the word ‘information’.) This is not the place to go into the details 
of the theory. 
99 Augustine, De doctrina christiana, Martin ed., II.2, lines 1–6. Compare the translation 
in Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Robertson trans., pp. 34–35. 
100 given signs = data signa. Augustine’s discussion suggests that this includes more 
than we have been calling “conventional” signs. Laughter and groans will qualify too, and for that 
matter gestures. (There is nothing in the passage about sound or speech.) Nevertheless, what 
Augustine says here does apply preeminently to spoken language. 
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The basic idea then is that the job of language is to express thought. When 
I hear what a person is saying, I know what he is thinking. This point of view em-
phasizes the social role of language for interpersonal communication. 
Ockham takes the opposite point of view. I know of nowhere Ockham ac-
tually argues that words do not in general signify concepts; he just takes it for 
granted that they don’t. Sometimes we hear words and we aren’t made to think of 
concepts at all; we are made to think of other things instead: rocks, trees, houses, 
and so on. 
Walter Burley, in one of his commentaries on the De interpretatione (he 
wrote several — for this one, see Text (34)), agrees with Ockham, although he too 
gives no real argument. He is willing to say that words always “signify” concepts, 
on the authority of Boethius, but is quick to point out that this is not “significa-
tion” in the sense of “that on which the name is first imposed.” In short, people do 
not set up language for the purpose of talking merely about their thoughts. 
On the other hand, John Duns Scotus, who wrote before either Burley or 
Ockham, does give an argument (although he doesn’t accept it) in his Questions 
on the First Book of the De interpretatione, q. 2.101 The question Scotus asks 
there is “Does a name [by which he here means a spoken noun or adjective] sig-
nify a real thing or a species [i.e., a concept] in the soul?” 
He refers to Aristotle’s De interpretatione 1, 16a3–8 (in Boethius’ transla-
tion, Text (9)) — that is, the text he is commenting on — in support of the af-
firmative. Then he gives several arguments for the negative side, that (spoken) 
names do not signify species or concepts.102 I have quoted the first one in the sec-
ond paragraph of Text (31). Scotus just points out there that we simply do not al-
ways think of concepts when we hear words. Sometimes we think of people or 
stones, or other things. The point is that this is simply an empirical fact. And that 
seems to be a correct. 
a.  The Transitivity of Signification 
In his resolution of the question (Text (31), last paragraph), Scotus sides 
with the affirmative: spoken words do signify concepts. The main point of his re-
marks here seems to be that signification is a transitive relation. 
                                                 
101 Text (31). Be warned that the current state of Scotus’ writings is a real mess. Scotus 
died relatively young, and many of his works were not yet in the form in which he wanted them. 
But it’s worse than that. There are a large number of works attributed to Scotus that are either 
certainly spurious or else at least of doubtful authenticity. Some of these are perhaps by more or 
less reputable Scotists, and so probably contain something close to his own doctrine, but you can’t 
rely on that. Furthermore, even the text of some of his authentic works is thoroughly mixed up 
with interpolations and glosses added by others. There is a committee set up (the so called “Scotus 
Commission”) to prepare critical editions of Scotus’ works, but they have for the most part pro-
ceeded very slowly, and some of their early conclusions have already been questioned and even 
revised. I do not intend to enter into the details of these questions here, since they are constantly 
changing. But you should take most of what I say about Scotus with all due caution. 
102 Remember the structure of the quaestio-form. See p. 55 above. 
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For example, we hear a word. It signifies the concept, which means that 
the concept comes before the mind, we think of it. But that concept or mental spe-
cies in turn signifies (brings to mind) some external reality, so that the original 
word also causes us, indirectly, to think of that external thing. 
This illustrates why it is important not to think of signification in modern 
terms, as “reference” or “meaning.”103 Reference and meaning are not transitive; 
signification is. 
Signification, in the mediaeval sense, is a special kind of causal relation: 
to signify x is to make one think of x. And so signification is just as transitive as 
the relevant kind of causality is. I see a written word, for example, and it makes 
me think (let us say) of the corresponding spoken word. The spoken word before 
my mind makes me think in turn of the corresponding concept. And the concept 
before my mind makes me think of what it is a concept of. This seems to be the 
sort of thing Scotus has in mind. 
The transitivity of signification, as a special kind of causality, is a point 
explicitly made by others as well. For example, Lambert of Auxerre104: 
For just as it is said that whatever is a cause of the cause is a cause 
of the caused, so in the [same] way it can be said that whatever is a 
sign of the sign is a sign of the significate. 
Likewise Burley in his so called Middle Commentary on the De interpretatione 
says105: 
Whatever is a sign of the sign is a sign of the significate. 
And again, in his Questions on the De interpretatione, he says106: 
And because whatever is a sign of the sign is a sign of the signed, 
therefore an utterance mediately signifies a thing. And in proposi-
tions there is a union for things107 and not for the passions [of the 
soul], just as in writing there is not a union for the written letters. 
Now in every expression there is a union for what is ultimately sig-
nified, that is, for what is signified in such a way that it does not 
signify [anything further]. 
                                                 
103 On ‘meaning’, see p. 61 above. For ‘reference’, it will become clear in Ch. 8 below 
that “supposition” is a much better candidate than “signification” is. 
104 Lambert of Auxerre, Logica, Alessio ed., pp. 205–206. 
105 Translated from Brown, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Peri-
hermeneias,” p. 55, § 1.15. Note: Burley is not speaking for himself here, but only describing a 
view. Note too: A “middle commentary” is midway between a mere epitome and a full-blown 
phrase by phrase commentary. 
106 Translated from Brown, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” p. 
208, § 1.3. Note: Again, Burley is not speaking for himself in this passage, but only describing a 
view. 
107 The locution looks harder than it really is. To say there is a “union for” x simply 
means that the words are put together for the sake of talking about x. 
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Of course, given the fact that signification is transitive, and given Buri-
dan’s and Boethius’ schema, according to which the primitive relations R1, R2 
and R3 are all signification relations, it follows that the derived relations R4, R5 
and R6 are signification relations too. Earlier we called them relations of mediate 
signification.108 At that time, we just took the point for granted. Now we see why 
it holds. Note that this argument does not hold on Ockham’s theory, according to 
which R2 and R3 are not signification relations. (Nevertheless, he does accept the 
conclusion that R5 and R6 — though not R4 — are signification relations. He just 
doesn’t accept it because of this argument.) 
3.  More on the Position of Spoken Language 
In the Scotist text we are looking at (Text (31)), Scotus seems to be siding 
with Boethius and Buridan. But notice that his resolution of the problem does not 
really answer the objection he raised at the beginning.109 It remains as much an 
empirical fact as before that we don’t always think of concepts when we hear 
speech. 
In any case, Scotus takes it all back in another set of questions he wrote on 
the De interpretatione. This is the work known as the Opus secundum or Second 
Work on the De interpretatione. I have quoted you the relevant passage in Text 
(32). There Scotus seems to take just the opposite point of view. There are textual 
difficulties with the passage, but at any rate it is clear that Scotus denies there that 
spoken words directly signify concepts in the mind. 
But there’s more. Scotus does not seem to have made up his mind on the 
issue. There is still another text of his, from his Ordinatio, an indisputably authen-
tic work that is his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, edited and 
prepared for “publication”110 by Scotus himself. I have translated the relevant 
passage as Text (33). Here Scotus holds that written, spoken and mental terms all 
directly signify the same things, although there is still a relation of genetic de-
pendence among the three. This of course is exactly what Ockham would hold 
shortly afterwards. 
My reason for citing all these texts here is merely to show you that the 
question whether spoken words signify concepts — that is, whether R2 is a signi-
fication relation — was not one that was altogether settled in this period. 
On the one hand, we have traditional view that language expresses 
thought; this provides motivation for an affirmative answer. On the other hand, 
we have the empirical fact that we simply do not always think of concepts when 
we speak or listen; this gives us the motivation for a negative answer. The differ-
ence between these two points of view is exactly the difference between Aristotle, 
Augustine, Boethius and Buridan, on one side, and Ockham and Burley, on the 
other. Scotus is on both sides, depending on which passage you read. 
                                                 
108 See Figure 7, p. 68 above. 
109 Text (31), second paragraph. 
110 This of course doesn’t mean “printing.” It meant preparing a hand-corrected manu-
script that he would then submit to the copyists. 
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Here is a little table listing the opposing teams: 
 
Figure 8: Do Words Signify Concepts? 
4.  Unanswered Questions 
To some extent it must be said that important issues in this dispute were 
not brought out very clearly and explicitly. For example, consider the affirmative 
side, the view that spoken words do signify concepts. Just whose concepts are 
signified in this way? 
When I hear you speak, it’s not my concepts that I am made to think of on 
this theory, but yours. Your thoughts are conveyed to me. The real point of the 
“social” view of language is that words signify the speaker’s concepts to the 
hearer. This is obscured by just saying without qualification that “words signify 
concepts.” 
Furthermore, even if words do signify the speaker’s concepts to the hearer, 
this holds only where the speaker is not identical to the hearer. When I listen to 
myself speak, my words do not typically make me think of my own concepts. My 
concepts are presumably already there, and are only being expressed in speech. 
Even if you hold that sometimes our concepts are simultaneous with our words 
(we “think as we speak”), still it would be hard to make the case that the concepts 
are caused by the words that are supposed to express them. 
For that matter, it would appear that neither do my own words call any-
thing to my mind — concepts or otherwise. My words, on this “social” theory of 
language, are supposed to express my thoughts (quite apart from the additional 
claim that they also signify my thoughts to my audience); they do not produce 
any thoughts in me — or at least this theory gives no reason to think they do. 
In short, some important lines in this dispute were not very clearly drawn. 
The Aristotelian, Augustinian, Boethian, Buridanian, sometimes-Scotist 
view — the one that takes R2 as a signification relation — emphasizes the social 
role of language for intercommunication. But by itself it ignores the plain fact that 
we often are not talking about concepts but about things. The Ockhamist-
Burleyite-sometimes-Scotist view, on the other hand, tends by itself to treat lan-
guage as an isolated, disembodied, abstract thing, and ignores the pragmatic and 
interpersonal role of language.111 
                                                 
111 This has real consequences. On Ockham’s most considered theory, for example, a 
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N.  Postscript 
Why have we considered this three-fold division of language at such 
length? Mainly, it was in order to bring out the notion of mental language for our 
inspection. 
First of all, it is obvious that in the schema we have developed it is mental 
language that is primary and basic. The properties — or at least many properties 
— of spoken and written language are to be accounted for by their relation to 
mental language. In fact, there are some grounds in the mediaeval literature for 
saying that what you study when you study logic is just mental language, its syn-
tax and semantics, and the inferential relations that hold in it. 
Such a notion is not altogether explicit in all the authors we have consid-
ered. It is strongly suggested by Ockham,112 but there is no suggestion of it in 
Buridan that I can find. Perhaps the clearest statement of the view is in Vincent 
Ferrer, a late fourteenth author of a broadly Thomist persuasion.113 
Second, it is worth pointing out that semantics in general is the theory of 
the relation between language and what that language is about — between lan-
guage and the world. On the other hand, mental language consists of thoughts — 
concepts and judgments. Thus, by studying the semantic features of mental lan-
guage, we are in effect studying the relations between concepts or judgments and 
the world. In short, the semantic theory of mental language is part of epistemol-
ogy. This means that we can use the machinery of semantic theory and apply it to 
certain questions in epistemology. That’s a nice thought. 
With all that in mind, in the next chapter we shall turn to mental language 
in more detail. 
O.  Additional Reading 
                                                                                                                                     
user. Yet he often speaks — and so does much of the secondary literature — as if certain terms 
were “absolute” all by themselves, in the abstract. We will talk more about this in Ch. 7 below. 
112 See Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham, Ch. 2, § 1, pp. 31–38. Although 
Moody’s book is by now more than half a century old, it is still very useful. Use it with caution, 
but treat it with respect. 
113 See Trentman, “Vincent Ferrer on the Logician as Artifex Intellectualis.” 
For additional reading on the material covered in this chapter, see: John Buri-
dan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, Scott’s “Introduction,” especially §5A, 
pp. 22–29; ibid., Ch. 1, especially the first four “conclusions,” pp. 70–72; Wil-
liam of Ockham, Summa of Logic, through Ch. 1; Philotheus Boehner, “Ock-
ham’s Theory of Signification,” in his Collected Articles on Ockham.  
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he idea of mental discourse was by no means a late mediaeval innovation. 
Anyone thoroughly familiar with Aristotle or Augustine had encountered 
the notion there, and those who wrote commentaries on the De interpreta-
tione of course had to deal with the idea directly. But for the most part, 
people were content to say what Boethius or Augustine had already said, and 
leave it at that. It was not until the early-fourteenth century that certain authors 
began to work out a real theory of mental language and to put it to philosophical 
use. 
William of Ockham appears to have been one of the first to do this, if not 
the very first. His treatment of mental language is perhaps the most extensive and 
detailed in the entire Middle Ages. (It is certainly the most extensive and detailed 
discussion I know.) A little later, John Buridan also began to work out a theory of 
mental language. His view by and large agrees with Ockham’s on the main points. 
But there are some important differences of detail, and Buridan’s account is not 
nearly so detailed as Ockham’s. 
By 1342,1 Gregory of Rimini had developed the theory in certain ways. 
(Just how original he was is not certain. We shall discuss his views below.) And 
in 1372, Peter of Ailly made use of both Gregory and Ockham in his own Con-
cepts and Insolubles, in an ingenious application of the theory of mental language 
to semantic paradoxes like the Liar Paradox. 
Other authors discussed mental language too, and perhaps some of them 
made major contributions; the detailed history of the theory is not yet known. We 
shall confine ourselves primarily to the four authors just mentioned, with occa-
sional remarks about others. 
                                                 
1 The date of Gregory’s Commentary on Book I of the Sentences. (See p. 46 above.) Note 
that at least some of what Buridan has to say about mental language (what he says in the Sophis-
mata) is probably later than 1342. (See p. 55 above.) 
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B.  The Conventionality of Spoken and Written 
Language 
What is the most basic feature that distinguishes mental language from 
spoken or written language? Answer: Mental language is supposed to be a natural 
language, whereas spoken language and written languages are conventional.2 
To say that mental language is “natural” is to say that its features are not 
established by choice or convention, but by nature. They’re not up to us. On the 
other hand, not all the features of spoken and written languages are established by 
nature in this way; some such features are conventional. The conventions can be 
changed, with the result that there are different languages over time. And for that 
matter the conventions can vary at any one time, so that there are several distinct 
languages all coexisting simultaneously (like English and French). 
Let’s look more closely at this notion of conventionality.3 
Many mediaevals were impressed by the fact that not only are spoken and 
written language “conventional” in the sense that Latin differs from French — 
that is, not only in the sense that there are interlinguistic differences that are ex-
plained by convention — but even within a single conventional language, you 
could give special meanings to certain utterances or inscriptions for certain spe-
cial and perhaps temporary purposes. Consider, for example, the instantiation of 
variables in modern logic: “There is an x such that φx. Let it be a.” Similarly, as 
Buridan points out, this sort of thing is done all the time in geometrical proofs4: 
For every day, some people in their disputations impose new 
names on things, so that an acute angle is called “A” and a straight 
line is called “B.” 
The adopting of a convention for a certain linguistic expression is called 
“imposition” (as Buridan implicitly just called it) or “institution.” 
1.  Robert Fland’s Extreme View 
Just how far should one carry this conventional nature of spoken and writ-
ten language? Some people wanted to take it very far indeed. For example, a cer-
tain Robert Fland. Let me first introduce him to you, and then I’ll talk about his 
extreme views on conventionality. 
Not much is known about Robert Fland. There is a manuscript in the town 
library at Bruges (that’s in Belgium), containing three short logical texts with his 
name on them. Fland cites other people’s views, and one of his own writings ap-
                                                 
2 Recall my earlier caveat about the word ‘natural’ in this context. It does not mean what 
people mean nowadays by it. See p. 75 above. 
3 On this, see the discussion in John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 6. 
4 John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 6, in the discussion of sophism 1. Scott ed., p. 103; 
Scott trans., p. 158. 
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pears to have been used later by Ralph Strode.5 On the basis of these connections, 
we can date his writings to between 1335 and about 1370.6 The name ‘Robert’, 
together with the sources he used and the influence he had, suggests that he was 
an Englishman. But that is basically all we know about him. No one suggests that 
he was an especially important or innovative thinker. (Certainly I’m not going to 
suggest it.) Nevertheless, he does have some interesting things to say. 
In his Consequences, Fland is discussing what he calls “copulative” 
propositions — what are nowadays called “conjunctions,” propositions of the 
form p & q.7 Here is what he says (Text (74)): 
A proposition is called “copulative” when a mark like ‘and’ joins 
propositions to one another, like ‘You run and you are at Rome’. A 
proposition is called “of coupled extreme” when the mark ‘and’ 
joins terms to one another, like ‘You are a man and an animal’, or 
‘Socrates and Plato run’. For a copulative to be true when imposi-
tion is withdrawn, it is required that every part be true. But, by 
means of an imposition, a copulative is true when every part of it is 
false. For instance, if the copulative ‘You are an ass and you are a 
nanny goat’ is imposed to signify precisely that God exists, and 
every part of it principally signifies nothing beyond its primary 
signification, then that copulative is true and every part of it is 
false. Likewise, a copulative is false and every part of it is true, 
and this by means of an imposition. For instance, if the copulative 
‘You are a man and you are an animal’ is assumed to signify pre-
cisely that you are an ass, and each of its categoricals has its pri-
mary signification, then the copulative is false and every part of it 
is true. 
Note the use of the clause ‘when imposition is withdrawn’. In this passage 
Fland observes that “when imposition is withdrawn” — that is, barring any spe-
cial or what is sometimes called “new” imposition, but leaving the normal lin-
                                                 
5 On Strode, see p. 76 above. 
6 I have edited Fland’s works in Spade, “Robert Fland’s Consequentiae,” “Robert 
Fland’s Insolubilia” (that paper also discusses his dates), and “Robert Fland’s Obligationes.” In 
the first of these papers, I remarked that in the case of each of the three attributions in the manu-
script, there is a period after the name ‘Robert Fland’, perhaps indicating that it is an abbreviation 
for ‘Robert of Flanders’ (in short, ‘Robert Fleming’). But I have more recently found the name 
‘Thomas Fland’ in an early-fifteenth century Oxford manuscript without any mark of abbrevia-
tion, suggesting that ‘Fland’ was a legitimate name on its own. (For Thomas Fland, see John Wy-
clif, Summa insolubilium, p. xiv.) 
7 Mediaeval logicians did not usually call them “conjunctions” or “conjunctive proposi-
tions” because the term ‘conjunction’ was used for the grammatical part of speech that includes 
not only ‘and’ but also ‘or’ or even ‘because’. It’s still used that way today, so that it’s the modern 
vocabulary that has the greater potential for confusion in this respect — a potential that, admit-
tedly, isn’t actualized very often in practice. 
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guistic conventions intact8 — the truth of a copulative proposition ‘p & q’ (and he 
means a spoken or written proposition) requires both the truth of p and the truth 
of q. (He doesn’t say so, but he also means that this is a sufficient condition too. 
Mediaeval authors are frequently very lax about this.) These are the normal con-
ventions. 
But, he goes on, since language is conventional, we can adopt different or 
new conventions, if we want. And if we do that, we might end up with a set of 
conventions whereby the spoken proposition ‘p & q’ is true, even though p itself 
is false and so is q! 
He gives an example. Consider the (spoken) proposition ‘You are an ass 
and you are a nanny goat’. It is a copulative proposition, of the form p & q. Now 
suppose we adopt a convention (an “imposition”) according to which that propo-
sition as a whole expresses the mental proposition “God exists,”9 but each con-
junct in it expresses just what it ordinarily does. In that case, both p and q are 
false, but the conjunction ‘p & q’ is true.10 
Or, we could do it the other way around, he says. We could have a situ-
ation where both p and q are true but their conjunction ‘p & q’ is false. For exam-
ple, let the spoken proposition ‘You are a man and you are an animal’ express the 
mental proposition “You are an ass,” but each conjunct express just what it ordi-
narily does. 
What is happening in both these cases is that the parts of the spoken copu-
lative are subordinated to the mental propositions with which they are ordinarily 
correlated, but the whole spoken copulative is subordinated to something com-
pletely different. Spoken language is conventional, after all, and so we can set 
things up any way we want. What Fland is in effect emphasizing here is that ‘any 
way we want’ means any way we want. In particular, the mental proposition to 
which a compound spoken proposition is subordinated need not be determined in 
any way by the mental propositions to which the components are subordinated. 
(And of course this applies mutatis mutandis to written language as well.) Thus 
the subordination of the whole need not be a function of the subordination of the 
parts. 
Of course, normally it is; Fland is not denying that. But it doesn’t have to 
be, and we can change it if we want. Language is conventional, after all. 
This passage from Robert Fland is probably the most extreme statement I 
have seen of the conventionality of spoken and written language. Most other au-
thors would probably, if you pushed them, agree that, yes, you can be that “non-
standard” if you want. But in fact they don’t say much about that possibility, pre-
                                                 
8 Otherwise, if there were no linguistic conventions imposed whatever, we wouldn’t have 
a piece of language at all. 
9 Recall from Ch. 3, p. 59, above that when I’m trying to make distinctions, I quote men-
tal expressions with double quotation marks. Unlike the distinction between written and spoken 
language, the distinction between either of those and mental language is a very important one for 
mediaeval authors, and so for us. Hence I will continue to use this convention when it matters. 
(When it doesn’t matter, I will use double quotation marks in the normal, loose way American 
English customarily does.) 
10 Fland of course believed in God. 
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cisely because it is so “non-standard.” Most of our authors tend to present their 
semantic theories within the limits of the normal conventions of imposition.11 
For example, Buridan (Text (70)) gives an account of truth conditions for 
categorical propositions on the basis of the semantic contributions of their terms. 
(The theory is called “supposition theory,” and we will talk about it below.) Ock-
ham does the same thing, and in Part II of his Summa logicae12 he gives an ac-
count of the truth conditions for certain compound propositions as functions of the 
truth conditions of their components. This sort of thing will not work, of course, 
in the kind of situation Fland is talking about. Buridan and Ockham really have 
no theory of truth conditions for such “funny cases.” Their theories are spe-
cialized theories that apply only to a subset of all the possible cases that might 
arise. 
2.  William Heytesbury’s Odd Restriction 
But while most authors, if you pushed them, would probably agree that, 
yes, language is as radically conventional as Fland says it is, there are some odd 
exceptional figures. 
For example, in 1335 William Heytesbury wrote his Rules for Solving So-
phisms.13 Chapter 1 of that work is devoted to the Liar Paradox, ‘This very propo-
sition is false’.14 As you probably know, the problem with such paradoxical 
propositions is not just that they are contradictory. There is no special problem 
with contradictory propositions. We know how to treat them: they’re just false. 
The problem with the Liar and related paradoxes is worse than that. There it ap-
                                                 
11 Nevertheless, Fland was not alone. The Logica magna attributed to Paul of Venice 
says the same thing, and uses virtually the same examples (Paul of Venice, Logica magna II.3, 
Broadie ed., pp. 90–91): 
 Note that I also say ‘signifying according to the composition [of its 
terms]’. For it is consistent that some copulative [proposition] be false and each 
main part of it be true. [This is] clear. I take the copulative [proposition] ‘You 
are a man and you are an animal’. Let the first part primarily signify you to be a 
man, and the second one [primarily signify] you to be an animal. Therefore, be-
cause the copulative is distinguished from these categoricals taken together — 
since it adds on the mark of coupling — let it primarily signify you to be an ass 
and you to be a nanny goat. The conclusion [then] follows. 
Also, some copulative [proposition] is true, each categorical [part] of 
which is false. [This is] clear for [the copulative] ‘You are an ass and you are a 
nanny goat’, positing that the parts adequately signify in the usual way and the 
copulative [as a whole] signify that you are a man and that [Note: I suspect this 
‘that’ should be deleted.] you are an animal. The conclusion [then] follows. 
12 Summa logicae II.32–33. Freddoso and Schuurman, trans., pp. 186–189. 
13 On Heytesbury, see Ch. 2, p. 47, above. For the date, see Weisheipl, “Ockham and 
Some Mertonians,” p. 196.  
14 I have translated Ch. 1, with a study, in William Heytesbury, On “Insoluble” Sen-
tences. 
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pears that we don’t just have a contradictory proposition, but a contradiction in 
our semantic theory itself.15 
Heytesbury’s theory of these paradoxes says in effect that propositions 
like the Liar Paradox — in the circumstances that make them paradoxical16 — do 
not mean just what they appear to. They have to mean something else, which is to 
say there has to be some other, “non-standard” imposition involved, even if we 
are not explicitly aware of it.  
The details of Heytesbury’s theory, and some of the difficulties it gives 
rise to, need not detain us here. The point at present is just that Heytesbury thinks 
this conclusion is inevitable. If the Liar and such propositions did mean just what 
they appear to, then they really would be paradoxical, there would be no way to 
avoid the paradox, and so our semantic theory really would be contradictory. But 
to say that our theory is contradictory is just to say that we need to reject it and 
adopt a better theory, one according to which the Liar and such propositions do 
not mean just what they appear to. 
Notice what Heytesbury is saying here. He is saying that there are certain 
propositions that under certain conditions cannot be imposed to behave semanti-
cally as expected. But this amounts to a curious restriction on the radical conven-
tionality of spoken and written language. We can’t make propositions mean just 
anything we want — or at least we can’t do that under all circumstances. 
But this is just bizarre. Consider the proposition ‘Everyone in the world 
who is speaking right now is uttering a false proposition’. Normally that proposi-
tion is false (typically not all speakers are doing that), but its meaning is quite un-
problematic. It “means just what it says.” Nevertheless according to Heytesbury’s 
theory, if you should utter that proposition while everyone else in the world hap-
pened to fall silent for a moment, the proposition could no longer “mean just what 
it says”; it would have to mean something else. And note that this follows whether 
you or anyone else realizes that the circumstances have temporarily made your 
proposition problematic. The whole world might consciously and explicitly in-
tend for that proposition to continue to mean just what it normally does. But this 
wouldn’t make any difference; it can’t do that just then. So much the worse for 
the “conventionality” of spoken language. 
The situation with Heytesbury’s theory is unusual but not unique. Al-
though most authors agreed that the semantic features of spoken and written lan-
guage were entirely a matter of arbitrary convention, some of them then cheer-
fully went on anyway to hold other doctrines that required restrictions on those 
conventions. 
                                                 
15 If you’re not familiar with how such paradoxes work, don’t worry about it. I’m only 
appealing to Heytesbury’s discussion of them to illustrate a quite different point. 
16 For Heytesbury, propositions are not paradoxical (in the way the Liar Paradox is) all 
by themselves. There is a story that goes with them. This was called the “case” (= casus). (‘Casus’ 
is a fourth-declension noun, so that its plural is also ‘casus’, but with a long ‘u’.) 
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C.  Natural Signification 
Now that we’ve looked at conventional language, let’s look at natural lan-
guage — that is, mental language. 
Perhaps the most important thing that’s “natural” about natural language is 
that its terms (namely, concepts) get their signification by nature and not by con-
vention. We’ve seen this claim before, of course.17 But now let’s look at it more 
carefully. Recall Aristotle’s De interpretatione 1, 16a3-8 (Text (3)): 
Therefore, things in speech are symbols of passions in the soul, 
and things written [are symbols] of those that are in speech. And 
just as letters are not the same for all [people], neither are utteranc-
es the same. But the things of which these [utterances] are primar-
ily signs are the same for all [people, namely] passions of the soul. 
And what the latter are likenesses of — [namely,] real things — 
are also the same. 
There Aristotle tells us that although spoken and written terms differ from 
linguistic community to linguistic community, mental terms or concepts (as 
Boethius interpreted the passage) do not. They “are the same for all.” 
This doesn’t mean that everyone has exactly the same supply of concepts, 
since that’s plainly not so; we think about and know about different things. And 
besides, some people I could mention appear to have a much smaller set of con-
cepts in their minds than you and I do, gentle reader. Instead what it means is that, 
for example, my concept “man”18 and your concept “man” differ only “numeri-
cally,” as they said. That is, they are exact duplicates of one another. They do not 
differ in the way the English spoken word ‘man’ differs from the Latin spoken 
word ‘homo’ or from the Greek spoken word ‘ἄνθροπος’, which are more than 
numerically different. (They don’t sound at all alike.19) In short, what Aristotle is 
saying in this text is that, while we may speak and write in different languages, 
we all think in the same language. 
Why is this supposed to be so? 
Well, Aristotle tells us in the same passage that concepts or mental terms 
are likenesses of real things and that real things are just what they are, the same 
for everybody. A stone is just a stone, and that’s the end of the matter. It doesn’t 
change its structure or nature depending on who’s thinking about it. It is “objec-
tive” in the sense of being interpersonally invariant. We all therefore live in the 
same world, ontologically speaking. There is no room for any sort of “ontological 
relativity” (to use Quine’s phrase) in this Aristotelian doctrine. 
Now concepts, Aristotle has just told us, are likenesses of these interper-
sonally invariant things. That is, the relation between a concept and what it is a 
concept of is a relation of similarity or likeness. What kind of similarity relation 
                                                 
17 See Ch. 3, pp. 75–77, above. 
18 Recall once again that we are using double quotation marks to quote concepts. 
19 The written words don’t look alike either. Hence they too are more than numerically 
distinct. 
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this is, and whether this theory of concepts will work, we shall have to ask later. 
Here let’s just explore some of the consequences of the doctrine. 
Similarity, when it occurs, is an objective fact. There is nothing conven-
tional about it at all. (Of course, it may be a matter of convention or cultural con-
ditioning which similarities matter to us, or which ones we notice. But that is an 
altogether different question.) If Socrates and Plato, for example, are alike to the 
extent that they are both over six feet tall, then that fact does not depend on any-
one’s convention20; it is, so to speak, a fact of “nature.” And it is not made any the 
less a fact of nature because the custom of measuring things in feet rather than, 
say, centimeters, is itself purely a convention of society. 
So too, if I have a concept that is similar to a stone (in whatever sense of 
similarity is involved here), then that too, it would seem, is a fact of nature, not 
subject to convention. But if it is a fact of nature whether my concept is similar to 
the stone in the relevant sense, then it is likewise a fact of nature whether my con-
cept is a concept of the stone. And therefore (since concepts signify what they are 
concepts of, you will recall21), it is a fact of nature whether my concept signifies 
the stone. 
It is in this sense that concepts signify “naturally.” Ockham tells us in his 
Summa of Logic I.1, § 10: 
Now certain differences are found among these [kinds of] terms. 
One is that a concept or passion of the soul signifies naturally 
whatever it signifies. But a spoken or written term signifies noth-
ing except according to arbitrary institution. From this there fol-
lows another difference, namely that a spoken or written term can 
change its significate at [the user’s] will, but a conceived term does 
not change its significate for anyone’s will. 
This tells us, then, in what sense the terms of mental language are sup-
posed to be the same for everyone. 
Now it requires some extra steps, but it is fairly clear that Ockham also 
thinks the other ingredients of mental language are the same for everyone too — 
not just what are called “categorematic” terms (those that can occur in subject or 
predicate position in propositions) but also the so called “syncategorematic” 
words, the grammatical particles, connectives, etc. In short, the whole of mental 
                                                 
20 A full treatment of this point would have to make it clear just which conventions are 
involved. For suppose Socrates and Plato both belong to an exotic culture in which everyone 
agrees that people should be as tall as possible. As a result, children are force-fed vitamins, given 
growth hormones, stretched on the rack, and so on. In that case, it might very well be true that 
either Socrates or Plato would have turned out less than six feet tall if it were not for the conven-
tions of their society, conventions that affected their diet and therefore their growth. In that sense, 
it might be said that the fact that they are both more than six feet tall depends on “convention.” 
But that is not the kind of linguistic convention we are talking about now. I leave it as an exercise 
to the reader to decide whether the relevant kind of convention can be characterized precisely — 
and if so, to do it. 
21 If you don’t, go back and look at Ch. 3 again. 
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language is the same for everyone. We come around to the same point: We all 
think in the same language. 
D.  Mental Language as the Explanation for 
Synonymy and Equivocation 
It is this fact that accounts for the possibility of translating from one lan-
guage to another. Insofar as a translation is supposed to “express the same 
thought” as the original, we can say that a statement in one language is a correct 
translation of a statement in another language iff the two statements are subordi-
nated to the same mental proposition. 
This suggests that mental language can provide us with a general account 
of synonymy, not only of interlinguistic synonymy (as with translation) but of in-
tralinguistic synonymy too. Two expressions — whether terms, whole proposi-
tions or whatever, whether from different languages or from the same language — 
are synonymous iff they are subordinated to the same mental expression. 
I say this is suggested. And in fact, until quite recently, it was the way the 
theory of mental language, particularly in Ockham, was generally understood.22 
But as it turns out, the situation is surprisingly messy. For now, let us develop the 
interpretation just described. Later on, we shall see the difficulties with it.23 
Here is one passage where Ockham talks about mental language and its 
connection to synonymy in speech or writing. It comes from Summa of Logic I.2, 
§ 5: 
Thus also it sometimes happens that two names24 are synonyms, 
and yet are of different genders and sometimes in different declen-
sions. For this reason, one need not attribute such a multiplicity [of 
genders and declensions] to natural signs. Thus, any plurality and 
variety of such accidents25 as can belong to synonymous names 
can be rightly dispensed with in mental [names]. 
That is perhaps not completely clear. But the point is made a little more 
plainly in Ockham’s Quodlibet 5, q. 8 (Text (51)), conclusion 2 (= § 11)26: 
                                                 
22 Two papers in the secondary literature are probably most responsible for this interpre-
tation: Trentman’s, “Ockham on Mental,” and my own “Synonymy and Equivocation in Ock-
ham’s Mental Language.” 
23 See later in this section, but especially Ch. 7 below. 
24 As the context shows, here he means names in speech or in writing — not mental 
names. 
25 accidents: That is, grammatical features. 
26 What does the word ‘quodlibet’ mean? Well literally it means “whatever you please.” 
In mediaeval universities, topics were often debated, in the classroom and elsewhere, using the 
quaestio-format. The term ‘quaestiones disputatae’ (= disputed questions) often refers to a collec-
tion of (heavily edited) summaries or reports of such debates by a single author. Such collections 
are usually focused around a single broad topic. (For example, Aquinas has a fairly large collec-
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… Therefore, one should not attribute the multitude of accidents 
that belong to synonymous names to natural signs [too], such as 
concepts, just as there is no plurality of concepts corresponding to 
synonymous names. 
In these passages the claim is that if two synonymous expressions of spo-
ken or written language differ from one another with respect to some linguistic 
feature, that difference is not reflected in mental language. The implicit reasoning 
appears to be that since synonyms are subordinated to the same mental expression 
(which is the point I’m trying to illustrate), it follows that if the relevant differ-
ence were carried over to the mental correlate of the spoken or written synonyms, 
the mental expression would have to differ from itself, which is absurd. For ex-
ample,27 the Latin words ‘lapis’ and ‘petra’ (a loan-word from Greek) are syno-
nyms; they both mean “stone” or “rock.” Yet the former is a third declension 
noun in the masculine, while the latter is a first declension noun in the feminine. 
Hence mental language lacks grammatical gender, and does not sort its nouns into 
different declensions. If it did, there would be nothing to prevent ‘lapis’ and 
‘petra’ from being subordinated to distinct concepts. But Ockham’s claim is that 
they are not. 
Here is one more passage, where Ockham states the point outright, from 
Quodlibet 5, q. 9 (Text (52), § 3)28: 
But there is no plurality in the mind corresponding to the multitude 
of synonymous names in speech. 
Note that in all these passages, Ockham is talking about spoken or written 
names — that is, nouns or adjectives. But that synonymy is not confined to names 
is clear from Text (51), § 16, where Ockham speaks of synonymy for spoken or 
written verbs: 
The reason [for this conclusion] is that sometimes verbs in differ-
ent conjugations and of different inflections can be synonymous. 
                                                                                                                                     
tion of such questions called Quaestiones disputatae de veritate — on the notion of truth.) But 
twice a year, certain especially daring “masters” would conduct public disputations in which they 
would debate any topic anyone cared to bring up — in short, “whatever you please” or “quod-
libet.” The reports of these disputations were often edited by the master and “published” — circu-
lated in manuscript form. Although the disputations were solemn and ceremonious occasions, 
there was no doubt a certain amount of bravado involved. A master who announced he would 
hold a quodlibet was in effect saying he would “take on all challengers.” A real, live quodlibet 
was held recently at The Ohio State University, conducted by mediaevalists in the Department of 
Philosophy there. From all reports, it was a smashing success. 
27 The example comes from Text (51), § 11. The point cannot be made well in English, 
which does not have a plurality of declensions or (except for pronouns) any gender that affects 
well-formedness. 
28 The quotation comes from one of the preliminary pro and con arguments in the quaes-
tio. In general, one must be very careful about citing such passages as reflecting the author’s own 
views. In this case, however, it is clear from the context that it does. 
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Consequently, such a diversity [of conjugation and inflection] does 
not have to correspond to them in the mind. 
All this seems clear enough. But if it is so, if synonyms are subordinated 
to the same mental expression, what are we to make of the following passage 
(Summa of Logic I.6, § 1): 
But, in order not to proceed in an ambiguous way, you have to 
know that the name ‘synonym’ is taken in two senses: strictly and 
broadly. Those synonyms are strictly so called which all users in-
tend to use for the same [thing]. I am not talking about synonyms 
in this sense here. Those synonyms are broadly so called which 
simply signify the same [thing] in all ways, so that nothing is signi-
fied in any way by the one [synonym] unless it is signified in the 
same way by the other, even though not all users believe them to 
signify the same [thing] but rather, under a deception, they judge 
something to be signified by the one that is not signified by the 
other … I intend to use the name ‘synonym’ in this second sense in 
this chapter and in many others. 
Here Ockham tells us that, in the sense in which he normally uses the 
term, it is possible for us to be mistaken about whether expressions are synony-
mous. But how can that be, if spoken and written synonyms are subordinated to 
the very same thought in the mind? To use the one term involves exactly the same 
mental events as using the other term does, so that it is hard to see how anyone 
could be mistaken about the terms.29 You begin to see why things are going to get 
complicated. 
We will have much more to say about synonymy later. But let us turn now 
to equivocation. Just as mental language provides an account of synonymy in spo-
ken and written language (even if it is a problematic account), so too it provides 
an account of equivocation there. Here the situation is not nearly so messy as it 
was with synonymy, but there will still be problems in Ockham’s case, as we 
shall discuss a little later. In any event, here is what Ockham says in his Summa of 
Logic I.3, § 3: 
                                                 
29 I don’t mean to suggest it is impossible to be mistaken in this way, only that it seems 
to be an entirely unmotivated mistake. There is a “use/mention” distinction to keep track of here. 
The proposition that synonymous spoken or written terms t and t* are not synonymous, or that one 
of them signifies something the other one doesn’t signify in the same way, is a proposition that 
mentions t and t*. In the mind, the proposition would presumably be one that doesn’t use the sin-
gle concept to which t and t* are both subordinated, but rather the concept of the term t and the 
concept of the term t*. (Those concepts will be quite distinct, since they are concepts of different 
things.) Nevertheless, it is hard to see how the mind would ever have any reason to assent to that 
erroneous proposition. 
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Now an utterance is “equivocal” if it signifies several [things and] 
is not a sign subordinated to one concept, but is instead a sign sub-
ordinated to several concepts or intentions30 of the soul. 
Thus a spoken (and presumably also a written) expression is equivocal iff 
it is subordinated to more than one mental expression.31 
Ockham goes on to say this holds not only for intralinguistic equivocation, 
but also for interlinguistic equivocation. It is a little hard to think of good exam-
ples of interlinguistic equivocation, but for spoken language consider the Latin 
‘homo’ (= man32) and the Greek prefix ‘ὁμο-’ (= the same). For written language, 
consider the sentence ‘Jam dies’. In English it affirms the mortality of that sweet 
substance one spreads on toast. (It’s an odd thing to say, of course, but that 
doesn’t matter here.) In Latin it says “Now it is day.”33 That’s equivocation if I 
ever saw it. 
In short, where the subordination relation is many-one, we have synon-
ymy. Where it is one-many, we have equivocation. 
Although it does not often arise in a language like Latin that is for the 
most part spelled phonetically, it is perhaps worth pointing out that similar con-
siderations can be applied to the subordination of written language to spoken lan-
guage, rather than of either written or spoken language to mental language. (That 
is, to relation R3 in Figure 7 from Ch. 3 above, rather than to relation R2 or R4.) In 
the case of ‘lead’ (the name of the chemical element) and ‘lead’ (the present tense 
of the verb) the relation is one-many. In the case of ‘red’ (the adjective) and 
‘read’ (the past tense of the verb) it is many-one.34 
                                                 
30 This is “intentions” not in the sense of volitions, but in the sense in which phenome-
nology talks about “intentionality.” 
31 Be careful how you think about this. A complex expression in speech (for example, 
the spoken proposition ‘The cat is on the mat’) may be subordinated to an equally complex mental 
expression (the mental proposition “The cat is on the mat”). (There’s our double quotation mark 
convention again.) Since the mental expression is composed of parts, each of which is a piece of 
mental language in its own right, one might be tempted to say that the spoken expression is there-
fore subordinated to several mental expressions (namely, to each of the parts of the complex men-
tal expression), and so would have to be counted as equivocal on the criterion just given. But that 
is wrong. The subordination relation relates spoken or written expression α to mental expression 
β. It does not (unless α really is equivocal) relate α to the parts of β, even though β may have 
parts. Warning: There is a big question whether mental expressions can have parts at all. We will 
talk about this later; for the present I am only trying to prevent a confusion about equivocation. 
32 That is, human being. For the male of the species, Latin has the separate word ‘vir’. 
33 This clever little example is not originally mine. But I no longer recall where I got it. 
34 The latter case is of course complicated by the fact that ‘read’, pronounced like ‘reed’, 
is also the present tense of the verb. 
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E.  Synonymy and Equivocation in Mental 
Language 
Mental language thus does a lot of work. It not only accounts for transla-
tion, but also for equivocation and synonymy in general. If this is so — if spoken 
or written expressions are synonymous or equivocal whenever their subordination 
to mental expressions fails to be one-one — then the question inevitably arises: Is 
there synonymy or equivocation in mental language itself?35 
My answer in both cases is no. I have arguments both of the textual kind 
and of the a priori, theoretical kind.36 
First a theoretical argument: What would equivocation or synonymy in 
mental language amount to? Since there is no supramental language to appeal to 
in the way one appeals to mental language to account for synonymy and equivo-
cation in spoken and written language, how could it even arise in mental lan-
guage? 
As it stands, of course, this argument is perhaps question-begging. It as-
sumes that the only way to account for synonymy and equivocation is by appeal-
ing to features of the subordination-relation in the way we did a moment ago. And 
that is far from obvious. 
Let’s look more closely. Take the case of equivocation first. An equivocal 
term is one that, in some straightforward sense I won’t try to specify here, “means 
two different things.” How can that happen with concepts? 
The spoken word ‘foot’, for instance, is subordinated to the concept of 
“foot” the bodily appendage, and also to the concept of “foot” the unit of meas-
urement.37 As a result, it signifies equivocally, both feet of the one kind and feet 
of the other. Likewise, the spoken word ‘bank’ is subordinated to the concept of 
“bank” the financial institution, and also to the concept of “bank” the side of a 
river. As a result, it signifies equivocally, both banks of the one kind and banks of 
the other. 
But if we had a concept that signified both kinds of feet (or banks), it 
would have to be a natural likeness of both kinds, in whatever sense of ‘likeness’ 
is involved when we say concepts are likenesses of things. Without worrying too 
much for now about just what kind of likeness that is, it nevertheless appears that 
such a concept, if it is possible at all, would not be an equivocal one but just a 
broader univocal concept — a rather odd one, no doubt, but not equivocal in any 
event. 
The distinction I am drawing here is a little (but only a little) like the dis-
tinction between the word ‘pen’, which equivocally means both the tool for writ-
                                                 
35 I have discussed this question in detail in Spade, “Synonymy and Equivocation in 
Ockham’s Mental Language.” 
36 Let me warn you that most of what I am going to be saying here applies mainly to 
Ockham. Buridan has remarkably little to say about the machinery of mental language. What he 
does say has to be gleaned piece by piece from remarks he makes in passing. 
37 Historically, these two uses of the word ‘foot’ are connected, to be sure. But that 
doesn’t spoil the example. The concepts are distinct anyway. 
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ing with ink and also the fenced enclosure for animals,38 and the term ‘tool for 
writing with or else a fenced enclosure for animals’, which means exactly the 
same things but is not equivocal at all; it’s just a broader univocal term. 
A somewhat similar theoretical argument can be given in the case of syn-
onymy. The term ‘rock’ and the term ‘stone’, let us say, are synonyms. They are 
subordinated to the same concept, which is a natural likeness of all stones (rocks) 
in the relevant sense. Could we have two concepts that were more than numeri-
cally distinct — that is, were not exact duplicates of one another, but differed in 
form or structure, in the way ‘rock’ and ‘stone’ differ in form and structure — 
could we have two such concepts and yet have them be concepts of exactly the 
same things? (We want the two concepts to be more than numerically distinct if 
we are going to talk about synonymy in any interesting sense. In a way, I suppose, 
we can say that two occurrences of the spoken term ‘dog’ are synonymous, but 
that is not the kind of synonymy that we are interested in. So too for concepts; we 
are asking about a kind of synonymy that involves more than mere repetition.) 
I don’t see how this could be possible, although here my argument is per-
haps not as strong as the previous one. I think the kind of “similarity” account of 
concepts that Ockham and others have in mind will require that two concepts are 
concepts of exactly the same things only if they bear exactly the same kind of 
relevant similarity relations to exactly the same things — that is, only if in form 
or structure they are relevantly like exactly the same things in exactly the same 
ways, and so only if they differ only numerically. Perhaps there is some way 
around this conclusion, but I do not see what it is. 
I have another more or less a priori, theoretical argument for this conclu-
sion, that there is no synonymy in mental language. We’ll look at it later in this 
chapter, when we turn to the question what goes into mental language.39 
In the meantime, let’s consider some textual arguments. In the case of syn-
onymy, we have already heard Ockham tell us that spoken or written synonyms 
do not correspond to synonymous concepts in the mind.40 Strictly speaking, of 
course, these texts do not say there are no mental synonyms at all; they only say 
in effect that if there are mental synonyms α and β, there are no spoken or written 
synonyms subordinated to them. But since spoken or written language gets its 
semantic properties from mental language,41 if there were terms x and y subordi-
nated to α and β respectively, x and y would be synonyms. So these passages in 
effect mean that if there are pairs of mental synonyms, at least one concept in 
each pair will have no spoken or written term subordinated to it! But if there are 
mental synonyms, it would be easy to violate this odd claim. Since the subordina-
tion relation is thoroughly conventional and subject to revision, let’s just stipulate 
that the spoken or written terms x and y are subordinated to the mental synonyms 
                                                 
38 And other things as well. For instance, it also means a state or federal prison. But let’s 
not make the example any more complicated than necessary. 
39 See p. 111 below 
40 See pp. 96–97 above. 
41 We have not really developed this point fully, but you are already in a position to see 
pretty much how it works. 
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α and β. And there we have it. To summarize: The texts where Ockham says that 
spoken or written synonyms do not correspond to mental synonyms, combined 
with the view that the subordination relation is completely conventional and re-
visable, imply that there is no synonymy in mental language. (On the other hand, 
don’t forget Summa of Logic I.6, § 1,42 which throws this whole picture into 
doubt.) 
For equivocation, there is more direct textual evidence. Consider Ock-
ham’s Summa of Logic I.13, § 2: 
First, you must know that only an utterance or other sign instituted 
by convention is equivocal or univocal. Therefore, an intention of 
the soul, or concept, is neither equivocal nor univocal, properly 
speaking. 
That’s pretty clear. But I should warn you that the text concerns only 
equivocal terms.43 That is, there are no equivocal terms (= concepts) in mental 
language.  
But what about propositions? After all, in spoken and written language, 
we find certain propositions that are equivocal or ambiguous even without con-
taining any equivocal terms. For example, consider the proposition ‘The killing of 
tyrants is justified’. Does this mean that it’s permissible to kill tyrants, or does it 
mean that the killing they do is justified?44 The proposition is ambiguous, and yet 
no term in it is equivocal (or if it is, its ambiguity doesn’t enter in here). 
Aristotle had distinguished these various kinds of ambiguity in his Sophis-
tic Refutations,45 and the mediaevals of course inherited these distinctions. 
Strictly speaking, equivocation was a matter of ambiguous terms. When it is am-
biguous propositions we are talking about, that was called “amphiboly.” The ter-
minological point is probably not all that important (and wasn’t always observed 
in practice anyway), but you should be aware of it. 
I draw your attention to this distinction, because while Ockham’s text in 
Summa of Logic I.13, rules out equivocal terms in mental language, it says noth-
ing at all about mental propositions.  
This is significant, because certain things Ockham says elsewhere will en-
tail that this kind of ambiguity — ambiguous or amphibolous propositions — is 
present in mental language. There are two main contexts where this happens: (a) 
in part of Ockham’s theory of supposition, and (b) in his theory of truth condi-
tions for tensed and modal propositions. (Interestingly enough, Buridan’s theory 
in these two areas does not have these implications.) 
                                                 
42 See p. 97 above. 
43 Paragraph 1 of the chapter makes it clear that the entire discussion is only about terms. 
44 For the grammarians among you, this example neatly illustrates the difference between 
the “objective genitive” and the “subjective genitive.” Although ‘killing’ is a gerund (a verbal 
noun), if it were converted into a finite verb would ‘tyrants’ be the subject or the direct object of 
the verb? 
45 Sophistic Refutations 4, 165b30–166a23. 
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We’ll look at all this later on. For the present, let’s just remark that al-
though Ockham does say things that imply the presence this kind of propositional 
ambiguity in mental language, this violates what is probably his “better doctrine.” 
In other words, there is a conflict here, and it is my opinion that Ockham should 
not have allowed any kind of equivocation or ambiguity in mental language. 
For recall one of the arguments I gave you a short while back, about the 
term ‘foot’.46 That argument was about equivocal terms, but the same kind of ar-
gument can be made for propositions too. Consider once again ‘The killing of ty-
rants is justified’. That spoken proposition is ambiguous, and so is subordinated to 
(at least) two mental propositions. The one mental proposition is true under one 
set of circumstances or truth conditions, and the other one is true under another 
set of circumstances or truth conditions. Thus the subordinated spoken proposi-
tion is true in one sense under the one set of truth conditions, and true in another 
sense under the other set of truth conditions. That is why it is ambiguous, after all. 
Now I do not see how this sort of situation could arise in mental language. 
We could, of course, have a mental proposition that was true under the one set of 
circumstances or under another set of circumstances. But in that case, the proposi-
tion would simply have a disjunctive set of truth-conditions, which is a quite dif-
ferent thing from being ambiguous. (If it weren’t, any old disjunctive proposition 
would be ambiguous.) 
What I have given you here are general considerations against allowing 
any kind of ambiguity or equivocation whatever into mental language, despite 
what Ockham says about certain kinds of ambiguous mental propositions. When 
we come to talk about the kinds of ambiguous propositions Ockham does allow 
into mental language, I’ll have some additional arguments against some of those 
cases, arguments independent of these general considerations — in other words, 
arguments that Ockham shouldn’t have said what he did. 
1.  Mental Language and Fregean Senses 
Let me point out an obvious parallel that may already have struck you. 
The theory of mental language seems to play much the same role as Frege’s the-
ory of “senses.”47 Both theories give us an account of synonymy and equivoca-
tion. (For Frege, synonyms have the same sense, whereas equivocals have more 
than one sense.48) 
It is therefore worth pointing out that there are also important differences 
between the two theories. Concepts are not Fregean senses. 
(1) First, Frege never had anything like a “language of senses.” 
The senses of terms are not themselves terms in some 
                                                 
46 See p. 99 above. 
47 See, for example, his papers “On Sense and Reference” and “The Thought.” 
48 For some further considerations along this line, see Normore, “Ockham on Mental 
Language,” § 1. 
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“sense-language” in the way concepts are terms in mental 
language. 
(2) Concepts are private and mind-dependent, at least on the 
theories of concepts held by the authors we will be con-
cerned with.49 But Fregean senses are public and not mind-
dependent. 
F.  The Ingredients of Mental Language 
Now that we’ve seen some of the things that do not occur in mental lan-
guage, let’s look at what does occur there. In short, what goes into mental lan-
guage? 
As usual when it comes to mental language, Buridan doesn’t have much to 
say about this. But Ockham does. There are two main discussions of this in Ock-
ham: 
(a) Summa of Logic I.3 (on the correspondence between spo-
ken and mental terms). 
(b) Quodlibet 5, q. 8: Do all the grammatical accidents50 of 
spoken terms belong to mental terms [too] (Text (51)). 
Let’s start with the former. Here Ockham says (§ 1) that there are parts of 
speech in mental language just as in spoken language — nouns, verbs, adjectives, 
prepositions, etc. He says the same thing in Text (51), § 551: 
 As for the first point, I say that just as among spoken and 
written terms some are names, [while] others [are] verbs, others 
pronouns, others participles, others adverbs, others conjunctions, 
[and] others prepositions, so [too] among mental concepts some 
concepts are names, others [are] verbs, others adverbs, others con-
junctions, [and] others prepositions. This is clear from the fact that 
for every spoken expression, true or false, there corresponds some 
mental proposition put together out of concepts. Therefore, just as 
the parts of the spoken proposition that are imposed to signify 
things on account of the necessity of signification or expression 
(for it is impossible to express all [things] by means of verbs and 
names alone that can be expressed by means of [them together 
with] the other parts of speech) are distinct parts, so [too] the parts 
of the mental proposition that correspond to utterances are distinct, 
to make distinct true and false propositions. 
                                                 
49 This is true even on Ockham’s earlier “fictum” theory of concepts, as described in 
Adams, William Ockham, Ch. 3. 
50 That is, grammatical properties. 
51 Peter of Ailly agrees. See Text (76). 
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In the passage from Summa of Logic (§ 2), he goes on to voice some 
doubts about whether participles and pronouns are found in mental language. In 
Text (51), §§ 18–19, he says a little more about the question of participles, but 
doesn’t mention pronouns there at all. Let’s look at these doubts more closely. 
(1) Participles: The idea here is that a proposition like ‘Socrates runs’ 
amounts to (is synonymous with) ‘Socrates is running’, where ‘running’ is the 
participle.52 Hence (since there is no synonymy in mental language), we cannot 
find both statements there. Ockham suggests that the participle can be eliminated 
in favor of the verb. 
Ockham’s hesitation here has always puzzled me. Even if it is true that all 
verbs (except the copula53) can be expanded into a copula plus a participle,54 why 
should this suggest that mental language does away with participles in favor of 
verbs? Why not the other way around? After all, we are still going to need a cop-
ula for propositions like ‘Every man is an animal’. 
Furthermore, while it is perhaps true that participles in predicate position 
(that is, after the copula) can be replaced by verbs, participles are used in other 
ways too — as adjectives (for example, in the now seldom-seen phrase ‘Yankee 
imperialist running dog’) — and it is perhaps not obvious that they can in all 
cases be done away with. If they can, it would presumably be by expanding them 
into relative clauses (‘Yankee imperialist dog that runs.) But that requires the use 
of relative pronouns, and Ockham expresses doubts over whether there are pro-
nouns in mental language. Let us then look at the question of mental pronouns. 
(2) Pronouns: Ockham is probably thinking here of pronouns that stand in 
for their antecedents. These are sometimes called “pronouns of laziness.” For ex-
                                                 
52 Now, gentle reader, it’s time for a short grammar lecture. A participle is a verbal ad-
jective; a gerund is a verbal noun. In English the distinction is obscured by the fact that the two 
forms are identical. Thus ‘running’ may be a verbal adjective (a participle), describing those who 
run. But it may also be used as a verbal noun (a gerund), referring to what runners do. Consider, 
for example, the difference between ‘the living and the dead’ (participle) and ‘Summertime, and 
the living is easy’ (gerund). Here’s a quick way to tell which you have in any given case: If you 
can substitute the infinitive without a change of meaning (even if the result is not very elegant), 
you have a gerund, not a participle. (English gets this feature from Latin, which has no special 
form for the nominative of the gerund, and regularly uses the infinitive instead.) Thus ‘Summer-
time, and to live is easy’ (or perhaps more smoothly, ‘… and it is easy to live’) is all right, but 
‘Socrates is to run’ doesn’t mean the same as ‘Socrates is running’. If it means anything at all, it 
means something like ‘Socrates is about to run’ or perhaps ‘Socrates is supposed to run’. And 
while we’re on the topic, I might as well tell you that the correct adjectival form of ‘gerund’ is 
‘gerundial’ — not ‘gerundive’, as people sometimes say. The latter refers to a quite different syn-
tactical construction, the future passive participle. 
53 Even the copula, if you don’t mind an infinite regress. 
54 This claim has been the object of much abuse. It is associated with the so called “two 
name” theory of predication according to which predication always involves a copula that links 
two “names” — nouns or adjectives (including verbal adjectives). Peter Geach, for example, in his 
“History of the Corruptions of Logic,” opines in typically overblown fashion that “Aristotle’s go-
ing over to the two-term theory was a disaster, comparable only to the Fall of Adam” (p. 47). But 
for the present the question is not whether it is advisable to construe all propositions this way — 
whether it is misleading or obscures important logical points. The question is only whether it is 
possible to do it, by force if necessary. And I know of no very persuasive argument against that. 
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ample, consider a common mediaeval example: ‘Socrates runs and he argues’. 
This is plainly synonymous with ‘Socrates runs and Socrates argues’. So we don’t 
need a separate pronoun here; the proper name can just be repeated. 
Nevertheless, I don’t see how Ockham can hope to get rid of pronouns en-
tirely in mental language. Consider the use of pronouns for quantificational cross-
reference. For example, ‘Someone who plays wins’. The pronoun ‘who’ is not a 
“pronoun of laziness” here, and cannot be done away with in any obvious way. 
Also, what about “demonstrative” pronouns, as in the proposition ‘This is 
red’? Ockham’s epistemology includes a theory of what is called “intuitive cogni-
tion” of individuals. Acts of intuitive cognition may serve as the subjects of sin-
gular mental propositions.55 In at least some such cases, it is hard to see how they 
do not amount to mental demonstrative expressions. 
Ockham’s hesitations, therefore, are a little perplexing, both about mental 
participles and about mental pronouns. 
G.  Common and Proper Grammatical Accidents 
While Ockham says that mental language reflects spoken and written lan-
guage to the extent that it too has parts of speech, and even (apart from the two 
doubtful cases we have just discussed) the same parts of speech, nevertheless 
there are other grammatical features of spoken and written language that do not 
carry over into mental language. 
Here Ockham’s Quodlibet 5, q. 8, gives the fuller account.56 In that ques-
tion he distinguishes two main kinds of grammatical “accidents” — that is, gram-
matical properties — of spoken (and written) words: “common” accidents and 
“proper” ones. We’ll see in a moment why they are so described. 
First, let me just give you a kind of list drawn from this passage: To begin 
with, for names (= nomina = nouns and adjectives, including verbal nouns and 
verbal adjectives), the “common” accidents are (Text (51), §§ 7–10): 
Case — For example, ‘dog’ is in the nominative case, whereas 
‘dog’s’ is in the possessive. (English also has an “objective” case, 
but it only shows up for the masculine and feminine pronouns.57) 
Number — For example, ‘dog’ is in the singular, but ‘dogs’ in the 
plural. 
Comparison — This applies only to adjectives and adverbs. For 
example, ‘tall’ (positive), ‘taller’ (comparative), ‘tallest’ (superla-
tive).58 
                                                 
55 See Adams, William Ockham, Ch. 13, especially pp. 530–531. 
56 See also Peter of Ailly in Text (76). 
57 So, strictly speaking, I suppose ‘dog’ might have been in the “objective” case instead. 
58 In Summa of Logic I.3, § 6, Ockham mentions a doubt about whether comparison is 
found in mental language, but he doesn’t say what that doubt is. In any case, he doesn’t indicate 
any such doubt in the later Quodlibet 5, q. 8 (Text (51), § 7). Perhaps he had in mind the elimina-
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Quality — I have not been able to determine what grammatical 
property this is supposed to be.59 
Still confining ourselves to names only, here are the so called “proper” ac-
cidents (Text (51), § 11): 
Gender — In English, this shows up mainly in the personal pro-
nouns, although we do have some quaint old suffixes that serve as 
feminine markers (‘aviatrix’, ‘drum majorette’). In Latin, gram-
matical gender is much more important for syntax. Thus ‘sol’ 
(= sun) is masculine, ‘luna’ (= moon) is feminine, and ‘lignum’ 
(= wood) is neuter. 
Declension — We do not have this in English. Latin has five de-
clensions for nouns and three for adjectives. Thus ‘sol’ is in the 
third declension, ‘luna’ is in the first, and ‘lignum’ is in the sec-
ond. The case-endings for nouns and adjectives will vary to some 
extent depending on which declension they are in. Note that de-
clension here is not the same as case (which was one of the “com-
mon” accidents listed above), even though we say we are “declin-
ing” a noun or adjective when we inflect it in its various case-
forms. The “declensions” in Latin are: first, second, third (and for 
nouns, fourth and fifth). The “cases” are: nominative, vocative, 
genitive, dative, accusative, ablative, and a vestigial locative that 
survives as a separate form in only a few words. 
For verbs, the “common” accidents are (Text (51), § 15): 
Mood — In Latin, the indicative, infinitive, imperative, and sub-
junctive moods are distinguished. 
Voice — This is just the familiar active or passive voice.60 
                                                                                                                                     
tion of separate comparative and superlative forms in favor of the construction ‘more’ + the posi-
tive degree and ‘most’ + the positive degree. Latin can do this just as English can. For another 
attempt to eliminate the comparative and superlative degrees of adjectives in this way, see Richard 
Lavenham’s treatment, discussed in Spade, “Five Logical Tracts by Richard Lavenham,” pp. 91–
92. 
59 In classical grammar, ‘quality’ sometimes referred to the mood of a verb. But we’re 
talking about names here, not verbs. The editors of Ockham’s Summa logicae suggest (p. 13 n. 3) 
that Ockham has in mind the distinction between proper names and “appellative” or common 
ones. Freddoso in William of Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, p. 426 n. 34, suggests that by 
‘quality’ Ockham means to distinguish “affirmative” from “negative” concepts like “infinite.” But 
while the term ‘quality’ is regularly used to refer to the affirmativeness or negativeness of whole 
propositions (see Ch. 2, p. 15, above), I have never seen it used in this way for single terms. So in 
the end, I don’t know what Ockham is talking about here. See also n. 63 below. 
60 Ockham also allows the “middle” voice into mental language (Summa of Logic I.3, § 
8). Latin has no middle voice, but Greek does. It is frequently (but by no means always) reflexive 
in meaning. Why Ockham thinks it is needed in mental language, since Latin itself doesn’t have it, 
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Person — The familiar first, second or third person. 
Number — Singular or plural. 
Tense — In English, past, present, future, and the various “perfect” 
tenses. In Latin, present, imperfect, future, perfect, pluperfect, fu-
ture perfect. 
The “proper” accidents for verbs are (Text (51), § 16): 
Conjugation — Like declension, we do not have this in English. 
Latin divides verbs into four conjugations, with the third admitting 
of some subgroups. For example, ‘amo’ (= I love) is in the first 
conjugation, while ‘moveo’ (= I move) is in the second. The in-
flected endings of the various verb-forms will vary somewhat de-
pending on which conjugation a verb is in. 
Inflection (= figura) — I have not been able to find out exactly 
what grammatical feature this is supposed to be.61 
With this list in hand, Ockham in effect draws a general conclusion62: All 
the common accidents of names and verbs are found also in mental language — 
that is why they are called “common,” no doubt — but the proper ones are not. In 
Summa of Logic I.3, § 6, and again in Quodlibet 5, q. 8 ((Text (51))), § 10, he says 
there is a doubt about whether the common accident “quality” is found in mental 
names. But, since I can’t satisfy myself about what ‘quality’ means here, I don’t 
know what he is worried about.63 
1.  Geach’s Criticisms of Ockham’s Theory 
Setting that worry aside, it is clear that for Ockham, mental language 
looks a great deal like Latin. This is so true, in fact, that some people thought it 
was a suspicious fact. For instance, Peter Geach did. In his Mental Acts,64 Geach 
criticizes Ockham on exactly this point. 
                                                                                                                                     
I don’t know. It is my personal opinion that the Greek middle voice is an invention of a malign 
demon for the purpose of tempting innocent souls to despair. 
61 Wey (the critical editor), in William of Ockham, Quodlibeta, p. 512.109, does not 
comment on the word. Freddoso, in William of Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, p. 428 n. 41, 
suggests that Ockham might be referring to the distinction between deponent and non-deponent 
verbs. His suggestion is plausible, but I cannot verify it. 
62 I say “in effect” because he divides the claim into four subclaims. See Text (51), §§ 7, 
11, 15–16. 
63 See n. 59 above. With respect to the suggestion by Ockham’s editors, I hardly think 
Ockham would want to do without the distinction between proper and common names in mental 
language, or that there could be much doubt about it. 
64 Geach, Mental Acts, § 23 (pp. 101–106). 
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Geach seems to think Ockham’s only criterion for what does and what 
doesn’t go into mental language is based on synonymy. For example65: 
Ockham’s criterion for transferring Latin grammatical terms to 
Mental was very simple-minded. Nouns of different declensions, 
or verbs of different conjugations, may be synonyms, and then pre-
sumably correspond to the same Mental noun or verb; so there is 
no reason to ascribe differences of declension or conjugation to 
Mental words. But a change of case or number or voice may quite 
alter the sense of a Latin sentence; so Mental words must have 
case, number, and voice. 
Thus, the grammatical features that do not go into mental language are just 
those with respect to which synonymous words can differ. All others, presumably, 
do go into mental language. 
Now we’ve seen that synonymy is indeed discussed at some length in 
Quodlibet 5, q. 8 (Text (51)), and more briefly in Summa of Logic I.3. So there is 
some basis for Geach’s remark. 
Geach also seems to think that the whole purpose of the theory of mental 
language was to explain or ground the various features we find as a matter of fact 
in Latin. Thus, he says66: 
He [Ockham] merely transfers features of Latin grammar to Men-
tal, and then regards this as explaining why such features occur in 
Latin — they are needed there if what we say inwardly in Mental 
is to be outwardly got across to others in Latin. But clearly nothing 
is explained at all. 
Both these points are wrong — both the claim that Ockham’s only crite-
rion for what does and does not go into mental language is based on synonymy, 
and the claim that the whole purpose of the theory of mental language was to ac-
count for the facts of spoken language. John Trentman was the first to argue this 
point (correctly, in my opinion).67 
Geach probably based his criticisms on Summa of Logic I.3, where what is 
going on is not so plain as it is in Quodlibet 5, q. 8 — although it’s there if you’re 
willing to look for it. Things are clearer in the Quodlibet passage, Text (51). Ock-
ham’s real basis for deciding what does and what does not go into mental lan-
guage is this: Mental language has exactly those features of spoken (or written) 
language that affect the truth values of propositions. That is why case, number, 
comparison, mood, voice, person and tense are all are found in mental language, 
whereas the distinctions of gender, declension and conjugation are not. Thus, the 
                                                 
65 Ibid., p. 102. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Trentman, “Ockham on Mental.” This seminal paper has influenced a whole genera-
tion of mediaevalists in their thinking about Ockham’s mental language. Many of the views I shall 
develop below are derived from reflection on this paper. 
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fact that a verb is in the first conjugation, for example, makes no difference what-
ever to the truth or falsehood of the proposition it occurs in. But the fact that it is 
in the future tense, say, may affect its truth or falsehood very much. 
Here we see why the discussion of synonyms came up in the first place. 
Synonyms can differ only in those features that do not affect truth or falsehood. 
Otherwise, synonyms would not be everywhere intersubstitutable salva veritate 
— and so would not be synonymous. These features turn out to be exactly the 
ones Ockham calls “proper accidents” of spoken and written names and verbs. 
Note that the kind of intersubstitutability we are talking about here is very 
strong indeed. The account we gave of synonymy, in terms of subordination to the 
same concept, means that synonyms are intersubstitutable even in otherwise 
opaque contexts.68 
Opaque contexts are contexts where substitution of identicals may fail.69 
For example: 
The number of planets = nine.70 
Now necessarily nine is greater than seven. 
But it is not necessary that the number of planets is 
greater than seven. (There might have been only 
five, say.) 
Or: The author of Waverley = Sir Walter Scott. 
King George wondered whether Scott was the au-
thor of Waverley. 
But King George certainly did not wonder whether 
Scott was Scott. 
Modal contexts (necessity, possibility) and epistemic contexts (knowl-
edge, doubt, wondering) are standard examples of “opaque contexts,” where sub-
stitution of identicals may fail, as the examples show. 
But we are not talking for now about terms that just happen to be names of 
the same (identical) thing; we’re talking about synonyms. If the term ‘the author 
of Waverley’ and the term ‘Sir Walter Scott’ were synonymous in the sense of 
being subordinated to the same concept in King George’s mind, then he could not 
possibly have wondered whether Scott was the author of Waverley. So too, it 
seems likely to me, in modal contexts — although you’d have to tell a longer 
story there. 
                                                 
68 But always remember that recalcitrant passage in Summa of Logic I.6, § 1 (see p. 97 
above). 
69 If you are not familiar with the vocabulary or problems of opaque contexts, a good in-
troduction may be found in Quine, “Reference and Modality,” especially pp. 142–159. 
70 Yes, I know, recent astronomical developments have suggested more. But I am being 
traditional here and throughout. 
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In fact, the only “opaque context” I can think of where synonyms cannot 
be freely intersubstituted salva veritate is quotation. For example, suppose ‘rock’ 
and ‘stone’ are really synonymous. Then we cannot argue: 
‘Rock’ has four letters. 
Therefore, by substitution, ‘stone’ has four letters. (It 
doesn’t; it has five letters, as you can tell by inspection.) 
I think it would be wrong to try to make too much of this fact. I realize 
that, in some circles, quotation has been taken as a kind of paradigm of opaque 
contexts.71 But while that may be all right for heuristic purposes, it would be a 
grievous mistake to suppose that deep mysteries of modality and epistemology 
can be illuminated very much by what, after all, amounts to a mere typographical 
convention — and a relatively recent one at that. (There was no quotation-mark 
convention in the Middle Ages, although they sometimes used other devices to 
accomplish the same end.72) 
Let’s back up a little and look again at Ockham’s criterion for what does 
and what does not go into mental language: Mental language has exactly those 
features of spoken (or written) language that affect the truth values of proposi-
tions. 
We might agree with Geach that mental language, as Ockham describes it, 
looks much too suspiciously like Latin. But the general criterion seems to be a 
reasonable one, even if Ockham may have applied it a little too freely. The basic 
idea is that mental language is to be a kind of ideal language, which has only 
those features it needs to enable it to discern the true from the false, to describe 
the world adequately and accurately. Other features of spoken and written lan-
guage are there only for style, for decoration, or perhaps for economy (that is, for 
the sake of brevity or abbreviation). They serve a basically rhetorical purpose, and 
are not at all needed to distinguish truth from falsehood. Hence, they are not 
found in mental language.73 
Style and decoration (and, for that matter, the decision to be concise rather 
than verbose) are matters subject to one’s will. They are matters of art and con-
                                                 
71 Quine does this, for example, in “Reference and Modality.” 
72 As we shall see in Ch. 8, below, “material supposition” does much of the work of the 
modern quotation-mark convention. (But there are important differences.) Sometimes too in late 
mediaeval manuscripts, the particle ‘ly’ (or ‘li’) is put before word or expression that is meant to 
be quoted. This particle is related to French ‘le’ and derived from Latin ‘ille’, which came to be 
used as something approximating a definite article. Somewhat similarly, Leibniz occasionally uses 
the Greek definite article ‘τὸ’ as a quotation device. (See, for example, his Disputatio Meta-
physica de principio individui, p. 19: “Per τὸ formaliter intelligent differe ratione” [= “By ‘for-
mally’ he understands differing by reason”].) In this connection, recall how Plato sometimes used 
the article ‘τὸ’ when he wanted to refer to the Forms. As quotation markers, these devices suffer 
from ambiguity. One is never sure just how much is intended to be included in the quotation; they 
tell you where the quotation begins, but not how far it extends. 
73 See, for example, Ockham’s Summa of Logic I.3, § 2, and Quodlibet 5, q. 8 (Text 
(51)), §§ 2 & 20. 
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vention, and so belong only to conventional language. On the other hand, what is 
true and false is not a matter of convention, but instead of matter of fact — of na-
ture. So too, Ockham thinks, which features of language are needed to distinguish 
the true from the false is not matter of convention, but a matter of nature. Those 
features are found in mental language. 
Hence Geach’s second point is also not well taken. The purpose of the 
theory of mental language is not to explain Latin syntax, but rather to get a lean, 
no-frills language adequate for a true description of the world — and for no other 
purpose. 
Notice that if this really is the point of the theory, then we have an addi-
tional argument that there is no synonymy in mental language. We don’t need 
synonyms there; they do not affect truth values.74 
This picture of mental language as more or less like the early-twentieth 
century notion of an “ideal,” logically perspicuous language (for example, in the 
early Wittgenstein) has been a very influential one in our understanding of what 
Ockham was up to with his mental language. It is a picture first articulated by 
John Trentman.75 But it would probably be a mistake to push the analogy too far. 
After all, in the passages we’ve looked at, Ockham is not saying anything explic-
itly about the overall “purpose” of “function” of mental language. (He doesn’t say 
anything about that anywhere, so far as I know.) All he is strictly talking about is 
the “grammatical accidents” of individual words in mental language; the rest is 
extrapolation. I leave it to the reader to puzzle out whether such an extrapolation 
is a reasonable one. If not, do you have any other suggestion for what the theo-
retical purpose of Ockham’s mental language was?76 
H.  The Structure of Mental Propositions 
So far, I’ve only told you what kinds of terms go into mental language, 
and what their grammatical features are. But what about mental propositions? 
What is their structure? 
Ockham many times says explicitly that mental propositions are com-
posed, made up, of mental terms — that is, of concepts. He says it for example in 
Summa of Logic I.1, § 6: 
A conceived term is an intention or passion of the soul naturally 
signifying or consignifying something [and] apt to be a part of a 
mental proposition… 
                                                 
74 Recall that I gave you an a priori argument earlier that there could not be two concepts 
that are more than numerically distinct and yet are concepts of exactly the same things; they 
would have to be like or similar to exactly the same things in exactly the same ways. I said at the 
time (p. 100 above) that I had another argument. Here it is. 
75 See Trentman, “Ockham on Mental.” 
76 The picture I have sketched has already begun to be questioned. See, for example, 
Tweedale, “Ockham’s Supposed Elimination of Connotative Terms and His Ontological Parsi-
mony.” 
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Later on in the same paragraph, he says: 
Thus, these conceived terms and the propositions put together out 
of them are the “mental words” that Blessed Augustine, in De trini-
tate XV,77 says belong to no language because they abide only in 
the mind and cannot be uttered outwardly, although utterances are 
pronounced outwardly as signs subordinated to them. 
And again in Quodlibet V, q. 8, (Text (51)), § 5: 
… for every spoken expression,78 true or false, there corresponds 
some mental proposition put together out of concepts. 
Buridan too seems to have the same view. For example, Sophismata, Ch. 
1, conclusion 679: 
To this, it is to be replied by positing a sixth conclusion, that a 
simple concept, if it is the subject or predicate in a mental proposi-
tion, supposits for the thing itself that is conceived by it. 
Here he talks about concepts as being in “subject or predicate position” in a men-
tal proposition. He talks the same way in Ch. 1, conclusion 780: 
Therefore, seventh, it is to be concluded that not every complex 
concept that is the subject or predicate in a mental proposition sup-
posits for everything it signifies … 
Again, in Ch. 1, the reply to the third sophism, Buridan talks about how the intel-
lect forms a mental proposition out of two occurrences of the mental term “God,” 
by adding a mental copula, resulting in the proposition “God is God”81: 
On this point it seems to me it must be noted that the propositions 
‘God is’82 and ‘God is God’ are very different with respect to the 
things signified outside [the mind]. For ‘God is’, since it too has in 
the mind a subject, a predicate and a copula, amounts to ‘God is a 
being’. And this signifies much more than does ‘God is God’, be-
cause it signifies all beings on account of the term ‘being’ [occur-
ring as its predicate]. But ‘God is God’ signifies nothing but God 
outside [the mind]. For the word ‘is’, insofar as it is precisely a 
                                                 
77 Augustine, De trinitate XV.10.19 (Text (6)). See also xv.12.22 and xv.27.50. 
78 I take it he means ‘proposition’ here, since other expressions aren’t true or false. 
79 Scott ed., pp. 26–27; Scott trans., p. 73. 
80 Scott ed., p. 27; Scott trans., p. 74. 
81 Scott ed., p. 32; Scott trans., p. 79. 
82 In the sense of “God exists.” 
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copula,83 signifies nothing outside [the mind] beyond the significa-
tion of the categorematic terms. Rather it signifies only the com-
plexive84 concept by which the intellect forms propositions from 
the terms ‘God’ and ‘God’.85 
Also, Ch. 6, sophism 3, where Buridan talks about a mental proposition as being 
divided into subject, copula and predicate86: 
But it is to be said that for a spoken proposition properly so called 
more is required, namely that the subject of the mental proposition 
be designated by one utterance and the predicate by another, and 
the complexive87 concept that is the copula by a third [utterance], 
or at least the subject and predicate by one verb.88 
So the claim that mental propositions are composed of mental terms is not 
something that was just said in passing; it seems to be pretty much a settled 
view.89 
The view implies that we have not only mental categorematic terms — 
that is, terms that signify things — but also mental syncategoremata, the “logical 
particles,” like ‘not’, ‘all’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if … then’, ‘necessarily’, etc. A list of 
categorematic terms is not enough to make up a proposition. 
What is the distinction between categoremata and syncategoremata? Ock-
ham discusses this in Summa of Logic I.4. In terms of formal semantics, the differ-
ence can be put like this: 
If you think of the semantics of a language as being given by (a) a 
set of models, and (b) a set of truth conditions that allow you to as-
                                                 
83 Mediaeval authors did not use the word ‘precisely’ carelessly. Here it means “insofar 
as it is a copula and nothing else” — in particular, insofar as it is not interpreted as having the 
participle ‘being’ implicitly built into it. 
84 The word is ‘complexive’, not ‘complex’, as Scott translates it. Buridan is not here 
saying that the concept is itself complex, but rather that it results in something complex. In Latin 
(as in English), the adjectival suffix ‘-ivus’ (English: ‘-ive’) is often used this way. Thus some-
thing “offensive” produces an offense; something “persuasive” produces persuasion. There are 
exceptions to this usage, in both Latin and English. For example, “objective” things aren’t gener-
ally ones that produce objects. 
85 That is, from two occurrences of the term ‘God’, resulting in the proposition ‘God is 
God’. 
86 Scott ed., p. 107; Scott trans., p. 164. 
87 Again, Scott translates this as ‘complex’. 
88 I suppose Buridan is here referring to the fact that in Latin a single word like ‘curro’ 
(= I run) may be a complete proposition, the subject marker being included in the inflected verb-
form. 
89 Nevertheless Ockham, in his Commentary on the De interpretatione, seems to have 
had some doubts. See Texts (36) & (38). These passages are especially interesting in light of the 
questions raised by Gregory of Rimini and Peter of Ailly, as described below. For some further 
considerations of Ockham on this point, see Normore, “Ockham on Mental Language,” especially 
pp. 63–64. 
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sign truth values to the propositions of the language with respect to 
those models,90 then 
(i) the categorematic terms are just those the se-
mantic role of which is given by assigning a model, 
and 
(ii) the syncategorematic words are just those the 
semantic role of which is given by the truth condi-
tions. 
Perhaps the claim that mental language has syncategorematic terms as 
well as categorematic ones can be made somewhat clearer if we observe that, 
while Ockham originally favored a theory that regarded a concept as a kind of 
intentional object of a mental act of thinking or understanding, he later came to 
abandon that view in favor of a theory according to which a concept just is a men-
tal act of thinking. The concept of cats, in other words, is just the act of thinking 
about cats — nothing more. 
Ockham’s motivation here doesn’t really matter for the present.91 The 
point is that, given that he came to have this theory of concepts — that is, of the 
categorematic terms of mental language — it is fairly easy to see how mental 
syncategoremata are just other kinds of mental acts. For example, the mental con-
junction “and” is just the mental act whereby the mind puts together two mental 
conjuncts. 
But, however you work out the details, both Ockham and Buridan hold 
that mental propositions are composites of mental categoremata and syncategore-
mata.92 That is, mental propositions really have an internal structure; they are 
really composed of parts. 
Furthermore, it turns out that, in certain favorable cases, both Ockham and 
Buridan think the structure of mental propositions parallels the structure of spo-
ken and written propositions, to such an extent in fact that the spoken or written 
proposition exactly reveals the structure of the mental proposition part by part. 
I said this was for “favorable” cases. There are exceptions. The main ones 
are: 
(a) The proper accidents of spoken and written terms are not paral-
leled in mental language, as we have already seen.93 
(b) Figurative or metaphorical expressions or abbreviated forms of 
expression do not accurately mirror their mental correlates. They 
are for decoration or brevity, after all, not exclusively for discern-
ing truth from falsehood. 
                                                 
90 If you don’t understand this kind of lingo, just skip it. 
91 For a discussion, see Adams, William Ockham, Ch. 3. 
92 But see n. 89 above. 
93 See p. 107 above. 
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(c) Connotative terms in spoken and written language, it will turn 
out,94 will not accurately reflect the structure of their mental coun-
terparts. 
(d) So called “exponible” propositions likewise will not accurately 
reflect the structure of the mental propositions to which they are 
subordinated. An exponible proposition may be regarded as the 
propositional analogue of a connotative term. Such exponible 
propositions have to be analyzed (= “expounded”) into a more 
complicated mental equivalent.95 
But these exceptions should not distract us from the more interesting 
point, that in certain favorable cases, the structure of spoken and written proposi-
tions does accurately mirror the structure of the corresponding mental proposi-
tions. For example, consider a spoken proposition without any of the above com-
plicating factors. Take, say: 
‘Every man is (an) animal.’ 
(I put the indefinite article ‘an’ in parenthesis because it is not there in the 
Latin equivalent ‘Omnis homo est animal’. Latin has no indefinite article.) 
On both Ockham’s theory and Buridan’s, the corresponding mental propo-
sition is literally put together out of: 
(1) A universal quantifier (“every”); 
(2) the concept “man”; 
(3) a mental copula (“is”); 
(4) the concept “animal.” 
Of course there are problems about details. We might disagree that the 
structure of mental language looks that much like English — or Latin. We might, 
for example, accept Ockham’s criterion for what goes into mental language, but 
still argue about his application of that criterion. 
Nevertheless, there is a more basic problem, a problem of principle. Peter 
of Ailly, for instance, has some arguments that mental propositions don’t have 
parts at all. He holds that the kind of straightforward, part by part mirroring of 
mental language by spoken or written language, even in what we described as fa-
vorable cases, is impossible in principle. The arguments are found in the “Insolu-
bles” part of his Concepts and Insolubles. 
Peter of Ailly, at least in that work, was on the whole a derivative writer 
who took many of his views from earlier authors and combined them in ways that 
                                                 
94 We will discuss connotation-theory in Ch. 7 below. 
95 For a little more on the theory of “exposition,” see Spade, “Five Logical Tracts by 
Richard Lavenham,” pp. 83–93, and with particular reference to Ockham, see Spade, “Ockham, 
Adams and Connotation,” pp. 608–612. 
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are sometimes not entirely consistent, but are very often very insightful and inter-
esting anyway. In the present context, Peter is taking the main lines of his argu-
ment from Gregory of Rimini, sometimes borrowing whole passages virtually 
verbatim.96 Still, Peter disagrees with Gregory on certain points.  
Much of Peter’s doctrine of mental language he took directly from Ock-
ham. For a striking instance of this, see Text (76), where Peter is talking about 
what kinds of grammatical features of spoken language are found also in mental 
language. After saying that mental language has names, verbs, adjectives, case, 
number and so on, he remarks that not all the features of spoken language are 
found also in mental language. But instead of going into further detail, he dis-
misses the topic with a curt “See Ockham on this.” 
1.  Proper and Improper Mental Language 
Nevertheless, Peter disagrees with Ockham’s usual view97 about the struc-
ture of mental propositions. In order to get into the topic, there is an important 
preliminary distinction that has to be made. I will follow Peter of Ailly’s presenta-
tion of this distinction, although Peter is here quoting Gregory of Rimini almost 
verbatim. 
The distinction is between mental language properly so called and mental 
language improperly so called. Peter discusses this distinction in two places in his 
Concepts and Insolubles: for mental terms he discusses it in the first (or “Con-
cepts”) part,98 and for mental propositions he discusses it in the second (or “In-
solubles”) part, Ch. 2.99 
                                                 
96 See Peter of Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, Spade trans., p. 115 n. 279 and p. 116 n. 
302. 
97 I say “Ockham’s usual view,” because sometimes Ockham seems to suggest that men-
tal propositions are simple mental acts, with no internal structure at all. See, for example, the dis-
cussion in Texts (36) & (38), where Ockham gives an argument very much like one given by 
Gregory and Peter, described below. See also n. 89 above. 
98 Spade trans., §§ 16–20, pp. 19–21. Here is part of what he says (§§ 16–17, pp. 19–20): 
“Again, among mental terms one kind is a mental term properly so called, [and] another kind im-
properly so called. An improperly so called mental term is a concept of an utterance or an inscrip-
tion synonymous with such an utterance. Such a concept is called a mental term “improperly” so 
called, because even though such a concept signifies naturally [and] properly the utterance or in-
scription of which it is the natural likeness, nevertheless it can together with this signify by con-
vention and be subordinated to another concept that signifies only naturally. For example, the 
concept of the utterance ‘man’ naturally [and] properly signifies that utterance, ‘man’. For it is a 
natural likeness of it. But it signifies by convention all individual men, and so is subordinated in 
signification to the concept that naturally [and] properly is representative of all men.” Since there 
is no modern edition of Peter’s Latin text, I here give you the Latin from the early printed edition 
in Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 3ra: “Item terminorum mentalium quidam est terminus mentalis 
proprie dictus, alius improprie dictus. Terminus mentalis improprie dictus est conceptus vocis vel 
scripturae synonymae tali voci. Et dicitur talis conceptus terminus mentalis improprie dictus quia 
talis conceptus licet significet naturaliter proprie vocem vel scripturam cuius est naturalis simili-
tudo potest tamen cum hoc significare ad placitum et subordinari alteri conceptui qui solum natu-
raliter significat. Verbi gratia, conceptus huius vocis ‘homo’ naturaliter proprie significat illam 
vocem ‘homo’, quia est eius naturalis similitudo. Sed ad placitum significat omnes homines singu-
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Recall that mental language is supposed to be the same for all people.100 
Nevertheless, there is certainly a kind of “mental language,” if you want to call it 
that, that goes on when we “think in English” or “think in Latin.” That kind of 
language is silent and invisible, so it can hardly be spoken or written language; it 
goes on only in your mind, after all. And yet it is plainly not the same for every-
one. Peter, quoting Gregory of Rimini, says101: 
Anyone can notice propositions like this if he keeps quiet with his 
mouth and speaks in his heart by forming likenesses which, if he 
were to speak with his mouth, he would utter outwardly. 
This kind of “mental language” is the work of imagination or memory, in 
which we picture in the mind’s eye or hear in the mind’s ear the actual words of 
some “national language” (in Augustine’s phrase102), which is of course conven-
tional. This is the sort of thing I would do, for instance, if I were rehearsing a 
speech silently in my mind by actually going through the words one after another, 
even though I am not saying anything out loud. 
Both Peter and Gregory explain that what we have in the mind in this case 
is concepts of the actual words used — spoken or written words — and not con-
cepts of the external objects those words signify. Such concepts immediately sig-
nify the words they are concepts of, and are in fact natural signs of those words. 
But since signification is transitive,103 those same concepts also signify, in a de-
rivative and secondary way, what those spoken or written words they are concepts 
of signify. Now those spoken or written words signify by convention. Hence, in 
such a case the concepts also, in a derivative and secondary way, signify by con-
vention what the words they naturally signify signify by convention. 
This is what Peter and Gregory call “mental language improperly so 
called.” Mental language “properly so called” is not like this kind of silent recita-
tion. Mental language properly so called is the same for all people, is not convent-
ional in any sense, and is not tied to one of the so called “national languages.” 
Why should anyone believe there is such a thing as mental language prop-
erly so called? Well, I suppose, one argument would be that, if there were not, it 
would be impossible to translate reliably from one conventional language to an-
other. But perhaps it is best not to push this argument, since it was not long ago 
that some philosophers were willing to say exactly that. In fact, they were not 
only willing, they were positively enthusiastic about it.104 
                                                                                                                                     
lares. Et sic subordinatur in significatione illi conceptui qui naturaliter proprie est repraesentativus 
omnium hominum.” 
99 Spade trans., §§ 94–96, pp. 36–37. I have retranslated §§ 94–95 in Text (77). 
100 See p. 93 above. 
101 From Text (77). For Gregory, see his Super primum et secundum Sententiarum I, 
prol., q. 1, a. 3, fol. 4F–G, (= Trapp ed., vol. 1, pp. 30–31). 
102 See Text (6). 
103 See Ch. 3, pp. 82–84, above. 
104 I am thinking of Quine’s famous theory of the “indeterminacy of translation.” See, 
for example, his Word and Object, especially Ch. 2. 
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So here is another reason. According to the theory, the propositions of 
mental language are judgments.105 But sometimes we make judgments “in a 
flash,” as it were — virtually instantaneously, and without running through any 
words of conventional language, even silently in our minds. Perhaps the most 
striking examples of this occur when one is doing logic or mathematics. There it 
sometimes happens that, after puzzling over some question for a long time, you 
all of a sudden just “see” how it goes, how to prove the theorem, how things are 
connected. This insight is not yet put into words, not even silent words. (In fact, 
sometimes there is a sense of urgency about getting it into words, getting it “down 
on paper,” before the insight is lost.106) But there is very definitely an affirmative 
judgment there. In fact, if the “insight” if particularly strong, if the “light of truth” 
is particularly bright on a given occasion, the affirmation is virtually automatic 
and involuntary; you cannot help but assent. 
Thus, such judgments — not formed in terms of any conventional lan-
guage — do occur. And that is exactly what Peter and Gregory mean by mental 
propositions properly so called. It may well be that not all such proper mental 
propositions occur in special moments of “insight.” But at any rate they do occur 
there, and that is enough to make the case that there is such a thing as mental lan-
guage properly so called. 
As I have said, Peter took the distinction between proper and improper 
mental language almost verbatim from Gregory of Rimini. But Gregory did not 
make the doctrine up himself. He refers, for example, to Augustine’s De trinitate 
Text (6)107: 
Thus whoever is able to understand the word, not only before it 
sounds but also before the images of its sounds are pondered in 
thought — for this is what pertains to no language (namely, none 
of those that are called national languages, of which ours is Latin) 
… 
When Augustine says “but also before the images of its sound are pon-
dered in thought,” he is talking about mental language improperly so called, and 
is saying that what he wants to focus on here happens even before that. 
Gregory also refers108 to a passage in Anselm’s Monologion, Ch. 10, 
where Anselm gives us a fully detailed and completely clear account of the differ-
ence109: 
                                                 
105 Actually, that is too simple. It is possible to entertain mental propositions without 
forming any judgment one way or the other about them. But in any case it is true according to the 
theory, even when formulated with full rigor, that judgments always require some kind of mental 
proposition. And that is all that is really needed for the following argument. 
106 It is an embarrassing fact, of course, that all too often, once one does get it “into 
words,” it turns out that the insight was wrong — things don’t go together that way after all. But 
this doesn’t detract from the present point. 
107 See Gregory, Super primum et secundum Sententiarum I, prol., q. 1, a. 3, fol. 4F–G 
(= Trapp ed., vol. 1, pp. 30–31). Peter does not quote this part of Gregory’s text. 
108 Ibid. Peter doesn’t quote this reference either. 
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For by frequent usage it is known that we can “speak” of 
one thing in three ways. For we either (a) speak of it by sensible 
signs — that is, [signs] that can be sensed with the bodily senses, 
by sensibly using [them]. Or (b) by insensibly thinking within our-
selves of the same signs that are outwardly sensible. Or (c) by us-
ing these signs neither sensibly nor insensibly, but rather by “say-
ing” the things themselves inwardly in our mind, either by the 
imagining of bodies or by the understanding of reason on behalf of 
the diversity of the things themselves.110 For I say man in one way 
when I signify him by the name ‘man’. In another way, I think of 
the same name silently. In [yet] another way, when the mind con-
siders him, the man himself, either through an image of [his] body 
or by reason: through an image of [his] body, as when it imagines 
his sensible shape; but by reason, as when it thinks of his universal 
essence, which is “mortal rational animal.” 
Anselm goes on to give some examples. He appears to think that mental 
language “properly so called” (as it would later be called) can proceed either by 
means of concepts or by means of mental imagery. Peter of Ailly and Gregory of 
Rimini won’t allow the latter alternative (the terms of proper mental language are 
concepts, not images in imagination or memory), but they all agree on the main 
point: mental language properly so called does not in any way use “sensible 
signs” — spoken or written words. 
Mental propositions improperly so called are plainly composed of parts. 
Their structure is exactly the structure of the corresponding spoken or written 
proposition, conventional features and all. When I rehearse a speech silently, I run 
through, part by part and in succession, every word I will ultimately utter aloud 
before an audience. 
But that is not what Gregory and Peter of Ailly are talking about when 
they ask whether mental propositions are made up of parts. They are worried 
about the structure of mental propositions properly so called. 
Although Ockham and Buridan don’t explicitly draw the distinction be-
tween proper and improper mental language, it is clear that Ockham, at any rate, 
is talking about mental propositions properly so called when he says they are 
composed of parts. In fact, in Summa of Logic I.1, § 6, which is one of the places 
where Ockham makes that claim — he refers to the text of Augustine’s De trini-
tate (Text (6)), and paraphrases the remark about belonging to no “national lan-
guage.” 
So the question Gregory and Peter are asking is this111: 
                                                                                                                                     
109 In Anselm, Opera omnia, Schmitt ed., vol. 1, p. 24.29–25.15. 
110 That last clause is obscure, I admit. 
111 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 8ra; Spade trans., § 99, pp. 37–38. The 
Latin is: “… utrum illa propositio mentalis sit essentialiter composita ex pluribus notitiis partiali-
bus quarum una sit subjectum alia vero praedicatum et alia copula. Videtur enim communiter om-
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… whether the mental proposition [properly so called] is essen-
tially composed of several partial acts of knowing, of which one is 
the subject, another the predicate and [yet] another the copula. For 
it seems to everyone in general that it is so. 
It seemed so to Ockham and Buridan, for instance.112 But both Gregory 
and Peter answer the question in the negative. Their discussion is very rich, and 
there are several lines of argument in it. I want to focus on just two of them. 
The second is confined to a single paragraph in Peter’s text, which I will 
discuss later. But the first one is diffused over several paragraphs in his “Insolu-
bles,” where Peter is, as he often does, quoting Gregory virtually verbatim.113 
The first line of argument (Text (78)) in effect asks: What is the difference 
between the two mental propositions properly so called that correspond to the two 
spoken or written propositions: 
‘Every whiteness is a quality’ (which is true) 
and 
‘Every quality is a whiteness’ (which is false). 
Ockham (and, I suppose, Buridan) would agree that, if we disregard the so 
called proper accidents of the words (for example, the fact that both ‘quality’ and 
‘whiteness’ are third-declension nouns in Latin), these two spoken or written 
propositions do not have any of the exceptional features I mentioned earlier as 
blocking spoken or written language from mirroring the structure of mental lan-
guage exactly.114 That is, neither proposition makes use of metaphor or figurative 
language, neither one contains any connotative term,115 and neither proposition is 
exponible.116 Therefore, the structures of the mental propositions expressed by 
these two spoken or written propositions should correspond part by part with the 
structures of the spoken or written propositions themselves. 
Notice also that these two spoken or written propositions are going to have 
to correspond to distinct mental propositions. If they did not, they would corre-
spond to the same mental proposition, and so would be synonymous spoken or 
written propositions. But they can’t be synonymous, since the first one is true 
whereas the second one is false. 
Now the only structural difference between the two physical propositions 
(that is, the spoken or written propositions) is one of word-order. So the question 
what the difference is between the two corresponding mental propositions comes 
                                                                                                                                     
nibus quod sic.” For Gregory, see his Super primum et secundum Sententiarum I, prol., q. 1, a. 3 
(= Trapp ed., vol. 1, p. 33). 
112 Always with the proviso about Ockham’s suggestion in Texts (36) & (38). 
113 Parts of the discussion are translated in Texts (78) & (79). 
114 See p. 114 above. 
115 We’ll talk about that in Ch. 7. 
116 On “exponible” propositions, see p. 115 and n. 95 above. 
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down to: What corresponds to word-order in mental language properly so 
called? 
2.  The Problem of Word-Order in Proper Mental 
Language 
In written language, of course, word-order is effected by the spatial con-
figurations of the words. But the mind is supposed to be a spiritual medium, so 
that such spatial distinctions are inapplicable there. 
Well, you might say, that’s not so bad. Spatial distinctions are also inap-
plicable to spoken language. There the distinctions of word-order are made out by 
the temporal ordering of the sounds. And at first it looks as if that is going to be 
the case in mental language too (Text (79)): 
But perhaps it would be said to these [arguments] that al-
though the parts are alike in such propositions, and in the same 
first subject,117 yet different propositions result on account of the 
different order of their production … Similarly, the part of the 
proposition produced earlier is the subject, but the part produced 
later is the predicate. 
Note that it is not really necessary to say, as Peter does in this passage, 
that the first part is the subject and the second part the predicate — any more than 
that is necessary in spoken Latin syntax, where sometimes the subject is deferred 
to later in the sentence. Still, what is necessary is the general claim that word-
order is accomplished by the order of production in time. 
Both Gregory and Peter reject this possibility for mental language prop-
erly so called. I want to focus on one line of reasoning they give. Here is what 
Peter says118: 
 
For first, it would be quite amazing if the intellect could not pro-
duce a whole proposition simultaneously, since [that] is its perfec-
tion. 
What is the point here? Well, recall what mental language properly so 
called is. It’s the sort of thing that goes on, for example, when we have a “flash of 
insight” in doing a proof in mathematics or logic. That kind of insight occurs sud-
                                                 
117 That is, they are accidents in the same mind. It doesn’t do any good if I am thinking 
of the subject but you are thinking of the predicate. 
118 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 8va; Spade trans., §108, p. 39. The para-
graph gives one reason why the suggestion in Text (79) must be rejected. The Latin is: “Primo 
enim valde mirum esset quod intellectus simul unam totam propositionem producere non posset, 
cum sit sua perfectio.” Gregory of Rimini makes effectively the same point, although he doesn’t 
say anything about this’s being the intellect’s “perfection.” See his Super primum et secundum 
Sententiarum I, prol., q. 1, a. 3, fol. 4N (= Trapp ed., vol. 1, p. 34). 
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denly, all at once. Although it happens in time, it doesn’t take time.119 Hence there 
can be no temporal order of production there. 
Even if mental language properly so called isn’t always a matter of these 
“flashes of insight,”120 still sometimes it is. And that is enough to give us the 
problem of mental word-order. 
Here is another argument, although neither Peter nor Gregory, nor anyone 
else that I know of actually states it. Mental language properly so called had bet-
ter be able to occur all at once without any temporal succession — because, if it 
didn’t, then what language would God think in? God is supposed to have thoughts 
and knowledge too, so that the notion of mental language properly so called ap-
plies as much to him as it does to us.121 
Now if God is atemporal, completely outside time, then of course his men-
tal language properly so called cannot proceed in temporal fashion. But even if 
God is in time, as Ockham and others thought,122 he could not form his mental 
propositions in this sequential, part by part fashion without changing over time, so 
that first he would form one part of the mental proposition, and then do something 
different to form the next part. But even Ockham, who thought God is a temporal 
being and in time as much as we are, did not think that God changed over time.123 
So mental language properly so called has got to be able to take place in-
stantaneously. That is, as Peter oddly puts it, its “perfection.” And if that is so, 
then mental language properly so called is not going to be able to accomplish 
word-order in general by means of the temporal order of production. The kind of 
sequential, part by part production mentioned in Text (79) is more characteristic 
of mental language improperly so called. But that is not what we’re talking about 
here. 
                                                 
119 Or at least it seems that way. Nevertheless, a surprising number of people I’ve talked 
to about this want to resist the idea that these occurrences are instantaneous. No, they say, they do 
take time, and there is indeed a temporal sequence involved; it just happens “very fast” — too fast 
for us to be aware of it. But why believe that, when reflection seems to testify to the opposite? I 
am very suspicious of moves that make things happen too fast for us to notice, when the sole pur-
pose of such moves seems to be to make the claims they are defending immune from empirical 
testing. 
120 And it isn’t. Insights are relatively rare, but mental language properly so called is 
supposed to be involved anytime we think. 
121 Ockham does explicitly say that angels communicate via mental language. In fact, he 
devotes a whole question to the topic angelic communication. See his Quodlibet 1, q. 6. Note that 
if angels communicate via mental language properly so called, then it seems they cannot lie to one 
another. For lying requires saying one thing while thinking another. But here the saying and the 
thinking are the same. 
122 In fact this view was more or less standard by Ockham’s day. See Normore, “Future 
Contingents,” p. 367. 
123 Modern readers sometimes find this kind of appeal to theological considerations dis-
tasteful. To begin with, even if they believe in God, they probably do not have the same concept 
of God as Ockham, Gregory, Peter and the others did. And even if they do, they often feel it is 
inappropriate to try to prove philosophical points this way. But think of it like this: Do you want 
to say that such a concept of God is philosophically impossible, and moreover that it is philoso-
phically impossible because of the nature of mental language properly so called? That would be a 
very strong philosophical claim! 
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In short, word order in mental language properly so called is not going to 
be accomplished by either the spatial or the temporal configuration of the words. 
It begins to look as if there is no way at all to make a distinction of word-order in 
mental language properly so called. 
Thus — and this is the moral of the story — Gregory’s and Peter’s argu-
ment amounts to a kind of reductio. If Ockham’s usual view is correct, and the 
mental propositions corresponding to the spoken or written propositions ‘Every 
whiteness is a quality’ and ‘Every quality is a whiteness’ really are composed of 
parts corresponding one for one to the parts of the spoken or written propositions, 
then there is going to be no way to distinguish those two mental propositions from 
one another. The two will have exactly the same parts, the same ingredients. And 
the “arrangement” of those ingredients is simply not an applicable notion here. 
Therefore, those two spoken or written propositions must be subordinated 
to the same mental proposition — or at best to mental propositions that are only 
numerically distinct (which doesn’t make any difference that matters for us). 
Therefore, those two spoken or written propositions would have to be synony-
mous. But they obviously aren’t! And just to drive the point home, they surely 
aren’t synonymous, since the one is true and the other is false! 
Therefore, the hypothesis that got us into this mess in the first place must 
be rejected. In short, the mental propositions to which the two spoken or written 
propositions are subordinated are not composed of parts at all in the way Ockham 
thinks. Q. E. D.124 
a.  Gregory of Rimini’s and Peter of Ailly’s Theory 
of Mental Propositions as Structureless Acts 
For Gregory and Peter, mental propositions properly so called are struc-
tureless mental acts. They cannot be further analyzed into component parts. For 
Peter, although not for Gregory, these structureless mental acts will nevertheless 
bear certain kinds of “equivalence” relations to other mental acts — to concepts 
in particular. But those concepts do not really enter into the make-up of the pro-
positional act as real parts of it. 
Peter discusses all this in the “Insolubles” part of his Concepts and Insol-
ubles, in a series of “conclusions.”125 Here is some of the discussion126: 
From what has been said above, a third conclusion is plain and is 
inferred, that an affirmation or negation in the intellect (or any 
                                                 
124 Although Ockham’s usual view is that mental propositions are composed of parts, re-
call that in Texts (36) & (38) he takes the opposite view and in fact presents an argument very 
much like the one we have just gone through. 
125 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 9rb–vb; Spade trans., §§ 125–137 (pp. 42–
44). 
126 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 9rb; Spade trans., § 125, p. 42. The Latin 
is: “Ex praedictis patet et infertur tertia conclusio, quod affirmatio vel negatio in intellectu seu 
quaevis mentalis oratio non debet dici complexa propter hoc quod sit composita ex pluribus noti-
tiis partialibus essentialiter.” 
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mental expression you want), ought not to be called “complex” be-
cause of its being essentially composed of several partial acts of 
knowing. 
We have just seen the reasoning behind that conclusion. Peter goes on127: 
The fourth conclusion [is that] a mental expression ought not to be 
called “complex” because in signifying it is equivalent to several 
utterances or inscriptions that are the components of a spoken or 
written expression in the way recounted above. [This is] proved, 
because if [it were] so, it follows that no mental expression would 
be complex naturally but by convention only. For any such [mental 
expression] is signified by an utterance or inscription [that is] com-
posite or complex in the way stated above. But it could [in addi-
tion] be signified conventionally by an incomplex utterance, just as 
it is signified by a complex [utterance]. And so it could be simulta-
neously complex and incomplex. All these things seem unreason-
able. 
On the theory being rejected here, a mental expression properly so called 
would be “complex” only by a kind of analogy with the spoken or written expres-
sions that are subordinated to it. This was Gregory of Rimini’s view,128 and Peter 
rejects it. He argues in the passage just quoted that this would make the complex-
ity or non-complexity of a mental expression depend on the conventions of spo-
ken and written language. Furthermore, since the conventions of spoken and writ-
ten language are completely arbitrary, it might happen that a complex spoken ex-
pression and a one-word spoken expression are subordinated to the same mental 
act, and in that case this theory would imply that that mental act was both simple 
and complex at the same time. And while there is not anything actually inconsis-
tent about all this if we are clear about what we mean by it, Peter thinks it is an 
unreasonable way to talk. He gives us his own view in the following passage129: 
The sixth conclusion [is that] an affirmation or negation in the in-
tellect ought to be called a “complex” act of knowing because in 
                                                 
127 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 9rb–va; Spade trans., §§ 129–130, p. 43. 
The Latin is: “Quarta conclusio: oratio mentalis non debet dici complexa quia aequivalet in signfi-
cando pluribus vocibus vel scriptis orationem vocalem vel scriptam praedicto modo componen-
tibus. Probatur, quia si sic, sequitur quod nulla oratio mentalis esset naturaliter complexa sed 
solum ad placitum. <Quia quaelibet talis ad placitum> significatur per vocem vel scripturam modo 
praedicto compositam vel complexam. Sed posset significari ad placitum per vocem incomplexam 
sicut significatur per complexam. Et sic posset simul esse complexa et incomplexa. Quae omnia 
videntur irrationabilia.” For the words in pointed brackets, see Spade trans., p. 121 n. 369. 
128 Gregory, Super primum et secundum Sententiarum I, prol., q. 1, a. 3, fol. 4O (that’s 4 
+ letter ‘O’, not “forty”) (= Trapp ed., vol. 1, p. 35). 
129 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 9va–b; Spade trans., § 135, p. 44. The 
Latin is: “Sexta conclusio: affirmatio vel negatio in intellectu debet dici notitia complexa quia 
pluribus notitiis specifice distinctis aequivalet in significando. 
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signifying it is equivalent to several acts of knowing [that are] spe-
cifically distinct. 
This avoids the problem with Gregory’s theory, which would make com-
plexity or the lack of it purely a matter of convention. Still, it is not altogether 
clear just what kind of “equivalence” Peter has in mind. At any rate it is clear that 
he (and for that matter Gregory of Rimini too) think mental propositions properly 
so called are not really complexes at all; they are simple, unanalyzable mental 
acts.130 
b.  God is a True Mental Proposition Properly So 
Called 
A little while back,131 I mentioned the notion of God’s mental language. 
Now although no one I know of actually used the notion of God’s mental lan-
guage to argue that mental propositions properly so called have to be able to oc-
cur instantaneously, Peter does in fact say something astonishing about mental 
language in connection with God. He’s rather hesitant about it, and doesn’t want 
to commit himself to it too firmly, but here is what he says132: 
The third conclusion,133 which I posit as probable [only] and do 
not [definitely] assert, for the sake of understanding what has gone 
before, [is] namely that God (or the divine act of knowing) is a true 
proposition for the divine intellect. 
The proof is given in the paragraphs following.134 The basic idea is this: 
God has knowledge, and that knowledge (like ours) is framed in terms of mental 
language properly so called. But God is metaphysically simple; he has no compo-
nent parts and no accidental properties.135 It follows, therefore, (1) that God and 
his knowledge are identical. There is no metaphysical distinction to be made there 
for him, as there is for us. And (2) it follows further that there is no metaphysical 
distinction to be made between God and his mental propositions properly so 
                                                 
130 The theory Ockham presents in Text (38) is ambiguous. It may be Gregory of 
Rimini’s theory, or it may be Peter’s. Or it may be something in between. 
131 See p. 122 above. 
132 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 14rb; Spade trans., § 226, p. 61. The 
Latin is: “Tertia conclusio quam pono probabiliter et <non> assertive est pro intellectu praeceden-
tis, scilicet quod deus seu divina notitia est ipsi intellectui divino propositio vera.” For the word in 
pointed brackets, see Spade trans., p. 135 n. 609. 
133 This “third conclusion” belong to a different series from the “third conclusion” 
quoted on p. 123 above. 
134 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 14rb–va; Spade trans., pp. 61–62. 
135 There is nothing surprising about this claim. It was a standard view. I don’t want to 
go into the details here, but it is based on two things: (a) the claim that God is a creator, and there-
fore uncaused; and (b) the view that any kind of real composition requires an efficient cause to 
put the components together. 
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called. In fact, we shouldn’t really even speak in the plural here. It is not as if God 
has (or is) several metaphysically distinct mental propositions (as though one 
thing were many). In God, it’s all the same. His one mental proposition properly 
so called does all the work that we accomplish with many such mental proposi-
tions. And that’s why God is a true proposition!136 
c.  The Difference Between Gregory’s Theory and 
Peter’s 
Gregory thinks the conclusion that mental propositions have no parts 
holds for all mental propositions properly so called. Peter doesn’t think so. He 
agrees with Gregory about mental categoricals137: 
The second conclusion138 [is that] no categorical mental proposi-
tion is essentially composed of several partial acts of knowing, of 
which one is the subject, another the predicate and [yet] another 
the copula. 
But curiously, he disagrees in the case of mental hypotheticals139: 
The first of these [conclusions] is [that] every mental hypothetical 
proposition is essentially composed of several partial acts of know-
ing. 
For example, Peter thinks a mental syllogism is a single mental condi-
tional proposition composed of two premises (as antecedent) and a conclusion (as 
consequent) that are really distinct, since it is possible to doubt the former and not 
the latter (or vice versa) at the same time140: 
                                                 
136 This striking claim is not original with Peter of Ailly. See Peter of Ailly, Concepts 
and Insolubles, Spade trans., pp. 135–137 n. 614. 
137 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 8vb–9ra; Spade trans., §119, p. 41. The 
Latin is: “Secunda conclusio: Nulla propositio mentalis categorica est essentialiter composita ex 
pluribus partialibus notitiis quarum una sit subjectum et alia praedicatum et alia copula.” 
138 You might as well give up any idea of trying to keep track of Peter’s several series of 
“conclusions.” 
139 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 8vb; Spade trans., § 113, p. 40. The Latin 
is: “Omnis propositio mentalis hypothetica est ex pluribus notitiis partialibus essentialiter compo-
sita.” The word ‘hypothetical’ in mediaeval logic refers to any proposition put together out of two 
or more simpler propositions. ‘Hypothetical’ does not necessarily mean “conditional,” and it does 
not exactly mean what we mean by “molecular” either — since the negations of atomic proposi-
tions are “molecular” in our sense but not “hypothetical” in theirs. 
140 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 8vb; Spade trans., § 117, p. 41. The Latin 
is: “Tertio, quilibet syllogismus — immo quaelibet consequentia mentalis — est propositio hy-
pothetica. Et constat quod quilibet talis syllogismus componitur ex praemissis et conclusione quae 
sunt partes distinctae, quia stat assentire uni et non alteri, ut clarum est. Igitur.” 
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Third, any [mental] syllogism (indeed, any mental consequence 
you want) is a hypothetical proposition. And it is certain that any 
such a syllogism is composed of premises and a conclusion that are 
distinct parts. For one can assent to the one and not the other, as is 
plain. Therefore, [there are some mental hypotheticals composite 
in the way described above]. 
The basic idea here seems to be that I cannot both assent to and yet not as-
sent to the same proposition at the same time. Thus, since I can assent to one 
premise, say, of a syllogism and yet doubt the other, or assent to the conclusion 
and yet doubt one or both of the premises, it follows that the two premises and the 
conclusion cannot be really the same proposition in the mind, but must be all 
really distinct from one another. Thus, mental syllogisms must be really com-
posed of parts. 
But that’s a terrible argument. The fact that you can assent to the conclu-
sion, say, of a syllogism without assenting to its premises no more shows that the 
syllogism really is metaphysically made up of those propositions as parts than the 
fact that I can produce distinct concepts separately shows that they really enter 
into mental propositions as parts. 
What is to prevent the mental syllogism from being a single, metaphysi-
cally simple mental act that is “equivalent in signifying” to several propositions, 
even though those propositions do not really enter into its metaphysical makeup, 
just as a mental proposition properly so called is “equivalent in signifying” to 
several concepts, even though those concepts do not really enter into the meta-
physical makeup of the proposition? Whatever Peter means by “equivalence in 
signifying” in the latter context, why should it not be applicable also in the for-
mer? 
But worse, Peter apparently fails to see that the considerations of word-
order apply to syllogisms just as much as they do to categorical propositions. 
What is the difference between the valid syllogism: 
and the invalid one: 
 
except the order and arrangement of the various propositions with respect to the 
word ‘therefore’? 
Every man is an animal. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, Socrates is an animal. 
 
Socrates is an animal. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, every man is an animal. 
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In fact, any kind of “hypothetical” connective141 that is not commutative 
(that is, any one for which the order does count) is going to be subject to Peter’s 
own word-order argument. 
Well, what about that word-order argument? I think it is a good and telling 
argument, but not good enough to establish the conclusion Gregory and Peter try 
to get from it. That is, I think the argument is probably enough to support the 
claim that there is no word order in mental language. But it is not enough to show 
that mental propositions have no parts. For there is a way to avoid the latter con-
clusion. 
d.  A Way Out of the Word-Order Argument 
What I have in mind is suggested (no more than that) in a curious text by 
an anonymous author writing no earlier than the third quarter of the fourteenth 
century (and probably later than that). This anonymous author wrote a very inter-
esting Commentarium in insolubilia Hollandrini — that is, a commentary on the 
Insolubilia of John of Holland. John of Holland was active in the 1360s at the 
University of Prague. You don’t have to know anything more about him than 
that.142 The anonymous commentary is interesting for lots of reasons. But it has 
never been edited, or even studied very fully.143 
One question raised by the anonymous author is this144: “Whether a part of 
an insoluble [proposition]145 is insoluble, and likewise whether a part of a propo-
sition is true?” Ignore the business about insolubles for now. But notice the sec-
ond part of the author’s question: “Whether a part of a proposition is true?” And I 
suspect our anonymous author is talking about mental propositions here, although 
that cannot be verified without further investigation. 
The author is thinking mainly of categorical propositions. He is asking 
whether, for example, the proposition ‘John ate’ is a constituent of the proposition 
‘John ate the apple’, a constituent with its own truth value, so that if John really 
did eat the apple, then anyone uttering the proposition ‘John ate the apple’ would 
be stating two truths, not just one: (1) that John ate, and (2) that John at the apple. 
But in addition to categorical propositions, the question can also be asked for hy-
pothetical (mental) propositions, which are made up — or at least seem to be 
made up — of other propositions as parts. If they really are so made up, as Peter 
of Ailly holds but Gregory of Rimini does not, then it would appear that the an-
swer to the second half of the question has to be “yes” for hypothetical (mental) 
                                                 
141 See n. 139 above. 
142 But if you are curious about his Insolubilia, which was moderately well known, see 
Bos’ edition in John of Holland, Four Tracts on Logic. 
143 As far as I know, the sum total of what we know about this text is reported in Spade, 
The Mediaeval Liar, item V (pp. 23–26), and in what you will read below. 
144 Translated from Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, Pal. Lat. MS 4853, fol. 102v. The Latin 
is: “Utrum pars insolubilis sit insolubilis, et similiter utrum pars propositionis sit vera?” 
145 An “insoluble” is an antinomial proposition like the Liar Paradox. John of Holland’s 
theory of insolubles is a variant of William Heytesbury’s theory. See p. 91 above. 
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propositions — they really do have other propositions as constituents, and those 
constituent propositions presumably bear truth values like any other proposition. 
But if they are not really so made up, as Gregory of Rimini holds but Peter of 
Ailly does not, then the answer would appear to be “no” for (mental) hypotheti-
cals. 
In connection with this question, our anonymous author refers to the view 
of certain unidentified people who appear to hold that (mental) propositions — 
both categorical and hypothetical — really are composed of parts. He says146: 
Adversaries who want to run away [from the problem] say here 
that no part of a categorical proposition is a proposition. And they 
say that for something to be a proposition it is required that there 
be a subject, a predicate and a copula in it, either expressly or 
equivalently.147 They say further that for something to be a subject 
there is required a syncategorema predenoting148 that it is the sub-
ject. The same holds for the copula and the predicate of the cate-
gorical. Just as, in order for something to be taken disjunctively a 
syncategorema is required by means of which it is so taken, so in 
order for some term to be taken as the subject, there is required a 
syncategorema by means of which it is taken as the subject. So too 
for the predicate. 
There are many things to question here. Not the least of them is: How does 
the theory in the rest of the paragraph bear on the claim referred to in the first sen-
tence? But I am not primarily concerned right now with understanding our 
anonymous author’s text. I only want to say that it suggests a way to allow for 
real complexity in mental propositions properly so called.149 So, fair warning: I’m 
really free-wheeling now. Here we go: 
Look at the last sentence of the quotation. The first part of it talks about 
disjunction, and says in effect that in order to have a disjunction you need a mark 
                                                 
146 MS cit., fol. 103r. The Latin is: “Adversarii volentes fugere dicunt hic sic, quod nulla 
pars propositionis categoricae sit propositio. Et dicunt quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit propositio 
requiritur quod in ipso expresse vel aequivalenter sit subjectum, praedicatum et copula. Dicunt 
ulterius quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit subjectum requiritur unum <syn>categorema praedenotans 
ipsum esse subjectum. Conformiter de copula et praedicato categoricae. [There follows an illegi-
ble abbreviation.] Sicut ad hoc quod aliquid accipiatur disjunctive requiritur unum syncategorema 
mediante quo sic accipiatur, sic ad hoc quod aliquis terminus capiatur pro subjecto, requiritur syn-
categorema mediante quo capiatur pro subjecto. Et sic de praedicato.” 
147 The phrase ‘or equivalently’ is reminiscent of Gregory’s and Peter’s view that, al-
though categorical mental propositions do not really have parts, nevertheless they are “equivalent 
in signifying” to complex expressions — spoken ones for Gregory, mental ones for Peter. This 
may be what our anonymous has in mind, but I doubt it. More likely he is thinking of how the 
one-word Latin sentence ‘Curro’ (= ‘I run), for instance, is “equivalent” in a fairly obvious and 
strong sense to ‘Ego sum currens’ (= ‘I am running’), with the subject expressed explicitly and the 
verb expanded to a copula and a participle. 
148 I have no idea what “predenotation” is. But that’s what the manuscript has. 
149 I emphatically not claiming that this is what the anonymous author himself had in 
mind. In fact, I am pretty confident that it isn’t. 
Chapter 4: Mental Language 
 
130
of disjunction, a “disjunction sign.” In English it’s ‘or’, in Latin it’s ‘vel’ or ‘aut’ 
or ‘sive’. In modern logical notation it’s the “wedge” (‘∨’), at least for inclusive 
disjunction. 
When our author talks about something’s being “taken disjunctively,” he 
could mean one of two things. He might mean taking it as a “disjunction,” in 
which case it will have to have some mark of disjunction in it. Thus ‘p ∨ q’ has 
‘∨’ in it. But he might also mean taking it as a “disjunct” in a disjunction, in 
which case it will have to have some mark of disjunction operating on it. (That is, 
it is “within the scope” of a disjunctive operator, as they say.) Thus, ‘p’ in ‘p ∨ q’ 
has ‘∨’ operating on it. So far so good. We haven’t seen anything surprising yet. 
Of course sometimes in ordinary language, although not usually in formal 
logic, we disjoin not propositions but terms.150 We sometimes say not ‘John is 
singing or Mary is singing’ but instead ‘John or Mary is singing’.151 The same 
thing we said about propositional disjunction applies also to term-disjunction: 
there must be some mark of disjunction there. 
Now Latin, although not English, allows two ways to form term-
disjunctions. You can either take the same words we use to disjoin propositions, 
only put them between terms instead (that’s the way we do it in English), or — 
and now things begin to get interesting — you can add the special suffix ‘-ve’ to 
the second term-disjunct.152 Thus ‘John or Mary is singing’ could be translated 
either as ‘Johannes vel Maria canit’ or as ‘Johannes Mariave canit’.153 The ‘-ve’ 
construction is not very common, particularly in late mediaeval Latin, but it was 
there and available for those who cared to use it. 
Now what’s the point of all this? Well, in the case of term-disjunction us-
ing ‘-ve’, we are in effect marking for disjunction not by reserving a special word 
for that purpose, but by what amounts to inflection. Just as grammatical case in 
Latin is marked by inflection, so that the genitive case-ending, for example, tells 
us about the syntactical function of the word, so too here we have the disjunctive 
suffix ‘-ve’ telling us about another syntactical function of the word. 
In English the difference between ‘The dog chased the cat’ and ‘The cat 
chased the dog’ is purely one of word-order. In Latin, word-order doesn’t matter 
in this case. Even though by the later Middle Ages it was customary to put the 
subject before the predicate, in fact the Latin sentence would be perfectly intelli-
                                                 
150 In fact, we will see in Ch. 9, below, that an important part of “supposition-theory” 
uses term-disjunction, namely the theory of “merely confused supposition.” And we will have 
occasion later to use term-conjunction too. 
151 There the two are equivalent, of course. But that isn’t always so. ‘Every human being 
is male or female’ is by no means equivalent to ‘Every human being is male or every human being 
is female’, and ‘I promise to give you either this horse or that horse’ is not equivalent to ‘I prom-
ise to give you this horse or I promise to give you that horse’. The theory of “merely confused 
supposition” was designed to handle such cases. (Horse-promising, it turns out, was a big topic in 
late mediaeval logic. See Ch. 9, pp. 286–288, below.) 
152 ‘-ve’ is obviously etymologically connected to ‘vel’. 
153 For that matter, look at Boethius’ famous definition of a proposition, in Boethius, De 
differentiis topicis, col. 1174B (see Stump trans., p. 30): “A proposition is an expression signify-
ing the true or the false.” The Latin is: “Propositio est oratio verum falsumve significans.” There 
you see the disjunctive suffix ‘-ve’ in action. 
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gible no matter what order the words came in. This is because the different syn-
tactical functions of the terms ‘dog’ and ‘cat’ are marked in Latin by inflection, 
by case-ending. 
Perhaps you can see where this is headed. It suggests the following theory 
of mental language: Mental propositions, let us say, categorical as well as hypo-
thetical ones, do indeed have parts. Thus — taking categorical propositions, for 
example — there is going to have to be something about the subject term that 
makes it the subject and not the predicate, and likewise something about the 
predicate term that makes it the predicate and not the subject. This is true of spo-
ken or written language just as much as it is for mental language. 
In spoken or written language it may be word-order that does it. But, as 
we have just seen, it doesn’t have to be. It might be grammatical inflection — 
something like case-ending — that marks the word as playing the role of subject, 
whereas a different inflection marks a word as playing the role of predicate. 
Note that the distinction between nominative and accusative is not enough 
make this difference, since the nominative is sometimes used for predicate terms 
too (we speak of “predicate nominatives” in that case). This is exactly what hap-
pens in our earlier example of ‘Every whiteness is a quality’ and ‘Every quality is 
a whiteness’,154 and it is just this fact that originally gave rise to the question what 
plays the role of word-order in mental language properly so called. Since Gregory 
and Peter have argued that the notion of word-order itself doesn’t make much 
sense for mental language, why not suppose that mental language has some spe-
cial kind of inflection that marks predicate terms, whether they are in the accusa-
tive case or the nominative? 
There is nothing contrary to the spirit of mental language here. Ockham, 
for example, is already committed to case, number, and comparison for mental 
names, and to mood, voice, person, number and tense for mental verbs.155 Thus, a 
concept of “lion” in the nominative case is not the same as the concept of “lion” 
in the accusative case, even though both are concepts of exactly the same things. 
Why not push this to an extreme, and make mental language such a highly 
inflected language that word order counts for nothing at all? Instead of determin-
ing the grammatical role of a mental term by looking at its position in the proposi-
tion (in other words, by word-order), you would just look at the term itself, which 
would bear its grammatical function on the face of it. And why not make this true 
not just for the individual words in mental categorical propositions but also for 
the propositional components of mental hypotheticals — so that a disjunct, for ex-
ample, would be marked by a special disjunctive inflection applied to all the men-
tal words in that disjunct? 
There are many ways to work this out. In typical spoken and written lan-
guages, we think of inflection as being done by word-endings. But it could have 
been otherwise. In written language, inflection could be a matter of using differ-
                                                 
154 See p. 120 above. 
155 See pp. 105–107 above. 
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ent colored inks. In spoken language, we could use tones (as in Chinese156) to 
mark syntactical function. In mental language, perhaps it’s a matter of a certain 
kind of mental “charge” that marks subject concepts, a different kind of mental 
“charge” that marks predicate concepts, yet a different kind of “charge” to mark 
the ingredients of a disjunction, and so on. 
The details are not important, but the general point is: It is possible to 
make the necessary distinctions of syntactical role by devices that are more analo-
gous to inflection than they are to word order. But if that is so, then it is possible 
for mental propositions to have real parts after all. The question of word order 
need not arise. 
On the view I am spinning out here,157 mental propositions would have 
parts after all, and the propositions themselves would just be a simple “binding to-
gether” of those parts — in no particular order. 
Thus it is possible to answer Gregory’s and Peter’s argument, and to allow 
real complexity into mental language. But note that in the process, we’ve made 
mental language much more complex than Ockham thought it was. The straight-
forward kind of correspondence he had in mind between spoken and mental lan-
guage (at least in favorable cases) won’t work. The subject of the mental proposi-
tion corresponding to ‘Every whiteness is a quality’ and the predicate of the men-
tal proposition corresponding to ‘Every quality is a whiteness’ will, on this new 
theory, be more than numerically distinct. They will be as distinct as ‘she’ is from 
‘her’ and ‘hers’, and as ‘he’ is from ‘his’ and ‘him’. 
So while Gregory’s and Peter’s argument does not establish their own 
view that mental propositions have no parts, it does tell against the rather simple 
“part”-theory that seems to have been Ockham’s usual view. 
3.  The Problem of the Unity of Proper Mental 
Propositions 
All that is the first of the two lines of argument I said I wanted to extract 
from Peter of Ailly’s discussion.158 The second line of argument can be handled 
much more quickly. 
Suppose we adopt the “inflection” theory just described. On that theory, 
mental propositions — and in general, all complex mental expressions — are just 
a bunch of mental acts bound together in any old order, or rather in no order at all. 
(A complex mental expression would then be more like an unordered set than like 
an ordered sequence.) 
In that case, here is a question: What exactly is this “binding together” of 
the parts? Just how are the parts of mental proposition put together? Peter says159: 
                                                 
156 I don’t mean that Chinese uses tones this way, but rather that the kinds of tones Chi-
nese uses could be used in a syntactical role rather than a lexical one. 
157 Understand that I am not recommending this theory. I’m only trying to find a way 
around Gregory’s and Peter’s view that because the notion of word-order makes little sense in 
mental language properly so called, therefore mental propositions can have no parts. 
158 See p. 120 above. 
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Second, it does not appear that [there is] any possible way for such 
a composition [to take place]. For if someone affirming or denying 
nothing should have some simple acts of knowing, and then form a 
proposition [made up of them], it is not apparent what change has 
occurred in them on account of which they are [now] put together 
with one another any more than earlier. 
This sounds perhaps as if Peter — and Gregory, whom Peter is continuing 
to quote very closely here — are thinking of the difference between merely enter-
taining a thought in the mind on the one hand and actually affirming it on the 
other. And perhaps that is really all they are thinking of. 
But I think there is a more interesting argument latent here as well. Re-
member that the question was160: Are mental propositions put together out of 
“partial acts of knowing” so that one such partial act of knowing is the subject of 
the proposition, another is the predicate, and yet another is the copula? 
So, let’s consider: What is the difference between having the three con-
cepts or mental acts: “Socrates,” “is,” and “mortal” (appropriately inflected, as 
described in the theory just discussed), and having the mental proposition or judg-
ment “Socrates is mortal”? The answer seems to be that the difference lies in the 
fact that in the latter case the three acts are somehow put together (= com + 
posed). 
In fact, there is an old and venerable theory, going back to Aristotle at 
least in spirit, of the intellect as “composing and dividing.” According to that the-
ory, the activity of the intellect as putting together is exactly its judgmental 
(= proposition-forming) activity. The mind takes the concept “Socrates” and the 
concept “mortal,” and puts them together in an affirmative way (“composes” 
them); the result of that putting together is the mental affirmation “Socrates is 
mortal.” Or it can put those same concepts together in a negative way (“dividing” 
them161); the result of that dividing is the mental denial “Socrates is not mortal.” 
But that theory, in its traditional form at any rate, won’t answer the pre-
sent question. For on that theory, the composing act of the mind, affirmative or 
negative, is just what plays the role of the mental copula, affirmative or negative. 
The mind puts the concepts “Socrates” and “mortal” together to form the judg-
ment “Socrates is mortal” or “Socrates is not mortal,” and that putting together is 
the mental copula “is” or “is not.” 
But in the question we are now considering, we have already taken ac-
count of the copula, as one of our three mental acts “Socrates,” “is,” and “mortal.” 
The question is asking in effect what the difference is between simply a list of 
                                                                                                                                     
159 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 8rb; Spade trans., § 103, pp. 38–39. The 
Latin is: “Secundo, non apparet modus possibilis talis compositionis. Nam si quis nihil affirmans 
vel negans habeat notitias aliquas simplices, et deinde formet propositionem, non apparet quae 
variatio in illis fiat propter quam plus adinvicem componantur quam prius.” Compare Gregory, 
Super primum et secundum Sententiarum I, prol., q. 1, a. 3, fol. 4L–M (= Trapp ed., vol. 1, p. 33). 
160 See p. 120 above. 
161 Don’t be confused by the terminology. “Dividing” is a kind of “composing”; it is 
composing negatively. 
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those three mental acts and the kind of mental unity that results when those three 
acts get together and interact to form a mental proposition. 
To suppose that we need yet another mental act, a kind of mental “super-
copula,” to bind the subject to the original copula, and that copula to the predicate 
— that looks like a sure way into an infinite regress. 
So the traditional theory of the intellect as “composing” and “dividing” 
cannot, at least not without a lot more explaining, account for the difference be-
tween a simple list of the ingredients of a mental proposition and the unified 
proposition that results from those ingredients. Thus we still do not have a good 
story about how mental propositions properly so called can be complexes made 
up of real parts. 
As it stands, of course, this argument is not a refutation of the view that 
mental propositions are complex. But it certainly is a challenge to that view. 
a.  Reply to This Problem 
Nevertheless, there is a way out of this argument too, just as there was a 
way out of the earlier one about word-order. That is, this second line of reasoning 
does not suffice to prove Gregory’s and Peter’s claim that mental propositions 
don’t have parts, any more than the first line of reasoning did. 
You might, for example, say that the question162 is badly formulated. The 
mental copula is not a part of the mental proposition in the same way the subject 
and predicate are. Rather, since the copula is supposed to be the mental act of 
conjoining the terms, you might argue that the mental copula is not a separable 
part of the mental proposition. You simply can’t have the copula (the conjoining) 
without having the things conjoined (the terms), and without having the product 
that results from the conjoining (i.e., the proposition or judgment). 
So, when it is asked what is the difference between merely having the 
three concepts “Socrates,” “is,” and “mortal,” and having the mental proposition 
or judgment “Socrates is mortal,” the correct answer is: None. By having the cop-
ula “is,” you ipso facto have the proposition too. The copula just is the putting to-
gether of the other terms to form the proposition. Since there is no difference, the 
fact that we can’t find any difference can hardly count as an objection to the the-
ory that mental propositions really have parts. 
Perhaps this view is to be found in Buridan himself. For example, consider 
the passage quoted earlier163: 
For the word ‘is’, insofar as it is precisely a copula, signifies noth-
ing outside [the mind] beyond the signification of the categore-
matic terms. Rather it signifies only the complexive concept by 
which the intellect forms propositions from the terms ‘God’ and 
‘God’. 
                                                 
162 See p. 133 above. 
163 Scott ed., p. 32; Scott trans., p. 79. For the context, see p. 112 above. 
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So, for this problem as for the previous one about word-order, perhaps it is 
possible to avoid Gregory’s and Peter’s conclusion that mental propositions do 
not have parts, by holding that the other parts are held together by the copula, 
which is not itself a part like the others. But, even if this strategy is successful, in 
adopting it we go far beyond the basically straightforward picture that was Ock-
ham’s usual view. For the copulas of spoken and written propositions are separa-
ble ingredients. They can be isolated and considered by themselves — without the 
terms they couple. At least you can do that for English or Latin. 
If you can’t do that with mental copulas, as Buridan perhaps suggests in 
the passage just quoted, then to that extent the structure of mental propositions 
fails to parallel that of spoken propositions. 
Furthermore, in spoken and written language there are quite distinct 
propositions with copulas that are nevertheless only numerically distinct. The ‘is’ 
in ‘The cat is on the mat’ sounds the same as the ‘is’ in ‘The hat is on the head’ or 
the one in ‘Diphtheria is a very serious disease’. The copulas there are mere du-
plicates of one another, specifically the same. But if, as Buridan perhaps suggests, 
the mental copula is inseparable from the terms it couples in the sense that you 
have different copulas for different pairs of coupled terms, then there are lots of 
different copulas — and they are different in kind, that is, “specifically” different. 
And of course the same thing holds for written language. 
So, once again, the close parallel between spoken or written language and 
mental language breaks down. The relation between spoken language and mental 
language is very complicated. The one is not mirrored by the other even in those 
“favorable” cases that Buridan and Ockham allowed. 
I.  Summary of the Two Preceding Problems 
Neither of the two arguments we have considered (and we have by no 
means discussed all the arguments Gregory and Peter raise) succeeds in showing 
that mental propositions properly so called really have no parts — as Peter and 
Gregory want to hold for some or all such propositions. 
They do however succeed in showing that if mental propositions are com-
posed of parts, their structure is not the straightforward kind of thing Ockham and 
Buridan seem to have had in mind. The structure of mental propositions is not ac-
curately represented in spoken and written language — not even in favorable 
cases. 
Chapter 4: Mental Language 
 
136
J.  Additional Reading 
For additional reading on the material covered in this chapter, see: John Buri-
dan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, Scott trans., all of Chs. 1 and 6. Ch. 6 is 
on “conventional” signification, and so not directly about mental language at all. 
But in the course of discussing conventional signification, Buridan says a lot of 
interesting things about mental language. See also William of Ockham, Summa 
of Logic I, all of Chs. 3 and 13; Texts (51)–(52), (53). Also Peter of Ailly, Text 
(80), for another use of the phrase “equivalent in signifying.” 
(We will have occasion to look at these last two passage more closely 
when we discuss the theory of “connotation” in Ch. 7, below. But they are of 
some interest even now. 









o some extent we have discussed the notion of signification already, in 
Ch. 3 above. At that time, we saw both a basic agreement about the psy-
chologico-epistemological criterion of signification (to signify x =df. to 
establish an understanding of x),1 and at the same time a disagreement 
over what it is that spoken words immediately signify. Is it the corresponding 
concept? Or is it some external object?2 
In the present chapter, I want to talk about a different kind of disagree-
ment. If the former one was about immediate signification (particularly the imme-
diate signification of spoken language), this new one is about ultimate significa-
tion. In effect, this new dispute is over what is conceived by a concept. Whereas 
the former one was over the role or use of language (is it to express thought, or is 
it to discuss things?), this new dispute is a metaphysical one. 
Perhaps we can best get a handle on this new question by looking at a dis-
agreement between William of Ockham and Walter Burley. Here, as is often the 
case, Burley’s view is the conservative, more or less traditional one, while Ock-
ham’s is something of a novelty.3 
The disagreement this time arises in the context of the correct way to de-
fine certain subcases of the semantic property known as “supposition.” We can set 
aside the details of supposition-theory for now; we will talk about them later. But 
I will need to say something about supposition even here, since it is the context in 
which this new dispute emerges between Ockham and Burley. For the present, 
let’s just say that supposition is reference. (That’s all right as a first approxima-
tion, but we’ll see later on that the situation is much more complicated than this.4) 
                                                 
1 See Ch. 3, p. 61, above. 
2 See Ch. 3, pp. 81–85, above. 
3 It is not Ockham’s metaphysical view that is especially novel, although there are inno-
vations there too. What I am claiming here is rather that it is the semantic theory that is the nov-
elty. 
4 See Chs. 8–9 below. 
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A.  A Dispute Between Ockham and Burley  
Both Ockham and Burley distinguish three main kinds of supposition: 
“personal” (for example, ‘man’ has “personal” supposition in ‘Every man is an 
animal’), “simple” (‘man’ in ‘Man is a species’), and “material” (‘man’ in ‘Man 
has three letters’).5 For the most part (but not always), the two authors were in 
agreement over individual cases. That is, if presented with a list of propositions, 
Ockham and Burley would usually agree about which terms in those propositions 
had which main kind of supposition. But they disagreed over what was going on 
in some of those cases. And that is what I want to focus on now. 
For example, look at Ockham’s Summa of Logic I.64, § 2. There Ockham 
says that personal supposition occurs when a term supposits for (= refers to, 
stands for) its significate, that is, for what it signifies — whatever that might turn 
out to be: 
… whether that significate is (a) a thing outside the soul, whether 
it is (b) an utterance, or (c) an intention of the soul, whether it is 
(d) an inscription, or anything else imaginable. 
Then he goes on to gives several examples. For instance (§ 3): 
[Here is] an example of the first case, (a): In saying ‘Every man is 
an animal’, ‘man’ supposits for its significates. For ‘man’ is im-
posed only to signify these men. For it does not properly signify 
anything common to them,6 but rather the men themselves, accord-
ing to Damascene. 
1.  Ockham’s Theory 
The reference to “Damascene” here is to John Damascene (that is, John of 
Damascus), an eighth century Greek author, whose Dialectica had been translated 
into Latin in the thirteenth century and was available to Ockham.7 There is some-
                                                 
5 Do not read too much into this terminology. Do not, for example, think that “personal” 
supposition has anything especially to do with persons. The origins of the terminology have never 
been traced completely, but the juxtaposition of ‘personal’ with ‘simple’ suggests that the termi-
nology arose in the context of speculation on the theological doctrine of the Trinity. Also, note 
that in the example of material supposition, we would nowadays put quotation marks around the 
subject term. But don’t be misled. Although the theory of “material” supposition does many of the 
jobs of modern quotation marks, it does other jobs as well, as we shall see in Ch. 8 below. 
6 That is, a universal human nature. 
7 The Dialectica is really the first part of a larger text called The Source of Knowledge 
(Πηγή γνῶσεως), Damascene’s main work. The correct title of the Dialectica is “Philosophi-
cal Chapters” Κεφάλαια φιλοσοφικά). The third part of The Source of Knowledge is an 
Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (IΕκδοσις τῆς ὀρθοδόχου Πίστεως), translated into Latin 
(under the title De fide orthodoxa) c. 1148–1150 by one Burgundio of Pisa. (See Gilson, History 
of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 91 and p. 600 nn. 67–68.) The translation of the 
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thing of a problem about identifying the exact text Ockham is referring to here. 
Ockham’s modern editors refer to a passage in Ch. 10 of the Dialectica,8 but that 
text is in effect a discussion of the so called “Porphyrian tree,” which divides the 
category substance into narrower and narrower species and subspecies and finally 
(in some versions ) into individuals.9 There is not a word there about significa-
tion, which is the whole point of the passage from Ockham. 
Nevertheless, in Ch. 5 of the Greek text, there is another passage that is 
closer to what Ockham says. That chapter is omitted from the Grosseteste transla-
tion,10 and although I have no idea how Ockham could have had access to it, I 
suspect it is the passage he had in mind11. Here it is12: 
But now a substantival utterance either signifies what the 
thing is or else what kind of a what it is. For instance, if one asks 
us what man is, we reply: an animal. Then if he asks what kind of 
an animal he is, we say: rational, mortal. And therefore a substan-
tival utterance that picks out what kind of a what that thing is is 
called a difference. But what reveals what it is either expresses 
many species, and then it makes up a genus, or else [it expresses] 
many items differing in number and not in species, and then it 
makes a species. 
Now genus, for example substance, is primary. For ‘sub-
stance’ signifies both man and horse and cow, each one of which is 
called — and is — a substance, but each one a species. Now the 
one and the other, each one is a species. 
But species, for example man, is secondary. Now it signi-
fies many, that is, each and every man, who differ in number 
among themselves. For Peter is one and Paul another. And they are 
not one, but rather two. But they do not differ in species, that is, in 
nature. For all are called men, and in fact they are [men]. 
                                                                                                                                     
Dialectica has also been attributed to Burgundio of Pisa, but Thomson, The Writings of Robert 
Grosseteste, p. 45, argues that it should be ascribed to Robert Grosseteste, the famous Bishop of 
Lincoln from 1235–1253. Grosseteste was active in translating other Greek works as well. On the 
date of the translation of the Dialectica, see ibid., p. 49. 
8 William of Ockham, Summa logicae, p. 195 n. 1. The reference is to the Greek text in 
Migne, PG, vol. 94, cols. 571A. The corresponding passage in the Grosseteste translation of the 
Dialectica, is on p. 4 in § 8. Note that the Grosseteste translation circulated in two redactions, 
which were intermixed in the manuscripts. The arrangement of chapters in the translation is not 
the same as that in the Greek text as edited in Migne, and parts of the Greek text are omitted from 
the Grosseteste translation, including an important chapter to be discussed below. 
9 See n. 18 below. 
10 At least as presented in the Colligan edition: John Damascene, Dialectica: Version of 
Robert Grosseteste. The facts about Latin translations of Damascene’s Dialectica could obviously 
benefit from further research. 
11 Ockham certainly didn’t know Greek, so if this is the passage he is referring to, he was 
using a different version of the Latin text. 
12 John Damascene, Dialectica, Migne ed., PG 94, col. 542C. 
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Note that the passage does not really offer unequivocal support to Ock-
ham’s view. Ockham’s view is this: 
Figure 9: Ockham’s Theory of Signification 
Damascene agrees with Ockham about the species-word ‘man’, which 
signifies individual men, but oddly disagrees with Ockham when it comes to the 
genus-word ‘substance’. The latter, he says, “signifies both man and horse and 
cow, each one of which is called — and is — a substance, but each one a spe-
cies.” 
2.  Burley’s Theory 
In any case, Ockham’s view is as pictured in the figure. Contrast Burley’s 
theory in his Purity, Ch. 3, §§ 28–30.13 Burley thinks that when a term supposits 
for or refers to what it signifies, it is not in personal supposition but rather simple 
supposition. Now there is much more to this disagreement,14 but in part at least 
the dispute is one over what terms signify. 
In §§ 29–30, Burley clearly has Ockham in mind when he says “But some 
people reject this statement” that it is in simple supposition, not personal, that a 
term supposits for what it signifies. Burley thus disagrees with Ockham over the 
proper way to define the various main kinds of supposition (although they usually 
agree on which kind of supposition a given term has in a given proposition). 
In § 30, Burley tells us that, on his view, the proposition ‘Man is a spe-
cies’ is true when the term ‘man’ supposits for its significate. And he goes on (§§ 
                                                 
13 As explained in the Bibliography below, ‘Purity’ abbreviates The Longer Treatise On 
the Purity of the Art of Logic, Tract I: “On the Properties of Terms.” Note that, as described in 
the Bibliography, I am using the preliminary translation on file with the Translation Clearing 
House, rather than the forthcoming translation in the series “Yale Library of Medieval philoso-
phy.” The paragraph numbers will be the same for this portion of Burley’s text.. 
14 See Spade, “Some Epistemological Implications,” and Spade, “Walter Burley on the 
Simple Supposition of Singular Terms.” 
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30, 32) — let me give you a little road-map of this portion of Burley’s text — to 
tell us that what the term ‘man’ signifies is an Aristotelian secondary substance, 
that it is not something individual and particular, but rather something common 
and shared (§§ 32–33). That’s not what Ockham said at all. 
In § 34, Burley says he is not committing himself (at least not in that para-
graph) on the question whether this common entity that is signified is something 
inside the mind (= a general concept) or outside the mind (= an external common 
nature or universal); his argument there is neutral on that point. Nevertheless, in § 
35, he makes it clear that his own view is that the common significate is not just 
something in the mind — not merely a concept — but is rather an external com-
mon nature or universal. 
Burley’s theory may be diagrammed like this: 
Figure 10: Walter Burley’s Theory of Signification 
(I have deliberately made the universal human nature rather gauzy and di-
aphanous, since universals are pretty spooky entities.) 
For present purposes, the question here between Ockham and Burley 
comes to this: In the proposition ‘Every man is mortal’, for example, where both 
Ockham and Burley agree that the terms are in “personal supposition,” and where 
both agree that the term ‘man’ refers to Socrates and Plato and other individual 
men, does that term refer to what it signifies or not? Burley says no; Ockham says 
yes. In short, what is the significate of that term? 
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3.  Historical Antecedents of Burley’s Theory 
Burley’s theory is more or less the standard or traditional one, going back 
to the thirteenth century and before. For example, William of Sherwood says in 
his Introduction to Logic (Text (27)): 
Now signification is the presentation of the form of something to 
the intellect. 
He goes on to say that this form is a universal or common form, a spe-
cies15: 
[Formal supposition] is divided as follows: one kind is simple, an-
other personal. It is simple when a word supposits its significate 
for its significate. For example, ‘Man is a species’. But [formal 
supposition is] personal when it supposits its significate not for 
[its] significate but for a thing that is under it. For instance, ‘Man 
runs’. For running inheres in man in virtue of some singular. 
Don’t worry for now about all the technical vocabulary in this passage. It 
is perhaps not altogether clear what distinction Sherwood is making here with that 
vocabulary. But it is clear that Sherwood’s theory is closer to Burley’s than to 
Ockham’s. The term ‘man’ has personal supposition in ‘Man is running’ and sim-
ple supposition in ‘Man is a species’, and it is in the latter, Sherwood says, that 
the term ‘man’ supposits for or refers to what it signifies. In short, the term ‘man’ 
signifies a universal species, just as Burley says it does and as Ockham says it 
does not. 
Again, Peter of Spain, in his Summulae logicales, says16: 
One kind of accidental supposition is simple and another kind is 
personal. Simple supposition is the taking of a common term for 
the universal thing signified by it. For instance, when ‘Man is a 
species’ or ‘Animal is a genus’ is said, the term ‘man’ supposits 
for man in general and not for any of its inferiors, and the term 
‘animal’ [supposits] for animal in general and not for any of its in-
feriors. And likewise for any other common term. For example, 
‘Risible is a property’, ‘Rational is a difference’, ‘White is an ac-
cident’. 
And a little later17: 
                                                 
15 Lohr ed., § 5.13, p. 266.11–15 (= Grabmann ed., p. 75.14–18). See Kretzmann trans., 
p. 107. With different examples, of course, it could just as well be a genus. But the point stands: it 
is not an individualized form, but instead something common. 
16 Tractatus, De Rijk trans., Trans. VI, § 5, p. 81.11–18. Compare Peter of Spain, Lan-
guage in Dispute, Dinneen trans., p. 70. 
17 De Rijk ed., Trans. VI, § 7, p. 82.10–12. Compare Dinneen trans., p. 71. 
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Personal supposition is the taking of a common term for its inferi-
ors. For instance, when ‘Man runs’ is said, the term ‘man’ suppos-
its for its inferiors. 
Once again, this looks more like Burley’s doctrine than like Ockham’s. 
The “inferiors” of a common term are the things that “fall under”18 the universal 
nature signified by that term. 
Note, however that, for Peter of Spain, not every case of signifying is a 
case of signifying a common or universal entity. For example19: 
Thus, since every thing is either universal or particular, words that 
do not signify a universal or a particular must not signify any-
thing. 
The terms that signify particulars, for Peter, are singular terms,20 whereas 
general terms signify universals. 
It is not clear where either William or Peter stands in the dispute about the 
immediate signification of terms, that is, about whether they directly signify con-
cepts or things (either universal or particular things). William of Sherwood never 
mentions concepts or mental language at all. And Peter of Spain explicitly states 
that his Summulae is confined to a discussion of spoken language21: 
Dialectic is the art that has the path to the principles of all 
methods. And therefore in acquiring the sciences dialectic ought to 
be prior. 
Now ‘dialectic’ is so called from ‘dia’, which is ‘two’,22 
and ‘logos’, which is ‘discourse’,23 or from ‘lexis’, which is ‘rea-
soning’.24 [So the whole word ‘dialectic’ means], as it were, a 
“discourse or reasoning between two parties” — that is, by the dis-
puting [that goes on] between an opponent and a respondent.25 But 
                                                 
18 The metaphor of superiority and inferiority in this talk comes from the so called “Por-
phyrian tree,” which was a common diagram used to illustrate the doctrine in Porphyry’s Isagoge. 
The diagram involved an “inverted”-tree structure with an Aristotelian category (a “most general 
genus”) at the top or root-position, and various species and subspecies (sometimes also individu-
als) arranged as branches under it. 
19 De Rijk ed., Trans. VI, § 2, p. 79.12–14. Compare Dinneen trans., p. 69. 
20 Recall from Ch. 2, n. 23, above that a “singular term” in this sense is not just any old 
term singular in number, but rather a proper name, a demonstrative pronoun or a demonstrative 
phrase. 
21 De Rijk ed., Trans. I, § 1, p. 1.4–12. See Dinneen trans., p. 1. 
22 It isn’t either; that’s ‘duo’. Greek ‘dia’ (= διὰ) means “through.” 
23 That Latin is ‘sermo’, which is as good a translation as any for ‘logos’. ‘Sermo’ itself 
can be translated into English many ways, including ‘word’, ‘statement’, etc. 
24 More or less. It really means “a speaking,” “speech.” Peter plainly did not know 
Greek. He’s getting these false etymologies from some traditional source or other. 
25 ‘Opponent’ and ‘respondent’ are important terms in the mediaeval obligationes-
literature. For a first orientation to the obligationes-literature, see Stump, “Obligations: From the 
Beginning to the Early Fourteenth Century,” and Spade, “Obligations: Developments in the Four-
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because disputation cannot be had except by means of discourse, 
or discourse except by means of an utterance, but every utterance 
is a sound, therefore one must begin with sound, as from what is 
prior.  
Accordingly, at the beginning of his Summulae (Text (20)), he starts from 
the general notion of sound, and begins adding various features one by one to 
build up a clear picture of what his subject-matter is. 
B.  Ockham’s Nominalism and Some of Its 
Consequences 
There was a reason for Ockham to reject the older view, for his saying that 
words do not (“ultimately”) signify universals or common natures but rather indi-
viduals. The reason, of course, is that Ockham was a nominalist and held that 
there simply are no universals or common natures in reality. 
This takes a little explaining. In general, there were two notions of univer-
sals current in the Middle Ages. They are not necessarily incompatible; they are 
just two ways of approaching the problem. There was first of all a metaphysical 
notion of a universal as an entity that is (or at least can be) shared as a whole by 
many things at once, in some metaphysically appropriate way.26 Ockham denies 
there are any universals like that. But there was also a logical or “predicational” 
notion of a universal, derived from a remark in De interpretatione 7, 17a38–39, 
where Aristotle says that a universal is what is apt to be predicated of many27: 
                                                                                                                                     
teenth Century.” The terms ‘opponent’ and ‘respondent’ come from the discussion of disputation 
in Aristotle’s Topics and Sophistic Refutations. 
26 This notion of a universal was introduced to the Middle Ages via Boethius’ second 
commentary on the De interpretatione, Brandt ed., pp. 162.15–163.3. Boethius appears to have 
taken his discussion from Porphyry’s Exposition of Aristotle’s Categories by Question and An-
swer, published in Porphyrii Isagoge et In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, Busse ed., p. 
62.17–33. Porphyry was not discussing there anything having to do with universals, but instead 
Aristotle’s remarks about homonymy at Categories 1, 1a1–2. So although Boethius was borrow-
ing liberally from Porphyry, he deserves credit for seeing how the latter’s comments could be ap-
plied to an entirely different kind of problem. For a translation of Boethius’ discussion, see Spade, 
Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals, p. 22, §§ 14–19. For Porphyry’s passage, see 
his On Aristotle’s Categories, Strange trans., pp. 41–42. 
27 In the latter sense, there of course are universals, since any general term (“common 
name”) will count as one. Nominalists then (on this definition of a universal) hold that universal 
terms are the only universals there are; realists hold that in addition there are certain non-linguistic 
entities that can also be said to be “predicated of many.” Nowadays, of course, we tend to restrict 
the term ‘predication’ so that only terms are predicated. But that is merely stipulation, not (or at 
least not usually) a substantive theoretical claim. If we wish to reserve the term in this way, then 
the realists’ position can be reformulated as holding that the linguistic relation of predication mir-
rors a single and more basic metaphysical relation, and that this metaphysical relation can be one-
many. Whether we want to call this metaphysical relation (if there is one) a kind of “predication” 
is a purely a terminological matter. Many mediaevals did, and I know of no good objection to 
their practice. 
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Now since some things are universal and others particular (I call 
“universal” what is naturally apt to be predicated of several things, 
and “particular” what is not — for example, man [is one] of the 
universals, but Kallias [is one] of the particulars) … 
What Ockham and fourteenth-century nominalists in general do, in a 
sense, is to take the realists’ notion of a universal entity, and transfer it into the 
mind, where it becomes the notion of a universal concept. A universal concept is 
of course not universal at all in any metaphysical sense of the word. But, since 
concepts are terms in mental language, a universal concept is universal in the 
other sense — it can be predicated of many. 
Thus, the only kind of “universals” Ockham will allow are universal 
terms. These are, primarily and most basically, general concepts in the mind, and 
then, secondarily and derivatively, the spoken or written terms subordinated to 
such general concepts. Such terms — spoken, written or mental — are “univer-
sal” only in the logical sense; they are universal by signification or predication. 
There are no common natures out there in reality. Once Ockham and the nominal-
ists move the realists’ universals into the mind in this way, all the things univer-
sals are typically called upon to do in a philosophical theory now have to be done 
by concepts. And so it is not surprising to find mediaeval nominalists emphasiz-
ing the theory of concepts. The nominalists are typically the ones who develop the 
theory of mental language. They are the ones who call attention to those passages 
in Aristotle’s De interpretatione, and in Boethius’ commentaries on it, that sug-
gest the doctrine of mental language. 
In William of Sherwood or Peter of Spain, there is not much mention of 
those passages from the De interpretatione or from Boethius’ commentaries on it 
— and for that matter, realists in general do not discuss those passages very 
much. Of course, if a realist writes a commentary on the De interpretatione, he is 
going to have to say something about the three-fold division of language that is 
set up there. But the fact remains that realists are not much concerned to develop 
the notion very far. 
So in general, it is the nominalists who do the most to work out a detailed 
theory of mental language; realists do not. Like all such sweeping claims, this one 
should be taken with a certain caution. But it is good rule of thumb. 
Now we already know that Ockham has a theory according to which we 
do not typically think of concepts when we hear a word. For him, spoken words 
do not immediately signify concepts. That is, the subordination relation for Ock-
ham is not also a kind of signification relation. That much we have already seen.28 
Therefore, since concepts29 are the only universal or common things there 
are in Ockham’s ontology, Ockham has to say that general terms do not as a rule 
signify universals, which is of course what he does say. In other words, it’s not 
just that Ockham doesn’t believe in universals in the realists’ sense, although 
                                                 
28 See Ch. 3, p. 77, above. 
29 And, in a derivative sense, spoken and written terms. But the same considerations will 
apply there. 
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that’s true too. Even universals in his own sense — universal concepts — are not 
as a rule signified by general terms. 
Burley, on the other hand, is a realist. We saw earlier30 that, while Burley 
is willing to say that in a sense terms signify concepts, and in particular general 
terms signify general concepts, he nevertheless recognizes that this is not a strict 
and proper way of speaking. He agrees with Ockham that spoken terms do not in 
general make us think of concepts, and so they do not in general signify concepts. 
But, because he is a realist, Burley can agree with Ockham on this point, and still 
hold that spoken terms do signify universals. And that is exactly what he does. 
Burley has other universals he can appeal to — real, metaphysical universals. 
C.  The Pros and Cons of Realism and Nominalism 
Let’s talk a little more about realism and nominalism, and see how the dif-
ference is reflected in the dispute between Ockham and Burley. 
Traditionally, the arguments against realism have always been metaphysi-
cal ones. How could one thing be common to (or predicable of) many things at 
once in the way a universal or common nature is supposed to be? Isn’t that a 
metaphysically suspect notion? (Such arguments may be ultimately answerable, 
but that’s not the point. The point is that they are the arguments.) 
On the other hand, the traditional arguments against nominalism have al-
ways been epistemological ones. If there is nothing really common or universal 
out there in reality corresponding to our general concepts and common names, 
then what grounds the formation of those general concepts and common names? 
If there are no such corresponding entities, then doesn’t that make our so-called 
knowledge of the world (which largely proceeds via such general terms and con-
cepts) a pure fiction? (Again, perhaps these arguments can be answered, but they 
are the arguments.) 
Nominalists, then, typically have a pretty lean and mean metaphysics, but 
a pretty strained epistemology. On the other hand, realists typically have an easier 
time with epistemology, but they have a lot of explaining to do in their metaphys-
ics. (I’ll say it once again and then not say it again: I am not adjudicating between 
realism and nominalism here, but simply describing where the traditional pres-
sures lie.) 
Thus, as we might expect, the objections Burley the realist raises against 
Ockham the nominalist are of a predominately epistemological sort. 
D.  Burley’s Arguments Against Ockham 
Let’s look at some of Burley’s arguments, from Ch. 3 of his Purity.31 
                                                 
30 See Ch. 3, p. 82, above. 
31 Recall that Burley’s On the Purity of the Art of Logic appears to have been written in 
response to Ockham (see Ch. 2, p. 44, above) — and perhaps in response to Ockham’s Summa 
logicae in particular. Actually, this is true only of The Longer Treatise, which is the only one we 
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1.  First Argument 
Look first at § 38 of that text. The argument there concerns the terms 
‘white’ and ‘black’. 
First a point of language. In English, ‘white’ is used ambiguously. Some-
times it refers to the color itself. We speak of “the color white.” But sometimes 
also the word refers to the thing that has that color. Thus we say “The chalk is 
white,” and we don’t mean that the chalk is the color but rather that it has the 
color. 
This isn’t so in Latin. In Latin there is a difference between the adjective 
‘white’ (= ‘albus’) and the noun ‘whiteness’ (= ‘albedo’).32 And they are never 
confused in Latin. So don’t you be confused in English in the following discus-
sion. The argument in Burley’s § 38 concerns the terms ‘white’ and ‘black’, not 
the terms ‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness’. 
The terms ‘white’ and ‘black’, in the normal case, refer to individual white 
things or black things. But of course, reference, we said,33 is treated in what is 
called supposition-theory, which is not what we are primarily concerned with 
here. On the contrary, what we are mainly concerned with here is signification, 
which is something different.34 
So while both Burley and Ockham will agree that ‘white’ and ‘black’ refer 
to or supposit for the individuals that bear the respective colors, the question here 
is not that but rather what those terms signify. For Ockham, the terms not only 
supposit for individual white and black things, respectively, they also signify 
those same white or black things. That is to say, when we hear the term ‘white’, 
we are made to think of individual white things. We are not made to think of any 
color whiteness, in virtue of which those white things are white — and we are 
certainly not made to think of any universal such color. So too for the term 
‘black’.35 
It is the point about universals that Burley is disagreeing with in § 38. It is 
not altogether clear there whether Burley thinks the term ‘white’ signifies a uni-
versal whiteness (the quality), or whether he thinks it signifies a universal white 
thing (a universal “bearer” of whiteness). But in any case, Burley does think the 
term signifies a universal. Here is his objection: 
If it is said that ‘white’ signifies the subject of whiteness — for in-
stance Socrates or Plato, for whom whiteness is an accident — I 
argue to the contrary: If this were true, then assuming that Socrates 
                                                                                                                                     
are concerned with for now. If that is the case, then On the Purity of the Art of Logic is the later 
work. (See the discussion in Walter Burley, De puritate, Boehner ed., “Introduction,” pp. vi–xvi.) 
But the evidence is perhaps not altogether decisive. 
32 English, to be sure, allows us to make this distinction by using the abstract suffix 
‘-ness’. But it also allows us to ignore the distinction, and that is the point here. 
33 See p. 139 above. 
34 We will discuss what this difference is in Ch. 8 below.. 
35 The bald claim that these terms do not make us think of the colors themselves will 
have to be qualified later, when we discuss “connotation-theory” in Ch. 7 below. 
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is first white and afterwards black, the name ‘white’ would first 
signify Socrates, and afterwards the name ‘black’ would signify 
Socrates. So, assuming that everything that today is white should 
become black tomorrow, then everything that ‘white’ signifies to-
day ‘black’ would signify tomorrow. And so utterances would con-
tinually be falling away from their significates. Neither could any-
one move his finger without an utterance’s by that fact falling 
away from its significate. For when the finger is still, the utterance 
‘still’ signifies the finger, and when the finger is moved, that utter-
ance would not signify the finger, which seems absurd. 
Burley’s claim is that what the word ‘still’ brings to mind in me ought not 
to change with every wag of someone’s finger. If something on the other side of 
the world changes color from white to black,36 that should not mean that I think of 
something different when I hear the term ‘white’ or ‘black’. 
a.  Ockham’s Reply 
This seems to be a good point and a powerful objection. But Ockham ap-
pears to be aware of it and in Summa of Logic I.33, in effect responds to it.37 
There he says there are four kinds of signification — i.e., four senses of the term 
‘signify’.38 The last two ways mainly concern connotation-theory, and we’ll just 
ignore them for now. But the first two ways are relevant here. 
(1) In the first sense, a term t signifies a thing x iff you can truly 
say ‘This is a t’ while pointing to x. The important thing to note 
here is the present tense of the verb. 
(2) In the second sense, t signifies x iff you can truly say ‘This is, 
or was, or will be, or can be a t’ while pointing to x.39 
In the first sense, the term ‘man’ signifies only presently existing people. 
In the second sense, it signifies all past, present and future people — and for that 
matter, people who never exist but might (= “merely possible” people). Note that 
Ockham could have shortened his description of the second kind of signification 
by using only the last disjunct, in effect saying simply that you can point to x and 
truly say "This can be a t.” (The other cases he lists all imply this one.) 
                                                 
36 Many mediaeval examples, in a variety of philosophical contexts, involve Socrates’ 
and Plato’s changing colors from white to black or conversely. You’ll soon get used to it. No one 
is quite sure why they used such odd examples, but there seems to be no racial overtones to the 
practice. In effect ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’ are just names for arbitrary material objects. 
37 I say “in effect” because it is not completely clear whether he is responding to the ob-
jection or anticipating it. See n. 31 above. 
38 The passage is closely paraphrased in Ockham’s Quodlibet V, q. 16, Wey ed., lines 
14–47 (pp. 543–544). See Freddoso and Kelley trans., pp. 454–455. 
39 Note that Ockham apparently doesn’t see any problem about “pointing” to non-
existing objects. 
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Now if ‘signify’ is taken in the first of these two senses, Burley’s criticism 
applies, as Ockham himself recognizes in Summa of Logic I.33, § 3: 
Taking ‘to signify’ in the first sense, and [the term] ‘significate’ 
corresponding to it, an utterance (and even a concept) often falls 
away from its significate through only a change in the thing. That 
is, something ceases to be signified that was signified earlier. 
But in the second sense, the objection is avoided. Ockham goes on in the 
same paragraph: 
[But] taking ‘to signify’ in the second sense, and [the term] ‘sig-
nificate’ corresponding to it, an utterance or concept does not fall 
away from its significate through only a change in the external 
thing. 
In practice, Ockham almost always uses the term ‘signify’ in this second 
sense, unless he explicitly says otherwise. Thus Ockham would reply that Bur-
ley’s objection fails if ‘signification’ is taken in the most usual sense of the term. 
The objection holds if the word is taken in the first sense, but that is not a real 
problem. The only reason Burley thought it was a problem is that he took it for 
granted that the signification of terms should not change with every change in the 
things themselves. And he’s right — they shouldn’t, in the second sense of ‘signi-
fication’. But in that same sense, they don’t change that way on Ockham’s theory. 
That is the distinction between the first two kinds of signification in Ock-
ham’s theory, and I suspect he makes it precisely in order to reply to (or perhaps 
to forestall) objections of exactly the kind Burley raises. 
b.  Difficulties 
But there are additional difficulties. If, as Ockham certainly would allow, 
it is at least possible, for any given black thing, that it turn into a white thing, or 
vice versa, and if we take signification in his second sense, then ‘black’ and 
‘white’ have exactly the same significates, and so would seem to be synonymous. 
When we hear the term ‘black’, it would seem to signify for us exactly the same 
things as the term ‘white’ signifies. And this seems to be just as serious an objec-
tion as Burley’s original one, which was the reason for adopting this second sense 
of ‘signification’ in the first place. 
As it turns out, Ockham can get around this particular example by appeal-
ing to his doctrine of connotation, the details of which we will examine in Ch. 7 
below. But let me say something briefly about it now. The basic text here is 
Summa of Logic I.10. 
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In that chapter, Ockham says there is a difference between signifying 
something primarily and signifying something secondarily.40 Without worrying 
about the details for now, we can say that connotative terms will signify some 
things primarily and some things secondarily, whereas non-connotative 
(= absolute) terms will signify whatever they signify primarily only. 
‘White’ (the adjective) is a connotative term for Ockham, signifying white 
things (or possible white things) primarily and whitenesses (or possible white-
nesses) secondarily.41 (Both the first and the second sense of ‘signify’ in Summa 
of Logic I.33, are kinds of primary signification. The third and fourth senses have 
to do with secondary signification.) Similarly, ‘black’ will primarily signify black 
things, and secondarily signify blacknesses. 
Now on Ockham’s theory two terms are synonymous when whatever the 
one signifies in any way, the other signifies in the same way.42 Thus ‘white’ and 
‘black’ will not be synonymous on Ockham’s theory after all, and he can avoid 
the difficulty raised here. The two terms signify exactly the same things in the 
second sense of primary signification (= the second sense in Ch. 33), but they sig-
nify different things secondarily. ‘White’ signifies whitenesses secondarily, but 
not blacknesses, and ‘black’ signifies ‘blacknesses’ secondarily, but not white-
nesses. And even if it is possible, for any black thing, that it become white, or 
vice versa, it is probably not possible for a blackness to turn into a whiteness, or 
vice versa. 
Ockham can therefore answer the objection in this particular case, because 
‘white’ and ‘black’ are connotative terms. Nevertheless, the question obviously 
arises: Can Burley’s objection be generalized to apply to non-connotative terms 
as well? If so, then Ockham would appear to be in deep trouble. 
The answer to this question would take us further into Ockham’s meta-
physics than I want to go in this book. But I can at least indicate the kinds of is-
sues that are involved. 
Non-connotative (= absolute) terms for Ockham seem to be in effect what 
nowadays are called “natural kind” terms. Since Ockham cannot appeal to conno-
tation-theory in the case of absolute terms, the question whether he has a com-
plete answer to Burley’s objection reduces to the question whether a thing of one 
“natural kind” can ever change into a thing of another “natural kind.” For exam-
ple, can one ever point to a human being and truly say “This can be a celery-
plant” — that is, for whatever it is one is pointing to that is now a human being, is 
it possible for that to be a celery-plant? The answer to this question is not obvi-
ous. What if, for example, a human being dies and the body decomposes into its 
chemical constituents and returns to the soil, and those constituents are then or-
ganically reabsorbed into a celery-plant? These are deep questions about identity 
                                                 
40 Don’t be confused. ‘Primarily’ and ‘secondarily’ here do not refer to the “first” and 
“second” senses of ‘signify’ distinguished in Summa of Logic I.33, which we have just looked at. 
This is a different distinction entirely. 
41 Ockham is a nominalist, so that for him every white thing has its own whiteness. 
Hence he can speak of ‘whitenesses’, in the plural. 
42 See Summa of Logic I.6. Ockham says the same thing in Quodlibet 5, q. 10 (Text 
(53)). 
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through change, and have to do as much (maybe more) with metaphysics as they 
do with logic. 
2.  Another Objection 
Burley has another line of objection, in Purity, §§ 33–34. Here is what he 
says: 
Again, the name ‘man’ signifies something first.43 And it 
does not first signify Socrates or Plato, because in that case one 
who heard the utterance and knew what was signified by the utter-
ance would determinately and distinctly understand Socrates, 
which is false. Therefore, the name ‘man’ does not first signify 
something singular. Therefore, it first signifies a common [entity]. 
And that common [entity] is a species. Therefore, what is first sig-
nified by the name ‘man’ is a species. 
I do not care for the present whether that common [entity] 
is a thing outside the soul or a concept in the soul.44 Rather it suf-
fices merely that what the name first signifies is a species. Thus 
‘Man is a species’ will be true insofar as ‘man’ is taken for its sig-
nificate. This is confirmed, because a name is not imposed except 
on the known …45 But he who imposed the name ‘man’ to signify 
did not know me or John who is now present. Therefore, the name 
‘man’ does not signify me or John who is now present… 
Again, this is an epistemological objection. This time, the objection ap-
plies to Ockham’s second as well as to his first sense of signification distin-
guished in Summa of Logic I.33. How can a sign make you think of (= signify) 
something completely unknown and unsuspected by you? Ockham’s theory that 
general terms signify individuals — either all presently existing ones (in his first 
sense of signification) or else all past, present, future and merely possible ones (in 
his second sense of signification) — would seem to have exactly such an undesir-
able consequence. And so, Burley’s objection concludes, general terms do not 
signify individuals at all; they signify universals. 
                                                 
43 On this notion, see Burley, Purity, n. 36 to § 28. 
44 Recall that Ockham had moved the realists’ universals into the mind where they be-
came general concepts. See p. 147 above. 
45 And then he cites some passages from Averroes (the great Islamic commentator on Ar-
istotle) and from Boethius. I’ll skip those here. 
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a.  Ockham’s Reply 
Ockham has a reply to this objection too. A full account of it would take 
us deeper into his epistemology than I plan to go in this book. But, in outline, it 
runs like this: 
The one who first imposed signification on the term ‘man’ — that is, the 
one who first set up the subordination convention we still use today for that word 
— did indeed know me and John (whoever he is), but in a “confused” way. 
To describe it as “confused” here is not to say that it is somehow inferior, 
or that there is anything bad about it. When Ockham is talking about “confused” 
concepts, he does not mean “muddled” concepts, or the concepts had by someone 
who is all perplexed or in a daze. Neither does he mean what are today sometimes 
called “fuzzy” concepts (that is, “vague” ones). Rather, he means a con + fused 
concept — that is a fused-together concept, one that is “composite” in a certain 
way. 
In his relatively early Commentary on the De interpretatione, he explains 
what he means (Text (37)): 
To the first [objection],46 it can be said that by such a con-
fused intellection singular external things are understood. For ex-
ample, to have a confused intellection of a man is nothing else than 
to have a cognition by which one man is no more understood than 
another, and yet by such a cognition a man is more cognized or 
understood than [is] an ass. This is nothing else than for such a 
cognition to be more similar, in some way of being similar, to a 
man than to an ass, and no more [similar] to this man than to that 
one. 
Ockham appears to recognize that this is perhaps a slightly uncomfortable 
view. Immediately afterwards in the same passage, he defends the theory: 
In that respect, it seems it has to be said as a consequence 
that an infinity [of things] can be cognized by such a confused 
cognition.47 This seems no more unthinkable than the fact that by 
the same love or desire an infinity [of things] can be loved or de-
sired. But the latter does not seem unthinkable. For someone can 
love all the parts of some continuum, which are infinite. Or he can 
long for all the parts of the continuum to endure in being. Yet by 
such a longing, nothing is longed for except some part of the con-
tinuum — and not one any more than another. They all have to be 
                                                 
46 Ockham had already raised this very objection against his own doctrine. 
47 Actually, that’s only true if we are thinking in terms of Ockham’s second sense of sig-
nification in Summa of Logic I.33. The number of presently existing human beings is large but not 
infinite; it is number of possible human beings that is infinite. Note that this supports what I said 
on p. 151 above, that Ockham almost always uses the term ‘signify’ in the second of the four 
senses he distinguishes in Summa of Logic I.33. 
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longed for, and yet they are infinite [in number]. Likewise, one can 
long for there to be all the men who can be, and yet they are infi-
nite, because an infinite [number of men] can be generated. 
For example, suppose you have a very beautiful curve,48 like the following 
one: 
 
Figure 11: A Most Lovely Curve 
Let’s say you like this curve a lot. In fact, you just love it. You don’t want 
it to be changed at all. You “long,” as Ockham puts it, for it to stay exactly as it is 
— every point of it. The fact that there is an infinity of such points, he observes, 
does not seem to make this a problem. Sometimes we do want such things. You 
love every point of the curve, but you don’t love each one of them distinctly; you 
love them, as he says, “confusedly.” And that doesn’t mean you love a universal. 
It’s not the universal “point in general” you love; it’s these points. So too, Ock-
ham says, if that is no problem, when why should there be a problem in conceiv-
ing a infinitude of things in a concept, even though we are not distinctly aware of 
each one of them separately? And this doesn’t mean, any more than before, that 
we conceive some kind of universal entity. 
i.  Concepts as Natural Likenesses 
Whatever you think of Ockham’s analogy, look back to Text (37). We are 
back again with the view that concepts are similar to the things they are concepts 
of (= the things they signify) — they are natural likenesses.49 The point I want to 
emphasize here is that this “similarity” or “likeness” is something that admits of 
degrees. In the passage mentioned, Ockham says the things a concept signifies are 
all such that: 
(a) The concept is like every one of them. 
                                                 
48 I picked a curve because it fits Ockham’s text — it’s continuous. 
49 See Ch. 3, p. 75, above. 
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(b) It is not like any one of them more than it is like any other 
one; it is equally like all of them. 
(c) It is like any one of them more than it is like anything else 
— anything that is not signified by the concept. 
Note these are the only features of the “similarity”-relation that really do 
any work in Ockham’s theory of concepts as natural signs. Apart from these 
purely formal characteristics, it is very difficult to pin down exactly what it means 
to say that concepts are natural likenesses of their objects. This is true for every-
one who talks this way in the Middle Ages, not just for Ockham. 
ii.  Ockham’s Two Main Theories of Concepts 
Ockham himself had at least two distinct theories of concepts that he en-
tertained at one time or another during his career.50 This is not the place to discuss 
the merits and defects of these theories in detail. But at least something needs to 
be said about them. The two theories, in brief, are these: 
(1) First, the so called “fictum”-theory. This is a theory we find also ear-
lier in the Middle Ages in Peter Abelard,51 Peter Aureoli (a Frenchman who was a 
little earlier than Ockham, and who influenced him to some extent),52 and others. 
On this theory, a concept is the object of a certain kind of mental act. In other 
words, it is a “thought-object.” In modern terminology, the concept is the “inten-
tional object” of an act of intellection. 
The main thing to know about the fictum theory is that ficta are not real 
entities.53 They have the kind of “spooky” being intentional objects have in at 
least certain versions of modern phenomenology.54 In mediaeval terminology, 
they have an “objective being” (= “esse objectivum”), the kind of being “objects 
of thought” have, not a “subjective being” (= “esse subjectivum”), the kind of 
being “real” things have, real subjects of real properties.55 
                                                 
50 See Adams, “Ockham’s Nominalism and Unreal Entities,” “Ockham’s Theory of 
Natural Signification,” and William Ockham, Ch. 3. See also Gál, “Gualteri de Chatton.” 
51 I have in mind Abelard’s doctrine of the res ficta. Be warned: there is considerable 
dispute about the proper interpretation of Abelard’s views on such matters. For my own interpre-
tation, see my review of Tweedale, Abailard on Universals, especially pp. 481–482 (of the re-
view, not of Tweedale’s book). Note that I am not claiming that Abelard identifies his res fictae 
with concepts (he doesn’t, as I understand him), but only that he has them. 
52 Alternative forms of his name: Peter Aureol, Peter Oriole, Petrus Aureolus, Petrus 
Aureoli, etc. On Aureoli, see Emmen. For the theory, see Peter Aureoli, Commentariorum I, d. 9, 
a. 1 (319f.). 
53 The word ‘fictum’ is the perfect passive participle of ‘fingo’, to make up, fabricate. We 
get ‘feign’ from it. 
54 I don’t mean to put too much weight on the parallel with phenomenology. Still, it is 
well-known that Franz Brentano regarded his own theory of intentionality as derived from medi-
aeval “scholasticism.” This is exactly where it came from. 
55 Note that the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ have completely reversed their mean-
ing since the Middle Ages. What was called “subjective” then, we call “objective” — it’s really 
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Ockham held this theory of concepts in his early writings — for example, 
in his Oxford Commentary on the Sentences.56 He continued to discuss it and to 
regard it as a plausible and arguable view in some of his later writings — for ex-
ample, in his Commentary on the De interpretatione.57 Already by that time, 
however, he was beginning to favor another view, which he finally came to settle 
on wholeheartedly58: 
(2) The quality-theory. On this second theory, the concept is a real quality 
inhering the mind just like any other real property. It has an esse subjectivum. 
There is no more of this “esse objectivum” talk with the quality-theory. Just what 
kind of mental quality the concept is on this theory is a matter subject to negotia-
tion. Ockham distinguished various possibilities, but eventually came to think that 
the intellectual act itself could do everything that was required. Thus, the theory 
he finally adopted is called the intellectio-theory — the concept just is the act of 
thinking, the “intellection.” The concept “man,” for instance, is the very act of 
thinking of men. And that act is a kind of real quality of the mind; it’s something 
that really goes on up there. 
Here, for example, is what he says in Summa of Logic I.1559: 
Therefore, it is to be granted without qualification that no 
universal is a substance, however it is considered. Rather every 
universal is an intention of the soul, which according to one likely 
opinion does not differ from the act of understanding. Hence, 
they60 say that the intellection by which I understand a man is a 
natural sign of men, just as natural [a sign] as a groan is a [natural] 
sign of sickness or sadness or pain. It is such a sign that it can 
stand for men in mental propositions, just as an utterance can stand 
for things in spoken propositions. 
                                                                                                                                     
out there, quite apart from any observer. What they called “objective” we call “subjective” — 
mind-dependent, produced by thought. This reversal of meaning is in part why beginning students 
have so much difficulty with Descartes’ notion of “objective reality” in the third Meditation. It 
would be interesting to trace out just when this reversal took place. I have not pursued the ques-
tion carefully, but I suspect it has something to do with Kant. 
56 See William of Ockham, Scriptum, d. 2, q. 8, Brown & Gál ed., pp. 271.14–289.10. 
57 William of Ockham, Commentary on the De interpretatione I, Prologue, § 7, Gam-
batese & Brown ed., in William of Ockham, Expositionis, pp. 359–361. 
58 William of Ockham, Commentary on the De interpretatione I, Prologue, § 9, Gam-
batese and Brown ed., in William of Ockham, Expositionis, pp. 363.4–369.169. See also § 6, pp. 
351.4–358.206. 
59 William of Ockham, Summa logicae, Gál et al. ed., p. 53.78–85. 
60 This includes Ockham himself by this stage in his career. 
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iii.  Why Did Ockham Abandon the Fictum-
Theory? 
Now why do you suppose Ockham felt compelled to abandon the fictum-
theory? He doesn’t explicitly tell us anywhere.61 But whatever his actual reasons 
were, here are some relevant considerations: 
What kind of being does a fictum or intentional object have? Ockham tells 
us in his Commentary on the De interpretatione (Text (39)) that “their being is 
nothing other than their being cognized.”62 
In the same discussion (Texts (39)–(40)), he in effect divides beings into 
two kinds: 
(a) Mind-dependent, intentional objects, which have “inten-
tional being” or esse objectivum. We just described those. 
Their being is their being cognized. 
(b) Real things, the being of which is not the same as their be-
ing cognized. Being in this sense is not an esse objectivum, 
but an esse subjectivum. It is this kind of being, it turns out, 
that is subdivided into the ten Aristotelian categories (into 
“substance and accident”). 
Given that much, there is already a problem for the fictum-theory. How 
can a fictum, which is not even in one of the Aristotelian categories, be similar to 
real beings, which are? The fictum must be similar to real beings in this way if 
concepts are ficta and are also “natural likenesses” of the things they naturally 
signify.63 
Certainly the definition of similarity Ockham gives in Summa of Logic 
I.10, § 8, won’t work. There he says: 
For if ‘similar’ is defined, it should be put like this: “The similar is 
something having such a quality as [something] else has,” or it 
should be defined in some [other] way like that. 
This definition is put in terms of two similar things’ having the same kind 
of quality. Note that Ockham does not say that they have the same quality, since 
that would make the quality a universal (shared by many things at once in the ap-
propriate way). Rather, what he has in mind is that there is a quality of the one 
that is an exact duplicate of a certain quality of the other. 
But this won’t work on the fictum-theory of concepts. The fictum is not 
even in one of the Aristotelian categories! It doesn’t have any qualities that are 
exact duplicates of the qualities of real things. To put it as strongly as I know 
                                                 
61 Nevertheless, see the evidence discussed in the sources cited in n. 50 above. It appears 
that Ockham’s contemporary and fellow-Franciscan Walter Chatton was importantly influential in 
arguing him out of the fictum-theory. See especially, Gál, “Gualteri de Chatton.” 
62 The parallel with Berkeley here is obvious and striking. 
63 See Ch. 3, p. 75, and p. 155 above. Ockham himself raises this objection in Text (41).  
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how, the fictum, along with all its fictive qualities, differs as much from real 
things and their real qualities as the unreal differs from the real. And that is a 
pretty big difference indeed. 
This is a serious objection. Ockham had recognized it as early as his 
Commentary on the Sentences, and tried to answer it. Here is his statement of the 
objection64: 
Second, it seems that such [ficta] are not like things. For no 
accident can be made similar to a substance. But the fictum is fur-
ther from a substance than any accident [is]. Therefore, it cannot 
be a likeness of a thing outside the soul. 
In his reply, Ockham says65: 
To the second [doubt], they66 would say that such ficta are 
not really similar [to external things], but are more dissimilar and 
further from a substance than accidents [are]. Yet they are such in 
objective being as other [things] are in subjective being … 
The first part of this reply seems to grant the basis for the objection: There 
is no literal similarity between concepts as ficta and what they are concepts of. 
Instead, there is a kind of quasi-similarity in the sense of some kind of structural 
isomorphism between concepts as ficta and what they are concepts of. But this 
means that concepts are similar to their objects only in an equivocal sense. There 
is no real similarity there at all, which seems to be contrary to the theory that con-
cepts are “natural likenesses” of their objects. 
But in the last sentence of the quotation, Ockham goes on to give a kind of 
“counterfactual” reading of ‘natural likeness’: If the concept (here regarded as a 
fictum) were to exist as a real being (with an esse subjectivum), then it would be 
literally similar those things. 
As I have said,67 it is not clear exactly what considerations led Ockham to 
abandon the fictum-theory for the intellectio-theory, although this objection might 
well have been among them. 
But it shouldn’t have been. For, first, it appears that Ockham has answered 
his own objection with his counterfactual reading of natural similarity. You may, 
of course, think his answer is not good enough, and you may be right. But there is 
no text that I know of where Ockham himself explicitly objects to that counterfac-
tual reading. 
Second, even if Ockham did come to think that his counterfactual reading 
of natural similarity is not good enough, notice that the original objection, as he 
raised it, works just as well against the intellectio-theory. In fact, in the very 
statement of that objection, he says “no accident can be made similar to a sub-
                                                 
64 William of Ockham, Scriptum d. 2, q. 8, Brown & Gál ed., p. 282.1–4. 
65 Ibid., p. 282.16–22. 
66 This includes Ockham himself at this stage of his thinking. 
67 See p. 158 above. 
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stance.” Now acts of intellection, whatever they are, are definitely not substances. 
So, if they are not ficta but real beings, then they must be some kind of accident.68 
Hence, on his own grounds, they cannot be really similar to substances after all.69 
b.  Concluding Remarks on This Objection 
Recall where we are. Burley had objected that, contrary to what Ockham’s 
theory seemed to require, we are not distinctly aware of each individual man 
whenever we have the concept “man.” Ockham replied by appealing to the notion 
of a “confused” concept, and then went on to explain this in terms of the theory of 
concepts as natural likenesses of their objects. We have now pushed that theory 
about as far as it can go. Whether it can be defended in the end remains an open 
question, at least to my mind. 
But notice that it doesn’t really matter. The theory of concepts as natural 
likenesses is a notorious theory, and has been subjected to criticism throughout 
the history of philosophy. But, although Ockham certainly does think of concepts 
in this way, and in fact appeals to this theory to explain “confused” concepts, the 
only features of the “natural likeness” relation that enter into his semantic theory 
in any real way are these70: 
(a) The concept is like every one of them. 
(b) It is not like any one of them more than it is like any other 
one; it is equally like all of them. 
(c) It is like any one of them more than it is like anything else 
— anything that is not signified by the concept. 
Any natural (non-conventional) relation that satisfies these three require-
ments will do every semantic job Ockham does with his “natural likeness.” 
3.  Still Other Objections 
Burley is by no means done with his objections. He has several others too, 
and let’s look at some of them briefly. First, consider Burley, Purity, § 40: 
Again, it is apparent that a term does not always have sim-
ple supposition when it supposits for an intention in the soul. For 
‘Every intention in the soul is in the soul’ is true, and the subject 
                                                 
68 In fact, Ockham thinks they belong to the category of quality. But that is another story. 
69Or, if you insist that everything is similar to everything else in some degree or other, it 
would still seem that concepts would be more similar to other accidents than they are to sub-
stances. And that’s just as bad, since according to Ockham, concepts are more like the things they 
are concepts of than they are like anything else. See p. 156 above. 
70 See pp. 155–156 above. 
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here supposits for an intention in the soul. Nevertheless, it does not 
supposit simply. 
We will not be talking about supposition theory directly until Ch. 8 below. 
Nevertheless, let me just warn you now that this objection completely fails as an 
objection to Ockham’s theory. Ockham, as it will turn out, does not define simple 
supposition in such a way that just any term whatever that happens to supposit for 
an intention in the soul will have simple supposition, as the objection presup-
poses. 
I am not sure whether Burley has simply mistaken Ockham’s view here 
(although that seems to me unlikely, since Ockham is pretty clear about it), or 
whether Burley is referring to someone else entirely. Certainly the general force 
of this entire series of objections in Burley is directed mainly against Ockham. 
But in any case, if this particular objection is directed against Ockham, it is based 
on a distortion of his view. 
In this same connection, look at the objection in Burley’s § 35: 
As for what they say — that ‘man’ signifies an intention in 
the soul, and that that intention is a species — I say … 
The argument that follows in the paragraph is obscure at best. But once 
again, the claim it is attacking (the claim in the quotation) does not represent 
Ockham’s view. Ockham emphatically denied that ‘man’ signifies an intention in 
the soul. For him, as we have seen, subordination is not signification.71 The term 
‘man’ is subordinated to the concept or intention “man,” but it signifies individual 
human beings. The theory Burley’s argument is directed against here appears to 
be, not Ockham’s, but more the theory of Aristotle, Boethius, Scotus (in some 
passages) and Buridan — the theory that originated in the notion of language as a 
vehicle for communicating thought. Burley and Ockham are in agreement here72: 
the word ‘man’ does not, strictly, signify the concept “man.” 
The other objections in this part of Burley’s Purity (Ch. 3, §§ 27–44) are 
based on the notion of a “second substance,” which comes out of Aristotle’s 
Categories, 5.73 
E.  Epistemological Factors in the Dispute 
The dispute between Ockham and Burley was in part a dispute between 
realism and nominalism. But there was something else going on as well. The dis-
                                                 
71 See Ch. 3, p. 77, above. 
72See Figure 10, on p. 143 above. 
73For Ockham’s views on these matters, see Summa logicae I.42, and Moody’s The 
Logic of William of Ockham, Ch. 4 § 2. I cannot in good conscience call Ockham’s remarks in 
I.42 his “response” to Burley’s objections, since the Summa logicae appears to antedate Burley’s 
longer version of On the Purity of the Art of Logic. Still, if Burley knew what Ockham had al-
ready said, then what was his purpose in raising arguments that had already been answered? You 
begin to see why the question of the relative chronology of these two works is so difficult. 
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pute reflects a change in epistemological theory that was taking place in the early-
fourteenth century. 
In the Aristotelian tradition of epistemology, including the Muslim trans-
mitters and commentators on Aristotle, knowledge is a pretty exalted thing. Just 
as for Plato, knowledge in this Aristotelian tradition can only be about what is 
necessary. As a result, there could be no knowledge, in the fullest sense of the 
term, about contingent particulars. Real knowledge, then, could only be had about 
universals.74 This was strongly brought out in Aristotle’s own Posterior Analytics, 
and was continued through people like Aquinas and many others. 
The basic theme in this epistemological tradition was sometimes formu-
lated in the slogan: “Understanding is of universals, but sensation is of particu-
lars” (Intellectus est universalium, sensus autem particularium).75 The idea was 
that the understanding (= the intellect) took sense impressions, which report on 
particular sensible objects, did something to them (just what it did was of course 
the hard question), and somehow abstracted the universal nature, which it then 
knew in an intellectual way. 
This quite traditional theory is reflected in the semantical claim by Wil-
liam of Sherwood (Texts (27)–(28)), Peter of Spain (Text (21)), Walter Burley 
(Purity, §§ 33–34) and others that what is signified — and so what is understood 
when we hear the term (since signifying is just “establishing an understanding”) 
— is a universal. 
But in the generation or so after Aquinas, around the time of Duns Scotus, 
people began to move away from this theory, and to worry about the obvious fact 
that we do have some kind of intellectual knowledge of individuals, not just a 
sensory knowledge of them. It may not be so exalted a knowledge as the full-
fledged “science” that the Posterior Analytics was talking about, but it was not 
just mere opinion, and it was certainly more than just sensation.76 
This new concern is reflected in Ockham and Buridan: What we think of 
in the end when we hear the spoken term ‘man’ is nothing but individuals.77 In 
their view, individuals are quite legitimate objects of intellectual knowledge. 
                                                 
74 Yes, I know, the move from necessity to universality is subject to criticism. Just bear 
with me. 
75See Day, Intuitive Cognition, e.g., p. 4. (The whole of Day’s discussion is relevant.) I 
hesitate to recommend this book very highly, since it is extremely polemical and indicative of the 
kind of partisan sniping that went on earlier in this century among some mediaevalists with par-
ticular axes to grind. Still, the book is a useful and informative one for the reader who is able to 
abstract from all that. For a more recent discussion, see Boler, “Intuitive and Abstractive Cogni-
tion.” 
76It is probably best not to think of this development as a rejection of the Aristotelian 
theory (although some authors, such as Ockham, did reject it) so much as an emergence of a new 
interest. It would be perfectly possible to say, for example, that Aristotle was completely right 
about the very special kind of “scientific” knowledge he was concerned with and still maintain 
that there is also a lesser kind of intellectual knowledge that Aristotle was simply not talking 
about. As a terminological matter, the term ‘science’ was reserved for the exalted kind of knowl-
edge Aristotle was discussing, while ‘cognition’ was used more generally to include the “lesser” 
intellectual knowledge of particulars too. 
77I say ‘in the end’ because we are here talking about ultimate signification. 
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They had better be, because on their nominalist ontologies there is simply nothing 
else to know. 
F.  Additional Reading 
 
 
For additional reading on the material covered in this chapter, see: Spade, “The 
Signification of Terms,” “Some Epistemological Implications”; Marilyn 
McCord Adams, “Ockham’s Nominalism and Unreal Entities,” “Ockham’s 
Theory of Natural Signification.” 
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e’ve talked about the signification of terms, in Ch. 5 above. But what 
if anything do propositions signify? What sort of ontological correlate 
is out there in reality that we are made to think of by, for example, the 
proposition ‘Socrates is wise’? That is what I want to talk about in the present 
chapter. As you might expect, there were a number of quite different views on the 
topic. 
A.  The Additive Principle 
Let us begin with Buridan. Here is what he has to say about the matter 
(Text (68))1: 
… everything that is signified by the terms, or by some [one] term, 
of a proposition is signified by that proposition [itself]. Indeed, the 
proposition is not imposed to signify as a whole [taken] together in 
addition to its terms, which the intellect puts together affirmatively 
or negatively as it wishes. 
In the late Middle Ages, there was a dispute about the signification of 
propositions. Do they signify anything over and above the “things” — that is, the 
substances and accidents in the usual Aristotelian categories — signified by their 
component terms? For example, do they signify a “state of affairs,” a “fact,” a 
“proposition” in the modern sense of the term? 
Buridan in the above passage says no, and Ockham would agree with him. 
There is simply nothing like “states of affairs,” “facts,” “propositions” (in the 
modern sense) in their ontologies, and so of course they can’t be signified, by 
propositions or by anything else. 
Ockham not only denied the existence of universals (which is what, prop-
erly speaking, makes him a nominalist2). He went further and denied the existence 
                                                 
1 Note that Buridan also has an entirely different view, which will be discussed later in 
this chapter. It is not clear how the two views are to be reconciled. 
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of anything at all besides substances and their qualities.3 (Quality, of course, is 
only one of the nine Aristotelian categories of accident.) And since there are no 
universals for Ockham, this means his ontology is restricted to individual sub-
stances and their individual qualities. This reduction of the Aristotelian categories 
to two is altogether independent of the denial of universals; either claim could be 
maintained without the other. The two principles are both motivated, to be sure, 
by the same kind of methodological principle of parsimony.4 But of course every-
one agreed about the desirability of being theoretically parsimonious; what they 
disagreed about was what kinds of entities you could do without in your ontol-
ogy. 
Ockham and Buridan thought you could do without quite a bit. For Ock-
ham, you need only individual substances and their individual qualities. This 
means that individual substances and qualities are going to be the significates of 
propositions just as much as they are of terms. There is simply nothing else that 
can serve as the significates of propositions for Ockham.5 
Buridan’s ontology is a bit richer,6 but still, as we have just heard him say 
in Text (68), propositions signify exactly what their constituent terms signify, 
nothing more. 
Thus we have the following principle, explicit in Buridan and implicit but 
definitely required by Ockham: A proposition signifies just exactly the sum total 
of what its categorematic terms signify. 
For future reference, let’s agree to call this “The Additive Principle.” 
When you think about it, the positive part of this claim is quite plausible.7 
Consider the proposition ‘The cat is on the mat’. There are two categorematic 
                                                                                                                                     
2 At least in the sense of the term I am using throughout this book. Nominalism is many 
things for modern-day readers: the rejection of universals, the rejection of “abstract entities” in 
general (whatever they are), and so on. And there is growing evidence that the original meaning of 
the term (in the twelfth century) had nothing whatever to do with universals. On this surprising 
fact, see Normore, “The Tradition of Mediaeval Nominalism,” and Courtenay, “Nominales and 
Nominalism in the Twelfth Century.” 
3 The nature of this denial needs to be understood properly. For some discussion, see 
Spade, “Ockham, Adams and Connotation,” especially pp. 606–608. There I present an argument 
that Ockham’s ontology is not as “reductionist” as it claims to be — it allows all the sorts of onto-
logical features dealt with in Aristotle’s list of categories; it just doesn’t allow us to refer to all 
those ontological features by means of nominal expressions (names and adjectives). Those that 
can be referred to in this way are exactly (individual) substances and their (individual) qualities. I 
now think the situation is the other way around, that Ockham never claimed his theory to be any 
more “reductionist” than this, and that the view that he did is a modern distortion of Ockham’s 
theory — a distortion for which I accept some (but by no means all) responsibility. My remarks in 
this chapter about Ockham’s restricting his ontology to substances and qualities should be under-
stood in this light. 
4 Sometimes called “Ockham’s Razor,” although there is nothing unique to Ockham 
about it. 
5 The link between this claim and n. 3 above is made by the fact that for Ockham any-
thing that can be signified can be referred to, in what we will learn (Ch. 8) to call “personal sup-
position.” 
6 See Normore, “Buridan’s Ontology.” 
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terms in it: ‘cat’ and ‘mat’; the rest are syncategorematic. When I hear that propo-
sition spoken, I hear the term ‘cat’, and that term signifies — makes me think of 
— all cats (“confusedly,” as Ockham puts it). I also hear the term ‘mat’, and that 
term signifies — makes me think of — all mats. 
And that’s all there is to it, at least for Ockham and Buridan. What the 
proposition as a whole makes me think of is just all cats and all mats. There are 
no “states of affairs,” no “propositions” (in the modern sense), no “facts” it could 
make us think of. 
Notice how this Additive Principle violates what Robert Fland said in 
Text (74).8 Recall how Fland there said that the propositions ‘You are an ass’ and 
‘You are a nanny goat’ could signify just what you expect them to, but their con-
junction ‘You are an ass and you are a nanny goat’ might still signify that God 
exists, and so be true. Here we have a proposition’s as a whole getting an im-
position over and above the impositions of its constituent parts. 
Buridan is in effect ruling out this kind of thing by his Additive Principle. 
For him, it is the primitive vocabulary of a conventional language that is “im-
posed to signify.” The primitive categorematic terms are subordinated to con-
cepts, and the primitive syncategoremata are subordinated to various kinds of 
mental syncategoremata that in effect determine truth conditions for the conven-
tional language. And that’s all you need. Given that, you don’t need any addi-
tional imposition for the propositions. Their semantic roles are determined by 
their components. As Buridan says (Text (68)): 
… the proposition is not imposed to signify as a whole [taken] to-
gether in addition to its terms … 
Fland’s point, you will recall, was to emphasize the radical convention-
ality of spoken and written language. Buridan’s doctrine thus amounts to a restric-
tion on that view — perhaps not a restriction in principle, but certainly a restric-
tion in practice. We do not in fact give separate impositions to propositions over 
and above the impositions of their parts. 
As I pointed out in Ch. 4,9 if you pushed Buridan (and others) on this 
point, they would probably reply that, yes, you could set up your impositions in 
the way Fland describes if you wanted to. But, since that would be a very eccen-
tric way to do it, we won’t discuss the possibility any further. As a result, Buridan 
and the others who take this approach do not really have any general theory of the 
signification of propositions to apply to such cases.  
Note something else about that Fland passage in Text (74). He said there 
that the proposition ‘You are an ass and you are a nanny goat’ might signify that 
God exists. But what kind of a thing is that God exists, the significate of this 
                                                                                                                                     
7 That is, the claim that a proposition does make us think of what its categorematic terms 
signify. The other part of The Additive Principle, the claim that a proposition does not make us 
think of anything further, you may or may not find so plausible. That’s what the present chapter is 
about. 
8 See Ch. 4, p. 89, above. 
9 See Ch. 4, pp. 90–91, above. 
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proposition? It certainly doesn’t seem to be a substance or a quality — or indeed 
any other kind of Aristotelian accident. But what else can it be? 
B.  Complexe significabilia 
This question brings us to another, and quite distinct, theory of the signifi-
cation of propositions, the theory of “complexe significabilia” or “complexly sig-
nificables.”10 This theory is perhaps the closest the later Middle Ages came to the 
present-day notion of a “proposition” — that is, of a bearer of truth value, an en-
tity that is not a sentence or statement (not even a sentence or statement in mental 
language), but rather what is expressed by such sentences or statements.11 
Historically, the doctrine of complexe significabilia has been mainly asso-
ciated with Gregory of Rimini, who was one of those who held the theory.12 This 
is true not only in the modern secondary literature, but in the Middle Ages as 
well. Peter of Ailly, for example, plainly had Gregory of Rimini in mind (and lib-
erally quoted from him) in his discussion and rejection of the view.13 
Nevertheless, Gregory did not make up the theory for himself. He in turn 
took it from one Adam Wodeham (ca. 1298–1358), an Englishman who is reputed 
to have been Ockham’s personal secretary for a while.14 Wodeham was an impor-
tant thinker in his own right, and by no means simply a camp-follower of Ockham 
— as evidenced by his adoption of the theory of complexe significabilia. It turns 
                                                 
10 It is important to realize that this theory does not involve any radically new, alternative 
notion of signification. Everything we have said so far about signification still holds; it is still the 
same psychologico-epistemological relation it always was. It is just that the proponents of the the-
ory we are about to discuss think the psychological and epistemological facts about language are 
not exhausted by what we have said so far. 
11 There were antecedents, however. See Tweedale, Abailard on Universals, Ch. 5; Nu-
chelmans, Theories of the Proposition (an outstanding book on this whole topic), and Kretzmann, 
“Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the Propositio.” 
12 See, for example, Elie, Le Complexe significabile, especially Ch. 2. Terminological 
note: The correct translation of ‘complexe significabile’ (plural = ‘complexe significabilia’) is 
‘complexly significable’ — that is to say, something that can be signified in a complex way (by a 
complex linguistic expression). Nevertheless, some modern scholars translate it as ‘complex sig-
nificable’, which is wrong. (For example, Scott’s introduction to his translation of Buridan, Soph-
isms on Meaning and Truth, p. 16.) ‘Complexe’ is an adverb and not a neuter adjective, which 
would be ‘complexum’. The nuance makes some difference, since to call this peculiar entity a 
“complex significabile” suggests that not only can it be signified by a complex linguistic expres-
sion, but it itself is also complex in its metaphysical make-up. The adverbial form avoids this sug-
gestion. (Nevertheless, some late mediaeval and post-mediaeval authors did use the adjectival 
form with all its suggestion of internal metaphysical complexity.) I suspect the confusion over the 
correct translation of this term stems from a careless reading of the title of Elie’s classic book on 
the topic. Apart from the article ‘le’, Elie’s title is in Latin, not French. In other words, I suspect 
the error arose from reading ‘Le Complexe significabile’ (note the penultimate ‘i’) as ‘Le Com-
plexe significable’ (without the ‘i’). But this is a purely speculative hypothesis on my part. On 
Gregory of Rimini, see Ch. 2, n. 118, above and the references there. 
13 See Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fols. 12vb–13ra; Spade trans., §§ 179–189 
(pp. 54–56). Peter wrote in 1372. See Ch. 2, p. 48, above. 
14 See the Prologue by “Adam of England” to Ockham’s Summa of Logic. 
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out that Wodeham was one of the most important conduits through which English 
thought in the early-fourteenth century was transmitted to France. His writings 
have only recently begun to be available in part in reliable Latin editions.15 
There are several ways to approach the theory of complexe significabilia. 
As is customary with mediaeval authors, we can cite both authorities and rational 
arguments in favor of the view. Let us begin with the authorities.16 
1.  Authoritative Sources for the Theory 
a.  Boethius 
An important text in this respect is Boethius’ definition of a proposition, 
from his On the Differences in the Topics (Text (16)): 
A proposition is an expression signifying the true or the false. 
By ‘the true or the false’ Boethius certainly doesn’t mean anything like 
Frege’s “True” or “False,” which are special entities, the one denoted by all true 
propositions and the other by all false ones. Rather, as often happens in Latin, we 
have here neuter adjectives playing the role of nouns. Hence Boethius’ famous 
definition amounts to saying that a proposition signifies “something true” or 
“something false.” 
For present purposes, the important thing about this text is the suggestion 
that it is not so much the proposition itself that is true or false, except perhaps in a 
derivative way, but rather something signified by the proposition. And what could 
that be? Plainly not the sorts of things Ockham and Buridan say propositions sig-
nify (namely, individual substances and their individual accidents), since those 
aren’t the kinds of things that can be said to be true or false; Socrates, for exam-
ple, is not true or false, and neither is his snub-nosiness or his Greekness. Or at 
least so it would seem. Hence, on the authority of Boethius, there must be some 
other kind of entity to serve as the primary bearer of truth value. Propositions 
have a truth value only in a secondary sense, insofar as they signify those primary 
bearers, whatever the latter turn out to be. 
                                                 
15 For the most complete study of Wodeham and his influence, see Courtenay, Adam 
Wodeham. Gedeon Gál was the one who established beyond doubt that Gregory of Rimini’s ver-
sion of the theory of complexe significabilia was lifted directly from Wodeham. See Gál, “Adam 
of Wodeham’s Question.” On Wodeham’s version of the theory, see also Nuchelmans, “Adam 
Wodeham on the Meaning of Declarative Sentences.” The text of Wodeham on which all this is 
based was first edited in a preliminary way in Gál, “Adam of Wodeham’s Question,” and then 
critically edited in Adam Wodeham, Adam de Wodeham Lectura secunda, d. 1, q. 1. 
16 Some people find it amusing to ridicule mediaeval philosophers for relying so much 
on “authorities,” as though they were afraid to think for themselves. But typically, as in the pre-
sent case, where one finds appeals to authority one finds real theoretical arguments in addition. 
Unfortunately, the same cannot always be said about authors in the late-twentieth century who, 
while criticizing the mediaevals, do not themselves hesitate to appeal to the authority of Wittgen-
stein or Heidegger, Quine or Derrida. 
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b.  Aristotle 
Another important textual source for the theory of complexe significabilia 
comes from Aristotle’s Categories 10 (Text (2)): 
Neither is what grounds negation and affirmation [itself] negation 
and affirmation. For an affirmation is an affirmative proposition, 
and a negation is a negative proposition. But none of what ground 
negation and affirmation is a proposition. These [grounds] are nev-
ertheless said to be opposed to one another as affirmation and ne-
gation are. For it is the same kind of opposition in these cases too. 
For just as affirmation is opposed to negation — for example, ‘He 
is sitting’ [is opposed] to ‘He is not sitting’ — so too the thing un-
derlying each one is opposed [to the thing underlying the other], 
sitting [is opposed] to not sitting. 
Once again, the suggestion is that there is something more expressed by a 
proposition than the sum total of substances and accidents signified by its cate-
gorematic terms, as Ockham and Buridan would have it — something more that 
can enter into relations of “opposition” in a way that substances and accidents do 
not. In short, there must be entities like “facts,” “states of affairs,” “proposition” 
in the modern sense. 
2.  Arguments for the Theory 
Let’s now turn to the reasons (as distinct from the authorities) for the the-
ory of complexe significabilia. 
Here is one, taken from Peter of Ailly’s discussion.17 Consider any af-
firmative singular proposition18 — for example, ‘Socrates is sitting’. 
Now I will give you a little advance peek at supposition-theory. An af-
firmative, singular proposition like ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true if and only if the 
subject term stands for (supposits for) something the predicate term stands for 
(supposits for) too. That is, it is true if and only if there is something of which the 
subject term can be truly affirmed and of which the predicate term can be truly af-
firmed as well. Thus, ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true if and only if there is something 
of which it is true to say ‘This is Socrates’ and of which it is also true to say ‘This 
is sitting’. (And of course if the proposition is true, then that something will be 
Socrates the person, who happens to be sitting at the time.) 
This illustrates a general feature of affirmative propositions (singular or 
otherwise): their truth requires that there be something of which the subject term 
can be truly affirmed19 and of which the predicate term can be truly affirmed too. 
                                                 
17 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 12va; Spade trans., § 179 (p. 54). Don’t 
forget, Peter rejected the theory. But first he had to discuss why other people believed in it. 
18 Recall that a “singular” proposition is just a categorical proposition with a singular 
term in subject position. See Ch. 2, p. 14, above. 
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Keeping that general feature in mind, consider the proposition: 
The proposition ‘Every man is an animal’ signifies every man to be 
an animal. 
The English phrase ‘every man to be an animal’ translates the Latin accu-
sative-plus-infinitive construction ‘omnem hominem esse animal’. This kind of 
construction is used regularly in Latin indirect discourse, and is perfectly straight-
forward Latin. We also have it (albeit vestigially) in English, as we can see in 
cases where the nominative and accusative forms differ — which only happens in 
English with personal pronouns: ‘They thought him to be king’, ‘I told them to 
go’, and so on. The construction is perhaps a little fancy and old-fashioned in 
some contexts (for instance, the former of the two examples), but we do have it.20 
In Latin this accusative-plus-infinitive construction is sometimes called a “dic-
tum” in the Middle Ages,21 so that we can speak of a “dictum” corresponding to a 
certain proposition. Thus, ‘him to be king’ is the dictum going with ‘He is king’, 
and so on. 
In present-day English, it is often more natural to use a ‘that’-clause: 
‘They thought that he was king’. You can do this in mediaeval Latin too, with a 
‘quod’-clause, as in the Latin translation of the proposition just given: ‘Putabant 
quod erat rex’. The ‘quod’-construction had become quite acceptable in the four-
teenth century. For our purposes, the two constructions (the accusative-plus-
infinitive construction and the ‘quod’-clause) are to be viewed as strictly on a par. 
Both are nominalizations of propositions. 
Now, with all that in mind, what about that proposition: 
The proposition ‘Every man is an animal’ signifies every man to be 
an animal? 
This is supposed to be a true proposition, making a claim that we all read-
ily accept pre-theoretically about the signification of the proposition ‘Every man 
is an animal’. The argument we are now considering starts from the non-
controversial fact that this is a true proposition. 
Note that in this proposition, the verb ‘signifies’ is in the active voice. 
Hence, by a simple syntactical transformation, we ought to be able to infer the 
corresponding passive proposition: 
Every man to be an animal is signified by the proposition ‘Every 
man is an animal’. 
                                                                                                                                     
19 See, for example, Texts (65)–(66), from Buridan. 
20 Sometimes in modern English it is much more natural to use a ‘for’-construction: ‘It is 
necessary for every man to be animal’. I shall use whichever construction seems the least awk-
ward in any given case. 
21 But be careful. Sometimes too the word ‘dictum’ refers to what is expressed by such a 
construction. See Kretzmann, “Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the Propositio.” But this 
doesn’t happen very often in the period we are studying in this book, when ‘dictum’ meant a piece 
of language, not a piece of the world. 
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Since the former proposition is true, this latter one ought to be true too. 
Now if you look at this passive-voice proposition, you will see that it is a singular 
affirmative proposition, with a dictum as the subject term,22 then a copula, and 
finally the rather complex predicate ‘signified by “Every man is an animal”’. 
Using the general rule I just gave you23 about the truth conditions for such 
propositions, it follows that there is something of which the subject term (the dic-
tum) in that proposition can be truly affirmed (and also of which the predicate 
term can be truly affirmed, but that doesn’t matter for now). That is, there is 
something we can point to and truly say ‘This is every man to be an animal’ (or, 
more colloquially, ‘This is what it is for every man to be animal’). 
But what kind of thing can that be? Certainly not any individual man, 
since you can’t point to Socrates, for example, and truly say “He is every man to 
be an animal.” So too for any other human being, and for any other substance or 
accident in the normal Aristotelian ontology. Hence we need to postulate some 
new and special kind of entity, outside the Aristotelian categories. And this is 
what came to be called a complexe significabile, something that can be signified 
by a complex linguistic expression.24 
3.  Terminological Variations 
These complexe significabilia were also sometimes called the “total” or 
“whole significates” of propositions.25 That is, everyone recognized that proposi-
tions signify substances and accidents, as Buridan says in his Additive Principle, 
in virtue of their having significant categorematic terms in them. But those who 
believed in complexe significabilia argued (we have just seen one of those argu-
ments) that a proposition as a whole signifies something else too, namely its 
“whole” or “total” significate. And that is just the complexe significabile under 
another name. 
Sometimes too the term ‘adequate significate’ was used for this same en-
tity.26 ‘Adequate’ here does not mean “enough,” as it often does in colloquial 
English. Instead, it is here used in its etymological sense (ad + aequatus = made 
                                                 
22 I don’t know of any actual argument in the Middle Ages that dicta are singular terms. 
It just seems to have been taken for granted. But it’s not an especially controversial point. Would 
you know what to do with a theory claiming that at one and the same time, for example, there 
were two distinct “facts” that every man is an animal? 
23 See p. 170 above. 
24 Of course it is implicitly understood here that we are only really interested in complex 
expressions of certain kinds: propositions and their corresponding nominalizations. Expressions 
like ‘red rose’ or ‘the day before yesterday’ are complex too, but they are not what we are talking 
about now. 
25 See, for example, Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 12va; Spade trans., § 
179 (p. 54). Note: ‘Total’ and ‘whole’ are simply alternative translations for the same Latin word, 
‘totale’; there is no distinction in the Latin. 
26 Ibid. 
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equal to), to mean the significate that “exactly fits” the proposition, as distinct 
from the significates of its constituent terms.27 
These complexe significabilia, these “whole” or “total” or “adequate” sig-
nificates of propositions are the bearers of truth and falsehood. They are what Ar-
istotle was talking about in Categories 10 (Text (2)), and Boethius in On the Dif-
ferences in the Topics (Text (16)). At least this is so for those who believed the 
theory. 
4.  The Ontological Status of Complexe 
significabilia 
a.  The Problem 
As we have seen, these complexe significabilia do not seem to fit into the 
usual Aristotelian scheme of the categories. Insofar then as the categories were 
intended to exhaust the kinds of realities there are, the “ontological status” of 
complexe significabilia turns out to be something of a problem.28 On the one 
hand, they must be real; we have just seen an argument why in the preceding sec-
tion. On the other hand, they don’t seem to have any place in the recognized 
scheme of realities — namely, the categories. What are we going to do about 
that? 
But, apart from the traditional classification derived from Aristotle’s Cate-
gories, there was another reason too for wondering about the ontological status of 
complexe significabilia. It was a theological reason, so you may or may not find it 
persuasive, depending on what you think about such things. In any case, here it 
is29: 
Even though we have seen what appears to be a perfectly good argument 
why there must really be complexe significabilia, it seems on the other hand that 
they cannot be real. For consider the theological doctrine of creation. Before crea-
tion, that doctrine goes, there was nothing real besides God.30 Nevertheless, be-
                                                 
27 These terminological points are all subject to variation from author to author. Maierù, 
Terminologia logica, is an invaluable source of information on such matters. 
28 There was considerable dispute in the Middle Ages about whether Aristotle’s Catego-
ries was meant as a classification of terms or as a classification of entities. (See Ch. 2, p. 11, 
above.) But that doesn’t affect the present point. Even those who took the work to be about terms 
recognized that there was a sense in which familiar entities can all be said to “belong” to one or 
another of the categories. 
29 I am taking this from Peter of Ailly’s discussion in Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 12va; 
Spade trans., § 181 (p. 54). 
30 One principal part of the doctrine of creation, as understood in the Middle Ages, is that 
God “created” — causally produced — absolutely everything besides himself. This feature of the 
doctrine is part of what distinguishes it from the Platonic theory of the Demiurge, whose work 
looks a little like creation insofar as the Demiurge arranges the cosmos. But the Demiurge works 
by putting order into a pre-existing “receptacle” (later interpreted as matter), so that he does not 
produce absolutely everything besides himself. Note that, insofar as time itself was often regarded 
as a result of creation, talk about what was and what was not so “before” creation may seem prob-
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fore creation it was true that the world was going to be (= mundum fore). So there 
was at least this truth, this complexe significabile, before creation. That complexe 
significabile cannot have been identical with God himself, since God is a neces-
sary being but the complexe significabile was contingent.31 Therefore, it was dis-
tinct from God. Here then we have a complexe significabile, distinct from God, 
that has to be both (1) real, since it has a semantic role to play,32 and yet (2) un-
real on pain of violating the doctrine of creation. And that, gentle reader, is what 
we call a problem. 
b.  Gregory of Rimini’s Three Kinds of Beings 
In discussing possible responses to this problem, Peter of Ailly cites Gre-
gory of Rimini as having distinguished three different senses of words like 
‘thing’, ‘something’, ‘being’, ‘real’, etc.33 
(1) In the first and broadest sense, anything that can be signi-
fied, complexly or incomplexly, truly or falsely, can be 
called a “being.”34 In this sense, tables and chairs are be-
ings, as are the complexly significables every man to be an 
animal, which is a true one, and every man to be an ass, 
which is a false one. 
(2) In a second and narrower sense, “beings” include anything 
that can be signified by a true proposition — that is, either 
by the proposition as a whole (the “being” in that case 
would be the true complexe significabile) or by any of the 
categorematic terms in that proposition (substances and ac-
cidents in the familiar Aristotelian categories). In this 
sense, false complexly significables aren’t beings. 
                                                                                                                                     
lematic. Mediaeval authors were quite aware of this problem and had various things to say about 
it, but I don’t want to digress on it here. 
31 That the world was going to be was a contingent fact, since God’s creative act was a 
free one. The contingency of creation is a second principal ingredient of the doctrine of creation. 
God not only didn’t have to create exactly the things he did, or in exactly the way he did; he 
didn’t have to create at all! 
32 Just as in the argument on pp. 170–172 above, so too here. The proposition ‘For the 
world to be going to be was a truth (before creation)’ is a singular true proposition, so that its sub-
ject term (the dictum) needs some real entity to be truly predicable of. The only difference be-
tween this case and the previous one is that this time the proposition is in the past tense. As we 
shall see in Ch. 10, when we talk about modal and tense logic, the only difference this makes is 
that the entity corresponding to the dictum is moved into the past — and in particular, moved back 
into the past before creation. 
33 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 12va–b; Spade trans., § 185–188 (pp. 55–
56). See Gregory, Super primum et secundum Sententiarum I, Prol. q. 1, fols. 1Q–2B (= Trapp 
ed., vol. 1, pp. 8.25–9.20). Gregory had introduced this threefold distinction in response to a dif-
ferent argument. 
34 Or a “thing,” or “real,” etc. I won’t keep adding these alternatives henceforth. 
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(3) In a third and narrowest sense, only “some essence or exist-
ing entity” can be called a “being.” This appears to mean 
an entity in the Aristotelian categories. 
Corresponding to the three senses of ‘being’, there are three senses of 
‘nothing’. Thus, if you ask “Are complexe significabilia something or are they 
nothing — make up your mind, Gregory,” he will say that all of them are things 
or realities or “somethings” in sense (1), the true ones are things or realities or 
“somethings” in sense (2) but the false ones are nothing in that sense, and that 
none of them is a thing or reality or “something” in sense (3) — they are all noth-
ing in that sense. In short, complexe significabilia do have some kind of ontologi-
cal status, but they are not real in the same way tables and chairs are. 
Well now! All that’s very nice, but of course it really doesn’t answer the 
question Peter asked, does it? In order to make it answer that question, one would 
have to add the claim that the doctrine of creation holds that God created abso-
lutely “everything” besides himself only in sense (3) of ‘everything’, and that in 
senses (1) and (2) there are uncreated realities distinct from God. And that, I sus-
pect, would have been regarded as an unacceptable diluting of the doctrine of 
creation. 
In any case, it is not clear how serious the theological objection was to be-
gin with. Peter of Ailly rejects it on the grounds that it involves an illegitimate 
substitution of identicals in an opaque modal context.35 
However all that turns out, it is apparent that defenders of complexe sig-
nificabilia took them to have a special kind of reality, quite unlike the reality of 
things falling under the various Aristotelian categories. 
C.   Buridan’s Theory 
Many authors rejected the theory of complexe significabilia. I’ve already 
told you Peter of Ailly did.36 In effect, Peter denied that the active/passive trans-
formation in our earlier argument37 is permissible; one cannot validly argue from 
the active ‘The proposition ‘Every man is an animal’ signifies every man to be an 
                                                 
35 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 14va; Spade trans., § 231 (p. 62). Peter ar-
gues in effect that before creation for the world to be going to be was indeed a necessary being, 
and was in fact identical with God. It was a necessary being; it just wasn’t necessarily true. From 
‘Necessarily A exists’ and ‘A is identical with B’, it does not follow that necessarily B exists, since 
A might be only contingently identical with B. (Similarly, to take a standard example, it is neces-
sary for nine to be greater than seven. But the number of planets is nine — or at least it was until 
recent recounts that we’ll conveniently ignore for the sake of the example. Yet it does not follow 
that it is necessary for the number of planets to be greater than nine; there might have been any 
number of planets.) But Peter’s argument is richer than this trivial little observation would indi-
cate. See Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 14vb; Spade trans., §§ 233–234 (pp. 62–63). And remem-
ber, Peter is not defending the theory of complexe significabilia, since he rejects it. It’s just that 
the theory can’t be refuted by appealing to a fallacious substitution argument. 
36 See p. 168 above. 
37 See p. 171 above. 
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animal’ to the passive ‘For every man to be an animal is signified by the proposi-
tion “Every man is an animal”’. The former is true, but the latter, in Peter’s view, 
is simply ill-formed.38 We’ll see why later. 
Buridan too rejected Gregory’s theory, but for entirely different reasons.39 
Where Peter of Ailly does not always allow the active/passive transformation, 
Buridan does allow it. Hence, unlike Peter, Buridan is willing to say that ‘For 
every man to be an animal is signified by the proposition “Every man is an ani-
mal”’ is not only well-formed but true. 
As a result, Buridan must find a candidate among the individual sub-
stances and accidents of his ontology to serve as the suppositum (= roughly, the 
referent) of the dictum ‘for every man to be an animal’. That is, he must find an 
individual substance or accident of which that dictum can be truly affirmed. And 
in general, for any affirmative proposition in which the subject is a dictum, if the 
proposition is true there must be some substance or accident of which the dictum 
can be truly affirmed. 
The implausibility of this, as we saw,40 was one of the motives behind the 
theory of complexe significabilia in the first place. But Buridan, who is not will-
ing to accept complexe significabilia, just bites the bullet. Here is how it goes41: 
If Socrates is sitting, then on Buridan’s theory the dictum ‘for Socrates to 
be sitting’ can be truly affirmed of Socrates. That is, the proposition ‘This is for 
Socrates to be sitting’ (or more colloquially, ‘This is what it is for Socrates to be 
sitting’) is true, pointing to Socrates. On the other hand, if Socrates is not sitting, 
then that dictum cannot be truly affirmed of anything at all.42 
Or, to put it another way: 
(1) If ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true, then Socrates is sitting, and in 
that case for Socrates to be sitting is identical with Socra-
tes. 
                                                 
38 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 13vb; Spade trans., § 212 (p. 59). 
39 See Texts (65)–(69). Note: Scott translates dicta — that is, accusative + infinitive con-
structions — in a very peculiar way. Thus ‘hominem esse animal’ (= ‘man to be an animal’ or ‘for 
a man to be an animal’) gets translated as ‘man-being-animal’ (with the hyphens). In his transla-
tion (p. 87, n. 8), he justifies this by saying “I have translated these phrases as gerundive, even 
though this leaves them awkward at times, because it is less inelegant than an infinitive transla-
tion.” Elegance is perhaps in the eye of the beholder, but for me ‘man-being-animal’ is about as 
inelegant as you can get, and far more awkward than the straightforward ‘for a man to be an ani-
mal’. The ‘for’ cannot always be included in the English (thus ‘I told him to go’, but not ‘I told for 
him to go’), so dicta cannot in all contexts be uniformly translated in this way. But this sort of 
thing can be handled by an explanatory footnote the first time it occurs. Besides, Scott’s form of 
translation is not “gerundive” but “gerundial.” (The “gerundive” is the future passive participle.) 
40 See p. 172 above. 
41 See Texts (66)–(69). 
42 Buridan uses this same treatment of dicta in his Sophismata, Ch. 4, sophisms 9–14 
(Scott ed., pp. 72–83; Scott trans., pp. 126–137), in his discussion of epistemically opaque con-
texts. See Geach, “A Medieval Discussion of Intentionality”; Moody, “Buridan and a Dilemma of 
Nominalism”; and the introduction to Scott’s translation of Buridan’s Sophismata, pp. 44–49. 
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(2) If ‘Socrates is sitting’ is false, then Socrates is not sitting, 
and in that case for Socrates to be sitting is not identical 
with Socrates, and not identical with anything else either; 
there is simply no such thing in that case. 
Although Buridan (Text (67)) cites some texts from Aristotle to support 
this view, the theory strikes me as not very plausible. Buridan has to find a sub-
stance or accident of which the dictum can be truly affirmed, and so (it seems to 
me) he finds one by fiat. But you can decide that for yourself. 
1.  Problems for Buridan’s Theory 
a.  One Problem 
Before you decide, however, consider the following problems. First, the 
theory may work (although I don’t personally find it very persuasive) for dicta of 
singular propositions: for Socrates to be sitting, for Socrates to be standing, etc. 
And perhaps likewise it will work for dicta of indefinite and particularly quanti-
fied propositions as well.43 But what are we going to say about universally quanti-
fied propositions? For example, ‘Every man is running’. Supposing the proposi-
tion is true, what can its dictum ‘for every man to be running’ be truly affirmed 
of? If we say it can be truly affirmed of every man, then in particular Socrates is 
for every man to be running, and so is Plato, etc. Each of them individually is for 
every man to be running. Or should we say instead that if every man is running, 
then all men taken somehow together or collectively are what the dictum ‘for 
every man to be running’ can be truly affirmed of?44 Buridan just doesn’t say. 
b.  A Possible Second Problem 
Perhaps there is a second problem lurking in the following observations. 
Earlier,45 I said that the proposition 
(a) ‘Socrates is sitting’ signifies Socrates to be sitting. 
                                                 
43 Thus if ‘A man is running’ or ‘Some man is running’ is true, then the dictum ‘for a 
(some) man to be running’ will have individual men — namely, the running ones — as its refer-
ents. (In that case, of course, the dictum is not a singular term.) I’m not recommending this, mind 
you, but it might work. 
44 For present-day readers, it is perhaps tempting to say that what the dictum can be af-
firmed of is the class of all men. Maybe, although “class”-talk is not mediaeval but modern. There 
was nothing like the modern notion of a class or set, as distinct from a mereological whole, in the 
Middle Ages. Perhaps then the mereological sum of all men will serve as the referent of the dic-
tum. The problem is that Buridan simply gives us no clue how to proceed here. 
45 See p. 171 above. I used a different example there, but the point is the same. 
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seems, on the face of it, to be true. From that, it seemed, we could infer the corre-
sponding passive form: 
(b) For Socrates to be sitting is signified by ‘Socrates is sit-
ting’. 
Peter of Ailly rejected this active/passive inference, but Buridan allowed 
it. On the other hand, according to Buridan’s theory, if Socrates is not in fact sit-
ting, then the dictum ‘for Socrates to be sitting’ doesn’t refer to anything at all. In 
that case, since (b) is an affirmative the subject of which cannot be truly affirmed 
of anything, (b) is false.46 
That much is straightforward. The problem arises because Buridan accepts 
the inference from (a) to (b). Hence, if Socrates is not running, not only is (b) 
false, so is (a). But (a), we said, seemed to be true. Furthermore, it seemed to be 
true quite independently of whether Socrates happens to be sitting or not. Buri-
dan’s theory thus has the odd result that a proposition’s signification changes if 
the proposition itself changes its truth value. 
On the other hand, perhaps this objection is not really all that damaging. It 
might be based on what amounts to nothing more than confusing signification 
with meaning.47 
D.  Digression on the Bearers of Truth Value 
Part of the textual basis for the theory of complexe significabilia was 
Boethius’ remark (Text (16)) implying that propositions themselves are not the 
bearers of truth or falsehood, except in a derivative sense, and that the bearers of 
truth value are instead what the propositions signify. Complexe significabilia ful-
filled that role. 
Therefore Buridan, Peter of Ailly, and others who rejected the theory of 
complexe significabilia had to find some other bearers of truth and falsehood. In 
practice, most such authors took the propositions themselves (as distinct from 
their significates) as the bearers of truth value.48 
For nominalists like Buridan and Ockham,49 the bearers of truth value are 
propositions — that is, declarative sentences. And since they were nominalists, 
and so rejected any kind of metaphysically universal entities, this meant that they 
identified the bearers of truth value with sentence-tokens rather than sentence-
types50 — that is, with individual utterances or individual inscriptions (or individ-
                                                 
46 See p. 170 above. 
47 On this, see Ch. 3, p. 61, above. 
48 They could then interpret Boethius’ text in various forced ways to avoid contradicting 
his authority, as Peter of Ailly does in his Conceptus et insolubilia, fols. 7vb–8ra; Spade trans., § 
98, p. 37. 
49 Ockham of course predated the theory of complexe significabilia. Nevertheless he, like 
Buridan, held the theory I am about to describe. 
50 If you are not familiar with this modern terminology, it is easy to explain by an exam-
ple. ‘Socrates is mortal’ and ‘Socrates is mortal’ are said to be two “tokens” of the same “type.” 
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ual judgments in mental language). As a result, for these authors, if you say ‘All 
men are mortal’ and I likewise say ‘All men are mortal’, we have uttered two 
truths, not one. Likewise, if you write the proposition ‘All men are mortal’ on a 
chalkboard, and I come along and erase it, I have destroyed a truth. 
As a result of what we might call this “tokenality” of nominalist logic, you 
frequently see Ockham and others saying things like “such and such a proposition 
is true if it is formed,” or “such and such a proposition is false if it exists.”51 
Truth and falsehood, therefore, belong only to existing sentence-tokens. 
Tokens that do not exist don’t have truth values; they don’t have anything.52 
This view leads to a certain interesting problem. Buridan recognized it and 
discussed it in his Sophismata, Ch. 8, sophisms 1–2.53 In capsule form, the prob-
lem is that the following three claims form an inconsistent triad: 
(a) Sentence-tokens are the bearers of truth value. 
(b) The usual “classically” valid inferences are valid, and the 
usual “classically” invalid ones are invalid. 
(c) An inference is valid if and only if (to put it loosely) when-
ever the premises are true the conclusion is true too.54 
For, here are two counterexamples. First, consider the inference: 
Every proposition is affirmative; therefore, no proposition is nega-
tive. 
This is a classically valid inference, the kind of inference we want to be a 
valid one (in virtue of (b)). Yet it might well be the case that the premise of this 
inference is true — for example, if some cataclysm destroyed all other sentence-
tokens but that one (or alternatively, if it destroyed all the negative ones). When it 
is true, however, the conclusion is not true — in fact, when it is true the conclu-
sion doesn’t even exist. Hence, given (a) and (b), (c) fails for this inference. On 
the other hand, consider the inference: 
No proposition is negative; therefore, some proposition is negative. 
This is the kind of inference we don’t want to be valid. It argues from a 
proposition to its contradictory opposite, and that of course is not supposed to be 
valid unless the former proposition is impossible. But that isn’t so here. On the 
contrary, it is quite possible for our hypothetical cataclysm to destroy all negative 
                                                 
51 See, for example, William of Ockham, Summa logicae, 2, 9, p. 375.72–84; translated 
in William of Ockham, Ockham’s Theory of Propositions, p. 111. 
52 For Ockham, the same thing is true for modalities like necessity, impossibility, possi-
bility, etc. See the references in n 51. For a discussion see Spade, “Les modalités aléthiques selon 
Ockham.” 
53 Scott ed., pp. 123–127; Scott trans., pp. 180–185. Hughes, ed. & trans., pp. 38–49 
(paperback trans., pp. 34–39). 
54 This is a quite standard way of describing validity even nowadays. 
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sentence-tokens. Nevertheless, the inference is valid according to the criterion in 
(c). For the premise cannot be true; if it exists at all, it is false. The definition of 
validity in (c), therefore, is trivially satisfied. 
Note that you can’t fix this problem by defining a valid inference nega-
tively, as one that never leads from true premises to a false conclusion. For that 
would validate the undesirable inference: 
Every proposition is affirmative; therefore, no proposition is af-
firmative. 
If our cataclysm this time made the premise true by destroying all negative 
sentence-tokens, then the conclusion would not exist at all, and so not be false. 
Buridan saw these difficulties and touched up the notion of consequence 
to accommodate them. That is, he kept (a) and (b), but revised (c).55 
E.  The Adverbial Theory of Signification 
There was yet another tradition of talking about the signification of propo-
sitions in the late Middle Ages. According to people in this tradition, if you ask 
what it is that a proposition signifies, the answer is given by The Additive Princi-
ple56: it signifies the sum total of whatever its categorematic terms signify. In this 
sense of signification, the truth or falsehood of a proposition cannot be deter-
mined by looking at its signification, on the one hand, and looking at the state of 
the world, on the other. For in this sense of signification, the proposition ‘The cat 
is on the mat’ has exactly the same signification as does the proposition ‘The cat 
is not on the mat’. Both signify exactly the same things. 
But, this tradition maintained, there is another kind of signification too, 
according to which the truth or falsehood of a proposition can be determined by 
looking at its signification and the state of the world. And this is what might be 
called the “adverbial” sense of signification. The idea is this: 
If you ask what ‘The cat is on the mat’ signifies, the answer (in accor-
dance with The Additive Principle) is that it signifies cats and mats. But if you 
ask, not what, but how the proposition signifies, the answer is that it signifies that 
the cat is on the mat, or the cat to be on the mat, etc.57 All the expressions used in 
the theory of complexe significabilia reappear here: dicta, ‘that’-clauses, and so 
on. 
The difference between the theory we are talking about now and the ones 
we have looked at previously is that this new theory does not regard the expres-
                                                 
55 See the references in n. 53 above. For a discussion of these issues, see Hughes’ com-
mentary in John Buridan, John Buridan on Self-Reference, pp. 141–149 (paperback, pp. 80–88), 
and Prior’s elegant paper, “The Possibly-True and the Possible.” For related issues, not necessar-
ily involving Buridan, see Kretzmann, “Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the Propositio,” 
and Sullivan, “What Was True or False in the Old Logic?” 
56 See p. 166 above. 
57 At least it does unless there is some special imposition adopted for that proposition. 
See the discussion of Robert Fland in Ch. 4, pp. 88–91, above. 
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sions ‘that the cat is on the mat’, ‘for the cat to be on the mat’, etc., as names at 
all. They are not really nominalizations of the corresponding propositions, but are 
instead to be regarded as adverbial expressions. 
To put it another way, this theory does not take the dictum in the proposi-
tion 
‘The cat is on the mat’ signifies the cat to be on the mat. 
as a direct object of ‘signifies’. On the contrary, ‘signifies’ is here used in-
transitively, and the dictum is a regarded as a kind of adverbial modifier. As a re-
sult, the active/passive transformation is blocked; one cannot infer 
For the cat to be on the mat is signified by ‘The cat is on the mat’. 
And therefore one does not have to look for some entity of which the dictum ‘for 
the cat to be on the mat’ can be truly affirmed. 
Peter of Ailly accepts such an adverbial theory of propositional significa-
tion,58 as do lots of other people. In fact, this theory is what was really behind Pe-
ter’s rejection of the active/passive inference, and why he said it resulted in an ill-
formed expression. Adverbs cannot serve as subject of propositions. 
1.  Questions and Problems 
There are obvious questions to be asked of this theory: How is significa-
tion in the adverbial sense related to signification in the nominal sense? That is, 
what is the relation between how a proposition signifies and what it signifies? If 
there is none, then is ‘signification’ being used just equivocally here? How does 
adverbial signification fit the basic notion of signification as “establishing an un-
derstanding”? No one, to my knowledge, ever gave a very satisfactory answer to 
these questions — or even addressed them. 
There is a more general problem too, it seems to me. What is the differ-
ence, on this theory, between signifying that the cat is on the mat, on the one 
hand, and signifying that the cat is not on the mat — or, for that matter, signifying 
that the mat is on the cat? The problem is that this theory seems to regard dicta 
and ‘that’-clauses as unanalyzable expressions that have to be treated as a whole; 
their semantic role does not seem to be in any way based on the semantics of their 
constituent categorematic or syncategorematic terms. In effect, they are treated as 
semantic primitives. 
The adverbial theory has the obvious advantage of not requiring its hold-
ers to find room for “total” or “adequate” significates of propositions in their on-
tologies. But this metaphysical innocence, it seems to me, is bought at the price of 
explanatory power. We started off wondering whether a proposition had a signifi-
cation of its own, as a whole, in addition to the significations of its component 
                                                 
58 See, for example, his Conceptus et insolubilia, fols. 10vb–11ra; Spade trans., § 159 (pp. 
48–49). 
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categorematic terms. This theory says yes it does. But then when we ask for an 
explanation of that additional signification, all we get for an answer is “Oh, that’s 
primitive.” In short, this theory leaves our questions unanswered. 
It’s true that any theory has to start somewhere, and something has to be 
taken as primitive. But this has to be done judiciously. To locate one’s primitives 
so close to the original question is to minimize the explanatory value of one’s the-
ory. That’s not to say the theory is false; it’s just to say that it doesn’t tell us very 
much. 
F.  Adverbial Signification as the Basis for A 
Theory of Truth 
The adverbial theory of signification was the basis for an account of truth 
conditions. There were various ways of expressing it, but one common formula-
tion put it this way: A proposition is true if and only if 
howsoever it signifies, so it is the case (qualitercumque significat 
ita est). 
Put more colloquially, however the proposition (adverbially) signifies the 
world to be arranged, the world is arranged that way. In short: 
if a proposition P signifies (adverbially) that p, then P is true if and 
only if p.59 
On the basis of the common Latin expression of this criterion, let us call 
this the ‘qualitercumque’-criterion of truth. It plainly supposes a form of a “corre-
spondence” theory of truth. But unlike certain modern correspondence theories, 
which require that true propositions correspond to some fact or state of affairs, 
this version, by borrowing on the metaphysical neutrality of the adverbial theory 
of signification, makes no metaphysical claims whatever.60 
There are minor complications that arise if one wants to generalize this 
formula to apply to past- or future-tensed propositions or to modal ones.61 But let 
us not worry about them here. 
Peter of Ailly maintained an adverbial theory of truth conditions.62 So did 
a certain Henry Hopton, a fellow of University College, Oxford, in 1357, and au-
thor of a treatise On the Truth and Falsehood of a Proposition.63 
                                                 
59 Those of you who are familiar with such things will recognize that this looks very 
much like Tarski’s famous “criterion of adequacy” for any theory of truth. See Tarski, “The Con-
cept of Truth in Formalized Languages,” § 1. 
60 Of course whatever objections one might have to an adverbial theory of signification 
will be inherited by any account of truth conditions that appeals that theory of signification. Meta-
physical neutrality does not come without a price. 
61 See, for example, the references in n. 58 above. 
62 Ibid. 
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Buridan allows the ‘qualitercumque’-formula as a criterion of truth,64 but 
he says it is only a manner of speaking and there is nothing special about the for-
mulation. In particular, despite the wording of the formula, it really has nothing to 
do with signification at all. It’s just a kind of shorthand way of saying what is said 
more fully and in detail in Buridan’s rules of truth in terms of supposition-
theory65: 
And so it seems to me that in giving causes of truth and falsehood, 
it is not enough to go to the significations of terms. Rather [one 
must] go to [their] suppositions. 
Nevertheless, he says (Text (71)): 
But finally, it must be noted that we can use names at will. 
When several people generally use this way of speaking, so that 
we say of every true proposition that “it is the case,” and of every 
false one that “it is not the case,” I have no intention of abolishing 
this way of speaking. Rather, for the sake of speaking more briefly, 
I will perhaps use it [myself], always meaning by it not what [the 
clause] signifies by [its] primary imposition, but rather the causes 
of truths or falsehoods given above, [which are] different for dif-
ferent [kinds of] propositions, as had been said [above]. 
For Buridan, the truth value of a proposition will depend in part on the se-
mantic contributions of its constituent terms. In particular, the truth value of a 
proposition will depend on the supposition of its terms. But for those who (like 
Robert Fland) emphasize the conventional nature of spoken and written language 
at every level, there will in general be no such guarantee that the truth value of a 
whole proposition is going to depend on the semantic role its parts play. As a re-
sult, while Buridan gives his truth conditions in terms of the supposition of terms, 
those who adopt an adverbial theory of truth conditions, not just because it is tra-
ditional but because of its lack of metaphysical commitment, never really get be-
yond the level of dealing with propositions as a whole, without regard for their 
constituent terms. 
                                                                                                                                     
63 On Henry, and on his treatise, see Ashworth and Spade, “Logic in Late Medieval Ox-
ford.” The treatise was printed in 1494, attributed to William Heytesbury, in William Heytesbury, 
Tractatus Gulielmi Hentisberi de sensu composito et diviso … On the correct attribution, see the 
notes to Ashworth and Spade. Hopton’s treatise appears to have been very influential in the sec-
ond half of the fourteenth century. 
64 See John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 2, the statement of sophism 1, Scott ed., p. 36; 
Scott trans., p. 83. Note: The text of the Latin edition at this point does not correspond to Scott’s 
own translation, and makes no sense as it stands. I have not tracked down the details of the error, 
but the Latin has obviously been garbled. Note also that although the passage occurs in the origi-
nal statement of sophism 1, there is nothing in the rest of Ch. 2 to suggest that Buridan rejects the 
‘qualitercumque’-formula, provided it is properly understood. See also the end of Text (73). 
65 Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 2, from conclusion 8, Scott ed., p. 42; Scott trans., p. 90. We 
will talk about such suppositional truth-rules in Ch. 8 below. 
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The ‘qualitercumque’-notion of truth was a common and generally ac-
cepted one, which is why Buridan was loath to reject it, even though he com-
pletely reinterpreted what it meant. Other people too, like Buridan, accepted this 
criterion of truth without thereby committing themselves to an adverbial theory of 
signification. 
G.  Direct and Consecutive Signification 
Some people who used the ‘qualitercumque’-account of truth distin-
guished “direct” signification from what they called “consecutive” signification. 
Thus, for example, Albert of Saxony (one of Buridan’s pupils)66: 
Seventh, I say that every proposition signifying itself to be 
false is false. This is clear, because it signifies the very same 
proposition itself to be [both] true and false.67 For by direct signifi-
cation it signifies itself to be false … But by consecutive significa-
tion it signifies itself to be true. And this is false, namely that the 
same proposition is true and false. 
And, for that matter, Buridan himself in Text (73).68 
The idea is this: According to the ‘qualitercumque’-notion of truth, a 
proposition is true if and only if howsoever it signifies, so it is the case. Now, al-
though it doesn’t quite follow, nevertheless it is only a small step from this to say-
ing that whatever is required for the truth of a proposition is signified by that 
proposition.69 
Consider then the proposition ‘The cat is on the mat’, and assume that the 
normal linguistic conventions are in force. In that case, to begin with, the proposi-
tion signifies that the cat is on the mat. This is what Albert and Buridan and oth-
ers call its “direct” signification. And in order for the proposition to be true it 
must be the case that the cat is on the mat. 
But if the proposition is true, it must also be the case that there is an ani-
mal on the mat, and that the cat is on something, and that God exists (if you think 
                                                 
66 Albert of Saxony, Perutilis logica, from tract. I, Ch. 6. Translated from the 1522 edi-
tion, fol. 4rb. The Latin text is quoted in Spade, The Mediaeval Liar, item xxiv, p. 47. 
67 Reading ‘quia significat eandem propositionem se ipsam esse veram et falsam’ with 
the edition. But I suspect the correct reading should be ‘quia significat eadem propositio se ipsam 
esse veram et falsam’ = ‘because the same proposition signifies itself to be [both] true and false’. 
68 Both of these passages occur in the context of a discussion of the Liar paradox, about 
which I will have a little more to say at the very end of this chapter. Note: In Scott’s translation of 
Buridan’s Sophismata, ‘consecutive’ (= consecutively) is translated as “indirectly.” 
69 The Mertonian Thomas Bradwardine seems to have been the first to take this step ex-
plicitly: “Every proposition signifies or denotes either as of now or simply [the disjunction refers 
to two different kinds of consequence relations. Don't worry about the distinction here.] every-
thing that follows from it either as of now or simply.” See the edition in Roure, “Le Problé-
matique,” p. 297; the Latin is also quoted in Spade, The Mediaeval Liar, item lxiv, p. 108. For a 
discussion, see Ashworth and Spade, “Logic in Late Medieval Oxford,” pp. 38–39, and Spade, 
“Insolubilia and Bradwardine’s Theory of Signification.” 
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that is a necessary truth), and that 2 + 2 = 4, and so on. In short, anything that fol-
lows from what a proposition directly signifies also has to be the case in order for 
that proposition to be true. Thus if we say that whatever is required for the truth 
of a proposition is signified by that proposition, then whatever follows from what 
a proposition directly signifies is also signified by that proposition. And this is 
what Albert and Buridan and others call “consecutive” signification.70 
In this sense then, for those who hold this view, a proposition’s adverbial 
signification is “closed,” as modern logicians say, under the consequence relation. 
That is, if a proposition signifies that such and such, it also signifies all the conse-
quences of such and such, and all their consequences, and so on. 
1.  Some Implications of This Distinction 
This closure of signification under the consequence relation is a doctrine 
with some very interesting implications. For instance, if the specification of truth 
conditions for a proposition presupposes the notion of consequence, as this doc-
trine does, then one cannot define valid consequences as the truth-preserving in-
ferences, since that would be plainly circular. And while, as far as I know, no one 
ever explicitly made exactly that point, we do find a few authors basing the notion 
of consequence on something other than the preservation of truth. The Mertonian 
Roger Swyneshed, for example, explicitly denied that valid consequences always 
preserve truth71: 
The second conclusion: In some valid formal consequence the 
false follows from the true. 
Swyneshed went on to say that, while valid consequence does not neces-
sarily preserve truth, it does preserve the property of signifying (principally72) as 
is the case73: 
If from some propositions each of which signifies principally as is 
the case there follows some proposition, the latter signifies [princi-
pally74] as is the case. But if from some propositions one of which 
signifies [principally75] otherwise than is the case, and all the oth-
ers [signify principally] as is the case, there follows some proposi-
                                                 
70 Necessary truths, like 2 + 2 = 4, follow from anything. Note: This so called “paradox 
of strict implication” was not taken for granted in the Middle Ages; it depends on the particular 
author’s theory of consequence. 
71 Translated from Spade, “Roger Swyneshed’s Insolubilia,” § 26, p. 189. The cases 
where this happens are the semantic paradoxes like the Liar. 
72 “Principal” signification appears to be what we earlier called “total” or “whole” or 
“adequate” signification. See p. 172 above. See also Spade, “Roger Swyneshed’s Theory of In-
solubilia,” p. 106. 
73 See Spade, “Roger Swyneshed’s Insolubilia,” § 35, p. 191. 
74 Some manuscripts have this word, while others omit it. 
75 Ditto. 
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tion, it does not follow that the latter [proposition] signifies as is 
the case. 
Again, it was sometimes said that any proposition implies its own truth as 
a logical consequence.76 Thus, from ‘The cat is on the mat’ you can validly infer 
‘The proposition ‘The cat is on the mat’ is true’.77 As a result, every proposition 
signifies its own truth — at least consecutively.78 
This claim was used by some authors79 to provide a “solution” to the fa-
mous “Liar paradox.” Consider the proposition ‘This proposition is false’, indicat-
ing itself. At first glance, it appears that this proposition can be neither true nor 
false. For (to put it loosely) if it is true, then what it says must be so, which means 
it is false after all. If it is false, then since that is just what it says, it is true after 
all. That is the paradox.80 
But let us apply the claim that propositions signify their own truth to this 
proposition in particular. Directly, the proposition signifies itself to be false. Con-
secutively, it (like all propositions) signifies itself to be true. Since both these 
conditions have to be met in order for the proposition to be true, and since it is 
impossible for both of them to be met (no proposition can be both true and false at 
once), it follows that the paradox is broken and that the proposition is really false 
after all. 
Note how, on this view, the other half of the paradox fails. You can no 
longer argue that if the proposition ‘This proposition is false’ is false, as we just 
concluded it was, then since that is exactly what the proposition says it follows 
that it is true after all. For on this theory that is not exactly what the proposition 
says; it’s only part of what it says.81 
                                                 
76 See, for example, Buridan in Text (73). Note that Buridan goes on to revise the view 
he describes there. See Scott ed., pp. 135–136; Scott trans., pp. 194–195; Hughes ed., pp. 66.105–
70.145; Hughes trans., §§ 7.7.1.1–7.7.2, pp. 67, 69 & 71 (paperback, pp. 48–50). See also Brad-
wardine as described in Spade, “Insolubilia and Bradwardine’s Theory of Signification.” Brad-
wardine actually makes this claim only for insolubilia (= paradoxical propositions like the Liar 
paradox), but his own principles allow the claim to be generalized to all propositions whatever. 
See ibid., pp. 121–124. See also ibid., n. 34, for other authors who maintained this claim. 
77 Nominalists who identify the bearers of truth value with the sentence-token would of 
course have to add an existence-clause to this claim: If the cat is on the mat, and a sentence-token 
of the form ‘The cat is on the mat’ exists, then that sentence-token is true. Some especially careful 
authors added yet another proviso: that the normal linguistic impositions be in effect. 
78 The self-referential proposition ‘This proposition is true’ would also signify its own 
truth directly. 
79 See the references in n. 76 above. 
80 Note that the paradox is not just a contradiction. We have no trouble dealing with con-
tradictions; contradictions are just false. But what we have here is a proposition that seems to gen-
erate a contradiction whether we say it is true or whether we say it is false. That is an altogether 
different story. 
81 I am not recommending this theory; I am only describing it. For a criticism, see Spade, 
“Insolubilia and Bradwardine’s Theory of Signification.” 
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H.  Additional Reading 
 
For additional reading on the material covered in this chapter, see: Hubert Elie, 
Le Complexe significabile; Gedeon Gál, “Adam of Wodeham’s Question on the 
‘Complexe Significabile’ as the Immediate Object of Scientific Knowledge;” 
Gabriel Nuchelmans, “The Semantics of Propositions,” “Adam Wodeham on 
the Meaning of Declarative Sentences,” Theories of the Proposition: Ancient 
and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, and Late-
Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition. (The last item deals 
mostly with a period later than the one we are concerned with, but there’s lots of 
interesting material in it.) 
Chapter 6: The Signification of Propositions 
 
188
 Chapter 7:  Connotation-Theory 
 
 
onnotation-theory is a very complex doctrine. There are lots of papers in 
the secondary literature that talk about it to some extent, but there are two 
main papers that talk about it in some detail. First, there is Loux’s “The 
Ontology of William of Ockham,” which is one of the two introductory 
essays in his translation of Part One of Ockham’s Summa logicae. Second, there 
is my own paper, “Ockham’s Distinctions between Absolute and Connotative 
Terms.”1 
Loux’s paper is an excellent account. But I think it is wrong on a very big 
point: the theory it presents is not Ockham’s, or at least not Ockham’s as I re-
construct him. Instead, it is closer to Buridan’s. In other words: fine paper, wrong 
theory. I hasten to add that it is no great criticism of Loux to say this, since when 
he was writing no one had these differences sorted out. 
I used to think Ockham’s theory and Buridan’s were pretty much the same 
here, but that where Ockham emphasized some points and was clear about them, 
while he was unclear about others or didn’t discuss them, Buridan was conven-
iently just the reverse, so that the two theories complemented each other very 
nicely. I now realize this is not so. Their doctrines are not the same, although they 
are much alike. So I will have to treat them separately. 
A.  The Theory of Paronymy 
But first I want to look at some background: the theory of “paronyms” or 
“paronymous names” in Aristotle, Augustine (354–430) and Anselm (1033–
1109). 
And what are paronymous names? Well, the classic text on this is found at 
the beginning of Aristotle’s Categories 1, 1a12–15 (Text (1)): 
Whatever get from something the names by which they are called, 
but differ in ending, are called “paronyms.” For example, a gram-
                                                 
1 The original title of this paper was “Ockham’s Distinction …” — singular — and in 
fact that is the way it is listed in the table of contents of the issue of Vivarium in which it ap-
peared. But, for some reason, on the first page of the actual article, ‘Distinction’ has been turned 
into the plural ‘Distinctions’. So I’m afraid that is the title by which it is known. As far as I know, 
Ockham has only one theory of the distinction between absolute and connotative terms. 
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marian [is so called] from grammar, and a brave [person is so 
called] from bravery. 
And that is pretty much all Aristotle has to say on the topic. 
From Aristotle’s remark, and particularly from his examples, you might 
get the idea that a theory of paronymous names would be simply a theory of con-
crete and abstract names. This idea would be then reinforced if you compared Ar-
istotle’s comment with, for instance, Ockham’s remark at the beginning of his 
discussion of concrete and abstract names in Summa of Logic I.5, § 2: 
You must observe that a concrete [name] and its [corre-
sponding] abstract [form] are names that have a similar beginning 
vocally, but do not have similar endings. For example, it is plain 
that ‘just’ and ‘justice’, ‘strong’ and ‘strength’, ‘animal’ and ‘ani-
mality’ begin with a similar letter or syllable, but do not end alike. 
Ockham’s remark is clearly based on Aristotle’s. 
Now if we insist on the syntactic criterion that both Aristotle and Ockham 
mention — that is, that paronymous names differ only with respect to their end-
ings — then what we will end up with is indeed probably only a theory of con-
crete and abstract names, and a pretty inadequate and cramped one at that. But if 
we relax that syntactical stricture and look at what is semantically interesting 
about paronymous names, we will find something of much more general interest. 
Consider, for instance, the case of ‘just’ and ‘justice’. When we call some-
thing just, we do so by making a kind of “oblique reference,” as it were, to some-
thing else — to the justice it exemplifies or has, in virtue of which we call it just. 
Similarly, when we call someone brave, we do so with one eye, so to speak, on 
something else — on the bravery that person displays or possesses, in virtue of 
which we call him or her brave. 
On the other hand, when we call a certain virtue justice or bravery, we do 
not make this kind of oblique reference to something else. The justice or the brav-
ery is all that is involved. 
What is semantically interesting about paronyms, therefore, is this feature 
I have just called “oblique reference.” Our task will be to specify as precisely as 
we can just what is going on there. 
So considered, the theory of paronymy is but a special case of the theory 
of absolute and connotative terms that was developed to a very high degree in the 
fourteenth century, particularly by Ockham and Buridan. The theory of connota-
tion turns out to be exactly the theory of this kind of “oblique reference,” in con-
texts that include but go beyond paronyms in the sense Aristotle described. 
So my interest here is not so much in the theory of paronymy narrowly 
taken as it is in what might be called “early connotation theory,” although the 
term ‘connotation’ was not used until later. I will focus on two authors: (1) on St. 
Augustine, who does not so far as I know discuss paronymy anywhere directly, 
and certainly does not in the passages I will be considering, but who does have 
some things of great interest to say that bear on connotation-theory more gener-
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ally; and (2) on St. Anselm, who has a great deal to say about a particular case of 
paronymy, which will also bear on connotation-theory more generally. Then, later 
on in the chapter, I will discuss the theory of connotation explicitly, as it was de-
veloped by Ockham and Buridan in the fourteenth century. 
1.  Augustine 
Let us look first then at Augustine. And let us begin by looking at a pas-
sage that concerns, of all things, the question how to define a human being. 
The passage is from Augustine’s On the Customs of the Catholic Church 
(Text (5)), nowadays perhaps not among his most widely read works. Augustine 
is discussing what the chief good is for human beings, and along the way he de-
cides that in answering this question it would help to figure out just what a human 
being is in the first place. 
Augustine recognizes that somehow you need both soul and body to have 
a fully constituted human being. We do not, he says, properly call a corpse a hu-
man being, and neither do we properly call a disembodied ghost a human being. 
Somehow you need both body and soul in order to have a human being. 
But, given that you need both in order to have a human being, what more 
can we say? Does it follow that the human being somehow is both — that he is a 
composite of body and soul in some way, perhaps after the Aristotelian fashion in 
which the soul is the substantial form of the body? 
Well, no, not necessarily. Augustine considers three possible stories one 
might tell here. In effect, he is asking “What kind of word is ‘man’ (= ‘human be-
ing’, ‘homo’)? 
(1) Is it a “pair”-word? For example, we speak of a “team” of horses. Nei-
ther horse by itself is the team, but only the pair of them when they are somehow 
hitched together. 
Is the word ‘man’ then like that, so that neither the body nor the soul is 
properly the man, but only the pair of them when they are somehow “hitched to-
gether”? This is more or less the Aristotelian theory, in a suitably loose sense: 
Body and soul are ingredients or parts of the composite whole we call a man, and 
the term we predicate of the whole is not truly predicable of either of its parts.2 Is 
the word ‘man’ then like this? 
(2) Or is the word ‘man’ more like the word ‘lantern’? Two things are re-
quired in order to make a lantern. First of all, you need the container or case, the 
material artifact made out of metal and glass, let us say. But if that case did not 
support a flame, so that it is somehow in the service of the flame, then what you 
have is not a lantern, but a piece of hardware that is at most “potentially” a lan-
tern, as Aristotle might have put it. Conversely, if you have a flame without the 
case, then you don’t have a lantern either; you have a fire on your hands! 
                                                 
2 Augustine also mentions the word ‘centaur’ as being another example of this kind of 
word. But that seems to be based on the odd view that a centaur is not half horse and half man, as 
is usually thought, but somehow a combination of a complete horse and a complete man. It’s 
probably best to disregard the example. 
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Both case and flame are required in order to have a fully constituted lan-
tern. Nevertheless, when you do have a lantern, it is not the pair consisting of the 
case and the flame that is the lantern. It is only the case that is properly speaking 
the lantern, although it is called a lantern only with a kind of “oblique reference” 
(and that is the notion we want to investigate) to the flame it supports. 
The example is perhaps a bit strained, but its application to Augustine’s 
main question is clear. Is the word ‘man’ like the word ‘lantern’? That is, is only 
the material casing — the body — properly speaking the man, even though it is 
called a man only when it contains and supports a soul, so that it is the body that 
we call the man, but only with an “oblique reference” to the soul? 
(3) Or finally, is the word ‘man’ more like the word ‘rider’3? You don’t 
have a rider unless you have a man who rides horses. You need both the man and 
the horse. Yet the rider is not the pair man-and-horse, somehow hitched together. 
And the rider is certainly not the horse considered as supporting and at the service 
of the man. Rather it is only the man who is properly speaking the rider, although 
we only call him a “rider” with a kind of “oblique reference” to the horse, which 
he governs and rules. 
Is the word ‘man’ then like this? Is it really only the soul that is the man, 
even thought it is only called a man insofar as it is supported by a body, which it 
governs and rules4? 
There is another passage from Augustine, this time from his On the City of 
God (Text (8)), where he lists the same three alternatives (in reverse order) and 
attributes them to the Roman pagan Eclectic philosopher Varro (116–27 BC), 
whom elsewhere he calls “most learned.”5 And he says that Varro chose the first 
alternative (the third in the ordering of Text (8)): that ‘man’ is a pair-word. 
Hence, according to Varro, the highest good for man is to lead a “mixed” life, that 
is, a mixture of the contemplative and the active life, so that the goods of both 
soul and body, and thus of the whole man, will be accommodated. 
Later on in On the City of God,6 Augustine says he thinks Varro treated 
the whole question superficially, because he tried to find the highest good of man 
in this life rather than in the next. And indeed, later in On the Customs of the 
Catholic Church Augustine makes it quite clear that he himself accepts the third 
of the alternatives he lists there, that it is the soul that is the man, but it is called a 
“soul” only insofar as it governs and rules a body. He says7: 
                                                 
3 That is, ‘eques’ = ‘horseman’. I did not want to translate this word as ‘horseman’, since 
in English that word has ‘man’ built into it, and so perhaps skews the point Augustine is making. 
Note that ‘eques’ is etymologically related to ‘equus’ = ‘horse’, so that the word means someone 
who rides horses — not someone who, say, rides a bicycle or is a passenger in a boat. 
4 The notion of “governing” and “ruling” is a characteristic Augustinian phrase that often 
occurs when he is describing the proper relation of the soul to the body. But there is no need to go 
into that here. 
5 Augustine, De civitate dei III.4.2. 
6 Ibid. XIX.4.132–180. 
7 Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae I.27.52, in Migne, PL 32, col. 1322. There 
are some textual problems here (an “earthly soul”?). I have translated as best I could. 
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Therefore man, as he appears to man, is a rational, mortal and 
earthly soul using a body. 
Augustine therefore accepts a basically Platonic picture of body and soul. 
For him they are like two distinct substances, not linked as matter and form, as 
they are for Aristotle, but by a relation of “governing and ruling,” as the rider 
dominates his horse or — to use other familiar similes from the Platonic tradition 
— as the ruler is in his city or as the captain is in his ship. And if you ask what, 
properly speaking, is the man, Augustine will answer that it is the soul, but only 
when it is doing its job of governing and ruling the body. 
a.  Semantical Implications 
Now you may think it is straining things a little to find much of logical or 
semantical importance in these passages. But if you do, you are wrong. 
Although the technical machinery is not there, Augustine is in effect 
claiming here that the term ‘man’ is what later authors will call a “connotative” 
term, that it names or is truly predicable of souls, but only by making in addition a 
kind of “oblique reference” to — “connoting,” as they will later say — the bodies 
those souls rule. 
On the second theory Augustine considers (and rejects), the theory that the 
term ‘man’ is like the term ‘lantern’, ‘man’ is likewise a connotative term. But 
this time the semantic situation is just the reverse. This time the term names bod-
ies, but only by making in addition an “oblique reference” to — “connoting” — 
the souls those bodies support and serve. 
On the other hand, on the first theory Augustine considers (and likewise 
rejects), the theory that ‘man’ is a pair-word like ‘team’ or ‘centaur’, ‘man’ is not 
a connotative term at all, but what later authors will call an “absolute” term. It 
names composite wholes consisting of bodies and souls put together, but it does 
not do so by making any “oblique reference” to — “connoting” — either the body 
or the soul, or for that matter anything else. 
It is perhaps hard to see what is different in this case, to see why on this 
first theory the term ‘man’ does not make an “oblique reference” to both bodies 
and souls. The problem here is that we do not yet have any general answer to the 
question: How do we distinguish absolute from connotative terms? That is a very 
difficult and delicate matter even for someone as technically-minded as Ockham, 
so that we should hardly expect a precise answer from Augustine — who was af-
ter all an extraordinarily deep and profound thinker, but scarcely a technician. 
Nevertheless, I think I can explicate the difference in a preliminary, rather 
non-technical, but still revealing, way by appealing to the notion of what I shall 
call “conditional naming.”8 
Consider a name that names — that is, is truly predicable of — an object 
x. Now some names name an object x only under the condition that x satisfy cer-
                                                 
8 Do not expect too much from this theory of “conditional naming.” I am making it up 
solely for the purpose of illustrating a point. 
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tain requirements. For instance, the name (or description) ‘the President of the 
United States’ names a certain individual person. — as I write, Bill Clinton. But it 
only names him under the condition that he occupies the office of President. After 
he leaves office, that same term will no longer name him because he will no 
longer satisfy the condition. 
On the other hand, other names name objects without any condition at all 
— or, if you will, they name those objects only under the condition that those ob-
jects exist, but under no further condition. For example, the name ‘Bill Clinton’ 
names a certain individual, and will continue to name that same individual — that 
is, to be truly predicable of him — provided only that he continue to exist. (For 
present purposes, we will ignore the possibility that he might change his name. 
That is, the “conditions” we are concerned with here pertain only to the situation 
in the world; we hold the language — the imposition of terms — fixed.) 
Now a term that names objects only under the one condition that those ob-
jects exist will be called an “absolute” term. A term that names objects only under 
the condition that those objects exist and also satisfy some further requirement 
will be called “connotative.” 
What makes this distinction so hard to pin down precisely is that some 
terms perhaps name objects under some further condition, where that further con-
dition is nevertheless automatically or necessarily satisfied, given that the objects 
exist at all. That does not necessarily mean the further condition is not there, or 
that it is not a further condition.9 
In effect, then, the difference between absolute and connotative terms, and 
the difficulty in distinguishing them, is a little like the situation with Kant’s dis-
tinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. A categorical impera-
tive is a pure imperative, with no condition attached to it explicitly or even im-
plicitly. A hypothetical imperative, however, does have some condition attached 
to it, even if the condition is only implicit,10 and even if the condition is one that 
is automatically and necessarily satisfied, given the kinds of beings we are.11 
These considerations will perhaps suffice to give you a kind of rough and 
ready sense of the distinction between absolute and connotative terms. The exact 
specification of that distinction need not concern us yet; we’ll talk about that later 
in this chapter. But for now, let us see how the distinction can be applied to the 
texts we have been considering from Augustine. 
On the second and third theories Augustine considers in Text (5) — the 
“lantern”-theory and the “rider”-theory — it is clear that we are treating ‘man’ as 
a connotative term in the sense just described. On the second theory, the term 
                                                 
9 So called “natural kind” terms may be like this, if natural kinds are such that a thing of 
one natural kind cannot change into a thing of another natural kind without losing its identity and 
becoming a different individual altogether. 
10 For example, the sign on the door: “Push.” Understand the implicit condition “if you 
want the door to open.” 
11 For example, various commands based on an understanding of human nature. “If you 
want to be happy — and of course we all do, since that is part of human nature — then cultivate a 
circle of friends.” Such hypothetical imperatives with guaranteed conditions Kant calls “precepts 
of prudence.” 
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names bodies, but does so only under the condition that those bodies support and 
serve souls. If they do not do that, as for instance they will no longer do after the 
departure of the soul at death, then the term ‘man’ no longer names — can no 
longer be truly predicated of — those bodies, even though those bodies continue 
to exist and to retain their identity, but now as corpses. 
On the third theory Augustine considers, the one he accepts, the term 
‘man’ names souls, but only under the condition that those souls inhabit and rule 
a body. If they do not do that, as for instance they will no longer do after death, 
then the term ‘man’ no longer names — can no longer be truly predicated of — 
those souls, even though the souls continue to exist and to retain their identity as 
disembodied spirits. They are souls, and in fact the same souls they were all 
along, but they are no longer men. 
On the first theory, however, the pair-word theory, things are different. 
There the term ‘man’ names a whole composed of body and soul. It does not 
name either the body or the soul individually — either when they are separated 
from one another or when they are together — any more than the word ‘man’ 
names my foot, either severed or attached. 
Now the term ‘man’ on this first theory names the whole composite of 
body and soul, provided only that that whole exists. If the composite is broken up, 
so that body and soul are separated, then the whole no longer exists, so that there 
is no longer anything for the term to name. The term ‘man’, therefore, names the 
composite objects it does, on this theory, only under the condition that those com-
posites exist. There is no further condition, implicit or explicit. Hence the term is 
not connotative, but “absolute.” 
Of course, you might insist that there is an implicit further condition after 
all, one that is automatically and necessarily satisfied — namely the condition 
that those composites consist of body and soul, or some other such condition. But 
this just brings us back to the point that an exact and technical distinction between 
absolute and connotative terms is a complicated and delicate matter. And I said 
we would put that off until later. 
This then is our first pass at the distinction between absolute and connota-
tive terms. It’s a good start, but clearly much remains to be done. 
2.  Anselm 
Now let’s turn to Anselm. There are two texts from Anselm I want to con-
sider. The first does not deal with paronymous terms especially, but more gener-
ally with “connotative” terms in the sense we have just discussed. The second text 
however does deal specifically with paronymy. 
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a.  Ontological Implications 
The first text is from Anselm’s dialogue On the Fall of the Devil, Ch. 11. 
Here it is12: 
For many things do not exist in reality in the way they are 
said. For example, “fearing”13 is called “active” according to the 
form of the word, although it is passive in reality. And so too 
blindness is said [to be] something according to the form of speak-
ing, although it is not something in reality. For just as we say of 
someone “He has sight” and “Sight is in him,” so we say “He has 
blindness” and “Blindness is in him,” even though this is not 
something but more a “non-something,” and to have it is not to 
have something. In fact [it is] to lack what is something. For blind-
ness is nothing but non-sight, or the absence of sight, where sight 
ought to be. But non-sight or the absence of sight is no more some-
thing where sight ought to be than [it is] where sight ought not to 
be. Thus, blindness is no more something in the eye, because sight 
ought to be there, than non-sight or the absence of sight [is some-
thing] in a stone, where sight ought not to be. Many other things 
too that are not something are likewise called something according 
to the form of speaking, because we talk about them just as [we do] 
of existing things. 
Now let’s discuss it. In the dialogue as a whole, Anselm is concerned with 
the problem of evil, among other things, and he is at pains to maintain the Augus-
tinian line that evil is not a thing, a reality in its own right. Nevertheless, Anselm 
wants to maintain also that the word ‘evil’ has a legitimate use (as Augustine 
would of course also say), and Anselm wonders how that can be. 
His analogy with the term ‘blindness’ is instructive. When we say of 
someone that sight is in him or there is sight in him, or simply that he has sight, 
the structure of our sentence is, as it were, a kind of “picture” of what it is that 
makes that sentence true. That is, just as we use the word ‘sight’ and the word 
‘him’ and the linking expression ‘is in’, so too, on the side of reality, we have the 
real property sight, a real entity in the ontology, and we also have the real person, 
and the former really inheres in or belongs to the other. 
But when we say of someone that blindness is in him or there is blindness 
in him or that he has blindness, our sentence — even though it may well be true 
— is not in this same kind of way a picture of what makes it true. What makes it 
true is not that there is some mysterious property blindness that really inheres in 
that person, but rather that the same property we dealt with before — namely, 
sight — is not in that person. 
                                                 
12 Anselm, De casu diaboli, in Opera omnia, Schmitt ed., vol. 1, pp. 250.1–251.2. 
13 The Latin is ‘timere’, the active infinitive “to fear.” 
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In effect then, for Anselm the term ‘blindness’ is a connotative term (al-
though he doesn’t use that expression). It does not name (cannot be truly predi-
cated of) anything at all, since blindness is not an entity in its own right. But we 
can truly say that blindness is in a person — not by referring to blindness, since 
there isn’t any such thing, but by making a kind of “oblique reference” to the 
sight that is not there. 
For Anselm then, despite its apparent simplicity, the term ‘blindness’ is 
really what logicians sometimes call an “incomplete symbol.” The expression 
‘Blindness is in x’ is really just a shorthand or abbreviated way of saying that 
sight is not in x.14 The latter, unlike the former, does provide an accurate picture 
of what it is that makes it true. We have sight, which really is something (al-
though not in x), and we have x, which is also really something, and we have the 
ontological relation of “being in,” which really does not hold in this case. 
The details of this can wait. But the moral of the story is already a rich and 
complex one. First of all, it means that not all the terms we can use in true af-
firmative propositions name things. That is, our terminology is not a reliable 
guide to ontology. 
In effect, we already knew this moral from what we saw in Augustine. If 
you want an inventory of the entities in the world, you would surely list bodies 
and souls, but you would not list men separately. Men just are souls, if we follow 
Augustine; they are souls that satisfy certain conditions. 
Absolute terms, then, are the ones that are linked to an inventory of the 
world. Connotative terms add nothing new to the ontology. 
This suggests that connotative terms are in principle eliminable from our 
vocabulary, as the term ‘blindness’ can be dispensed with in Anselm, and as the 
term ‘man’ in Augustine could always be replaced by its definition: “a rational, 
mortal and earthly soul using a body” — in which all the terms are absolute (or, if 
they are not, can be replaced in turn by their definitions until we ultimately come 
to absolute terms). This will be an important thesis when we come to the connota-
tion-theory of Ockham and Buridan. 
A second and related moral to Anselm’s story is then that connotation-
theory may be used as a vehicle for reducing the number of entities in one’s ontol-
ogy. Thus, just as Anselm observes that we do not need blindnesses (or evils), so 
too it may turn out that we do not need lots of other things for which we have pu-
tative names. They can be parsed away, as Anselm did to blindness (and to evil). 
This is a program Ockham will adopt with a vengeance. He tried to pare down the 
number of ontological categories to two and two only: substance and quality 
alone. All terms in the other recognized Aristotelian list of categories were conno-
tative, could in principle be eliminated from our vocabulary, and thus carried no 
“ontological commitment.”15 
                                                 
14 Or actually, that sight is not in x and ought to be in x, as Anselm makes clear in the 
passage just quoted. But I am not concerned with the “ought”-claim here. 
15 See Ch. 6, p. 166, above. 
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b.  Anselm’s Semantics of Paronymy 
Let us turn to the second Anselmian text I want to consider, and with it 
from blindness to literacy. This second text is Anselm’s well known dialogue De 
grammatico, which has been extensively studied in several publications by Des-
mond Paul Henry.16 
The topic that sets the stage for Anselm’s dialogue concerns the Latin 
term ‘grammaticus’, which means ‘grammatical’ or even ‘grammarian’. Never-
theless, Henry suggests that, in order to catch the nuances of the term in the dia-
logue – and the nuances are quite important here — it is perhaps best to translate 
‘grammaticus’ as “literate,” and to allow it to be used nominally, so that we can 
call someone a literate (note the article), just we might call someone an illiterate, 
without requiring any further noun. 
In any case, the choice of the term ‘grammaticus’ as the vehicle for the 
dialogue is no accident. First of all, it is a stock example of a paronymous term. 
Aristotle, for example, in Text (1), says that the grammarian is so called from 
grammar — or, as we should now say, the literate from literacy. 
But second, and of special importance given that ‘grammaticus’ was taken 
as paradigmatic of paronymy, is the fact that there seems to be some disagreement 
among the traditional authorities over just what the term ‘grammaticus’ signifies. 
On the one hand, in Ch. 4 of the Categories, where Aristotle is giving examples 
of the various categories, he lists ‘γραμματικόν’ for the category of quality 
(Categories 4, 1b25–29): 
Each of what are said without any composition either signifies sub-
stance, or quantity, or quality, or relation, or where, or when, or 
situation, or having, or acting or being acted on. Substance is, to 
give an example, like a man, a horse; quantity, like two cubits, 
three cubits; quality, like white, γραμματικό ν  … 
So ‘grammaticus’ (switching now from Greek back to Latin) signifies a 
quality, presumably grammar or literacy, considered as a quality in the soul. 
On the other hand Priscian, the famous Latin grammarian (c. 500 AD), 
says this about adjectives17: 
Adjectives are so called because they are usually adjoined to other 
appellatives [i.e., common nouns] that signify a substance, or to 
proper names as well, in order to make manifest their qualities or 
quantities, which can grow or diminish without the destruction of 
                                                 
16 Including all the items listed under his name in the Bibliography below. I will be citing 
Anselm’s text according to the paragraph numbering given by Henry in his The De Grammatico 
of St. Anselm. (The same paragraph numbers are used in his Commentary on De Grammatico.) 
Henry’s Latin text is based on the Schmitt edition in Anselm’s Opera omnia, vol. 1, pp. 145–168. 
17 Priscian, Institutionum grammaticarum II.58.20.24. The Latin text may also be found 
in Henry, Commentary on De Grammatico, p. 213. 
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the substance. For example, ‘good animal’, ‘big man’, ‘wise gram-
maticus’, ‘great Homer’. 
Here the term ‘grammaticus’ — by coincidence one of the terms Aristotle 
picked as signifying a quality — is used by Priscian as one of those “appellative” 
terms, i.e. terms “naturally common to many,”18 to which adjectives are attached 
and which signify substances. Hence according to Aristotle ‘grammaticus’ signi-
fies a quality, according to Priscian a substance. Which is it? That is the stage on 
which the dialogue takes place, although the lessons of the dialogue apply to other 
terms besides ‘grammaticus’. 
Now, as you might expect, the solution to this apparent conflict is going to 
have to do justice to both our authorities, both to Aristotle and to Priscian. That is, 
we are going to have to find a way in which ‘grammaticus’ and similar terms can 
be said to signify both a substance and a quality. And Anselm does this, in good 
Scholastic fashion, by making a distinction. He distinguishes two kinds of signifi-
cation, which he calls signification per se (= “through itself”) and signification 
per aliud (= “through something else”). 
Signification per aliud is linked with what Anselm calls “appellation,” al-
though not every case of appellation is a case of signification per aliud. We must 
therefore look at appellation. 
Appellation is what appellative terms do. And an appellative term is, ac-
cording to Priscian one that is “common to many”19: 
This is the difference between a proper and an appellative [name], 
that an appellative is naturally common to many. 
Now the only plausible way a term can be “common to many” is by being 
truly predicable of many. Hence common nouns and adjectives are said to “appel-
late” the several things they are truly predicable of. Appellation is therefore what 
I earlier called “naming.”20 
According to Anselm, the term ‘grammaticus’ appellates men — but only 
literate ones — at the same time it per se signifies the literacy those men possess 
(from Text (17))21: 
But ‘grammaticus’ does not signify man and grammar as 
one. Rather it signifies grammar per se and man per aliud. The 
name [‘grammaticus’], even though it is appellative of man, never-
theless cannot properly be called significative of him; and although 
it is significative of grammar, nevertheless it is not appellative of 
                                                 
18 Ibid. II.58.14.15. Quoted below.  
19 Ibid. 
20 See p. 193 above. Be careful. The noun ‘appellation’ seems to be used sometimes in 
cases where a term names only one thing, even though the phrase ‘appellative name’ seems to be 
reserved for common nouns and adjectives. 
21 The De grammatico is a dialogue between a “master” and a “disciple.” The master is 
speaking. 
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it. I am now calling an “appellative name” of any thing [that] by 
which the thing itself is appellated [= called] in common usage. 
For [there is] no common usage by which it is said that grammar is 
grammaticus, or a grammaticus is grammar. Rather, a man is 
grammaticus, and a grammaticus a man. 
The concrete term ‘grammaticus’ therefore names men, but only under the 
condition that they possess literacy. It is therefore what will later be called a “con-
notative” term. It names men, but makes an “oblique reference” to literacy, an 
oblique reference that Anselm calls signification per se. (By calling it “per se” he 
indicates that he doesn’t think there’s anything “oblique” about it; it’s the main 
kind of signification. We’ll see why a little later.) Similarly, the concrete term 
‘white’ names or appellates white things, but per se signifies whiteness (Text 
(19)). 
On the other hand, the corresponding abstract terms ‘grammatica’ 
(= literacy, grammar) and ‘whiteness’ appellate or name literacy and whiteness, 
respectively, but also signify them per se. In these cases, then, what the terms ap-
pellate and what they signify per se are the same. The things the terms name they 
name provided only that the things exist, and under no further condition. The 
terms are therefore what will later be called “absolute” names. 
For absolute terms, therefore, appellation and per se signification coin-
cide. For connotative terms, appellation and per se signification do not coincide, 
and in that case what the terms appellate they are also said to signify per aliud. To 
put it in a formula, for Anselm signification per aliud is the appellation of what 
will later be called connotative terms. 
Now if you concentrate on the examples we have looked at so far, you 
might suppose that in general concrete terms are connotative while their corre-
sponding abstract forms are absolute. But we already know that cannot be right. 
We have seen that for Anselm the abstract term ‘blindness’ is not absolute but 
connotative.22 
There are cases in which this neat division breaks down the other way too, 
where we have concrete terms that are absolute. For example, Anselm tells us that 
the concrete term ‘man’ both appellates and signifies — that is, per se signifies — 
a substance, the actual man. It is therefore an absolute term and not a connotative 
one. It “signifies per se and as one the [things] of which the whole man consists” 
(from the first paragraph of Text (17)). Anselm therefore disagrees with 
Augustine, for whom ‘man’ is a connotative term.23 Note that the concrete term 
‘man’ is absolute for Anselm even though the word does have a corresponding 
abstract form, ‘humanity’, and did in the Latin of Anselm’s day too. We may 
parse this fact as follows: The things named by the term ‘man’ will indeed auto-
matically possess humanity provided only that they exist, since humanity is essen-
tial to them. But the condition that they possess humanity is not explicitly or im-
                                                 
22 See p. 197 above. 
23 See p. 193 above. 
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plicitly a condition built into the term ‘man’ itself. Thus the term ‘man’ names 
what it does unconditionally. 
i.  Signification Per se and Signification Per aliud 
Let us now look more closely at the notions of signification per se and 
signification per aliud. They are both said to be kinds of signification, so that they 
must both in some way involve the “establishing of an understanding.”24 How 
does this work, and what is the difference between the two kinds of signification? 
We will begin by looking first at signification per se, or simply “significa-
tion.” (Anselm sometimes drops the ‘per se’ where it can be taken for granted.) 
Consider the following passage (from near the end of Text (19)): 
For since the name ‘white’ does not signify anything else than does 
the expression ‘having whiteness’, [therefore] just as the expres-
sion by itself (per se) establishes an understanding of whiteness for 
me, and not of the thing that has whiteness, so does the name. 
I want to extract three claims from this text: (a) The term ‘white’ signifies 
the same as does the expression ‘having whiteness’. Moreover, just as the latter 
expression (b) “establishes an understanding” in me of whiteness, but (c) not of 
the thing that has the whiteness, so too does the simple term ‘white’. 
This is a rich passage. In claim (b), Anselm says that what term ‘white’ 
makes me think of, and so signifies, is just whiteness. But that is true of the ab-
stract term ‘whiteness’ too. So why does Anselm say ‘white’ signifies the same as 
does the expression ‘having whiteness’ — claim (a)? Why does he not simply say 
it signifies the same as the term ‘whiteness’ does all by itself? 
Well, as far as what the term signifies is concerned, both claims are true. I 
think what Anselm has in mind is not just the view that ‘white’ signifies the same 
as ‘having whiteness’ does, but that the former is somehow just a shorthand ab-
breviation of the latter. There is some further evidence for this in an argument we 
will look at in a moment. 
If this is right, it is important. For in later connotation-theory, a connota-
tive term was said to have only “nominal” definitions (plural — it can have more 
than one), whereas an absolute term did not but instead had something called a 
“real” definition. (The exact specification of this difference is a complicated mat-
ter we can defer until later.) 
Now ‘having whiteness’ will later be taken as a nominal definition of the 
connotative term ‘white’. So if connotative terms are regarded as simply short-
hand abbreviations for their nominal definitions (plural again), all those nominal 
definitions must somehow amount to the same thing — they must in effect be 
synonymous. This is a result that will be affirmed by Ockham. Whenever I use a 
connotative term, I am in effect using an abbreviation for all those synonymous 
nominal definitions, so that the connotative term signifies — I am made to think 
                                                 
24 See Ch. 3, p. 61, above on this phrase. 
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of — whatever those synonymous definitions signify. And in virtue of what we 
called the “Additive Principle” in Buridan25 and implicitly in Ockham, nominal 
definitions signify just whatever their constituent categorematic terms signify. In 
our example, ‘having whiteness’ has only one constituent categorematic term, 
‘whiteness’, which makes one think of whiteness — and that is all. (The ‘having’ 
there seems to be regarded as a kind of logical particle — a syncategorema — 
without any independent significative function.) 
Contrast this with the absolute term ‘man’. That term has a definition, a so 
called “real” definition: ‘rational animal’. Now if absolute terms were regarded as 
simply shorthand abbreviations of their definitions in the way connotative terms 
are of theirs, then whenever I used the term ‘man’, I would be in effect using in 
abbreviated fashion the expression ‘rational animal’. But in virtue of the Additive 
Principle, the expression ‘rational animal’ not only signifies rational animals — 
i.e., men — but also signifies all animals in virtue of the second component of the 
definition. Hence if absolute terms were simply abbreviations of their definitions, 
as connotative terms are of theirs, then whenever I used the term ‘man’ I would 
be made to think of all animals whatever. 
Worse, ‘animal’ itself has a real definition: ‘sensitive26 organism’. And 
‘organism’ does too, and so on until we come to a fully expanded real definition 
of man as a “rational, sensitive, living, corporeal substance.”27 Thus if absolute 
terms were simply abbreviations of their definitions, then whenever I used the 
terms ‘man’ I would be made to think of all substances whatsoever. And this is 
simply not so. 
It follows then that absolute terms are not just abbreviations of their real 
definitions. Real definitions do not therefore just introduce a more abbreviated 
terminology, as for instance definitions do in certain styles of modern formal logi-
cal systems. Something else is involved. Real definitions are supposed to have 
something to do with the internal metaphysical structure of the thing defined. 
Hence, since absolute terms are not just abbreviations, they may have al-
ternative, non-synonymous real definitions. Those definitions must pick out the 
same things — and indeed, necessarily pick out the same things, since we’re talk-
ing about definitions after all. But they need not have the same constituent terms. 
Again, this result too is affirmed by Ockham. 
In drawing these consequences, I am of course going way beyond any-
thing explicitly found in Anselm’s text. But I do not think I am violating that text. 
I think it is legitimate to see there the roots of the later, more fully articulated doc-
trine. 
Another point is worth making here. Although I said that in the later the-
ory, connotative terms are simply shorthand abbreviations of their nominal defini-
tions, we have already seen a case where this will not work without some adjust-
                                                 
25 See Ch. 6, p. 166, above. 
26 That is, endowed with sensation. We’re not talking here about delicate emotions or 
poetic souls. 
27 The sequence ends there, since substance is an Aristotelian category and therefore 
cannot be defined in terms of a difference plus a higher genus. That’s what a category is: a “most 
general genus.” 
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ments. ‘Blindness’ does not have a nominal definition. It cannot be regarded as 
simply an abbreviation of a more complex expression. ‘Blindness’, we said, is 
only a kind of “incomplete symbol”28; it can only be defined in context. That is, it 
is not the single term ‘blindness’ that can be regarded as an abbreviation for 
something else; rather it is the construction ‘x has blindness’ or ‘blindness is in x’ 
that can be regarded as an abbreviation for ‘x does not have sight’. 
This is important, because Ockham will later say that certain terms — for 
example, quantitative terms (Summa of Logic I.10, § 10) and indeed all terms in 
categories other than substance and quality — are connotative, even though some 
of them will be incomplete symbols and can be defined only in context. 
Such terms will be part of what gives rise to the theory of “exposition,” in 
which whole propositions, not just isolated terms, will be analyzed into more 
complex forms. The theory of exposition will not be discussed in detail in this 
book, mainly because no modern scholar has ever worked out the details of it so 
that there is not much I can say.29 But exposition is historically linked to the the-
ory of connotation, and here we see part of the reason. 
There is yet another thing to be learned from Anselm’s remark about 
‘white’ and ‘having whiteness’. Both expressions, he says (claim (c)30), signify — 
that is, per se signify — only whiteness. They do not signify per se the thing that 
has the whiteness. That is to say, the nominal definition of ‘white’ is simply ‘hav-
ing whiteness’; it is not ‘thing having whiteness’ or ‘substance having whiteness’ 
or anything like that. Anselm insists on this pretty strongly. 
Similarly, the nominal definition of ‘literate’ (grammaticus) is ‘having lit-
eracy (grammatica)’, not ‘man having literacy’. Otherwise, if the nominal defini-
tion did include the word ‘man’, then when we say ‘He is a literate man’ — as we 
certainly can say with grammatical propriety — then, since connotative terms are 
just abbreviations of their definitions,31 we would in effect be saying ‘He is a man 
having literacy man’, or something like that. (See Text (18).) And that is some-
thing we certainly cannot say with grammatical propriety. Hence the fact that 
connotative adjectives, at any rate, can grammatically modify nouns implies that 
those nouns cannot be already built into the nominal definitions of those adjec-
tives. (Whether the same point can be made in general, for words other than ad-
jectives, is perhaps open to question, but Anselm apparently thinks it can.) 
Now this raises an obvious question. If ‘white’ does not contain in its 
nominal definition a term for the bearer of whiteness, then how can the term 
‘white’ be said to signify that bearer per aliud? In short, how in the case of con-
notative terms does appellation get to be a kind of signification at all? 
Again, we are now in a position to see what signification per se is: An ab-
solute term signifies per se just what it appellates. A connotative term signifies 
                                                 
28 See p. 197 above. 
29 Nevertheless, for what I can say about it, see Spade, “Five Logical Tracts by Richard 
Lavenham,” pp. 83–93, and Spade, “Ockham, Adams and Connotation,” pp. 608–611. 
30 See p. 201 above. 
31 I do not see how Anselm’s argument in Text (18) will work without this assumption. 
The argument I am giving here is the “further evidence” I promised you on p. 201 above. 
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per se just what the absolute terms in its nominal definition appellate. But what is 
signification per aliud — and how is it a kind of signification? 
On this point, Anselm gives a very curious illustration (Text (19)). Sup-
pose you saw a white horse and a black ox, and someone told you “Strike it!,” and 
you asked “Which one?” If he then said “The white” (I want to leave out the noun 
in virtue of the above argument), you know which one he meant; you would think 
of the white horse. 
Now in a sense it is by means of the word ‘white’ that you are made to 
think of the horse; it’s the only word in the sentence, after all.32 But the word 
‘white’ cannot do this all by itself. If you couldn’t see the horse, say, you 
wouldn’t know what the fellow meant. It is only in virtue of something else — in 
virtue of your seeing the white horse, and the other circumstances of the story — 
that the word ‘white’ can make you think of the horse and know it is what is 
meant. 
Hence the term ‘white’ does not per se — by itself — signify the bearer of 
whiteness, but only with the help of something else — per aliud, only with the 
help of the circumstances. 
Signification per aliud is therefore a thoroughly context-dependent notion. 
It depends on appellation or naming in the occurrent sense, what a term is actually 
used to appellate or name on a given occasion. If we want to say that a conno-
tative term per aliud signifies all its bearers, all the things the term can be used to 
appellate or name truly, we can only say that in a very weak, dispositional sense. 
The term does not actually make us think of those things in any sense, except on 
the particular occasions when it is actually used to name those things. 
In Anselm’s theory, therefore, signification per se is the dominant notion. 
Signification per aliud is a definitely subordinate, and indeed rather strained and 
contrived, kind of signification. This emphasis will be shifted by the time we 
come to Ockham and Buridan. The shift represents more a shift in the theory of 
signification than a change in the theory of connotation terms itself. 
B.  Connotation-Theory in Ockham 
Let’s turn now to the fourteenth century. And let’s begin by looking at 
how Ockham draws the distinction between absolute and connotative names. Here 
is what he says in Summa of Logic I.10, § 1: 
Merely absolute names are those that do not signify something 
principally and [something] else, or even the same [thing], secon-
darily. Rather, whatever is signified by the name is signified 
equally primarily [by it]. For example, it is clear with the name 
‘animal’ that it does not signify [anything] but cattle, asses and 
men, and so on for other animals. 
                                                 
32 In English, I added the definite article ‘the’. But there is nothing corresponding to it in 
the Latin. And in any case, it’s not the definite article that is making me think of the horse. 
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Then he goes on, in § 5: “But a connotative name is one that signifies 
something primarily (or principally) and something secondarily.” 
At the first level then we have the following preliminary way of drawing 
the distinction: 
(1) Absolute names are such that whatever they signify they 
signify “primarily.” 
(2) Connotative names are such that they signify some things 
primarily and some things “secondarily.” 
We shall see later on that there is reason to refine this, that Ockham 
doesn’t really mean that all connotative names must signify some things primarily 
and some things secondarily; some connotative terms will turn out to signify 
nothing at all primarily. But they will signify some things secondarily. And that, I 
think, is going to be the distinguishing feature of connotative names. 
What does it mean to signify something “primarily” or “secondarily”? 
Well, first some things the locutions do not mean. They do not mean “immedi-
ately” vs. “mediately,” as they perhaps do in Summa of Logic I.1, §7: 
Now I say that utterances are signs subordinated to concepts or in-
tentions of the soul, not because … these utterances always signify 
those concepts of the soul primarily and properly, but rather be-
cause utterances are imposed to signify the same things that are 
signified by the concepts of the mind, so that the concept primarily 
signifies something naturally, and the utterance secondarily signi-
fies the same thing … 
Neither does ‘primarily’ refer to the first sense of ‘signify’ distinguished in 
Summa of Logic I.33 (§ 1), while ‘secondarily’ refers to the second sense distin-
guished there (§ 2).33 Rather, let’s look at his example: 
‘Animal’, he tells us (I.10, § 1), is an absolute name, and this means that 
whatever it signifies it signifies only “primarily.” And he also tells us that ‘ani-
mal’ signifies nothing but “cattle, asses and men, and so on for other animals.” In 
other words, the primary significates of a term appear to be exactly the things the 
term can be truly predicated of. (This is what Anselm had called “appellation.”) 
Now we know (from Summa of Logic I.33, §§ 1–2) that there is a narrow 
and a broad sense of that, according to whether we are talking about predication 
of the form ‘This is an animal’ (present tense) or are also allowing predications of 
the form ‘This was …’ or ‘… will be …’ or ‘… can be an animal’. In short, pri-
mary signification seems to be signification in either of the first two modes listed 
in Summa of Logic I.33. Secondary signification, then, will include cases of signi-
fication in one of the two remaining modes distinguished there. 
Now we already know enough about Ockham’s supposition-theory, from 
our discussion of his dispute with Burley over the signification of terms,34 to 
                                                 
33 On these senses, see the discussion in Ch. 5, pp. 150–151, above. 
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know that for Ockham it is in general in personal supposition that a term suppos-
its for what it signifies. And it’s going to turn out that this means “for what it pri-
marily signifies.”35 So the primary significates of a term are, to express it in sev-
eral equivalent formulations: 
(1) its significates in one of the other of the first two modes de-
scribed in Summa of Logic I.33; or 
(2) its personal supposita; or 
(3) its appellata (to use Anselm’s term36). 
Thus it will be easy to tell what the primary significates of a term are. But 
how do we tell what else, if anything, a term signifies? That, of course, will be the 
secondary significates of the term.37 That is, what else does a term signify besides 
what it can be predicated of? In short, how do we tell which terms are absolute 
and which are connotative — and, for the connotative terms, how do we tell what 
they “connote” or signify secondarily? 
The practical problem here will become obvious if we look at some of the 
examples Ockham gives. In Summa of Logic I.10, § 4, he tells us that ‘man’, 
‘animal’, ‘goat’, ‘stone’, ‘tree’, ‘fire’, ‘earth’, ‘water’, ‘heaven’, ‘whiteness’, 
‘blackness’, ‘heat’, ‘sweetness’, ‘smell’, and ‘taste’ are all absolute terms, 
whereas in § 12 he says that ‘true’, ‘good’, ‘one’, ‘power’, ‘act’, ‘intellect’, ‘intel-
ligible’, ‘will’, and ‘volible’38 are connotative. What is the difference between 
them? The two lists do not, at least for me, suggest any obvious rule that would 
allow me to classify other terms and be confident I was doing it correctly. In 
short, you can’t tell the difference between absolute and connotative terms by 
“feel”; it’s not obvious on the face of it. 
1.  Ockham’s Theory of Definition 
Let’s push a little deeper. In Summa of Logic I.10, §§ 2 and 5, Ockham 
tells us that absolute names have no nominal definitions, whereas connotative 
names do. (This claim is perhaps implicit in Anselm’s theory, as described above, 
although of course the terminology is not his.) This distinction will be the distin-
guishing feature between absolute and connotative names for Ockham, and we 
have to figure out what it means. It will be a long story. 
                                                                                                                                     
34 See Ch. 5, pp. 140–143, above. 
35 There will be complications about tense and modality that reflect the differences be-
tween the first and second modes of signification in Summa of Logic I.33, but let’s not worry 
about them for now. 
36 Ockham does not use ‘appellatio’ in this sense. 
37 But remember that Ockham says that it is possible for a term to signify secondarily the 
same things it signifies primarily. See Summa of Logic I.10, § 1, as quoted on p. 204 above. We 
will work out the implications of this in due course. 
38 That is, something that can be willed, that can be the object of a volition. 
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For help, let us turn to Ockham’s chapter on “definition,” Summa of Logic 
I.26. There we learn that there are two types of definition39: 
(1) definitions “expressing the quid rei,” nowadays more com-
monly called “real definitions”; and 
(2) definitions “expressing the quid nominis,” more commonly 
called “nominal definitions.” 
(The expressions ‘quid rei’ and ‘quid nominis’ mean literally the “what of the 
thing” and the “what of the name,” respectively. We will see more about them in 
a little while.) 
We already know that all and only connotative terms have nominal defini-
tion (from Summa of Logic I.10, §§ 2 and 5). Therefore, the only terms that have 
real definitions will be absolute terms. But not all absolute terms will have real 
definitions. For instance, proper names in the category of substance (‘Socrates’, 
‘Plato’) will be absolute terms, and yet they do not have real definitions, since 
you can’t define the individual.40 And, for various other reasons, there are no real 
definitions of the category terms ‘substance’ and ‘quality’ (and of course not the 
names of the other categories, since those terms will be connotative for Ock-
ham41), of the absolute “transcendental” term ‘being’,42 and perhaps of some other 
absolute names as well. 
As a result, not every name will have a definition, real or nominal. Some 
names have no definitions at all. Let me explain more fully. 
In English common discourse, we frequently use the term ‘definition’ very 
broadly, so that we say we are “defining” a term when we find some other term or 
expression that is, in some appropriate sense, “equivalent” (the mediaevals would 
say “convertible”) with it. Ockham’s notion of definition is much narrower than 
that. Perhaps it is possible to “define” all terms in that very broad sense, but not in 
Ockham’s very precise sense. 
a.  Real Definitions 
Let us look more closely at the two kinds of definition. In Summa of Logic 
I.26, § 4, Ockham says that definitions expressing the quid rei, “real definitions,” 
are themselves of two kinds, real definitions in the broad sense and real defini-
tions in the strict sense. 
                                                 
39 See also Quodlibet V, q. 19 (Wey ed., pp. 553.1–557.91); Freddoso and Kelley trans., 
pp. 463–465. Additional material on the theory of definition may be found in Summa logicae III–
2.31–33; III–3.23–26 (The third part of the Summa logicae is divided into four subparts. The last 
two passages occur in the second and third of them.) 
40 The indefinability of individuals was a standard claim in the Aristotelian tradition; real 
definition stops at the level of species. 
41 See p. 197 above. 
42 A “transcendental” term is a term that “transcends” the categories and is truly predica-
ble of things in any category. 
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In the strict sense, a real definition is somehow supposed to reveal or ex-
press the inner metaphysical structure of what is being defined, the essential parts 
of it. For example, if you are giving a strict real definition of the term ‘man’, you 
are going to have to bring out somehow the notion of body and soul, matter and 
form — the essential parts of man. The traditional definition ‘rational animal’ is 
such a strict real definition. 
In the broad sense, real definitions include, of course, real definitions in 
the strict sense, but also other expressions: they will include what are properly 
called “descriptive definitions,” which Ockham discusses in Summa of Logic I.28, 
and which uniquely pick out things the term signifies by expressing or revealing 
not only their essential parts, but also certain accidents. I will say more about de-
scriptive definitions in a moment. 
Real definition in the strict sense are further subdivided. Some are “physi-
cal” definitions (that is, the kind of definition used in physics or philosophy of 
nature), and others are “metaphysical” definitions (Summa of Logic I.26, §§ 5–6). 
The difference between them, syntactically speaking, is straightforward. 
Metaphysical definitions consist of a noun and one or more adjectives, all in the 
nominative case, whereas physical definitions consist of terms some of which are 
in oblique cases — that is, cases other than the nominative. Thus the metaphysical 
definition of ‘man’ is ‘rational animal’. The noun ‘animal’ expresses that part of 
the animal consisting of matter together with its corporeality, life, and sense-
powers. The adjective ‘rational’ brings out the further substantial form reason or 
rationality. 
Now if you are alert, you will recognize at once that although ‘animal’ is 
one of the terms Ockham explicitly tells us is absolute (Summa of Logic I.10, § 
10), ‘rational’ is going to be connotative. I just said it “brings out” reason or ra-
tionality, but of course it is not predicated of reason or rationality. It is not reason 
that is rational; it is the man who is rational. So ‘rational’ seems to “bring out” — 
to call to mind, to signify — something it does not signify primarily. That is, it is 
connotative. 
I think this is going to be the difference in the end between metaphysical 
and physical real definitions in the strict sense. Real definitions in the strict and 
metaphysical sense may have connotative terms in them (although of course they 
are never definitions of connotative terms), while “physical” definitions do not. I 
say I “think” this is the direction Ockham is going, although the example he gives 
of a physical definition doesn’t quite fit this. He gives the physical definition of 
‘man’ as (Summa of Logic I.26, § 5): ‘substance composed of a body and an intel-
lective soul’. 
In the Latin, there are two genitives here, two nouns in an oblique case: 
‘body’ and ‘soul’. Hence not everything is in the nominative. Strictly speaking, it 
is this that distinguishes it from a metaphysical definition. Of course, if Ockham 
is really trying to have no connotative terms here at all, he hasn’t quite succeeded 
since ‘intellective’ seems to be connotative. (It connotes intellects, but is predi-
cated of and so primarily signifies things that have intellects.) What he would 
have to say instead is something like ‘substance composed of a body, life, sense-
power and reason’, thus eliminating all connotative adjectives. 
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In addition to definitions, Ockham also considers “descriptions” in Summa 
of Logic I.27. Just as definitions — or at least real definitions — uniquely pick out 
the defined in terms of essential parts, a description uniquely picks out the defined 
in terms of accidents alone. Thus when we say that man is a “featherless biped,” 
we are giving a description, not a definition. Those features are accidents.43 
In addition to definitions and descriptions, there are also mixed cases, 
cases in which things are uniquely picked out in terms of both essential parts and 
accidents. These are the so called “descriptive definitions” discussed in Summa of 
Logic I.28, and are included under the heading of “real definition” in the broad or 
loose sense. Ockham’s example is ‘Man is a rational animal, walks upright [and] 
has broad nails’. 
b.  Nominal Definitions 
Now let’s look at the other main kind of definitions, nominal definitions 
or, literally, “definitions expressing the quid nominis.”44 To get an idea what is 
going on here, go back and consider Augustine’s discussion in On the Customs of 
the Catholic Church.45 
If we define man as “body and soul hitched together,” we are giving a 
kind of real definition, a definition that reveals the metaphysical structure of the 
thing itself. But if we define man as either “ a body animated by a soul” or “a soul 
governing and ruling a body,” we are not giving a real definition. We are not by 
those expressions revealing the internal metaphysical structure of the body that is 
the man, or of the soul that is the man. All we are doing instead is saying under 
what conditions the term ‘man’ applies to that body or that soul — and that is a 
far broader notion. We can do that, as we are here, without saying anything about 
the inner structure of the thing the term ‘man’ is applied to. It is in this sense, 
then, that nominal definitions are “nominal.” They are about words in a way that 
real definitions are not. 
In Summa of Logic I.26, where Ockham is discussing definitions, he does 
not give us a very full account of how we tell whether what we have is a nominal 
definition or not. He has much more to say about it in Ch. 10. There it seems what 
is going on is something like this: 
i.  Expressions Expressing the Quid Nominis 
We start with the notion of an expression expressing the quid nominis of a 
name. This is not yet the notion of a definition expressing the quid nominis (= a 
“nominal definition”); that will be a narrower notion. Here we have the much 
broader notion of any expression that tells us when we can apply a given name. 
                                                 
43 Ockham’s own example (Summa of Logic I.27, § 4) is ‘biped having two hands’. 
44 See p. 207 above. 
45 See pp. 191–195 above. 
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The principle Ockham uses in Ch. 10 is this: If a term has only one such 
expression expressing its quid nominis (or only “equivalent” ones in some sense 
yet to be pinned down), then it is a connotative term, and that expression is (or 
those equivalent expressions are) a “definition” expressing the quid nominis of 
the term — that is, its nominal definition. This is both a necessary and a sufficient 
condition. 
On the other hand, if a term has several non-equivalent such expressions 
expressing the quid nominis, then the term is absolute. It does not have a nominal 
definition, although it may have a real definition. 
Ockham gives an example in Summa of Logic I.10, § 3: the absolute term 
‘angel’.46 He tells us there that ‘angel’ is an absolute term, provided we mean the 
“substance” and not the “job” of the angel. (Etymologically, ‘angel’ comes from a 
Greek word meaning “messenger,” so that the term might be taken as a kind of 
job-description. That’s what Ockham means to be ruling out here; in the example, 
he means to be using ‘angel’ to talk about a particular kind of immaterial sub-
stance, not a particular function it performs.) 
There are, Ockham says, several expressions expressing equally well the 
quid nominis of the term ‘angel’. For example: ‘substance abstracted from mat-
ter’, ‘intellectual and incorruptible substance’, ‘simple substance that does not 
enter into composition with anything else’. Each one of these expressions in some 
sense explicates what the term ‘angel’ signifies. It tells you under what conditions 
you can apply the term ‘angel’ to something, and in that sense expresses its quid 
nominis, the “what of the name.” 
This does not mean that all these expressions signify just exactly what the 
term ‘angel’ signifies, since they don’t. They signify more. In virtue of the Addi-
tive Principle47, which says that a complex expression signifies the sum total of 
what its categorematic constituents signify, these expressions signify all sub-
stances, for instance, and other things besides, not just angels. 
These expressions, Ockham tells us, fail to be equivalent (that’s my word, 
not Ockham’s) in the sense required if the term ‘angel’ is to have a nominal defi-
nition. And since they so fail, ‘angel’ has several non-equivalent expressions ex-
pressing its quid nominis, and so is an absolute term. 
Now what exactly is the “equivalence” that is involved here? Well, look at 
what Ockham says in Summa of Logic I.10, § 2: 
For, properly speaking, for a name that has a definition expressing 
what the name means [= the quid nominis, here and throughout the 
passage], there is only one definition explicating what the name 
means — that is, in such a way that for such a name there are not 
several expressions expressing what the name means [and] having 
distinct parts, one of which signifies something that is not con-
                                                 
46 As it turns out, this is an unfortunate example, since the term ‘angel’ will probably 
turn out to be connotative, for reasons we shall see on p. 232 below. But never mind, it is the ex-
ample he gives. 
47 See Ch. 6, p. 166, above. 
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veyed in the same way by some part of the other expression. In-
stead, such names, insofar as what they mean is concerned, can be 
explicated after a fashion by several expressions that do not signify 
the same things by their parts. And so none of those [expressions] 
is properly a definition expressing what the name means. 
It appears from this passage, then, that the expressions expressing the quid 
nominis of a term are “equivalent” in the sense required for a nominal definition 
iff they all signify the same things in the same way. 
It’s not yet clear what this “conveyed in the same way” business is. But, 
although I will have some suggestions below about how to interpret it, for the pre-
sent we don’t need to know; we can unpack it another way: 
If you look at Summa of Logic I.6, § 1, Ockham tells us that in the sense of 
‘synonym’ he normally uses, two terms are synonyms iff they: 
… simply signify the same thing in all ways, so that nothing is sig-
nified in any way by the one [synonym] unless it is signified in the 
same way by the other. 
It is tempting, and I think probably correct, to view the “ways” of signify-
ing here in Ch. 6 with the “ways” of “conveying” in Ch. 10. If that is so, then 
whatever the “ways of signifying” are here,48 it looks as if the expressions ex-
pressing the quid nominis of a term are “equivalent” in the sense required for a 
nominal definition iff they are synonymous. And we already have an account of 
synonymy in terms of subordination to the same concept.49 
Here then is what we have: If all expressions expressing the quid nominis 
of a term are synonymous, then the term is connotative and those expressions for-
mulate the nominal definition of the term. If they are not all synonymous, the 
term is absolute, and may or may not have a real definition, depending on the par-
ticular case. And since we have an independent account of synonymy, it looks as 
if everything is in order. 
Thus suggests a big question, however. Since it appeared that there is no 
synonymy in mental language,50 does mental language itself have connotative 
terms in it? We will return to this question shortly, but first let us finish the busi-
ness at hand. 
In the case of the spoken term ‘angel’, we have the expressions ‘substance 
abstracted from matter’, ‘intellectual and incorruptible substance’ and ‘simple 
substance that does not enter into composition with anything else’, all of which 
express the quid nominis of the term. Those expressions are obviously not syn-
onymous; they are not subordinated to the same concept in the mind. 
                                                 
48 They are not the four “ways” or “modes” of signifying in Summa of Logic I.33 (see 
Ch. 5, pp. 150–151, above), since, without further refinement, those would not give us synonymy. 
49 See Ch. 4, pp. 95–103, above, and recall that there are some difficulties with this no-
tion of synonymy. We will discuss them soon. 
50 Ibid. 
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On the other hand, take the paradigmatic connotative term ‘white’. It will 
have, Ockham says (Summa of Logic I.10, § 5), the following expressions ex-
pressing its quid nominis: ‘something informed by a whiteness’, ‘something hav-
ing a whiteness,” etc.51 These expressions, he goes on, do signify the same things 
“in the same way.” Hence they are synonymous, and are subordinated to the same 
concept. As a result, the expressions are nominal definitions of the term ‘white’, 
which is therefore a connotative term. 
(A)  Identifying Which Expressions Express the 
Quid Nominis 
All of this seems to work out nicely, provided we have a way to tell which 
expressions do in fact express the quid nominis of a given name. How do we do 
that? Well, I’m afraid Ockham doesn’t give us a very good account here. But we 
can get at least some idea of what is involved. 
The basic idea, recall, is that an expression expressing the quid nominis of 
a name is supposed to give us the conditions under which we can apply that name 
to a given thing. This suggests that if we have a simple term t and a complex ex-
pression t*, and we want to test whether t* expresses the quid nominis of t, one 
necessary condition is that the following hold: 
For all x, x is a t iff x is a t*. 
Of course this condition is probably going to be too weak, since it is satis-
fied whenever the simple term t and the complex expression t* just happen to be 
coextensive, as occurs for example with ‘the number of planets’ and ‘ 81’. As a 
result, we may want to try the stronger condition, that the above be not only true 
but necessarily true: 
Necessarily, for all x, x is a t iff x is a t*. 
I think that is certainly a necessary condition too, but still not a sufficient 
condition. For consider so called figmenta, “figment”-terms. These are terms for 
impossible objects. For example, ‘chimera’ and ‘vacuum’. It is important for my 
point that these be names for impossible objects, not just names that happen to be 
non-denoting.52 Ockham explicitly tells us (Summa logicae II.1453) that all fig-
ment-terms are connotative. Hence, they will all have nominal definitions. And 
                                                 
51 Note that, by inserting the pronoun ‘something’, Ockham appears to have left himself 
wide open to Anselm’s objection here. Recall that for Anselm there can be no term for the bearer 
of whiteness here. See p. 203 above. 
52 Given mediaeval physics, it is relatively easy to see why vacua were thought to be im-
possible. It is harder to see why chimeras were thought be impossible too, and not just non-
existent. But they were. 
53 See William of Ockham, Ockham’s Theory of Propositions, Freddoso and Schuurman, 
trans., p. 122. 
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therefore, if what we have said so far is correct, all the expressions expressing the 
quid nominis of any given figment-term will be synonymous with one another. 
But figment-terms are not truly predicable of anything at all, and this fact 
is necessarily so, since we are talking about figment-terms and not just non-
denoting terms.54 Now if being necessarily coextensive were a sufficient condi-
tion for a complex expression to express the quid nominis of a simple term, then 
whatever complex expression expressed the quid nominis of one figment term 
would express the quid nominis of all figment terms alike. Hence the nominal 
definitions of all figment terms would by synonymous with one another. 
But that is not so. The nominal definition of ‘chimera’ is ‘animal com-
posed of a goat and an ox’,55 whereas the nominal definition of ‘vacuum’ is ‘place 
not filled with a body’, or something like that,56 and those expressions are not 
synonymous. The latter, for instance, signifies all bodies in virtue of the Additive 
Principle,57 whereas the former does not. 
So being necessarily coextensive is not enough. In my paper, “Ockham’s 
Distinctions between Absolute and Connotative Terms,”58 I suggest a kind of hy-
brid formula that seems to avoid these problems: 
A complex expression t* expresses the quid nominis of a term t iff 
either (a) t* is synonymous with t, or else (b) t* signifies nothing 
secondarily and the proposition ‘For all x, x if (a) t iff x is (a) t*’ is 
necessary.59 
This formula appeals, of course, to the notion of secondary signification, 
which we still have to discuss. But even before doing that, we can see how the 
formula will work. For whatever secondary signification is, we already know that 
all and only connotative terms have it.60 Furthermore, as we shall see in a few mo-
ments, there is reason to believe that, for Ockham, not only are all the expressions 
expressing the quid nominis of a connotative name synonymous with one another, 
they are also synonymous with the connotative name itself. 
                                                 
54 Figment-terms are the exceptions I promised above (p. 205) to the claim that all con-
notative terms signify some things primarily and some things secondarily. 
55 Summa of Logic I.26, § 18. But later on in the paragraph, Ockham substitutes ‘a man 
and a lion’ for ‘a goat and an ox’. My point remains unaffected. 
56 In Summa logicae II.14 (Freddoso and Schuurman, trans., p. 122), Ockham tells us that 
‘vacuum’ is connotative, but he does not provide any nominal definition for it. I have taken this 
one from John Buridan, Sophismata I, the discussion of conclusion 11 (Scott ed., p. 30; Scott 
trans., p. 76): “Hence, because of this, the expression ‘place not filled with a body’ should be the 
description giving the quid nominis of ‘vacuum’. It does not indicate which thing is a vacuum but 
which things and how the name ‘vacuum’ signifies.” (I conjecture that Scott’s ‘description’ 
should read ‘definition’, but a decision on that will have to wait on the new edition of the text.) 
57 See Ch. 6, p. 166, above. 
58 Spade, “Ockham’s Distinctions between Absolute and Connotative Terms,” p. 75. 
59 As often, I put the articles ‘a’ in parenthesis, since Latin doesn’t have them and since 
English uses them only when t and t* are nouns, not adjectives. 
60 See p. 205 above. 
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If this is so, then clause (a) of the above formula will apply to all connota-
tive names. That is, since connotative names have nominal definitions for Ock-
ham, and since nominal definitions work the way we have described, we know 
there will be complex expressions synonymous with a given connotative name, 
and they will all express the quid nominis of the name. Since connotative names 
always signify something secondarily, clause (b) will not apply to them, so that 
no additional expressions will end up expressing the quid nominis of a connota-
tive name in virtue of clause (b). Thus, all expressions expressing the quid 
nominis of a connotative name will be synonymous with one another, which is 
exactly what we want. 
On the other hand, since absolute terms don’t signify anything secondar-
ily, clause (b) is for them. An expression t* can express the quid nominis of a 
term t in virtue of clause (b) without being synonymous with t, which again is ex-
actly what we want. And since clause (b) does not apply to connotative names, 
figment-terms do not pose any special problem.61 
I think the above formula will give us the right results, even though we 
will not be in a position to know how to apply it in practice until we know more 
about secondary signification.62 But it must be admitted that it is pretty much of a 
hybrid, and has little to recommend it except that it will probably work. I em-
phatically do not, for example, suppose that something like this formula is what 
Ockham “really had in mind,” but just didn’t have the courtesy to tell us. My rea-
son for offering it is simply to make the point that the notion of an expression ex-
pressing the quid nominis of a name is not something we have to leave at the level 
of sheer mystery. As for what Ockham “really” meant by that notion, well he 
simply didn’t tell us, and that’s that. 
Given the above formula, we now have — pending an account of secon-
dary signification — a way of determining which expressions express the quid 
nominis of a given term. Since we already have an account of when such expres-
sions, and expressions in general, are synonymous (they are subordinated to the 
same mental expression), this will put us in a position to say which terms have 
nominal definitions and which do not and, on the basis of that in turn, to say at 
last which terms are connotative and which are absolute. This, then, seems to be 
roughly Ockham’s strategy for drawing the distinction. 
                                                 
61 See Spade, “Ockham’s Distinctions,” pp. 75–76, for a further discussion of how the 
above formula works, and in particular for a rather exotic discussion of whether clause (a) applies 
to certain absolute names as well as connotative ones. (It doesn’t matter for the purposes of the 
formula, but it is an interesting question.) 
62 In practice, we cannot avoid dealing with secondary signification, as we just did, by 
saying that whatever it is, only connotative names have it, so that the necessary equivalence in 
clause (b) only matters for absolute names. That strategy is fine for convincing ourselves that the 
formula will give the right results, but we can’t actually get those results yet because we don’t yet 
know which names are connotative. We won’t know that until we know which names have nomi-
nal definitions and which do not. And we do not know that latter until we know whether all the 
expressions expressing the quid nominis of the name are synonymous or not. But we cannot know 
that in turn until we know which expressions do express the quid nominis of the name, which is 
just what the formula itself is supposed to tell us. 
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c.  A List of Connotative Terms 
Well then, which terms are connotative? Ockham lists several different 
kinds, in several different places: 
1. All figment-terms.63 
2. Negative terms (e.g., ‘immaterial’), privative terms (e.g., 
‘evil’), and “infinite” terms (e.g., ‘non-man’).64 
3. All relative terms (e.g., ‘similar’, ‘father’).65 
4. “According to” some people (including Ockham himself),66 
quantitative terms, and in fact all terms in categories other 
than substance and quality. 
5. ‘True’, ‘good’, ‘one’ — as transcendental terms67 — 
‘power’, ‘act’, ‘intellect’, ‘intelligible’ ‘will’, ‘volible’, 
etc.68 
6. Concrete terms “of the first kind.”69 
2.  The Secondary Significates of Connotative 
Terms 
To complete this part of our story, we need to say something about the no-
tion of secondary signification. 
In “Ockham’s Distinctions between Absolute and Connotative Terms,”70 I 
argued that there are textual reasons to suppose not only that all the expressions 
expressing the quid nominis of a connotative name are synonymous with one an-
other, but also that the connotative name itself is synonymous with each one of 
them.71 The textual evidence is far from decisive, to be sure, and in fact Claude 
Panaccio has argued forcefully against my claim on the grounds that it leads to 
                                                 
63 Summa logicae II.14, Freddoso and Schuurman, trans., p. 122. 
64 Ibid. II.12, Freddoso and Schuurman, p. 119. 
65 Summa of Logic I.10, §§ 8–9. “Relative” terms in this sense are not names for rela-
tions, but rather names for one or another pole of a relation. 
66 Ibid., §§ 10–11. 
67 See n. 42 above. 
68 Summa of Logic I.10, § 12–13. 
69 Ibid., § 7. The reference to “kinds” of concrete terms is to Ockham’s extremely subtle 
discussion of the various kinds of differences between concrete and abstract names. See ibid., I.5–
9, and Quodlibet 5, q. 9. That discussion repays careful study, but I don’t want to digress for it 
here. 
70 Spade, “Ockham’s Distinctions,” pp. 66–67. 
71 In that case, a connotative name works like a kind of “shorthand abbreviation” of its 
nominal definition, just as for Anselm. 
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trouble when we consider the possibility of connotation in mental language.72 We 
will consider his arguments shortly, but for the present note that, in addition to the 
inconclusive texts, there is another, very powerful reason for supposing connota-
tive names are synonymous with their nominal definitions: If they are not, then 
what counts as being a correct nominal definition of a name? In the case of real 
definitions, of absolute terms, there is presumably another way the matter is set-
tled, since real definitions are supposed to have something to do with the inner 
metaphysical structures of things, and we either get that right or we don’t. But 
that kind of link with metaphysical objectivity is absent for nominal definitions. 
Something else needs to take its place. If it’s not synonymy, then what is it?73 
Panaccio has no suggestions here. Note that our earlier formula for finding which 
expressions express the quid nominis of a name74 will not help here. That is, we 
cannot just say all we have to do is use that formula to find out which expressions 
express the quid nominis of a given name, and then if all those expressions are 
synonymous with one another we have a connotative name and those expressions 
are nominal definitions of it, while if not then we have an absolute name. For that 
formula presupposes the synonymy of connotative names with their nominal defi-
nitions, and so cannot be used as a substitute for that synonymy. 
For the time being, then, we will take it that connotative names are syn-
onymous with their nominal definitions. We’ll discuss the objections later. 
Now we already know, in virtue of the Additive Principle, that a complex 
expression will signify just the sum total of what its categorematic constituent 
terms signify. In particular then, a nominal definition of a name will signify just 
the sum total of what its categorematic constituents signify. Since we are regard-
ing a connotative name as synonymous with its nominal definition, it follows then 
that the connotative name will likewise signify just the sum total of what the 
categorematic constituent terms in its nominal definition signify, because syno-
nyms “signify the same things in all ways.”75 The things it signifies that it is also 
truly predicable of it signifies primarily.76 But which things does it signify secon-
darily? 
It is tempting to say simply: all the rest. That is, to put it as a quasi-
mathematical formula: Secondary signification = signification – primary signif-
ication. 
But that will not work. For consider a transcendental name like ‘one’. 
Ockham explicitly says this is connotative (Summa of Logic I.10, § 12). But since 
it is transcendental, it is truly predicable of absolutely everything77 — whatever is 
is one. Hence there will be nothing left over for it to signify secondarily, if we 
                                                 
72 Panaccio, “Connotative Terms in Ockham’s Mental Language.” Martin Tweedale, in 
his “Ockham’s Supposed Elimination of Connotative Terms and His Ontological Parsimony,” also 
argues against the synonymy of connotative terms with their nominal definitions, but on quite 
different grounds. 
73 I owe this consideration to Professor Calvin Normore. 
74 See p. 213 above. 
75 Summa of Logic I.6, § 1. See p. 211 above. 
76 See p. 205 above. 
77 See n. 42 above. 
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accept the suggested formula. It will signify everything primarily and nothing 
secondarily. But this means it will be an absolute name,78 not a connotative one, 
in explicit violation of what Ockham says. 
So this simple and tempting suggestion will not work. Nevertheless, it is 
the view Loux ascribes to Ockham in his “The Ontology of William of Ock-
ham.”79 This is what I meant when I said at the beginning of this chapter that the 
theory of connotation Loux presents is not Ockham’s. It fails to be Ockham’s the-
ory for rather technical reasons involving transcendentals, to be sure, but the rea-
sons are Ockham’s own, not ones I just made up myself. 
a.  Buridan’s Account 
Nevertheless, if the theory Loux attributes to Ockham is not quite his, it 
does seem to be what Buridan had in mind. Consider his statement (Text (72)): 
For first it must be known that a term [that is] naturally apt to sup-
posit for something is said to appellate everything it signifies or 
consignifies besides what it supposits for, unless it is restricted … 
I have italicized the technical terms here: ‘supposit for’, ‘appellate’, ‘sig-
nifies’, ‘consignifies’ and ‘restricted’. We already know about signification in 
general; Buridan has nothing especially novel to add here. As for ‘appellate’, it is 
a curious terminological fact that Buridan (and some of his followers) regularly 
use ‘appellation’ for what other authors mean by ‘connotation’. I do not know the 
explanation for this oddity, but I’m sure there is one.80 For practical purposes, just 
read the word as “connotation.” 
We have already talked a little about “supposition,” in Ch. 5.81 Let us look 
at it a little more closely.82 In Ch. 3 of his Sophismata, Buridan says83: 
 
Now supposition, as it is taken here, is the taking of a term in a 
proposition for something or for some things that, when it is indi-
cated or they are indicated by the pronouns ‘this’ or ‘these’, or 
                                                 
78 See p. 205 above. 
79 Loux, “The Ontology of William of Ockham,” p. 7. 
80 We have already met the notion of appellation in Priscian and Anselm, but there is 
meant something quite different — what Ockham would call “primary signification.” Ockham too 
uses the term ‘appellation’, but again in a quite different sense. See Summa of Logic I.63, § 2, and 
I.72, § 13). For a thorough discussion of the word, see Maierù, Terminologia logica della tarda 
scolastica, Ch. 1. Note that Scott’s translation of Buridan’s Sophismata renders forms of ‘appel-
late’ by forms of ‘connote’. I think that is doctrinally correct, although it obscures the termino-
logical point. 
81 See Ch. 5, pp. 140–145, above. 
82 We will look at it much more closely in Chs. 8–10 below. 
83 John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 3, Scott ed., p. 50; Scott trans., pp. 99–100. 
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[words] equipollent to them, the term is truly affirmed of the pro-
noun by means of the copula of the proposition. 
The passage is perhaps needlessly complicated by Buridan’s scrupulous 
concern to allow both for cases where a term supposits for only one thing and for 
cases where it supposits for more than one. But when you boil it down, all he is 
saying is that a term in a proposition supposits for what it can be truly predicated 
of.84 Ockham gives a similar explanation in Summa of Logic I.63, § 3: 
Supposition is so called as, so to speak, a “positing for another,” in 
such a way that when a term in a proposition stands for something, 
so that we use the term for something of which (or of a pronoun 
pointing to it) that term (or the nominative of that term, if it is in an 
oblique case) is verified, it supposits for that [thing]. At least this is 
true when the suppositing term is taken significatively. 
The last sentence, about being “taken significatively” just means in effect 
that this is true with respect to so called “personal” supposition, which is the only 
kind that concerns us for now. A term thus supposits for what it is truly predicable 
of. In short, the kind of supposition involved here is what we have already called 
“primary signification.”85 
As for “consignification” in Text (72), the locus classicus for this notion is 
Aristotle, De interpretatione 3, 16b6: “A verb is what consignifies time.” The 
Greek here is ‘προσσημαῖνον’, and the Latin translation reads ‘consignificat’. 
The idea is that a verb had built into it an implicit reference to time, either the pre-
sent, past or future time, depending on the form of the verb. But “consignifica-
tion” came to be taken in a broader sense than that. Basically, it means anything 
that is signified in addition to (con + signify = signify together with) what the 
term is truly predicable of. In Buridan, I think consignification is the same thing 
as connotation, and that the relation is a sub-relation of signification in general. 
Putting all this together, it appears that when Buridan says (Text (72)): 
a term [that is] naturally apt to supposit for something is said to ap-
pellate everything it signifies or consignifies besides what it sup-
posits for, unless it is restricted … 
he is in effect saying that CONNOTATION = SIGNIFICATION – SUPPOSITION, which 
— given the link we have just seen between supposition and what Ockham calls 
“primary signification” — is just the theory Loux wrongly attributes to Ockham. 
Buridan adds the proviso ‘unless it is restricted’ at the end of the passage. 
This refers to the kind of thing that is going on in, for example, the phrase ‘tall 
man’ in the proposition ‘John is a tall man’. The term ‘man’ doesn’t connote any-
                                                 
84 The business at the end about ‘the copula of the proposition’ is meant to accommodate 
tense and modality. But we needn’t delay over those factors here; we will talk about them in Ch. 
10 below. 
85 See p. 205 above. 
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thing; it is an absolute name, and so can supposit for — be truly predicated of — 
everything it signifies. Nevertheless, in the phrase ‘tall man’ we can think of the 
supposition of the term ‘man’ as “restricted” by the term ‘tall’ so that ‘man’ now 
supposits in the proposition only for some men — the ones who are tall. 
From this point of view, adjectives (and certain relative clauses) affect the 
supposition of the nouns they modify. But there is another way of looking at the 
situation too, one that is more common and that Buridan himself seems to use 
more frequently. According to this other point of view, it is the whole composite 
term ‘tall man’ that has supposition in the proposition for exactly the tall men. 
The term ‘man’ also supposits there (for all men), and so does the term ‘tall’ (for 
tall men, tall trees, tall mountains, tall buildings and in general for all tall things 
of any kind). Each of those component terms contributes to the supposition of the 
complex term ‘tall man’. In this particular case, the supposition of ‘tall man’ is 
simply the “intersection” of the supposition of ‘tall’ and the supposition of ‘men’, 
but in other cases the contributions of the components will not be so easy to de-
scribe. 
In effect, restriction is something we don’t have to worry about, and we 
can safely ignore the last clause in Buridan’s statement. 
Buridan nowhere, so far as I have found, gives an account of how to tell 
what all a term signifies. Of course it will signify whatever it can be truly predi-
cated of. But if it is connotative, it will signify other things too, and Buridan gives 
us no way to tell what things they are. This is what Ockham does with his view, 
as I interpret him, that connotative terms are synonymous with their nominal defi-
nitions, and so signify exactly what the latter do — namely, the sum total of what 
their categorematic constituents signify. 
b.  Ockham’s Account 
But if Ockham does not think of secondary signification in the way Loux 
says he does, then how does he think of it? Well, just as Ockham has really very 
little to say explicitly about how to pick out the expressions that express the quid 
nominis of a name, so too he has very little to say about what secondary significa-
tion is. Nevertheless, what little he does say is suggestive. For example, Summa of 
Logic I.10, §§ 1 and 5: 
[The absolute term ‘animal’] does not signify one [animal] primar-
ily and another one secondarily in such a way that something has 
to be signified in the nominative and [something] else in an 
oblique [case]. Neither in the definition expressing what the name 
means [= the quid nominis] do there have to occur such distinct 
[terms] in different cases, or an adjectival verb.86 … But a connota-
tive name is one that signifies something primarily and something 
secondarily. Such a name does properly have a definition express-
                                                 
86 An adjectival verb is any verb besides the forms of ‘to be’; the latter was called a 
“substantival verb.” 
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ing what the name means. And often you have to put one [term] of 
that definition in the nominative and another [term] in an oblique 
case. 
I am not sure what to do with the clause about an “adjectival verb.” But 
note the talk at the beginning of the passage, about something’s being signified in 
various grammatical cases. The only way I can make sense of this is to suppose 
that a term signifying x and occurring in an expression in grammatical case c can 
be said to signify x in that expression “in case c.” So too, any term synonymous 
with that expression can be said to signify x in case c, since synonyms “signify 
the same things in all ways.”87 
Given this, and disregarding for the moment the business about adjectival 
verbs, the passage just quoted at least suggests the following criterion: A name 
secondarily signifies x iff it signifies x in some oblique case. 
Thus, if t is a connotative term and t* is a “fully expanded” nominal defi-
nition of it,88 then t will secondarily signify exactly what is primarily signified by 
the categorematic terms that occur in t* in an oblique case. 
Ockham himself gives an example, immediately following the second part 
of the passage just quoted, of how these “oblique cases” occur in nominal defini-
tions: 
This happens for the name ‘white’. For ‘white’ has a definition ex-
pressing what the name means [= the quid nominis], in which one 
word is put in the nominative and another one in an oblique case. 
Thus, if you ask what the name ‘white’ signifies, you will say that 
[it signifies] the same as [does] the whole expression ‘something 
informed by a whiteness’ or ‘something having a whiteness’. It is 
clear that one part of this expression is put in the nominative and 
another [part] in an oblique case. 
In the Latin, ‘whiteness’ (albedo) is in the ablative case in the first definition, and 
in the accusative in the second, and those are both “oblique” cases (that is, cases 
other than the nominative). 
The criterion I suggested for secondary signification would seem also to 
be at work, with another added clause about verbs, in the following passage89: 
Connotative [names] are defined by their subjects taken in the 
nominative and by the names of their connotata taken in an 
oblique case, or by verbs. For example, quantity is defined as fol-
                                                 
87 Summa of Logic I.6, § 1. See p. 211 above. 
88 By a “fully expanded” nominal definition, I mean one that contains no simple connota-
tive terms; any such connotative terms have been replaced by their nominal definitions, and so on, 
until the only simple terms occurring in the definition are absolute terms. Unless we are going to 
allow definitional “circles” or infinite regresses of definitions, this will always be possible in prin-
ciple. 
89 Summa logicae, III-3.26.40–45. 
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lows: ‘Quantity is a thing having parts’. Continuous permanent 
quantity can be defined as follows: ‘Permanent continuous quan-
tity is one thing, having a part outside a part’.90 But the white is de-
fined as follows: ‘The white is a body having a whiteness’. And so 
on. 
But the situation is complicated both theoretically and textually. Consider 
figment-terms once again. They are truly predicable of nothing at all, so that they 
do not primarily signify anything. Therefore, whatever they signify they signify 
secondarily. If the above criterion were correct, this would mean that no absolute 
term occurring in the nominal definition of a figment-term could occur there only 
in the nominative case. But that is not so. Ockham tells us that the nominal defini-
tion of ‘chimera’ is ‘animal composed of a goat and an ox’,91 and ‘animal’ occurs 
there in the nominative case only. 
But worse, Ockham himself goes on immediately after the passage just 
quoted, to say92: 
Privations and negations are defined through the positive [names 
that are] their opposites. For example, blindness is defined through 
sight. [And] non-man is defined through man, as ‘a thing that is 
not a man’. 
Here privative and negative terms are being contrasted with connotative 
terms. Yet earlier they were included under connotative terms.93 And in fact, if 
the theory we have been developing so far is anything close to correct, then ‘non-
man’ certainly is connotative if ‘a thing that is not a man’ defines it. For that defi-
nition signifies all men, and indeed all things, in virtue of the Additive Principle, 
but ‘non-man’ is plainly not predicable of men, much less of all things! Hence not 
everything it signifies does it signify primarily. 
But if ‘non-man’ is a connotative term defined by ‘a thing that is not a 
man’,94 then our suggested criterion for secondary signification fails miserably. 
For here is a connotative term, which must therefore signify some things secon-
darily, and yet all the terms in its nominal definition are in the nominative case.95 
I’m afraid Ockham leaves us in the lurch here, and doesn’t really say 
much more to help us pin down what secondary signification is. Nevertheless, as 
with the problem of determining which expressions express the quid nominis of a 
name, so too here: I have a kind of hodgepodge formula that seems to give the 
                                                 
90 Do not worry about the strangeness of these definitions. On Ockham’s theory of quan-
tity, see Adams, William Ockham, Ch. 6. 
91 Summa of Logic I.26, § 18. See p. 213 above. 
92 Summa logicae, III-3.26.46–48. 
93 Summa logicae, II.12, Freddoso and Schuurman, p. 119. See p. 215 above. 
94 Note that this definition is “fully expanded”; it contains no connotative terms. 
95 Moreover, the only verb in the definition is the verb ‘is’, which is not an “adjectival” 
verb. 
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right results, even though I do not for a moment suppose this is what Ockham was 
thinking of. 
The formula is a simple combination of Buridan’s theory with the criterion 
I suggested (and rejected) for Ockham. Here it is: 
A name t secondarily signifies x iff either (a) t signifies x in some 
oblique case, or else (b) t signifies x but not primarily. 
Clause (a) accommodates transcendental terms, which were a problem for 
applying Buridan’s theory to Ockham. And clause (b) accommodates figment-
terms as well as terms like ‘non-man’, which were a problem for the earlier crite-
rion I suggested for Ockham’s theory.96 
This disjunctive formula is messy and obviously ad hoc, but there is noth-
ing to be done about that. It says nothing about verbs, which were apparently on 
Ockham’s mind in this connection, since we have seen him mention them twice in 
the passages quoted above. But I can’t think of any good way to incorporate verbs 
into our account. The best I can say is that this formula seems to work. So, unless 
someone can show me a case for which it gives the wrong result, let’s adopt it — 
not with the idea that this is what Ockham meant, but that whatever Ockham 
meant, there is at least one way (this one) of filling out his theory so that it will 
give a complete story. 
That story can now be told. We start with the notions of true predication 
(giving us primary signification), and synonymy (subordination to the same con-
cept). In terms of those notions, and a little grammar, we can define the notion of 
secondary signification, as above. From there we can go on to define the notion of 
“expressing the quid nominis” of a name, in the way we did earlier.97 Once we 
have that, we can determine which such expressions are nominal definitions and 
which are not (since an expression expressing the quid nominis of a certain name 
is a nominal definition of it if and only if all the expressions expressing its quid 
nominis are synonymous). And on the basis of that, we can decide finally which 
names are connotative and which are absolute. 
3.  A Generalization and Some Conclusions 
So far we have been talking about the distinction between absolute and 
connotative names as if it were a division of simple names only — that is, of one-
word names rather than phases or whole complex expressions. And in fact that is 
the way Ockham himself presents it. In Summa of Logic I.2, § 4, Ockham tells us 
that complex expressions can be counted as “terms,” but then in I.3, § 1, he says 
he is going to turn to various divisions among “non-complex” terms. That nar-
rower focus seems to be still in effect in I.10, where he introduces the distinction 
                                                 
96 For a further discussion of this suggestion, see my “Ockham’s Distinctions between 
Absolute and Connotative Terms,” pp. 71–73. 
97 See p. 213 above. 
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between absolute and connotative names. And in fact it seems to be in effect 
throughout the rest of Part I of the Summa logicae. 
Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent our generalizing the distinction. 
The semantic relationships will be exactly the same, even if our terminology is a 
little broader than Ockham’s. 
For example, just as the term ‘white’ is connotative and has as a nominal 
definition ‘something having a whiteness’, so too we can say that the complex ex-
pression ‘something having a whiteness’ is itself a connotative term too. It is cer-
tainly not absolute, because in virtue of the Additive Principle it signifies all 
whitenesses, and yet it cannot be truly predicated of whitenesses. Hence some of 
the things it signifies it does not signify primarily. This makes it connotative (on 
both Ockham’s account and Buridan’s). 
In a sense, the expression ‘something having a whiteness’ would be a “de-
generate case” of a connotative term, in the sense in which a circle is a “degener-
ate case” of an ellipse or a square a “degenerate case” of a rectangle. It would 
perhaps be a little odd as a connotative term, since it would be its own nominal 
definition. But there is nothing really wrong with that.98 
If we do allow the distinction between absolute and connotative names to 
apply to complex expressions too, then we can say: 
(1) Nominal definitions of connotative terms are themselves 
connotative terms, and are their own nominal definitions. 
(2) Real definitions of absolute terms are also themselves con-
notative terms, and are their own nominal definitions. For 
instance, ‘rational animal’ signifies all animals, and yet is 
truly predicable only of men. Hence it is a connotative 
term. 
Hence 
(3) Absolute terms are not synonymous with their real defini-
tions. (Since those real definitions are connotative terms, 
all the expressions expressing their quid nominis are syn-
onymous. Thus, if an absolute term were synonymous with 
its real definition, it would also be synonymous with all 
those other expressions, and would therefore express its 
                                                 
98 Claude Panaccio, “Connotative Terms in Ockham’s Mental Language,” pp. 6–7, takes 
me to task here, since Ockham explicitly says (Summa of Logic I.26, § 15, and other passages 
cited by Panaccio) that definitions are not the same as the terms they define. But this is purely a 
terminological matter, and only reflects the fact that Ockham is thinking mainly of simple terms in 
these passages. (He is thinking of them as the definienda — the definitions will of course be com-
plex.) As I said, the semantic facts of the situation are not affected one bit by the terminology. I 
find that the broader terminology makes it somewhat easier for me to keep track of those semantic 
facts, but you may disagree. 
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quid nominis too. Hence the term would be connotative, not 
absolute after all.99) 
C.  Connotation in Mental Language 
Is there connotation in mental language? Well, if we allow complex ex-
pressions to count as connotative terms, then of course there is. The real question 
is rather whether there are simple (“one-word”) connotative names in mental lan-
guage. 
The way Ockham proceeds in Part I of Summa of Logic would indicate 
that there are. We have already seen100 that Ockham seems to introduce the dis-
tinction between absolute and connotative names as a division among simple 
terms (even if we can apply that distinction more broadly). Now in Summa of 
Logic I.3, § 1, he indicates that he is about to begin discussing a series of distinc-
tions that apply to mental language as well as to spoken and written language: 
Thus, not only is the non-complex term divided into the spoken, 
written and conceived term. Each branch is also subdivided by 
similar divisions. 
That is, the three “branches” — spoken, written and mental language — are sub-
divided in parallel ways. In Ch. 10, he discusses absolute and connotative names. 
Then at the beginning of I.11, § 11, he says: 
Now that we have set out the divisions that can belong both 
to terms signifying naturally [that is, mental terms] and also to 
terms instituted by convention, we have to talk about certain divi-
sions that belong [only] to terms instituted by convention. 
This doesn’t quite say, but plainly implies, that the distinction among sim-
ple terms introduced in the immediately preceding chapter, between absolute and 
connotative names, does indeed apply to mental language. 
But there’s stronger evidence than that. Ockham, Buridan and Peter of 
Ailly all quite explicitly say there are simple connotative terms in mental lan-
guage. Indeed, they all give exactly the same example: the term ‘white’. The fact 
that all three give the same example suggests it is not mere coincidence or a mo-
mentary slip on their part; they meant it. Here is what Peter of Ailly says (Text 
(80)): 
                                                 
99 The same point can be argued another way, without applying the notion of connotative 
terms to complex expressions. Since real definitions proceed by genus and difference, and since 
the genus is always broader than the species defined, it follows by the Additive Principle that a 
real definition will always signify things the defined term is not truly predicable of. But since ab-
solute terms only signify primarily — that is, only signify what they are truly predicable of — it 
follows that absolute terms cannot be synonymous with their real definitions. 
100 See p. 222 above. 
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First, because many people maintain, and it is quite argu-
able, that the concept the utterance ‘white’ corresponds to is a sim-
ple act of knowing. Nevertheless, it is equivalent in signifying to 
several acts of knowing. For it signifies whatever its nominal defi-
nition and any part of [its nominal definition] signifies. 
‘White’ is a paradigm of a connotative term, and yet here Peter is saying it 
is highly probable that it corresponds to a simple connotative concept, although 
he gives no argument. 
Buridan says it in his Sophismata, Ch. 1, the sixth conclusion, although he 
doesn’t give an argument either101: 
To this it is to be replied by positing this sixth conclusion: A sim-
ple concept, if it is the subject or predicate in a mental proposition, 
supposits for the very thing that is conceived by it. For there is 
nothing that forbids this, unless perhaps in two cases. The first one 
is that the thing be conceived after the fashion of what is added to 
something else, as would hold for the concept from which the 
name ‘white’ is taken. For it could be said that whiteness is con-
ceived by [that concept] and yet [the concept] does not supposit for 
whiteness but for the subject to which [whiteness] is added, be-
cause it is understood after the fashion of what is added.102 
The concept here is the one “from which the name ‘white’ is taken” — that is, the 
one to which the spoken or written term ‘white’ is subordinated. It is said to be a 
simple concept, and yet described in a way that fits only connotative terms. 
Ockham makes the claim in Quodlibet V, q. 9, and actually gives an argu-
ment (Text (52), § 6): 
The reason for this is that the same mental proposition can-
not be true and false together, whatever the case is for a spoken 
proposition. But the proposition ‘A man is white’ is true in the 
mind, and ‘A man is a whiteness’ is false. And there is no variation 
here except in the predicates, with respect to concrete and abstract 
in the first mode.103 
The context of this passage is not important here. But note that Ockham is saying 
the two mental propositions have two distinct concepts “white” and “whiteness” 
in predicate position, and that those concepts differ only insofar as the former is 
the concrete form and the latter the abstract form. But the distinction between 
concrete and abstract names seems to apply to simple names only, for two rea-
                                                 
101 Scott ed., pp. 26–27; Scott trans., p. 73. 
102 The text goes on to discuss the second case, which involves tenses of verbs and 
doesn’t concern us here. 
103 This last refers to Ockham’s elaborate and careful analysis of concrete and abstract 
names, developed earlier in the question and also in Summa of Logic I.5–9. See n. 69 above. 
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sons. First, it is discussed in Summa of Logic I.5–9, where simple names seem to 
be what are on the agenda. But second, the syntactical criterion Ockham gives for 
distinguishing concrete from abstract names104 will not in general work for com-
plex expressions. Hence, it looks as if there is a simple concept “white,” a para-
digm of a connotative term. 
But notice that Ockham’s argument, if you look at it carefully, begs the 
question. He starts out by talking about the mental propositions “A man is white” 
and “A man is a whiteness.” And he says these mental propositions differ only in-
sofar as one has a concrete predicate and the other an abstract one. But that of 
course is just the question at issue. What we should be talking about instead is the 
mental propositions corresponding to the spoken (or written) propositions ‘A man 
is white’ and ‘A man is a whiteness’. And if we make that adjustment, Ockham’s 
argument won’t work. 
He is right to say that there must be two mental propositions correspond-
ing to the two spoken propositions, since the one spoken proposition is true while 
the other is false. And he is perhaps also right that, since the rest of the spoken 
propositions are the same, the difference in the mental propositions must come in 
their predicates.105 But in any event he is wrong to infer that the predicate of the 
one mental proposition is the simple concrete concept “white” and the predicate 
of the other is the simple abstract concept “whiteness.” That needn’t be so. We 
might have instead: 
Figure 12: A Possible Subordination Relation 
Here the mental predicates are not related as simple abstract to simple concrete, 
but as simple abstract to the nominal definition of the corresponding simple con-
crete. If this were the case, it would not follow that there are simple connotative 
terms in mental language. 
Still, whether the argument is conclusive or not, the passage does indicate 
that, at least here, Ockham thought there were simple connotative terms in mental 
language. 
But it is not just there. In his Ordinatio (a partial commentary on Peter 
Lombard’s Sentences that Ockham himself corrected and prepared for circula-
                                                 
104 See p. 190 above. 
105 See Ch. 4, p. 114, above on the “favorable cases” in which the structure of mental 
propositions parallels the structures of the corresponding spoken propositions. The spoken propo-
sition ‘A man is a whiteness’ is one of those favorable cases. The other proposition, ‘A man is 
white’, is more problematic, since it is not one of the favorable cases, in virtue of its connotative 
predicate. 
Mental A (some) man is [something having 
a whiteness] 
A (some) man is a whiteness 
 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Spoken A (some) man is white A (some) man is a whiteness 
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tion), Ockham explicitly says that “God can be known by us in a simple, connota-
tive and negative concept proper to him.”106 And a little later, in a reply to an ar-
gument that there can be several “quidditative” (here just read it as “absolute”) 
concepts of God, Ockham says107: 
I say there can be several simple denominative concepts of the 
same thing, and this [comes about] through the diversity of their 
connotata. But there cannot be several quidditative simple [con-
cepts of the same thing]. 
1.  Why Ockham Cannot Have Simple Connotative 
Concepts 
Nevertheless, I have a general argument that, at least for Ockham, this 
can’t work; there cannot be simple connotative terms in mental language, no mat-
ter what he says. Here it is: 
Suppose there are simple connotative names in mental language. Suppose, 
to use Ockham’s own example, there is a simple connotative concept “white” and 
a simple absolute concept “whiteness.” Then, given only minimal assumptions 
about our ability to form complex expressions in mental language, we would 
surely be able to form the complex concept “something having a whiteness,” 
which would of course be the nominal definition of the simple concept “white.” 
But, as we have developed the theory of connotation above, connotative terms are 
synonymous with their nominal definitions. Hence we have two synonyms in 
mental language, violating the rule that there is no synonymy in mental lan-
guage.108 
As it stands, the argument is incomplete. What it shows is only that we 
cannot have both the simple connotative concept and also the simple absolute 
concepts that make up its nominal definition. If for some reason we did not have 
the concept “whiteness,” we would be unable to form the mental nominal defini-
tion of “white,” and so there would be no synonymy to prevent our having a sim-
ple concept “white.” 
Nevertheless, from Ockham’s views on how we come to acquire absolute 
and connotative concepts, I think it follows that whenever we have a connotative 
concept, we do also have the absolute concepts that make up its nominal defini-
tion. We will look at those views in a moment. 
My argument is perhaps not fully decisive; we’ll talk about that shortly 
too. Nevertheless, the conclusion of this line of reasoning is plain: There are no 
                                                 
106 Ockham, Scriptum, d. 3, q. 2, Brown and Gál ed., p. 405.5–6. See also p. 405.11–13. 
Panaccio, “Connotative Terms in Ockham’s Mental Language,” p. 5, brought this passage to my 
attention. 
107 Ibid., d. 3, q. 3, Brown and Gál ed., p. 425.5–8. Panaccio, loc. cit., likewise made me 
notice this passage. 
108 See Ch. 4, pp. 99–101 and 111 above, on this claim. 
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simple connotative names in mental language. All simple mental concepts are ab-
solute; all connotative ones are composites, made up of absolute components and 
perhaps various mental syncategoremata. 
2.  Why Buridan Cannot Have Them 
I also have a textual argument to this same conclusion for Buridan. (Peter 
of Ailly doesn’t say enough about connotation for me to come up with an argu-
ment that applies to him.) Here is what Buridan says in Sophismata, Ch. 1, the 
discussion of conclusion 11109: 
Hence only a spoken term to which there does not correspond an 
incomplex concept but a complex one properly has a definition 
giving the quid nominis — that is, [a definition] precisely signify-
ing whatever [thing or things110] the term signifies. 
Thus if a spoken term has a nominal definition — that is, if it is connota-
tive — then it corresponds to a complex concept, not to a simple one. Now the 
spoken term ‘white’, which is connotative, is like this, and so corresponds to a 
complex concept (presumably its mental nominal definition), not to a simple one. 
If there were also another concept “white,” this time a simple one, the text would 
therefore imply that there is no spoken term corresponding to it. That failure of 
correspondence might happen by chance, of course, but the conventional charac-
ter of spoken language guarantees that it will not happen as a matter of principle, 
as a rule, as the quoted passage would seem to require. 
3.  Conceptual Atomism 
The picture we end up with, therefore, is a kind of “conceptual atomism,” 
if I might call it that. Simple concepts are the atoms, and they are the absolute 
names of mental language. Connotative names in mental language are all “mole-
cules,” complexes put together out of the atomic concepts. At the level of mental 
language then, the distinction between absolute and connotative names seems to 
coincide exactly with the distinction between simple and compound or complex 
concepts.111 
                                                 
109 Scott ed., p. 31; Scott trans., pp. 77–78. 
110 whatever [thing or things]: quicquid et quaecumque. Buridan uses singular and plural 
pronouns, with no noun attached. 
111 There may be funny exceptions. For example, consider the atomic and therefore abso-
lute concept “man.” Now consider two occurrences of that concept, conjoined by the mental con-
junction “and”: “man and man,” or something like that. That would be a complex concept, and yet 
it is absolute, because everything it signifies (namely, all men) it is truly predicable of. We can 
point to Socrates or Plato, for example, and say ‘This is (a) man and (a) man’. (The articles don’t 
occur in the Latin, or presumably in mental language.) It’s an odd thing to say, but never mind; 
odd or not, it can be said and said truly. Can mental language produce such odd complex expres-
sions? I’m not sure, but I don’t see why not. (For similar considerations about a somewhat differ-
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On the other hand, this neat structural distinction between absolute and 
connotative names breaks down for conventional language. There we can have 
simple names that are connotative — for example, the spoken or written term 
‘white’. Their being connotative is explained by their being subordinated to a 
complex concept. Absoluteness and connotativeness in spoken and written lan-
guage, therefore, is to be explained by looking to mental language, where it is just 
the difference between simple and complex concepts. 
Can it go the other way as well? Can we have a complex spoken term cor-
responding to a simple concept? Could we have the complex spoken phrase ‘king 
of the beasts’, for example, corresponding to the simple and absolute concept 
“lion”? 
Well, if we did, then of course that whole phrase ‘king of the beasts’ 
would be absolute too, and would therefore signify only what it is truly predicable 
of. That is, it would signify only lions (if you think the lion really is the king of 
the beasts), and not all kings and all beasts, as you would expect in virtue of the 
Additive Principle. But this means that, despite the fact that it is written with 
spaces between some of the letters, the expression is not really a complex term 
after all. It is, so to speak, “semantically opaque,” one multi-syllable simple term. 
Its internal structure does not count. The occurrences of ‘king’ and ‘beast’ in the 
expression play no semantic role, any more than does the occurrence of ‘cat’ in 
‘cattle’. 
In short, the Additive Principle prevents complex spoken or written terms 
from corresponding to simple concepts.112 In this connection, it is interesting to 
note what Buridan has to say in his Sophismata, Ch. 1, the discussion of that same 
conclusion 11113: 
For this reason, you need to know that on every incomplex concept 
there can be imposed an incomplex utterance, and on every com-
plex [concept] a complex [utterance].114 But also, because utter-
ances are imposed to signify by our convention, therefore on no 
matter how complex a concept we can, correspondingly, impose an 
incomplex utterance immediately signifying that complex concept 
and signifying as a consequent all [the things] that are conceived 
by that concept. For example, a certain poet distinctly conceives by 
a great complex concept the history of Troy, how Paris carried off 
Helen, and that because of this the king of the Greeks attacked the 
Trojans, etc. And then the poet wrote, distinctly and complexly in 
correspondence with that concept, a great book signifying what are 
conceived by that manyfold complex concept. Next he imposed the 
                                                                                                                                     
ent point, see Spade, “Ockham’s Distinctions between Absolute and Connotative Terms,” p. 75 n. 
64.) Nevertheless, let’s just agree to ignore the possibility for now. 
112 See n. 111 above. The same funny cases would be exceptions here too. 
113 Scott ed., pp. 29–30; Scott trans., p. 76. 
114 The terminology is a little unusual here. Generally spoken terms are said to be im-
posed “to signify” such and such, but they are not usually said to be imposed on concepts. Never-
theless, there’s nothing mysterious about the usage here. 
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incomplex term ‘Iliad’ to signifying all at once however that big 
book signified. And so to the name ‘Iliad’ there corresponds a very 
complicatedly complex concept. 
The example about Homer would seem to imply that whenever you hear 
the word ‘Iliad’ you automatically run through the entire story in your head, and 
that’s probably not so. But never mind. The important thing here is to notice what 
Buridan fails to mention here. He mentions simple spoken terms corresponding to 
simple concepts, complex spoken terms corresponding to complex concepts, and 
simple terms corresponding to complex concepts. But he conspicuously does not 
mention complex spoken expressions corresponding to simple concepts. Given 
the Additive Principle, this is exactly what we should expect. 
What we have, then, is a picture somewhat like this115: 
 
Figure 13: Simple and Complex vs. Absolute and Connotative 
The upshot of all this is that connotation does not add any new and irre-
ducible semantic relation to our theory. Apart from syncategoremata, the ele-
mentary building blocks of mental language are absolute terms, simple concepts. 
Connotative mental terms are simply constructs out of these. In spoken and writ-
ten language, terms are absolute or connotative according to whether the mental 
terms they are subordinated to are absolute or connotative. In the end, then, con-
notation is not a new semantic primitive. It can be reduced to the signification of 
                                                 
115 If the funny cases mentioned in nn 111–112 are allowed, this diagram would have to 
be adjusted. 
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absolute terms — primary signification (“being truly predicable of”) — plus syn-
tactical devices employed in combining concepts.116 
4.  Epistemological Factors 
So far I have been talking as though the distinction between absolute and 
connotative names were a distinction fixed once and for all; a term is either abso-
lute or it is connotative, and that’s that. But in fact that is not so; we need to add 
some important epistemological qualifications. In effect, everything I have said so 
far about Ockham’s connotation-theory has implicitly been from the point of view 
of an ideal knower — if you will, from God’s perspective. 
But Ockham has some other things to say about the distinction between 
absolute and connotative names, and what he says indicates that what is an abso-
lute name for one person may perhaps not be absolute but rather connotative for 
another person.117 Thus we must relativize our notions of absolute and connota-
tive names. We must say a term is absolute or relative “relative to a person.” 
What effect will this have? 
Well, all the terms we have up to now been calling connotative will turn 
out to be still connotative — for everyone. But the terms we have been calling ab-
solute may be connotative for some people and absolute for others. 
Roughly, the distinction between absolute and connotative names parallels 
the distinction between what is sometimes called “knowledge by acquaintance” 
and “knowledge by description.” For example, if I have seen or otherwise experi-
enced lions, or whitenesses, I have an absolute mental name “lion” or “white-
ness.” That absolute mental name is a simple, “atomic” concept, and any spoken 
or written name subordinated to it is likewise absolute for me. On the other hand, 
if I have never experienced lions or whitenesses (perhaps I am blind), I can still 
know about them — not by “acquaintance” but by “description.” For example, the 
spoken word ‘lion’ may be subordinated to the descriptive and “molecular” con-
cept “king of the beasts,” which is connotative,118 and the spoken term ‘white-
ness’ may be subordinated to the concept “color most dazzling to sight,”119 which 
is likewise connotative. 
So the same term may be absolute to you but connotative to me because 
my experience has been more restricted than yours. Whereas you got your simple 
absolute concept by simply observing instances of what it is a concept of, I had to 
get my complex connotative concept by piecing it together out of other concepts I 
got from my own narrower experience. An ideal knower, one who had knowledge 
                                                 
116 On this point, see also Spade, “Ockham’s Distinctions between Absolute and Conno-
tative Terms,” p. 76. 
117 I am not going to go into detail here, since this is not a book about Ockham’s episte-
mology. Nevertheless, for further information, see Adams, William Ockham, Ch. 13, and Moody, 
The Logic of William of Ockham, especially Ch. 6. 
118 At least if we allow the notion of connotation to apply to complex expressions as well 
as simple ones. 
119 This definition was a standard piece of mediaeval lore. 
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by acquaintance (what Ockham calls “intuitive cognition”) of everything there is, 
would have absolute concepts of everything there is.120 
Earlier, I said absolute names are the ones linked to an inventory of the 
world; connotative names add nothing new to the ontology.121 But only for an 
ideal knower could a complete inventory of the world be accomplished by means 
of absolute terms alone. The relativization of the distinction between absolute and 
connotative names to persons means that, while there can be absolute names only 
where there is a corresponding entity122 (since we get our absolute names by be-
ing actually acquainted with such entities), yet because of our ignorance or be-
cause of the narrowness of our experience, we might fail to have an absolute 
name for some entities that nevertheless do exist. 
Note that because of the way we get absolute names — by encountering 
what they are names of — it follows that there are no “non-denoting” absolute 
names. But there are non-denoting connotative names — figment-terms,123 for 
example. From the fact that we can construct a certain description by combining 
absolute concepts in various ways, it by no means follows that there actually is 
anything so described. 
No doubt this “atomic/molecular” picture of concepts, with the accompa-
nying story about how we acquire our atomic concepts, sounds familiar. And in-
deed it should sound familiar to anyone who has had the standard undergraduate 
“Descartes through Kant” course. Think, for example, of John Locke. 
This familiarity should come as no surprise. Despite the now old-
fashioned story, the views of those later philosophers were not created ex nihilo. 
They had a past, and their past is exactly the kind of doctrine we see here in Ock-
ham and in other mediaeval authors. 
5.  An Interpretative Tangle 
The picture I have presented above does have its dark and murky spots, 
for example the question how to determine which expressions express the quid 
nominis of a name and the question what exactly secondary signification is. But 
never mind. On the whole, it is a tidy and even attractive picture, and has come to 
                                                 
120 Earlier (p. 210 above) I said Ockham’s choice of ‘angel’ as an example of an absolute 
term was an unfortunate one. We now see why. We do not know angels by acquaintance (or at 
least not enough people do to make it a good example), but by description. Hence for us it is a 
connotative term, even if it is absolute for God. It follows therefore that either the expressions 
Ockham listed — ‘substance abstracted from matter’, ‘intellectual and incorruptible substance’, 
‘simple substance that does not enter into composition with anything else’ — are all synonymous 
(and even Ockham says they are not), or else some of them do not express the quid nominis of 
‘angel’ after all. 
121 See p. 197 above. 
122 It doesn’t go the other way around, at least not if the kind of “correspondence” we are 
talking about is merely a matter of the term’s being truly predicable of the entity. For ‘white’ is 
truly predicable of white things, but is a connotative term, not absolute.  
123 Recall that figment-terms are not just names of things that don’t exist, but names of 
impossible things. See p. 212 above. 
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be, I suppose, the “prevailing” interpretation of Ockham on these topics. For bet-
ter or for worse, this is a situation for which I take some small responsibility. 
Nevertheless, this interpretation has been challenged recently, first by 
Claude Panaccio in an excellent paper entitled “Connotative Terms in Ockham’s 
Mental Language,”124 and then by Martin Tweedale in his “Ockham’s Supposed 
Elimination of Connotative Terms and His Ontological Parsimony.” 
a.  Claude Panaccio’s Interpretation 
Panaccio’s paper is motivated in large measure by concerns over relational 
concepts, which are one kind of connotative concepts.125 But he discusses conno-
tation more generally as well. 
It was Panaccio who forced researchers in this area (including me) to rec-
ognize finally that Ockham did explicitly allow simple connotative terms in men-
tal language, whether he should have done so or not, and that he did it in enough 
passages that it could not be just a momentary lapse on his part. Although in a 
sense these passages were common knowledge all along, it was Panaccio who 
gathered some of them together and presented them side by side, so that the point 
was driven home once and for all. 
Given that Ockham did allow simple connotative names in mental lan-
guage, what are we going to do about the “prevailing” view I have presented 
above? Well, here is how Panaccio sets up the problem.126 The fact that Ockham 
does allow simple connotative names in mental language means that either his 
theory is just inconsistent or else there is something wrong with the following ar-
gument: 
(1) All connotative terms have nominal definitions. 
(2) Simple connotative terms are synonymous with their nomi-
nal definitions. 
(3) But there is no synonymy in mental language, for the rea-
sons we discussed above. 
(4) Therefore, in mental language there are no simple connota-
tive terms if their nominal definitions are there too. (Since 
the ability to form mental nominal definitions seems to re-
quire only minimal cognitive machinery, this in effect 
                                                 
124 This paper caused quite a stir when it first appeared, and rightly so. You may think it 
was all a tempest in a teapot, since after all this material is pretty arcane stuff and only of interest 
to a very few people. That’s true, I suppose, but things were really whirling around in that teapot 
for a while, and still haven’t settled down. Those of us working in this area have all been forced to 
rethink their views. 
125 See p. 215 above. I think Tweedale effectively answers Panaccio’s worries about re-
lational concepts. 
126 Panaccio, “Connotative Terms,” p. 12. I am rephrasing a little, but not much. 
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means there are no simple connotative terms in mental lan-
guage.) 
 
Everyone agrees on step (1), and in any case it seems incontrovertible on 
the basis of Ockham’s texts. And Panaccio accepts (3), for basically the reasons I 
gave above. Thus, the only place he can locate the problem is with step (2). Not 
surprisingly, this is exactly what he does. 
Panaccio goes on to offer textual arguments to show that (2) is in fact not 
grounded, and that for Ockham connotative terms are not quite synonymous with 
their nominal definitions. I do not find his arguments entirely convincing. 
First, there are passages where Ockham says definitions are more “ex-
plicit” than what they define. But surely synonyms ought to be equally “explicit.” 
One such passage is Summa logicae III-2.14127: 
Likewise [the proposition] ‘Every thing composed of matter and 
form is corruptible’ is prior to [the proposition] ‘Every body is cor-
ruptible’, because the first explicates some things that the second 
does not explicate, and conversely, just as a definition explicates 
more things than the defined [does]. 
‘Explicate’ here is Latin ‘explicat’, related to English ‘explicit’, and means some-
thing like “unroll,” “display,” “unfold.” But whatever the exact sense, ‘body’ is 
an absolute term, not a connotative one, and the definition appealed to here 
(‘thing composed of matter and form’) is a real definition, not a nominal one. It is 
part of the “prevailing” interpretation, not an objection to it, to observe that abso-
lute terms are not synonymous with their real definitions.128 
Again, in his Little Summa of Natural Philosophy I.3, in a chapter on pri-
vation, Ockham says129: 
And if you say that definitions are not of names or terms but of 
things, it is to be said [in reply] that although the name ‘defined’ 
often stands for the thing the essence of which is expressed by the 
definition, nevertheless in many locutions it stands for the name or 
term. For instance, in Physics I [1, 184a26–b10], it is said “Now 
names hold in a certain way this same [relation] to the defini-
tion,”130 meaning that names are the defined. And in general it is 
said that “A definition signifies the same [thing] explicitly that the 
defined signifies implicitly.” In this proposition ‘defined’ stands 
only for a name or for a term. 
                                                 
127 Not Ch. 15, as Panaccio says, “Connotative Terms,” p. 7, n. 14; see Summa logicae, 
Gál et al., ed., p. 530.26–30. 
128 See p. 223 above. 
129 Summula philosophiae naturalis I.3, Brown ed., p. 162.52–60. 
130 definition: rationem. This word is the despair of translators everywhere, but Ockham 
plainly takes it here to mean ‘definition’ (one of its accepted meanings), so we will too. 
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It is not clear to me whether in this passage Ockham is talking about real 
or nominal definitions. Since the whole chapter is about privations, one would 
expect nominal definitions to be on the agenda.131 On the other hand, the phrase 
‘the essence of which is expressed by the definition’ suggests a real definition to 
me, since that’s what real definitions do. But in either case the passage does not 
seem to me to be decisive. For why should synonyms be equally “explicit”? If 
“explicitness” is taken as a syntactical or structural matter rather than a semantic 
one, there would seem to be no reason to say they are. After all, ‘unmarried man’ 
is more “explicit” than ‘bachelor’, and yet in the modern literature they are a 
paradigm of synonymy. 
Second, Panaccio observes that in Quodlibet V, q. 19, Ockham allows 
nominal definitions of verbs, adverbs and conjunctions, not just of “names” 
(= nouns and adjectives). He then remarks, “The definitions in these cases are 
metalinguistic while the defined terms are not, and consequently they cannot be 
synonymous with them.”132 But look at what Ockham actually says133: 
Fourth, [real and nominal definitions] differ in the fact that 
there is a definition expressing the quid rei only for names taken 
significatively,134 but there is a definition expressing the quid 
nominis for verbs, adverbs and conjunctions [too]. For he who 
wants to define ‘where’ will say it is “an interrogative adverb of 
place.” Likewise, he will say ‘when’ is “an interrogative adverb of 
time,” and so on, where the definition is predicated of the defined 
suppositing materially. 
The last two words, which I have emphasized, refer to so called “material 
supposition,” which we will be discussing in the Chapter 8.. There we will see 
that material supposition works in many cases like quotation marks in modern 
philosophical usage, and that, in general, terms taken in material supposition are 
being used “metalinguistically.” In short, I think Panaccio’s point here is not well 
taken; the defined terms are being taken metalinguistically. 
The most troublesome evidence Panaccio cites, however, is two discus-
sions in Ockham’s commentary on Aristotle’s Sophistic Refutations, where Ock-
ham says that terms are not always freely intersubstitutable with their defini-
tions.135 The passages are lengthy, and I won’t quote them here. But both concern 
the Aristotelian fallacy known as “nugation” (nugatio). This is exactly the sort of 
thing Anselm was concerned to avoid when he insisted that ‘literate’ should not 
be defined as ‘man having literacy’.136 Otherwise, recall, we could not say with 
syntactical correctness ‘Socrates is a literate man’, because it would amount to 
                                                 
131 See p. 215 above. 
132 Panaccio, “Connotative Terms,” p. 14. 
133 Quodlibet V, q. 19 (Wey ed., p. 556.66–73). 
134 We shall see in Ch. 8 below that this means “taken in personal supposition.” 
135 Ockham, Expositio super libros Elenchorum I.20, del Punta ed., pp. 129.1–133.67; 
ibid. II.16, del Punta ed., pp. 296.1–305.48. 
136 See p. 203 above. 
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saying ‘Socrates is a man having literacy man’, which is syntactical gibberish. 
(That’s the technical meaning of ‘nugation’, this kind of syntactical stammering.) 
Ockham certainly does say in these passages what Panaccio says he does. 
But I am not sure how much to make of it. First of all, it should be pointed out 
that Ockham says all this in a commentary. And it is usually sound advice to be 
wary about taking what an author says in a commentary as his own views; in a 
commentary he is constrained by the views of the text he is commenting on. Nev-
ertheless, having said that I don’t want to overemphasize it, because Ockham 
generally makes Aristotle fit his own views anyway, so that it is unlikely he 
doesn’t mean what he says in these passages. 
I have already noted that, by including in the nominal definition of ‘white’ 
a name for the bearer of whiteness, Ockham seems to be leaving himself wide 
open to problems of nugatio137 — at least if he, like Anselm, regards connotative 
terms as in effect shorthand abbreviations for their nominal definitions, and there-
fore as intersubstitutable with them. This is exactly the problem Ockham is ad-
dressing in his commentary. It seems to me we have one of two choices. (a) We 
can say Ockham has simply formulated the wrong nominal definitions, that he 
should have formulated them without making reference to the bearer of whiteness 
or the possessor of literacy, for example, thereby preserving the synonymy of 
connotative names with their nominal definitions. Or, alternatively, (b) we can 
take Ockham at his word here and agree with Panaccio that connotative names are 
not synonymous with their nominal definitions after all. 
I don’t think it makes much difference in the end which alternative we 
adopt, because even if we follow Panaccio’s interpretation (b), the problem does 
not go away. If what prevents connotative names (or at least some of them138) 
from being synonymous with their nominal definitions is the presence in the latter 
of an extra term for the primary significate of the connotative name (a term for the 
bearer of whiteness or the possessor of literacy), then let’s just form another ex-
pression from the nominal definition by deleting the offending term. The result 
will be an expression (‘having a whiteness’, ‘having literacy’) completely con-
tained in the nominal definition, so that if the latter whole occurs in mental lan-
guage so does the former part. Furthermore, the resulting expression is exactly the 
expression interpretation (a) says Ockham should have given as the nominal defi-
nition in the first place, and it is synonymous with the connotative name. If it 
isn’t, then in what sense is the nominal definition from which this expression was 
formed a correct nominal definition?139 In other words, in order to generate the 
problem that now concerns us, we do not need connotative names to be synony-
                                                 
137 See n. 51 above. 
138 The kind of case Ockham is discussing in his commentary on the Sophistic Refuta-
tions can only arise for adjectives. I do not see how it can arise, and so how the intersubstitutabil-
ity of connotative names and their nominal definitions can be blocked, in the case of connotative 
nouns — much less in the case of connotative nouns in general. Remember, all it takes is a few or 
even one connotative name that is synonymous with its nominal definition in order to generate the 
problem we are trying to avoid. It is not enough to say that the intersubsitutability that would fol-
low on synonymy fails in some cases. 
139 See the argument on p. 216 above. 
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mous with their nominal definitions; it is enough if they are synonymous with an 
embedded part of their nominal definitions. Either way, we will have synonymy 
in mental language. 
b.  Martin Tweedale’s Interpretation 
Martin Tweedale140 agrees with Panaccio in accepting (3) and rejecting (2) 
of the above argument,141 but for an entirely different reason. According to 
Tweedale, Ockham’s usage suggests that he confines synonymy to simple words, 
so that simple connotative names fail to be synonymous with their nominal defini-
tions, but only because those nominal definitions are complex expressions and 
therefore do not qualify as being synonymous with anything.142 Hence there is 
nothing to prevent our having simple connotative terms together with their com-
plex nominal definitions in mental language. 
My objections to Tweedale’s approach are two. First, it’s false. Here is a 
passage where Ockham explicitly calls a complex expression (the combination of 
a copula plus a participle) a synonym. It comes from Quodlibet 5, q. 8 (Text (51), 
§ 19): 
For a verb and the participle of the verb taken together with the 
verb ‘is’ are always equipollent in signifying and are synonymous. 
To be sure, that’s the only text I know of like that. But my text at least has 
the advantage of being completely explicit, whereas Tweedale has no explicit 
texts at all. His argument is an argument from silence. After all, Ockham nowhere 
explicitly says he is confining synonymy to simple expressions; Tweedale’s point 
is only that this is what he seems to be doing in practice. My reply: not always. 
But second, even if we regard this passage as an isolated fluke, and other-
wise agree with Tweedale about Ockham’s overall usage, the problem has not 
gone away. If the only reason nominal definitions are not synonymous with the 
terms they define is that they are just “too big” to be synonyms, if they behave ex-
actly like synonyms, then we have not gained anything. For, if you go back to 
look again at the passages from which we concluded that there is no synonymy in 
mental language,143 you will see that Ockham himself doesn’t put it in terms of 
mental synonymy; that was simply my (and other people’s) way of putting it.144 
What Ockham himself actually says is that “there is no plurality of concepts cor-
                                                 
140 Tweedale, “Ockham’s Supposed Elimination of Connotative Terms and His Onto-
logical Parsimony.” 
141 See p. 233 above. 
142 Tweedale accepts (3), the claim that there is no synonymy in mental language, only in 
this “attenuated” sense: there are no simple (one-word) mental synonyms. See ibid., pp. 433–434. 
(For Tweedale, of course, this sense is not “attenuated” at all, since it is the only sense of ‘synon-
ymy’ Ockham uses.) 
143 See Ch. 4, pp. 95–101, above. 
144 I think it is a quite correct way of putting it, but the point now is that it is not quite the 
way Ockham himself says it. 
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responding to synonymous names” (Text (51), § 11), or “there is no plurality in 
the mind corresponding to the multitude of synonymous names in speech” (Text 
(52), § 3). (The “correspondence” he is talking about is the correspondence 
whereby spoken or written terms are subordinated to the mental terms that give 
them their semantics.) 
It is this claim that will not hold in general if mental language contains 
both simple connotative terms and their nominal definitions, whether we say 
those nominal definitions are synonymous with the terms they define or not. For 
if we agree that spoken and written expressions inherit their semantic behavior 
from the concepts they are subordinated to, and if we further agree that at least 
simple expressions are synonymous if they behave semantically exactly alike,145 
then either nominal definitions fail to be synonymous with the terms they define 
because they do not behave semantically exactly like those terms, and so fail for 
reasons in addition to their being too complex, or else our problem remains. For 
suppose c is a simple connotative concept and d its mental nominal definition. 
Then if two simple spoken or written terms t1 and t2 are both subordinated to c, 
everyone will agree they are synonymous. Likewise if they are both subordinated 
to d. But if one of them is subordinated to c and the other one to d, and the nomi-
nal definition d behaves semantically exactly like the connotative concept c it de-
fines, then t1 and t2 will be synonymous once again,146 even though this time they 
are subordinated to two distinct concepts, in explicit violation of Ockham’s claim 
that “there is no plurality of concepts corresponding to synonymous names.” 
In sum, quite apart from the question whether it is textually justified or 
not, restricting synonymy to simple expressions in the way Tweedale does will 
not by itself fix our problem. 
c.  Suggestions and Conjectures 
Where does all this leave us? It is not easy to say. But two things, at any 
rate, seem pretty much agreed. First, Panaccio’s evidence shows that it is Ock-
ham’s considered opinion that mental language contains simple connotative 
terms. And second, mental language has the conceptual and syntactical where-
withal to formulate the nominal definitions of any connotative terms it pos-
sesses.147 
The situation is less clear with the claim that there is no synonymy in 
mental language — or, to accommodate Tweedale’s point about Ockham’s 
(usual) restriction of synonymy to one-word expressions, that there are no two 
                                                 
145 Recall Ockham’s characterization of synonymy in Summa of Logic I.6, § 1: “Those 
synonyms are broadly so called which simply signify the same [thing] in all ways, so that nothing 
is signified in any way by the one [synonym] unless it is signified in the same way by the other … 
I intend to use the name ‘synonym’ in this second sense in this chapter and in many others.” 
146 Since they are both simple, and behave semantically exactly alike. 
147 This claim has never been explicitly supported with textual arguments, as far as I 
know. But it has never really been disputed either. Certainly mental language would be impover-
ished indeed if it could not do this. 
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expressions in mental language that play exactly the same semantic roles. On the 
one hand, Ockham more than once says outright that synonyms in spoken lan-
guage do not correspond to a plurality of concepts in the mind.148 This, combined 
with the view that the subordination-relation is completely conventional,149 im-
plies that there are no two expressions in mental language that behave semanti-
cally exactly alike, whether we call them “synonyms” or not. In addition, there is 
the theoretical argument I gave you in Ch. 4, above, that Ockham’s “similarity” 
account of natural signification would mean that two such concepts are only nu-
merically distinct.150 On the other hand, there is the troublesome passage in 
Summa of Logic I.6, § 1, that seems to imply that, in his usual sense of ‘synon-
ymy’, spoken synonyms can after all be subordinated to distinct concepts — and 
since it is synonyms that are subordinated to these concepts, the concepts must 
behave semantically alike. 
One might try to reconcile these texts by suggesting that when Ockham 
says spoken synonyms do not “correspond” to several concepts in mental lan-
guage, he has in mind a correspondence that is more than just the subordination-
relation. If we agree with Tweedale that Ockham typically (but not always) calls 
only simple expressions synonyms, then perhaps what Ockham means is that spo-
ken synonyms do not correspond (are not subordinated) to a plurality of corre-
spondingly simple expressions in mental language. If that is so, then the texts say 
only that there are no simple synonyms in mental language; the question of com-
plex mental expressions is left open, and therefore Summa of Logic I.6, § 1, can be 
accommodated. 
The problem with this initially attractive suggestion is that there is abso-
lutely no positive evidence that this is in fact what Ockham means by ‘correspon-
dence’ in these passages. Furthermore, there is still the theoretical argument in 
Ch. 4, about “similarity,”151 which still conflicts with Summa of Logic I.6, § 1. 
There is another possibility to be considered here, although it too does 
nothing to accommodate Summa of Logic I.6, § 1. Recall the discussion in Greg-
ory of Rimini and Peter of Ailly about whether mental propositions properly so 
called are really metaphysical complexes, composed of parts, or whether they are 
metaphysically simple but nevertheless somehow “equivalent in signifying” with 
certain complex expression.152 And recall also that while Ockham usually talks 
about mental propositions as if they are metaphysically complex, there are pas-
sages153 where he seems to espouse the other theory. Could it be, then, that when 
Ockham says there are simple connotative terms in mental language, he means 
something similar? If so, then we would not necessarily have simple connotative 
                                                 
148 That is, concepts that differ more than just “numerically.” See the discussion in Ch. 4, 
p. 100 above. Thinking the same concept twice does not count as the kind of “synonymy” we are 
interested in here. 
149 See Ch. 4, p. 100 above on the role of this proviso. 
150 See Ch. 4, p. 100, above. 
151 Ibid. 
152 See Ch. 4, pp. 123–128, above. Exactly what kind of “equivalence” this is supposed 
to be remains unclear. 
153 See, for instance, Texts (36) & (38). 
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terms in mental language and in addition their complex mental nominal defini-
tions, any more than we have metaphysically simple mental propositions and in 
addition metaphysically complex ones that say the same thing. On this hypotheti-
cal view, everything that goes on in mental language is metaphysically simple and 
not really composed of parts at all; nevertheless, we can still speak of them as 
“complex” because their semantics makes them somehow “equivalent” to com-
plex expressions. Simple connotative concepts would then be “synonymous” with 
their mental nominal definitions only in the degenerate and innocuous sense of 
being identical with them.154 The presence of simple connotative mental terms 
would then not by itself be any reason for introducing synonymy into mental lan-
guage in any objectionable way. (There is still, of course, the reason given in 
Summa of Logic I.6, § 1.) 
I find this approach perhaps the most attractive one to pursue. For, apart 
from the question of mental synonymy, there is another reason to be worried 
about the possibility of simple connotative concepts: they threaten to interfere 
with the epistemology of mental language. According to the picture presented 
above,155 the distinction between absolute and connotative terms in mental lan-
guage comes down to the distinction between simple concepts that we acquire by 
direct experience with what they are concepts of (“knowledge by acquaintance”), 
and complex concepts that we acquire by constructing them in various ways out 
of those simple concepts and that therefore may be concepts of things we have 
never directly encountered (“knowledge by description”). Obviously this picture 
in trouble if we allow simple connotative concepts. 
But the trouble can be handled with a minimum of adjustment if we follow 
the interpretation I have just suggested. According to this revised picture, all men-
tal terms are metaphysically or “structurally” simple. Nevertheless, some of them 
are in addition “semantically” simple while others are “semantically” complex, 
just as mental propositions are metaphysically or structurally simple but semanti-
cally complex insofar as they are “equivalent in signifying” with complex expres-
sions. The distinction between absolute and connotative terms in mental language 
then comes down to the distinction between semantically simple concepts that we 
acquire by direct experience with what they are concepts of, and semantically 
complex concepts that we acquire, not by literally “constructing” them out of ab-
solute concepts in such a way that the latter are really parts of the connotative 
concepts (they don’t have parts), but by in any case mentally doing something 
that presupposes those absolute concepts and that yields the new, connotative 
concept as a result. 
Obviously there are many questions to ask here. What exactly does the 
mind do to produce these connotative concepts? If it does not use absolute con-
cepts as parts of the connotative concepts it produces, then why are the absolute 
concepts required for this mental operation at all? And exactly what sense are we 
                                                 
154 In this connection, note that when Peter of Ailly says it is arguable that mental lan-
guage has the simple concept “white,” he uses the telltale expression ‘equivalent in signifying’, 
the same expression he used in discussing the structure of mental propositions properly so called. 
See Text (80) and p. 224 above. 
155 See pp. 228–232 above. 
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to make out of the “semantic complexity” of metaphysically simple concepts?156 
But for all the questions it suggests, this approach does save the epistemological 
significance of mental language. It allows us, for example, to have a simple con-
cept of God (as Ockham says we do have) without requiring any direct acquaint-
ance with God. In my view, any full account of Ockham’s theory of connotation 
must deal with these epistemological issues, since Ockham himself certainly uses 
connotation-theory for epistemological purposes. 
We have pushed the question of connotation in Ockham’s theory of men-
tal language about as far as I am prepared to go at present. If there is a final, com-
pletely satisfactory account that resolves all the lingering problems, I leave it as a 
homework exercise to find it. 
D.  Additional Reading 
For additional reading on the material covered in this chapter, see: Marilyn McCord Adams, Wil-
liam Ockham, particularly Chs. 5–9 and 13; Michael J. Loux, “The Ontology of William of Ock-
ham”; Claude Panaccio, “Connotative Terms in Ockham’s Mental Language”; Paul Vincent 
Spade, “Ockham’s Distinctions Between Absolute and Connotative Terms,” “Ockham, Adams 
and Connotation.” (That last item, in § V, pp. 602–608, contains a discussion of Ockham’s use of 
connotation-theory in his program of “reducing” the Aristotelian categories to substance and qual-
ity alone. There I present an argument that the program, at least as usually conceived, will not 
work, for reasons that I have not gone into in the present chapter.) Also Paul Vincent Spade, 
“Synonymy and Equivocation in Ockham’s Mental Language”; Martin M. Tweedale, “Ockham’s 
Supposed Elimination of Connotative Terms and His Ontological Parsimony.” 
 
 
                                                 
156 We have already encountered a variation of this last question when we considered 
Gregory’s of Rimini’s and Peter of Ailly’s theory of mental propositions as metaphysically sim-
ple. See Ch. 4, pp. 123–128, above. 
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 Chapter 8:  Supposition — The 




ack in the 1960’s, T. K. Scott’s translation of Buridan’s Sophismata was 
one of the first English translations of an important mediaeval logical 
work.1 As a result, the translation had a considerable influence on an en-
tire generation of scholars. It came with an “Introduction” that was for 
many people their first exposure to this dense fourteenth-century literature. Much 
of what Scott wrote in that “Introduction” has now been superseded. But there is 
an important distinction he draws there that I think is absolutely crucial for under-
standing the theory of “supposition” as it had developed by the fourteenth cen-
tury. 
According to Scott, supposition-theory is not one theory but two. As a re-
sult, it is a mistake to try to give a single, general characterization of supposition 
that will take account of both theories at the same time. Here is what he says2: 
It is this double function of supposition that has led astray 
most attempts to give a general characterization of the theory. It is 
in fact, not one theory, but two, and they require separate treat-
ments. The first, which can be called simply the doctrine of suppo-
sition proper, is a set of rules governing the reference of terms in 
propositions and is the basis for a theory of truth. The second, 
which I call the doctrine of modes of supposition, has no effect on 
the reference of terms, but is a set of rules for the syntactical 
analysis of propositions containing quantifying words and is thus 
the quantification theory of terminist logic. 
I will argue in Ch. 9, below, that that last part, about quantification theory, 
is not right. But quite apart from that, the claim in the quotation ought to strike 
                                                 
1 John Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth (published in 1966). It was not the very 
first; Joseph Mullally had already translated Peter of Spain’s Summulae logicales and Tractatus 
syncategorematum on the basis of pre-critical and highly unreliable early printed texts. Scott’s 
translation was the first one directed to a philosophical audience of a broadly “analytical” persua-
sion. 
2 Scott, “Introduction” to Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, p. 30. 
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you as suspicious. After all, if ‘supposition’ covers two theories as diverse as 
Scott wants them to be, then why did the two share the same name? Why did no 
mediaeval author, so far as I know, recognize and say that ‘supposition’ is an 
equivocal term — equivocal in the quite radical way Scott says it is? 
Nevertheless, despite the oddity, I think Scott is absolutely right, at least 
about supposition theory from about Walter Burley on — that is, from at least the 
early-fourteenth century.3 What may have happened, and what I suspect did hap-
pen, is that a single, more or less unified notion of supposition gradually split into 
two theories. But we will talk more about that in Ch. 9. 
Well, what are the two theories Scott finds combined under the one head-
ing ‘supposition’? In the above passage, he calls the first “the doctrine of supposi-
tion proper” and the second “the doctrine of modes of supposition.” Neither ex-
pression is a mediaeval one. But the expressions are useful ones for distinguishing 
these two main parts of supposition theory, and I will adopt them here. The pre-
sent chapter then is about the theory of “supposition proper”; Ch. 9 will be about 
the theory of “modes of supposition.” 
The first theory contains the division of supposition into proper and im-
proper (at least for authors such as Ockham and Burley), and of proper supposi-
tion into material, simple and personal, together with various subdivisions of ma-
terial and simple supposition. The details vary considerably from author to au-
thor.4 It also contains the theory of “ampliation” (or how to “expand” or “am-
plify” the supposition of a term in the context of tensed and modal words), and at 
least in some authors a theory of “restriction.” There is no need to worry about all 
these terms right now. 
The second theory, on the other hand, is confined to personal supposition. 
It contains the division of personal supposition into discrete and common, of 
common supposition into determinate and confused, and of confused supposition 
into merely confused and confused and distributive. Some authors also talk about 
“mobile” and “immobile” supposition here.5 Again, do not worry over these terms 
now. The point is that the second theory is one that concerns divisions and subdi-
visions of personal supposition only. It develops these distinctions in terms of an 
elaborate account of something called “descent to singulars,” sometimes com-
bined, at least in the most careful and complete authors, with a correlative account 
of “ascent from singulars.” 
The main difference, however, between the two theories can be seen by 
asking what question each one tries to answer. The first one answers the question 
“What thing or things does a given term in a given proposition ‘supposit’ for?” 
That is to say, what a term supposits for is completely determined by the first the-
ory. The second theory has nothing to do with that question — at least not by the 
fourteenth century. Instead, it appears to be addressed to another question. 
                                                 
3 Burley wrote a treatise De suppositionibus around 1302. See Stephen F. Brown, “Wal-
ter Burleigh’s Treatise De suppositionibus.” On the date, see ibid., p. 16. 
4 See the diagrams in the Supplement at the end of this chapter. 
5 Ditto. 
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And what question is that? Well, unfortunately, that is hard to say. In ef-
fect, we are asking what the strange theory of descent and ascent is trying to do. 
And that is far from clear. 
In the past, it has often been said that the theory provided an account of 
truth conditions for quantified propositions, so that in effect the second half of 
supposition-theory amounted to the mediaeval version of quantification.6 But, as 
we shall see in Ch. 9 below, there are serious reasons to dispute that. 
In the present chapter, however, we are concerned with the first part of 
supposition theory, the “doctrine of supposition proper.” I should add that I am 
not going to talk about ampliation in this chapter, even though it belongs to the 
first part of supposition-theory; that will come in Ch. 10. 
Now the “doctrine of supposition proper,” I said, addresses itself to the 
question what thing or things a given term in a given proposition “supposits for.” 
It would be a lot easier to answer that question if we knew what it meant in gen-
eral for a term to supposit for something. What sort of relation is supposition? 
Well, the first thing we can say about it is that supposition is a semantic 
relation. To a first (but pretty good) approximation, supposition in this first part of 
the theory is what nowadays we call “reference.” It is the relation between the 
terms used in a proposition and the things those terms are used to talk about in 
that proposition. Just what those things are is a question that depends in part on 
the syntactical relations among the terms in the proposition. But that doesn’t 
make supposition a syntactical relation, as has sometimes been claimed.7 
Many authors did distinguish a grammatical use of the term ‘supposition’ 
from a properly logical use. For the grammarians, they say, supposition is prop-
erly confined to the grammatical subjects of propositions, whereas logically 
speaking, supposition occurs in both subjects and predicates.8 Here, for example, 
is what Buridan says9: 
I say therefore that here I do not mean ‘supposition’ as the gram-
marian speaks of it, that is, insofar as a nominative is called a 
“suppositum” with respect to a verb because it provides it with a 
person.10 For in this way the term ‘chimera’ supposits the verb11 
‘runs’ in the proposition ‘A chimera runs’. But for the logician, 
supposition is said properly of the subject and the predicate of a 
                                                 
6 See, for example, the passage from Scott quoted on p. 243 above. 
7 For example, in Moody, Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic, p. 22, “Supposition 
is a syntactical relation of term to term, and not a semantical relation of the term to an extra-
linguistic ‘object’ or ‘designatum’.” In my view, that claim is dead wrong. 
8 The grammatical usage, which should be kept strictly separate from the logical one, 
may have been in part what was behind Moody’s view, although in actual fact he gives a rather 
strange theoretical argument in support of his claim (ibid., pp. 22–23). 
9 Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 3, Scott ed., p. 50. Scott, trans., pp. 99–100.  
10 This is a little piece of mediaeval grammatical lingo. Just ignore it. It has to do the 
grammatical notion of “first person,” “second person,” “third person.” 
11 The construction is ‘supponit’ plus the dative. 
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proposition, and even sometimes, less properly, oblique terms that 
are parts of subjects and predicates are conceded to supposit. 
Again, this same dual usage is appealed to in the following passage from 
Lambert of Auxerre’s Logica12: 
In the third way, supposition can be called the ordering, 
with respect to its position, of the part of a proposition of which 
something is said. Thus, there is said to be supposition in a name 
with respect to a verb. For the name supposits the verb, and the 
verb is said of the name. To this kind of supposition there answers 
“appellation.”13 Appellation can be called the ordering, with re-
spect to position, of that which is said of another. 
In the fourth way, supposition is called the taking of a term 
for itself,14 or for its [corresponding] thing, or for some suppositum 
or supposita contained under its [corresponding] thing.15 And it is 
in this fourth way that I intend ‘supposition’ here… For ‘supposi-
tion’ said in the third way pertains to grammar and not to logic. 
Burley draws the same distinction in his Longer Treatise on the Purity of 
the Art of Logic, although he doesn’t there link the distinction with the difference 
between grammar and logic. Instead, he describes it purely in terms of a broader 
and a narrower use (Purity, §§ 4–5)16: 
As for the first chapter, you have to know that ‘supposition’ 
is taken in two senses, namely, broadly and properly. Supposition 
taken broadly is a property of a term relative to another term in a 
proposition. In this sense, supposition belongs to the subject as 
well as to the predicate, and even to the verb or the consignificates 
of the verb. We shall use ‘supposition’ in this sense in many places 
in this first part [of the Longer Treatise On the Purity of the Art of 
                                                 
12 Alessio ed., p. 206. See Kretzmann and Stump, The Cambridge Translations of Me-
dieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, p. 106. 
13 Don’t worry about the what “appellation” is here. We have already seen the term in 
Ch. 7, pp. 199–204, 217, above. The word has a variety of meanings in the grammatico-logical 
literature. 
14 Reading ‘pro se’ for Alessio's ‘per se’.  
15 This is confusing unless you are warned about it. The term ‘suppositum’ (the perfect 
passive participle of the verb translated as ‘supposit’) has two quite distinct usages. On the one 
hand, it can mean “whatever a term supposits for,” and that will obviously be the most important 
meaning for us. But there is also a metaphysical meaning that comes ultimately out of the theol-
ogy of the Incarnation and the Trinity. In the latter sense a “suppositum” is (roughly) something 
that does not inhere as a metaphysical ingredient of anything else, but is such that other meta-
physical ingredients may inhere in it. It is the latter sense that Lambert is using here. (Otherwise 
his claim would be vacuous: Supposition is the taking of a term for what is supposits for.) There is 
some historical link between the metaphysical/theological use of the term ‘suppositum’ and the 
logical use, but the details are not yet well researched. 
16 Compare Ockham, Summa of Logic I.63, § 2. 
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Logic]. Taken in this sense, supposition belongs to more than ap-
pellation does, because supposition belongs to the subject as well 
as to the predicate, while appellation belongs only to the predicate. 
Supposition properly so called is a property of the subject 
term relative to the predicate. Now ‘term’ here is taken indiffer-
ently for anything that can be an extreme of a proposition, whether 
it is a simple term, whether it is an aggregate of an adjective and a 
substantive, or [an aggregate] of adjectives, or is even put together 
by means of conjunction or disjunction.17 
In the present chapter, I want to confine our discussion to the “logical” no-
tion of supposition, which applies to both the subjects and predicates of proposi-
tions. 
A.  The Difference Between Supposition and 
Signification 
First of all, how does supposition differ from signification? After all, both 
are semantic relations of terms to things. 
Some authors don’t explain the distinction very clearly at all. William of 
Sherwood, for instance, treats supposition as a species of signification18: “The 
signification of something as subsisting is called ‘supposition’.” Similar remarks 
can be found in other authors.19 But let us listen to what Peter of Spain tells us 
about the difference between supposition and signification20: 
The signification of a term, as it is taken here, is the repre-
sentation of a thing by an utterance, according to a convention… 
But supposition is the taking of a substantive term for something. 
Now supposition and signification are different. For signification 
occurs through the imposition of an utterance for signifying a 
thing. But supposition is the taking of the term itself, already sig-
nificant, for something. Thus when ‘Man runs’ is said, the term 
‘man’ supposits for Socrates and Plato, and so on. Hence significa-
tion is prior to supposition. Neither do they belong to the same 
thing. For to signify belongs to an utterance, but to supposit be-
                                                 
17 Do not worry about the details of these alternatives. 
18 William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam, Ch. 5, Grabmann ed., p. 74.22–23; 
Lohr ed., 5.0.1 (p. 265.14–15). Compare Kretzmann trans., p. 105. Strictly speaking, William is 
here defining supposition taken in what he calls a “dispositional” sense, as opposed to an “actual” 
sense (in habitu/in actu). But we needn’t dwell on that distinction now. For further information on 
the background and context of this distinction, see Braakhuis, “The Views of William of Sher-
wood.” 
19 See De Rijk, Logica modernorum, vol. 2, index under ‘suppositio’. 
20 Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, tract. VI, De Rijk, ed., pp. 79 § (2)–80 § (3). 
Compare Dinneen trans., pp. 69–70. 
Chapter 8: Supposition — The Theory of Reference 
 
248
longs to a term already, as it were, put together out of an utterance 
and a signification. Therefore, supposition is not signification. 
The basic idea here is fairly standard among later authors. It is one thing 
to assign certain terms to certain things — that is, to establish the subordination 
relation — so that we can have a language at all. It is quite another thing actually 
to use that language, to employ those terms in actual practice to talk about things. 
The differences in practice come down to two main ones: 
1.  The First Main Difference 
Terms perform their significative function whenever we run across them. 
Signification, remember, is a kind of causality — even if it is conventional — so 
that the effect is triggered whenever the cause is present. On the other hand, it is 
by means of “propositions” that we actually talk about things and say things about 
them. 
Hence the first difference between signification and supposition is that 
terms supposit only in the context of a proposition, whereas they signify whether 
they occur in a proposition or in isolation. 
Although this is fairly standard doctrine, there is some dispute over it. You 
sometimes hear about something called “natural supposition,” which a term is 
supposed to be able to have even outside the context of a proposition. Unfortu-
nately, there is a lot of confusion in the secondary literature over the doctrine of 
natural supposition. Many of the texts cited to illustrate the doctrine are ambigu-
ous on the question whether terms can supposit naturally even outside a proposi-
tional context. 
Perhaps the best known text in this regard is the following passage from 
Peter of Spain21: 
Natural supposition is the taking of a common term for all the 
things by which it is naturally apt to be participated. For instance, 
‘man’, taken by itself, supposits by its nature for all men who were 
and who are and who will be. 
And then Peter goes on to contrast this with what he calls “accidental sup-
position”22: 
Accidental supposition, on the other hand, is the taking of a com-
mon term for the things for which [what is] adjoined [to it] re-
quires [it to be taken]. For example, ‘Man is’ — the term ‘man’ 
supposits for present [men]. But when ‘Man was’ is said, it sup-
posits for past [men]. And when ‘Man will be’ is said, it supposits 
                                                 
21 Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, tract. VI, De Rijk ed., p. 81 § 4. Compare Dinneen 
trans., p. 70. 
22 Ibid. 
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for future [men]. And so [the term] has diverse suppositions ac-
cording to the diversity of the things adjoined to it. 
The business about tenses belongs to the theory of ampliation, and we can 
ignore that for now. 
Accidental supposition is clearly confined by this passage to propositional 
contexts. On the other hand, in the characterization of natural supposition, the key 
phrase is ‘taken by itself’. Does the phrase mean that the term can have natural 
supposition even outside a propositional contexts, “by itself,” or does it mean 
only that within a propositional context, what a term supposits for in natural sup-
position does not depend on what the other parts of that proposition are, but only 
on the term itself (“by itself”)? The text does not decide between these two alter-
natives. 
Many texts on natural supposition are like this, and I suspect most of them 
mean nothing stronger than the second alternative.23 Nevertheless, some authors 
are quite explicit on the matter, and do unequivocally allow terms to have natural 
supposition outside propositional contexts. Thus, Lambert of Auxerre says24: 
Natural supposition is what a term has by itself and from its 
nature. A term is said to have this when it is put by itself, that is, 
when it is adjoined to nothing else. Now a term having this kind of 
supposition not only supposits for things that participate its form; 
rather it supposits for all the things that participate its form, 
namely, for present, past and future things. Now this kind of sup-
position is called “natural” insofar as the intention is not from out-
side but from inside. For the natural is that the principle of which 
is within. Accidental supposition is what a term has from an ad-
junct, and in this kind of supposition a term supposits according to 
the requirements of what it is adjoined to. For if ‘Man is’ is said, it 
supposits for present [men], because it is adjoined to a verb in the 
present. If ‘Man was’ is said, [it supposits] for past [men]. If ‘Man 
will be’ is said, [it supposits] for future [men]. Now this is called 
“accidental” insofar as it is in a term from outside. For what in-
heres in something from outside is accidental to it. 
Again, a certain Robert the Englishman (which doesn’t narrow it down a 
lot), in his commentary on Peter of Spain Summulae logicales, says25: 
First note that a term placed outside an expression has natu-
ral supposition, and in that case it supposits for all the things that 
                                                 
23 See, for example, the passages discussed in De Rijk, “The Development of Suppositio 
naturalis.” To my mind, De Rijk is far too ready to interpret such passages as implying that natu-
ral supposition occurs outside propositional contexts. And he is by no means alone in this. 
24 Lambert of Auxerre, Logica, Alessio ed., p. 208. See Kretzmann and Stump, The 
Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, p. 109. 
25 Quoted in Brown, “Walter Burleigh's Treatise De suppositionibus,” pp. 21–22, n. 25. 
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are and that were and that will be. For example, ‘man’ placed by 
itself. But a term placed in an expression has accidental supposi-
tion, and in that case it supposits for present things, for example 
‘Man runs’, or for future things, for example ‘Man will be’, or for 
past ones, for example ‘Man was’. 
Nevertheless, apart from funny business about “natural” supposition in 
some authors, we can say that supposition occurs only in a propositional context. 
And this is the first main difference between supposition and signification, which 
can occur outside a propositional context according to almost any author. 
2.  The Second Main Difference 
The second main difference is this: We do not always in practice use terms 
in propositions to talk about what those terms signify. We use them in a variety of 
other ways too. Hence supposition also differs from signification insofar as a term 
may signify one thing, but supposit on a given occasion for something entirely 
different. The various possibilities here are organized and codified in the main 
divisions of supposition, to which we now turn. 
B.  The Kinds of Supposition 
Please refer now to the Supplement at the end of this chapter. We are not 
yet concerned with any of the subdivisions that come under “personal” supposi-
tion. They belong to the second of the two theories combined under the general 
heading ‘supposition’: the theory of “descent and ascent,” which we will talk 
about in Ch. 9. 
For now we are concerned with everything down to that point. What I am 
going to say about these divisions will be based primarily on Ockham and Burley, 
because I think things are clearer in those authors — at least they are for me. I 
will refer to the other authors cited in the Supplement as I have occasion to. 
1.  Proper and Improper Supposition 
Let us look then at how Ockham and Burley divide up supposition. Both 
of them begin with a division into proper and improper supposition. This is a di-
vision many authors omitted, as you can see from the Supplement. 
Here is the way Ockham describes the difference between the two near the 
very end of the first part of the Summa logicae26: 
                                                 
26 Ockham, Summa logicae I.77, p. 236.24–4. 
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Now you need to know that just as proper supposition oc-
curs when a term supposits for what it properly signifies, improper 
supposition occurs when a term is employed improperly. 
This borders on tautology, and is not much help. As we shall see shortly, it 
is a very careless way of putting the matter. Burley’s way of stating the distinc-
tion is somewhat less precise, but at least not positively objectionable. Here is 
what he says in Purity, § 8: 
By its first division, supposition is divided into proper and 
improper supposition. Supposition is proper when a term supposits 
for something for which it is permitted to supposit literally. Suppo-
sition is improper when a term supposits for something by tran-
sumption27 or from its usage in speech. 
Improper supposition therefore is the kind of supposition or reference a 
term has when it is used figuratively and not literally. 
Now a detailed semantics of metaphor was just as much beyond the reach 
of mediaeval authors as it is beyond our reach today. So we should not be sur-
prised to find that the theory of improper supposition is not worked out very fully. 
Nevertheless, both Ockham and Burley do list three kinds of improper supposi-
tion28: 
(a) “antonomastic,” in which a general term that signifies sev-
eral things is appropriated to supposit for only one of them 
by reason of its excellence, as in ‘The Apostle says this’ 
(meaning St. Paul29) or ‘The Philosopher denies this’ 
(meaning Aristotle). In Latin, of course, these sentences 
would not have the definite article, since Latin doesn’t have 
one. 
(b) “synechdochical,” in which a term that signifies a part of 
something is used to supposit for the whole thing, as in 
‘The prow is in the sea’, when we mean that the whole ship 
is in the sea. Richard Lavenham, later in the fourteenth cen-
tury, also allowed it to go the other way around, as in 
‘Christ descended into hell’, where we mean that his soul 
                                                 
27 ‘Transumption’ is the name given by the mediaevals to the second of the three 
“modes” of equivocation described by Aristotle at Sophistic Refutations 4, 166a4ff. It amounts to 
equivocation by analogy. For example, the term ‘man’ may be used to describe both human be-
ings and the images or statues of human beings.  
28 Ockham, Summa logicae I.77, p. 237.5–10; Burley, Purity, Ch. 6, §§ 188–191. 
29 For purposes of the example, ignore the inconvenient fact that St. Paul wasn’t really 
one of the twelve Apostles. 
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descended into hell — so that here the term for the whole 
supposits for a part rather than conversely.30 
(c) “metonymical, in which a term that signifies a container is 
used to supposit for what is contained. Lavenham gives the 
examples ‘Drink a cup’, or ‘England fights’.31 
This is a pretty haphazard list of figurative usages, as mediaeval authors 
knew full well. But in any case, the theory of improper supposition went no fur-
ther than this — with one qualification. Burley also uses the phrase ‘improper 
supposition’ in a quite different sense (Purity, § 193). If, with Burley and others, 
we call the whole subject and the whole predicate of a proposition its “extremes,” 
then Burley says that parts of extremes do not supposit properly, but only im-
properly. For example, in ‘You are going to Rome’ the term ‘Rome’ would sup-
posit only improperly, since it is neither the subject nor the predicate of the 
proposition, but only a part of the predicate; the whole predicate is ‘going to 
Rome’. 
Many authors said things like this.32 Their reasons are at best obscure. It 
seems to have had something to do with blocking inferences from terms of nar-
rower extension to terms of broader extension. Thus, although everyone who goes 
exists, it does not follow that everyone who goes to Rome exists at Rome.33 Still, 
it escapes me why authors tried to block inferences like this by saying that certain 
terms don’t have supposition, or have it only in some inferior way. Why didn’t 
they instead just refine the rules for inferences from a narrower to a broader term? 
In any event, the same authors who seem to think there is something faintly illicit 
about the supposition of parts of extremes are nevertheless able to put their scru-
ples aside in practice, and regularly appeal to such supposition whenever the oc-
casion suits them.34 I will follow their practice rather than their preaching, and 
                                                 
30 Richard Lavenham, Suppositiones, § 3, edited in Spade, “Five Logical Tracts” p. 93. 
Lavenham’s discussion of improper supposition, which is basically the same as Burley’s and 
Ockham’s, is found ibid., pp. 93–94, §§ 3–5. 
31 Ibid., p. 93, § 4. Those of you with some training in rhetoric will no doubt recognize 
these three types of improper supposition as based on classical rhetorical figures. 
32 For instance, Buridan as quoted on p. 246 above (Buridan says such supposition is 
only “less proper”), and Ockham, Summa of Logic I.72, § 23. 
33 The example is Burley’s, Purity, §§ 193–194. Burley expresses the fallacious infer-
ence as ‘si tu es vadens Romae, tu es existens Romae’. (‘Romae’ is in the locative case in the con-
sequent. The locative would not normally be used to express a destination, so ‘Romae’ in the an-
tecedent is a little odd. Alternatively, it could be in the dative there — the two forms would look 
exactly alike — but ‘vadens’ would not normally be construed with the dative of destination ei-
ther.) English requires the switch from ‘to Rome’ to ‘at Rome’ and so looks fallacious on the face 
of it in a way the Latin perhaps does not. 
34 For example, Burley himself, Purity, § 93, appeals to the supposition of ‘bread’ in 
‘Twice you ate a loaf of bread’ in order to explain why the startling inference ‘Twice you ate a 
loaf of bread; therefore, a loaf of bread you ate twice’ is invalid. In neither the antecedent nor the 
consequent is ‘loaf of bread’ the whole extreme, but Burley does not hesitate to attribute supposi-
tion to it, and says nothing to suggest that its supposition is somehow less than respectable. The 
example is by no means an isolated one. 
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allow parts of extremes to supposit just as much, and just as genuinely, as the ex-
tremes themselves do. 
2.  The Divisions of Proper Supposition 
So much for improper supposition. We turn now to proper supposition, 
which comes in three kinds for most authors: personal, simple and material. These 
may be illustrated by the following paradigmatic propositions. The term ‘man’ in 
(a) ‘(A) man runs’ has personal supposition35; 
(b) ‘Man is a species’ has simple supposition; 
(c) ‘Man is a monosyllable’ has material supposition. 
(Don’t worry for now about putting quotation marks around the subject of 
the last example. The theory of material supposition will do, among other things, 
what we do nowadays with quotation marks.) 
Now these propositions are paradigms, and we can learn a lot from them. 
But we can also be misled and get things quite wrong if we concentrate on them 
too exclusively. Instead, let us look at the actual definitions of these three kinds of 
supposition, beginning with Ockham’s. 
a.  Ockham’s Divisions 
In order to understand his definitions, recall that for Ockham, although 
spoken and written terms are subordinated to concepts, they do not in general sig-
nify those concepts, as they do for Boethius and others.36 Rather, they signify 
whatever those concepts signify or are likenesses of. You must also remember 
that Ockham was a nominalist, and therefore rejected all real universals or com-
mon natures. For Ockham, therefore, terms signify individuals, since that is the 
only kind of thing there is for him. In fact, terms for Ockham signify — that is, 
“primarily” signify — the things they can be truly predicated of. The term ‘man’, 
therefore, primarily signifies all individual men: Socrates, Plato, and so on. 
i.  Personal Supposition 
With this in mind, here is how Ockham defines personal supposition 
(Summa of Logic I.64, § 2): 
Personal supposition, in general, is that [which occurs] 
when a term supposits for its significate, whether that significate is 
                                                 
35 I put the indefinite article in parentheses, since the corresponding Latin sentence 
would not have one. 
36 See Ch. 3, p. 77, above. 
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(a) a thing outside the soul, whether it is (b) an utterance, or (c) an 
intention of the soul, whether it is (d) an inscription, or anything 
else imaginable. So whenever the subject or predicate of a proposi-
tion supposits for its significate in such a way that it is taken sig-
nificatively, the supposition is always personal. 
And he goes on to give some examples of the various possibilities he lists 
(ibid., §§ 3–6): 
(a) In ‘Every man is an animal’, ‘man’ supposits personally for 
a thing outside the soul. 
(b) In ‘Every spoken name is a part of speech’, ‘name’ suppos-
its personally for utterances. 
(c) In ‘Every intention of the soul is in the soul’, ‘intention of 
the soul’ supposits personally for intentions of the soul. 
(d) In ‘Every written word is a word’, ‘written word’ supposits 
for inscriptions. 
In each case, the term refers to or supposits for the things it (primarily) 
signifies, the things it is truly predicable of, and so is in personal supposition. 
Notice, at the end of the definition just quoted, the phrase ‘taken significa-
tively’. What do you suppose its role is? Well, it is not redundant; it does not just 
repeat the earlier part, about the term’s suppositing for what it signifies. 
The proper interpretation of this phrase confused me for a long time. And 
in my paper “Ockham’s Rule of Supposition,” I said some things I later had to 
retract.37 I have come to the conclusion that the phrase only makes sense if we 
interpret it as follows: 
A term is taken significatively if and only if it is taken for (suppos-
its for) everything it primarily signifies. 
So in fact the phrase ‘taken significatively’, far from being redundant in 
the definition, is really the operative phrase. All the stuff at the beginning, with its 
singular nouns ‘its significate’, ‘a thing outside the soul’, and so on, might sug-
gest that a term is in personal supposition provided only that it supposits for 
something it primarily signifies. But that is not enough, and the phrase ‘taken sig-
nificatively’ at the end of the definition puts things aright. 
I will not here rehearse all the details of my reasoning in favor of this in-
terpretation of the phrase ‘taken significatively’.38 But let me give you a hint. On 
the other interpretation — and these are the only two reasonable ones — it would 
follow that the term ‘being’, since it signifies absolutely everything, would al-
                                                 
37 The retraction occurs in “Ockham’s Distinctions between Absolute and Connotative 
Terms.” Professor Calvin Normore was the one who convinced me that I was mistaken. 
38 See the second “problem” discussed in my “Ockham’s Rule of Supposition,” and the 
reply in “Ockham’s Distinctions between Absolute and Connotative Terms,” p. 62 n. 23. 
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ways be in personal supposition whenever it occurred in a propositional context. 
And that, as we shall see, is not so. I will give you further examples as we pro-
ceed. 
ii.  Simple Supposition 
So much for personal supposition. Ockham defines simple supposition as 
follows (Summa of Logic I.64, § 8): 
Simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for an in-
tention of the soul, but is not taken significatively. 
There’s that phrase ‘taken significatively’ again. Notice that if it does not 
mean what I think it does, then on the other interpretation the term ‘concept’ 
could never be in simple supposition. And that will turn out not to be so. 
Let me give you an example of the kind of thing Ockham has in mind for 
simple supposition. For Ockham, recall, there are no real universals or common 
natures. The only universals for him are universal concepts.39 And even they are 
not universal in the sense of being metaphysically shared by many things, as real-
ists want universals to be. They are universal only in the sense that they are con-
cepts of many things — they are “general” concepts. Metaphysically, they are just 
as individual as anything else; they are individual thoughts. They are not univer-
sal in the sense of being “in many”; they are universal only in the sense of being 
“predicated of many.” Ockham interprets talk about species and genera as refer-
ring to these general concepts, since they are the only plausible candidates, given 
his ontology. 
Hence for Ockham, in ‘Man is a species’, in the sense in which it is true, 
the subject term supposits not for some extramental universal or common nature 
that is the species, but rather for the concept of man, which is a specific concept.40 
Now notice: In that proposition the term ‘man’ supposits for an intention 
of the soul, but it is not taken significatively, since it does not supposit for men 
there, but for the concept. Hence it is in simple supposition. 
On the other hand, in ‘Every concept is in the mind’, the term ‘concept’ is 
not in simple supposition, even though it supposits for intentions of the soul, be-
cause there it is “taken significatively.” It supposits for all concepts, which is to 
say, for all its primary significates. It is therefore in personal supposition, not 
simple. 
In principle, the definition of simple supposition we have just seen allows 
for cases in which a term supposits for any concept, as long as the term is not 
                                                 
39 And universal spoken and written terms. But the latter are universal only in a deriva-
tive and parasitic sense; they get their universality from the universal concepts they are subordi-
nated to. 
40 Do not use the term ‘specific’ loosely when talking about mediaeval philosophy and 
logic. Here, for instance, a “specific concept” is not just some one, given concept, but a concept at 
the level of “species” on the Porphyrian tree. 
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taken significatively. In practice, however, what Ockham seems to have in mind, 
for spoken and written terms at any rate, is the case in which a term supposits 
only for the concept to which it is subordinated, as in the example I just gave you. 
Hence, for Ockham, although spoken and written terms do not in general signify 
the concepts they are subordinated to, nevertheless we sometimes use them in 
simple supposition to talk about the concepts to which they are subordinated. 
iii.  Material Supposition 
Let us look finally at material supposition. Here is how Ockham defines it 
(Summa of Logic I.64, § 10): 
Material supposition occurs when a term does not supposit 
significatively but supposits for an utterance or for an inscription. 
Notice that if the phrase ‘taken significatively’ does not mean what I have 
claimed it does, then on any other reasonable interpretation the term ‘utterance’ 
could never be in material supposition. 
As an example of material supposition, consider the proposition ‘Man is a 
monosyllable’. In the sense in which that proposition is true, the term ‘man’ sup-
posits not for individual men, and not for the concept to which it is subordinated, 
but for itself. And, since it is not taken significatively there, it follows that the 
term is in material supposition. 
On the other hand, in the proposition ‘Every utterance takes time to pro-
nounce’, the subject term is in personal supposition, not material, because even 
though it supposits for utterances, nevertheless it is “taken significatively” there, 
since it supposits for all utterances — which is to say, for all its primary signifi-
cates. 
Incidentally, we are now in a position to see what was wrong with Ock-
ham’s definition of proper supposition as the supposition of a term for what it 
“properly signifies.”41 If that were so, then most instances of simple and material 
supposition would be cases of improper supposition, which seems to be com-
pletely contrary to Ockham’s intention. 
iv.  Summary 
Here then is the picture we have so far. (For the present I will ignore the 
distinction between spoken and written language.) 
                                                 
41 See p. 251 above. 




Figure 14: First Approximation of Ockham’s Schema 
But actually, the situation is more complicated than this picture suggests. 
For, as Ockham says (Summa of Logic I.64, § (13)), this distinction of three kinds 
of supposition can also be made in mental language. Hence our picture becomes: 
 
Figure 15: Ockham’s Full Schema 
v.  Mistaken Interpretations of Ockham’s Division 
There are some mistakes to avoid in thinking about Ockham’s division of 
supposition. 
Chapter 8: Supposition — The Theory of Reference 
 
258
(1) In personal supposition a term always supposits for an ex-
ternal non-linguistic thing. 
That’s wrong. It is true that whenever a term does supposit for an external 
non-linguistic thing, it will be in personal supposition.42 The converse, however, 
does not hold. There are cases of personal supposition in which the term supposits 
for a concept, or for a spoken or written expression. 
For the same reasons, therefore, it is wrong to think that simple supposi-
tion occurs whenever a term supposits for a concept, or that material supposition 
occurs whenever a term supposits for a spoken or written expression. 
(2) Material supposition occurs just whenever a term supposits 
only for itself. Thus, material supposition corresponds to 
our modern-day use of quotation marks. 
That’s wrong too. It is both too broad and too narrow a characterization of 
material supposition. It is too broad insofar as in mental language a term has sim-
ple supposition, not material, when it supposits only for itself. (Refer back to the 
definitions.) 
vi.  Refinements in Material and Simple Supposi-
tion 
It is also too narrow a characterization, for reasons we must now examine. 
Ockham points out (Summa of Logic I.64, § 12) that, if we wanted, we could sub-
divide material supposition into two kinds, according as the term supposits for a 
spoken expression (and is not taken significatively) or for a written expression 
(ditto). But, he says, in fact we lack such a terminology and do not in practice 
make this finer distinction. 
For example, if I say aloud “Man has three letters,” then in the sense in 
which that is true I am referring not to the spoken word ‘man’ but to the written 
word. Likewise, if I write ‘Cacophony is an ugly word’, then in the sense in 
which it is true I am referring to the spoken word ‘cacophony’, not to the written 
word. (The written word is visually rather pleasing, with all its nicely curved let-
ters.) 
Both examples would count as cases of material supposition, in accor-
dance with Ockham’s definition. And yet in neither case does the term in material 
supposition supposit for itself. 
                                                 
42 Actually, this follows only if we assume that Ockham’s three main kinds of proper 
supposition are intended to be exhaustive. Otherwise, it would be possible for a term to supposit 
for an external non-linguistic thing and yet not to supposit for everything it primarily signifies (so 
that it is not “taken significatively”). For example, if the term ‘red’ supposited only for a certain 
apple, even though there were lots of other red things too. This case does not fit any of Ockham’s 
three definitions. Ockham does not talk about such cases, presumably because he didn’t think they 
could arise. 
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Furthermore, it turns out that even if we ignore the distinction between 
spoken and written language here, there are still at least two quite different kinds 
of material supposition in spoken and written language (and, correspondingly, 
two kinds of simple supposition in mental language). First of all, there is the case 
in which a term supposits for itself or for other tokens of the same type. For in-
stance, ‘man’ in ‘Man is a monosyllable’. This corresponds more or less to our 
modern-day use of quotation marks.43 And since we are continuing to ignore the 
distinction between spoken and written language, we can include here cases in 
which the written word supposits for the corresponding spoken word or vice versa 
(as in ‘Man has three letters’ or ‘Cacophony is an ugly word’). These as a group 
are the kinds of cases we have been talking about so far. 
But there are other cases of material supposition in spoken or written lan-
guage (or of simple supposition in mental language), in which a term supposits 
for another expression entirely. Consider the true propositions 
‘Hominem esse animal est verum’ 
(‘For a man to be an animal is true’), or 
‘Quod homo est animal est verum’ 
(‘That a man is an animal is true’). 
The complex subjects of these propositions do not supposit for themselves 
but for the proposition ‘A man is an animal’ (or its Latin equivalent), which is a 
quite distinct, although related, expression. It is the proposition that is true, after 
all, not the nominal expressions that serve as its name.44 Furthermore, the subjects 
of those propositions are not “taken significatively.” In virtue of the Additive 
Principle,45 they signify just the sum total of what their parts signify — namely, 
all men and all animals. But they do not primarily signify anything at all; there is 
nothing you can point to and truly say “This is for a man to be an animal,” or 
“This is that a man is an animal.” Hence, if the subjects were taken significa-
tively, the propositions would be false, not true, since they would be affirmative 
propositions with non-denoting subject terms.46 
Thus, if the two propositions above are talking about the spoken or written 
proposition ‘A man is an animal’, which they very well might, their subjects sup-
posit for a spoken or written proposition and are not taken significatively. Hence 
they are in material supposition and yet are not quotations of themselves or of 
anything like themselves. Thus the claim that material supposition amounts to 
quotation is too narrow. And of course a similar thing happens with simple sup-
position for concepts in mental language. 
                                                 
43 I say “more or less” because quotation-mark conventions are not all that clear in con-
texts where we are distinguishing tokens of the same type. 
44 Recall that there are no complexe significabilia in Ockham’s ontology. See Ch. 6, pp. 
165–167, above. 
45 See Ch. 6, p. 166, above. 
46 See Ch. 6, p. 170, above. 
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John Buridan points out that we do not always use infinitival expressions 
in the way illustrated by the first proposition above. He observes47: 
But sometimes such an expression supposits personally, and is 
taken significatively whether it supposits or not.48 For instance, if I 
say ‘For a man to be white is for a man to be colored’,49 ‘To cut is 
to act’, ‘To be cut is to be acted upon or to suffer’. 
Here it is clear that we need a quite different account of what is being said 
and of what is being referred to by those infinitival expressions. We are definitely 
not saying that the proposition ‘A man is white’ is the proposition ‘A man is col-
ored’.50 
b.  Burley’s and Other Authors’ Divisions 
Now let us turn briefly to Burley and some of the other authors displayed 
in the Supplement to this chapter. Most of these people seem to have little to say 
about mental language. Mental language was of interest mainly to the nominalists, 
for reasons I have discussed above.51 But Burley and most of the other authors in 
our Supplement were of a predominately realist persuasion, at least as far as we 
can tell. Hence we can ignore the complications about the supposition of concepts 
in mental language. 
I used to think there was a fairly simple way to link Ockham’s views with 
Burley’s more traditional approach: First, (1) recognize the metaphysical dis-
agreement, that Burley took universals or common natures to be real entities in 
their own right; and then (2) recognize that in addition Burley, unlike Ockham, 
held the psychologico-epistemological claim that terms signify those genera and 
species and not the individuals of which they are the genera and species.52 Thus 
instead of Ockham’s picture (here it is again) 
                                                 
47 John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 3, Scott ed., pp. 51; Scott trans., p. 50. 
48 This probably means “whether there is any thing for which it supposits or not.”  
49 This of course has nothing to do with ‘white man’ and ‘colored man’ in the modern, 
racial sense. In the present context, whiteness is a color like any other color, and something that is 
white is ipso facto colored. 
50 For Buridan’s account of how such expressions work in contexts like this, see Ch. 6, 
pp. 176–177, above. Ockham takes no account of them. 
51 See Ch. 5, p. 147, above. 
52 See Figure 10 (Ch. 5 above, p. 143), and the discussion surrounding it. See also Spade, 
“Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular Terms.” 




Figure 16: Approximation of Ockham’s Schema (Again) 
we get 
 
Figure 17: Approximation of Burley’s Schema 
But while that recipe is all right for some heuristic purposes, the situation 
is in fact more complicated. For example, Burley explicitly holds that, for what he 
calls “discrete simple terms” (proper names will qualify), simple supposition and 
personal supposition coincide53: 
In [the case of] a discrete simple term, simple and personal suppo-
sition do not differ. Rather such a term suppositing simply and 
suppositing personally supposits for entirely the same [thing]. 
We saw nothing like this in Ockham. In personal supposition, the term 
‘Socrates’ (a “discrete simple term”) supposits for Socrates the man, according to 
both Ockham and Burley. For Burley, however, the term also supposits for ex-
                                                 
53 Burley, De suppositionibus, § 2.4; Spade, trans., § 29. For what Burley means by “dis-
crete simple terms,” see Spade, “Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular Terms.”  
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actly the same thing, for Socrates himself, in simple supposition. Thus simple 
supposition is not always supposition for a universal on Burley’s view.54 
Again, Burley defines simple supposition as the kind that occurs when a 
term supposits for its significate55: 
But supposition is simple when a common term or an ag-
gregated singular [term] supposits for what it signifies.56 
As for the first point, I say that supposition is simple when 
a common term supposits for its first significate or for everything 
contained under its first significate, or else when a singular con-
crete term or a singular compound term supposits for its whole 
significate.57 
… when a common term or a concrete singular term or an 
aggregated singular [term] supposits for what it signifies, it has 
simple supposition, …58 
As a result, he cannot (and does not) use the phrase ‘taken significatively’ 
in the way Ockham does in his characterizations of the various branches of sup-
position. 
For Burley, then, it is in general in simple supposition, not personal sup-
position, that terms supposit for what they signify. 
As for material supposition, Burley defines it as occurring (Purity, § 9): 
when an utterance supposits for itself or for another utterance that 
is not inferior to it. 
The second disjunct is meant to accommodate cases like ‘For a man to be 
an animal is true’, which we discussed above.59 The clause ‘that is not inferior to 
it’ in effect does the work of Ockham’s phrase ‘not taken significatively’, insofar 
as terms can be truly predicated of — and so, for Ockham, primarily signify — 
their “inferiors.”60 
Nevertheless, the results are not exactly the same as Ockham’s. For Burley 
goes on to indicate that, despite what is syntactically the most natural way of 
reading the definition, according to which that clause ‘that is not inferior to it’ 
modifies ‘another utterance’, it in fact modifies both disjuncts (Purity, § 10): 
                                                 
54 It is worth pointing out that Burley is not saying here that a “discrete simple term” like 
‘Socrates’ supposits in simple supposition for an “individual nature” (for example, for 
“Socrateity”), if that is interpreted as anything other than just the individual Socrates himself. So 
we cannot just suppose that, for Burley, while personal supposition is for individuals, simple sup-
position is for natures — universal or individual natures, depending on the case. That won’t work. 
55 Actually, things will be more complicated, as the various parts of the following defini-
tions suggest. For a discussion, see ibid. 
56 Burley, Purity, § 13. 
57 Ibid., § 28. 
58 Ibid., § 41. 
59 Compare pp. 259–260, above. 
60 On the “inferiors” of a term, see Ch. 5, p. 145, above. 
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Now I said that supposition is material when an utterance 
supposits for itself or for another utterance “that is not inferior to 
it.” For an utterance sometimes does supposit for something infe-
rior to it, and in that case it supposits personally, whether what is 
inferior is an utterance or whether it is a thing or a concept … 
Hence, for Burley, in the proposition ‘Being is a participle’ the subject 
does not have material supposition, because the term ‘being’ can be truly predi-
cated of itself just as much as it can be predicated of anything else.61 For Ockham, 
the term does have material supposition there. 
As for personal supposition, Burley defines it as occurring when (Purity, § 
12): 
… a term supposits for its suppositum or supposita or for some 
singular of which the term is accidentally predicated. 
The “supposita” here are not just whatever the term happens to supposit 
for, so that the whole thing would reduce to a tautology. Instead the term is used 
here in its etymological sense: what is “put under” the term — in short, it “inferi-
ors.”62 
The last clause of the definition, about a “singular of which the term is ac-
cidentally predicated,” is meant to accommodate certain funny but very interest-
ing cases that need not detain us here.63 
Although the details vary quite a bit from author to author, Burley’s the-
ory, not Ockham’s, is the one that more closely resembles the theory in earlier 
people. For instance, Peter of Spain (Texts (21)–(22)), Lambert of Auxerre (Text 
(24)), William of Sherwood (Text (28)), and Roger Bacon (Text (30)). 
Notice that Peter of Spain makes no mention at all of material supposition. 
Bacon has it, but he doesn’t call it that; for him it is just one branch of simple 
supposition. Lambert’s definition of simple supposition seems to include what 
others call material supposition, but his actual discussion of simple supposition 
does not. 
Note also that the fifteenth century Paul of Pergula omits simple supposi-
tion entirely. Buridan, who was a nominalist, has it in effect, but treats it as just 
one kind of material supposition (Text (54)). Just as Ockham didn’t think there 
was any compelling reason to distinguish spoken from written language when it 
came to material supposition, so too Buridan apparently didn’t think there was 
any special reason to single out mental language with its own “simple” supposi-
tion. For Buridan, it’s all just material supposition. Several other authors did this 
too. 
                                                 
61 Although it is terminologically odd to say so, this means that the term is “inferior” to 
itself. 
62 Compare n. 15 above. 
63 See Spade, “Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular Terms.” 
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c.  Subdivisions of Simple Supposition 
Some realist authors, like Burley and William of Sherwood, show a 
marked tendency toward a proliferation of subdivisions of simple supposition.64 
What seems to be going on in these cases is this. There are a number of 
problematic propositions where terms don’t seem to fit into any of the major divi-
sions of supposition as described so far. For instance, consider the proposition 
‘Man is the worthiest of creatures’. Let’s just all agree that there is a sense in 
which that proposition is supposed to be true; man is the pinnacle of creation, let 
us say (we won’t be the first to do so).65 
All right, in the sense in which the proposition is true, what does its sub-
ject term supposit for? It certainly doesn’t supposit in material supposition for the 
term ‘man’, whether spoken or written. Terms, as mere pieces of language, are 
pretty insignificant when it comes to “worthiness.” Likewise, the subject doesn’t 
supposit for the species man either, whether you interpret that as a concept or as a 
real common nature or universal. Any individual is arguably worth more than a 
concept or a common nature or universal is.66 
On the other hand, the proposition doesn’t seem to be saying merely that 
some one individual human being is the worthiest of creatures. We wouldn’t 
count the proposition as true in the intended sense if there turned out to be one 
exalted human being who won the prize for worthiness among creatures, but all 
the other human beings were no-account low-grades. 
Neither does the proposition seem to be saying that all human beings are 
the worthiest of creatures, that somehow the competition ends up in a tie among 
the whole human race. We want to continue to allow gradations of metaphysical 
worth even within the human species. 
Rather, what the proposition appears to mean, in the sense in which we are 
saying it is true, is that, taken as a group, man is the worthiest of creatures. But 
what does that mean? How does it fit into the three kinds of supposition we’ve 
got so far? We have no recognized branch of supposition in which terms supposit 
for things “taken as a group.” 
Ockham’s general strategy for problems like this is to look to mental lan-
guage, and to translate such recalcitrant propositions in spoken or written lan-
guage into less problematic correlates in mental language. In effect, he is making 
a distinction a little like the modern distinction between the “surface structure” 
and the “deep structure” of language. 
                                                 
64 See the diagrams in the Supplement at the end of this chapter. 
65 We’re talking about some kind of metaphysical “worthiness” here, not moral upright-
ness. Unfortunately, human beings — particularly some I know — score rather low on the latter 
scale. 
66 You might wonder about that claim, but this is only an example. Think of the individ-
ual as adding some “individual perfection” onto whatever perfection it has in virtue of the species 
it belong to. 
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In the case of ‘Man is the worthiest of creatures’, Ockham says (Summa of 
Logic I.66, § 2,67 and reply §§ 7–11) that the spoken or written proposition is sub-
ordinated to some such mental proposition as 
[Every] man is worthier than any corporeal creature is that is not a 
man.68 
It is this, Ockham says, that we really “intend” when we say aloud, or 
write, ‘Man is the worthiest of creatures’. 
Many of the authoritative statements in Scripture and the Church Fathers 
are like this, Ockham says (§ 11). They are false if you take them at face value. 
Hence you must look instead at the “intention” of the authors, at what they really 
meant. And that means speculating about what they were saying in mental lan-
guage. 
This is obviously a strategy that will allow you to get by with an awful lot. 
Nevertheless, it is not a strategy that is available to you unless you take the notion 
of mental language seriously to begin with. Thus, realists — who, I have said,69 in 
general have little to say about mental language — sometimes try to handle these 
problematic propositions instead by introducing various distinctions at the surface 
level, dividing and subdividing the branches of supposition as needed. 
Usually, this involves dividing simple supposition. Both William of Sher-
wood and Burley, for instance, have three kinds of simple supposition.70 The dis-
tinctions are delicate, and it is not clear whether they have the same three.71 
Sometimes, it seems to me, this “surface level” approach is clumsy and 
doesn’t really work very well. But sometimes it demonstrates a nice sensitivity to 
nuances. Burley, for instance (Purity, § 47), asks about the true proposition ‘Sub-
stance is properly defined’ — that is, it has a real, not just a nominal definition.72 
It is not the word that is defined here, since we’re talking about real definition. 
And it is not individual substances that are defined either, since the standard Aris-
totelian view was that individuals do not have real definitions. On the other hand, 
neither can the universal category substance, which is what is signified by the 
term ‘substance’, have a real definition, since real definitions proceed in terms of 
genus and difference and there is no higher genus in which to put the category 
substance.73 Thus, it appears that the word ‘substance’ in the proposition ‘Sub-
                                                 
67 Ockham discusses the proposition in the form ‘Man is the worthiest creature among 
creatures’. The odd phrase just means “the worthiest creature of them all.” 
68 That’s my paraphrase. See Ockham, Summa of Logic I.66, § 10. The restriction to cor-
poreal creatures is meant to rule out angels, who may be even worthier than human beings. (Ock-
ham would have got some argument about that last claim.) 
69 See Ch. 5, p. 147, above. 
70 See the Supplement at the end of this chapter. 
71 For Burley’s account, see Spade, “Walter Burley on the Kinds of Simple Supposition.” 
72 On real and nominal definitions, see Ch. 7, pp. 206–214, above. Ignore all the Ock-
hamist machinery there, since Burley doesn’t use it. For simplicity, let’s assume that we’re talking 
about what Ockham calls “real metaphysical definitions in the strict sense” (ibid., pp. 207–209), 
which proceed by genus- and difference-terms all in the nominative case. 
73 Recall that categories are “most general genera.” 
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stance is properly defined’ can have neither material, personal nor simple suppo-
sition. Yet the proposition is true, since we can define man and animal, and they 
are substances. 
Burley tries to solve this difficulty by appealing to a subtype of simple 
supposition.74 You will have to decide for yourself whether his solution works, 
but in any event his discussion shows an awareness of a nice problem. 
d.  Additional Questions 
i.  Problems about Ockham’s Account of Supposi-
tion in Mental Language 
There are some difficulties with Ockham’ theory of supposition in mental 
language. For example, Kneale and Kneale point out75 that the very notion of ma-
terial supposition in mental language is problematic for Ockham’s account. A 
term in material supposition in mental language would have to be a concept that 
supposits for a spoken or written expression without suppositing for everything it 
signifies (without being “taken significatively”). For example, consider the men-
tal proposition “Man has three letters,” where the subject term is not the concept 
of the written term ‘man’, which is what has three letters after all, but rather the 
concept “man” by which we conceive Socrates and Plato and other people. 
That is certainly an odd theoretical picture. Yet Ockham explicitly says 
this kind of thing can occur (Summa of Logic I.64, § 13)): 
Now just as such a diversity of [kinds of] supposition can 
belong to a spoken and a written term, so too can it belong to a 
mental term. For an intention can supposit for what it signifies, for 
itself, for an utterance and for an inscription. 
In fact, however, when you think about it, the whole notion of different 
kinds of supposition in mental language seems unworkable. Consider the mental 
proposition “Man is an accident,” in which the subject is the concept “man” 
whereby we conceive individual human beings and that supposits in that proposi-
tion in simple supposition for itself. That proposition, so taken, is true.76 But what 
can we learn from it? What do we know when we form that proposition in our 
mental language and assent to it? What epistemological function does it perform? 
Well, surely it ought to tell us, we ought to know by means of it, that man 
is an accident — that is, that the concept “man” is an accident. But how is it that 
we can know that by means of this proposition? After all, the subject of the 
                                                 
74 He calls it “special compared simple supposition.” See Spade, “Walter Burley on the 
Kinds of Simple Supposition.” 
75 William and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic, p. 269. 
76 Ockham came to regard concepts as mental acts, and so as accidents in the category of 
quality. 
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proposition, the concept “man,” signifies individual human beings, not concepts. 
So when we have that concept in mind, we are thinking of individual human be-
ings, not of concepts. How then can that mental proposition tell us that the con-
cept “man” is an accident? 
In other words, if a proposition is going to do epistemological duty, it can 
only tell us about what it makes us think of; it cannot inform us about anything 
else. Now if a mental proposition “makes us think of” something, then it signifies 
that thing.77 But, according to Ockham, a mental proposition can signify some-
thing only if some categorematic constituent term of the proposition signifies that 
thing.78 So in general, if mental propositions are going to do epistemological duty 
in the “language of thought,” it seems their categorematic terms are going to have 
to be in personal supposition, not in material or simple supposition.79 
I therefore offer the following thesis, which explicitly goes against Ock-
ham’s express doctrine, but which I think he should have held: All supposition in 
mental language is personal supposition. 
Peter of Ailly explicitly accepted this consequence in the Concepts part of 
his Concept and Insolubles80: 
It can be inferred also that since a mental term properly so 
called is always taken naturally in a mental proposition, [that is,] 
for the thing it ultimately properly signifies naturally, therefore it 
always supposits for its ultimate significate. It always supposits 
personally, never materially …81 
So did Buridan82: 
Therefore, you have to know, as it seems to me, that mate-
rial supposition does not occur except by reason of a significative 
utterance. No term in a mental proposition supposits materially, 
but always personally. For we do not use mental terms at will, as 
we do utterances and inscriptions. The same mental expression 
never has diverse significations or ways of being taken. For the 
passions of the soul are the same for all, and so are the things of 
which they are the likenesses, as the first part of the On Interpreta-
                                                 
77 See Ch. 3, p. 61, above. 
78 Recall the “Additive Principle” in Ch. 6, p. 166, above. 
79 There are funny cases. For example, no matter what kind of supposition the concept 
“being” has in a mental proposition, it will signify what it supposits for (since it signifies abso-
lutely everything). So the argument I just gave will not without further ado rule out material or 
simple supposition there. But Ockham appears to want his three kinds of supposition to be possi-
ble for any mental term, not just for “funny ones.” 
80 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 5vb; Spade trans., § 68 (p. 29). 
81 Note that Peter does not generally distinguish between material and simple supposi-
tion. See Spade, Concepts and Insolubles, § 67 (p. 29), and p. 112 n. 215. Note also that the claim 
in this paragraph is a rather odd thing for Peter to be saying, since he holds that categorical mental 
propositions properly so called do not have any real parts. See Ch. 4, pp. 126–128, above. 
82 See Sten Ebbesen, “The Summulae, Tractatus VII: De fallaciis,” p. 156. 
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tion has it [1, 16a6–8]. Hence, I say that the mental proposition 
corresponding to the proposition ‘A man is a species’, insofar as it 
is true, is not a proposition in which the specific concept of men is 
made the subject. Rather it is a proposition in which the concept 
whereby the specific concept of men is conceived is made the sub-
ject. And that surely supposits not for itself but for the specific 
concept of men. 
In short, only if the terms of mental proposition supposit personally do we 
in general “know what we are thinking.” Here is the argument in a nutshell: 
(1) The concept of a thing is the very act of thinking about that 
thing.83 
(2) Therefore, we cannot think about a thing except by means of a 
concept of that thing. 
(3) Concepts signify what they are concepts of. 
(4) Therefore, we cannot think about a thing except by means of a 
concept that signifies that thing. 
(5) Therefore, if we want to say in mental language that the con-
cept “man” is an accident, we must use not the concept “man,” but 
rather the concept of the concept “man.”84 
This means that when we utter the spoken proposition ‘Man is an acci-
dent’ with the subject term in simple supposition, the proposition as a whole is 
subordinated to a mental proposition in which the subject is not, as you might ex-
pect, the concept “man” to which the spoken subject ‘man’ is subordinated, but 
rather the concept of that concept. Note that in such cases the subordination of the 
whole spoken proposition is not a function of the subordination of its parts.85 
I think we are led to this conclusion, despite Ockham’s explicit statement 
that all three kinds of supposition can occur in mental language, by following out 
the implications of: (a) Ockham’s definition of personal supposition in terms of 
signification; (b) the notion of signification as an epistemological relation; (c) the 
epistemological role of mental language as the vehicle of thought.86 
                                                 
83 Not everyone held this “intellectio”-theory, but Ockham came to hold it. See Ch. 5, 
pp. 156–160, above. In any case, everyone would have held the next step of the argument, even if 
not for this reason. 
84 Note that the conclusion follows even if you don’t hold that concepts are mental acci-
dents — you think the mental proposition is false. 
85 Recall our discussion of Robert Fland in Ch. 4, pp. 88–91, above. 
86 Some of the issues I’ve just been raising were discussed also in Spade, “Synonymy 
and Equivocation in Ockham’s Mental Language,” pp. 17–22. 
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ii.  The “Rule of Supposition” 
Here is another question for you: How do you tell which of the three main 
kinds of supposition a term has on any given occasion? That is, how do you tell 
what a term is referring to, since there is more than one possibility? 
Several authors addressed this point, and gave what I call a “Rule of Sup-
position” for resolving the question.87 The actual content of the rule varied from 
author to author. But most of them — Paul of Pergula is an exception88 — seem 
to have held that the predicate terms of propositions always have personal suppo-
sition, whereas subjects may have one or another kind of supposition, depending 
on the semantic kind of the predicate term. Let us confine ourselves here mainly 
to Ockham’s and Burley’s versions of the rule. (See Ockham, Summa of Logic 
I.65; Burley, Purity, §§ 42–44.) 
For both of these authors, subject terms can have personal supposition in 
any context whatever. But they can have material or simple supposition only if 
the predicate is semantically appropriate — that is, the sort of term that can be 
truly predicated of what the subject term supposits for in material or simple sup-
position. 
Thus in ‘Man is an animal’, the subject term ‘man’ can have only personal 
supposition, while in ‘Man is a monosyllable’ it can have either material or per-
sonal supposition, and in ‘Man is a species’ it can have either simple or personal 
supposition. (In the last two cases, the proposition will be false if the term is taken 
in personal supposition, but that doesn’t matter.) For Ockham, in ‘Man is a com-
mon name’, the term can have any of the three types of supposition, insofar as (a) 
it can always have personal supposition, and insofar as the predicate ‘common 
name’ can be truly predicated both of (b) spoken and written expressions and of 
(c) mental common names — that is, general concepts. For Burley (and for Ock-
ham), in ‘Man is a being’, the subject can likewise have any of the three kinds of 
supposition. 
Some propositions are therefore ambiguous because their subjects may 
have more than one kind of supposition. Both Ockham and Burley say this explic-
itly, and warn that such propositions have to be “distinguished” according to their 
various senses. 
In a way there is an obvious bias in these rules, a bias in favor of personal 
supposition. A term can always be taken in personal supposition, but in simple or 
material supposition only in special contexts. Personal supposition, therefore, be-
comes the “normal” kind of supposition.89 
Ockham explicitly allows this kind of ambiguity or equivocation in mental 
language. Thus (Summa logicae III–4.4)90: 
                                                 
87 See Spade, “Ockham’s Rule of Supposition.” 
88 Ibid., pp. 72–73. 
89 Paul of Pergula and Richard Lavenham have rules that do not exhibit this feature; for 
them, terms cannot have personal supposition in all contexts. See Spade, “Ockham’s rule of Sup-
position,” pp. 71–73. 
90 Gál et al., ed., p. 763.113–118. 
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And it must be noted that this third mode of equivocation 
can be found in a purely mental proposition, although the first two 
modes have no place except among signs instituted by conven-
tion.91 Thus the mental proposition “Man is a species” can be dis-
tinguished insofar as the subject can supposit significatively or for 
itself … 
The fact that Ockham explicitly says this, however, does not lessen the 
fact that it conflicts with other features of his doctrine. In Ch. 4, I gave you what I 
consider a pretty conclusive argument that there is no equivocation of any kind in 
mental language: in effect, there is nothing equivocation there could be.92 In this 
respect, it seems to me that Buridan’s and Peter of Ailly’s theory, that all supposi-
tion in mental language is personal, is the better one. 
iii.  Supposition Theory as the Basis for a Theory of 
Truth Conditions 
There is one last but very important point to be made about this first half 
of supposition theory. Some authors, although by no means all, give an explicit 
theory of truth conditions for categorical propositions in terms of the theory of 
“supposition proper,” as we have called it, the first of the two parts into which T. 
K. Scott divided supposition theory.93 It is worth emphasizing, for reasons we 
shall see in Ch. 9 below, that this is a theory of truth conditions that has nothing at 
all to do with the doctrine of “descent to singulars,” which will be a big feature of 
the theory of “modes of personal supposition.” 
Such an account of truth conditions is by no means a regular part of the 
theory of supposition proper. There is nothing like it, for instance, in William of 
Sherwood, Roger Bacon, Peter of Spain, Lambert of Auxerre, Walter Burley, 
Richard Lavenham or Paul of Pergula. On the other hand, we do find it in Ock-
ham’s Summa logicae, II.2–4 (Texts (43)–(45)), and in Ch. 2 of Buridan’s 
Sophismata, conclusions 10–14 (Text (70)). 
It will help to understand Ockham here if you recall that in personal sup-
position a term is “taken significatively” — that is, supposits for all its signifi-
cates.94 Thus in ‘Some man is tall’ the term ‘man’ supposits for all men, not just 
for the tall ones, and the term ‘tall’ supposits for all tall things, not just for tall 
men. 
Given this, Ockham says that a universal affirmative, ‘Every A is a B’, is 
true iff the predicate supposits for everything the subject supposits for — maybe 
for more besides, but for at least those things. A particular affirmative, ‘Some A is 
                                                 
91 On the three “modes” of equivocation, see Spade, “Ockham’s Rule of Supposition,” p. 
65 n. 7, and Spade, “Synonymy and Equivocation in Ockham’s Mental Language,” pp. 15–22. 
92 See Ch. 4, pp. 99–100, above. See also, Spade, “Synonymy and Equivocation in Ock-
ham’s Mental Language,” pp. 19–20. 
93 See p. 243, above. 
94 See p. 254 above. 
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B’, is true iff the predicate supposits for something the subject supposits for. And 
so on. One can easily go around the “square of opposition” and generate appro-
priate truth conditions in this way. 
Buridan’s statement of his corresponding rules is a little more careless 
than Ockham’s. But the effect of the rules seems to be exactly the same. 
This account of truth conditions of course sounds very much like what we 
do today when we give truth conditions for formal languages in terms of set-
theoretic relations among the denotations or extensions of the terms in a proposi-
tion. And to some extent, I suppose, it is all right to think of think of the mediae-
val theory in those terms, provided we keep two things clearly in mind: 
First, Ockham and Buridan (and anyone else who had such a theory) were 
not really proceeding set-theoretically. Their theories were put in terms of sup-
positing for all or some or none of the same things, not in terms of “inclusion,” 
“intersection” or “exclusion,” and they carry no commitment to the existence of 
things like the null set, power sets, and so on.95 In effect, what I am saying is that 
Ockham and Buridan were not proceeding set-theoretically in any way that goes 
beyond what is sometimes called “virtual set-theory” or the “virtual theory of 
classes.”96 
Second, we have to remember that all affirmative propositions were taken 
in the Middle Ages with “existential import” — they were false if their subjects 
were non-denoting.97 The most natural and normal way of expressing truth condi-
tions set-theoretically does not have this feature. 
C.  Additional Reading 
For additional reading on the material covered in this chapter, see: T. K. Scott, “Introduction” to 
John Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, pp. 29–35; Paul Vincent Spade, “Walter Burley 
on the Kinds of Simple Supposition,” “Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular 
Terms,” “Ockham’s Rule of Supposition: Two Conflicts in His Theory,” “Synonymy and Equivo-
cation in Ockham’s Mental Language.” (You can tell whose work in this field I like best.) 
                                                 
95 If you don’t know this lingo, just skip it. 
96 See Quine, Set Theory and Its Logic, p. 16: “Much, however, of what is commonly 
said of classes with the help of ‘∈’ [the notation for class-membership] can be accounted for as a 
mere manner of speaking, involving no real reference to classes nor any irreducible use of ‘∈’.” 
(The technical distinction between classes and sets is irrelevant to anything that concerns us here.) 
97 On existential import, see Ch. 2, p. 17, above. Recall also that negative categoricals 
were taken as not having existential import, as they had better be if they are going to be the con-
tradictories of affirmatives. 




D.  Supplement: Diagrams of the Divisions of 
Supposition Proper 
Peter of Spain’s Division: 
 
Roger Bacon’s Division: 
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Lambert of Auxerre’s Division: 
 
William of Sherwood’s Division: 
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Walter Burley’s Division: 
 
The “Ockhamist” Division” 
 
Variations: Albert of Saxony makes no mention of improper supposition. For 
Richard Lavenham, mobile = confused and distributive, and immobile = merely 
confused. 
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John Buridan’s and Paul of Pergula’s Division: 
 
Variation: Buridan omits the distinction mobile/immobile. 
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 Chapter 9: The Ups and Downs of 
Personal Supposition 
n Chapter 8, above, we discussed the theory of “supposition proper,” the 
first half of supposition theory according to the distinction drawn by T. 
K. Scott in the “Introduction” to his translation of Buridan’s Sophis-
mata.1 In the present chapter, we will discuss the second half of supposi-
tion theory, what Scott calls the doctrine of “modes of supposition.”2 
The first thing you must realize is that the theory of “modes of supposi-
tion” is a theory that applies to personal supposition only — that is, to that kind of 
supposition wherein, for instance, the term ‘man’ supposits for all human beings, 
not for the spoken or written word ‘man’, and not for the concept “man” or the 
universal nature man. 
The theory of modes of supposition is a theory that divides personal sup-
position into branches and subbranches. It is therefore, first of all, a classification 
schema. Just how did this classification go, and what was the point of it? 
The second question, oddly enough, is one of the big mysteries in this 
business. But the answer to the first question, although complicated, is relatively 
clear. So let’s begin there. 
A.  The Branches of Personal Supposition 
Look back at the Supplement to Ch. 8, above. Notice that under personal 
supposition, everyone there, with the exception of William of Sherwood and Peter 
of Spain, has a division like this: 
                                                 
1 Scott, “Introduction” to Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, p. 30. 
2 Remember that this is Scott’s name for it, not a mediaeval one; they didn’t draw the 
distinction. Much of what I say in this chapter is a more extended and less technical version of 
material presented in Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical.” For any serious work on what I am 
talking about in this chapter, you will have to go look at that paper. 
 




Figure 18: Branches of Personal Supposition 
As always with these things, there are variations. Lambert of Auxerre 
(Text (25)), for example, uses the terms ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ for ‘merely con-
fused’ and ‘confused and distributive’, but the idea seems to be pretty much the 
same. 
Some authors divide confused and distributive supposition into mobile and 
immobile supposition. Others appear to have simply taken those terms as mere 
equivalents for ‘confused and distributive’ and ‘merely confused’, respectively. 
For example, Richard Lavenham and Robert Fland, both in the second half of the 
fourteenth century. Paul of Pergula divides both confused and distributive and 
merely confused supposition into mobile and immobile. I will have little to say 
here about mobile and immobile supposition, and will concentrate instead on 
things down to that point in the diagram. 
Let us look first at discrete supposition. For Sherwood, at least insofar as I 
understand what he says, there is some question about just where discrete suppo-
sition fits on the schema. And for Peter of Spain, discrete supposition is not a 
branch of personal supposition at all, but rather a prior branch, before we come to 
the division into personal and simple supposition as species of “common” suppo-
sition.3 
Well, what then is discrete supposition? In a word, it is the kind of per-
sonal supposition “discrete terms” have — that is, proper names (like “Socrates’, 
‘Plato’), demonstrative pronouns (like ‘this’, ‘that’), and demonstrative phrases 
(like ‘this man’, ‘that animal’), etc.4 
Recall that a “singular proposition” is a categorical proposition in which 
the subject term is one of these discrete (or “singular”) terms.5 Hence the subjects 
of singular propositions will always have discrete supposition.6 
                                                 
3 Note also that Peter of Spain does not recognize material supposition. 
4 Note that since Latin lacks a definite article, there is no real equivalent to the modern 
notion of a “definite description” (for instance, ‘the dog on the porch’), although a pretty close 
equivalent can be constructed by using demonstrative phrases and relative clauses (‘that dog 
which is on the porch’). 
5 See Ch. 2, p. 14, above. 
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Discrete supposition will be absolutely central to the theory. The other 
modes of personal supposition are going to be cashed out in terms of discrete 
supposition, to be in a sense “reduced” to it. 
As distinct from discrete supposition, the other modes of personal supposi-
tion all count as kinds of “common” supposition. They are the kinds of personal 
supposition a term can have if it is not a discrete term — in short, if it is a “com-
mon name.” There are three main kinds of common personal supposition: deter-
minate supposition, confused and distributive supposition,7 and merely confused 
supposition.8 
1.  Syntactical Rules 
How are these three kinds of common supposition distinguished from one 
another? Well, we find two main approaches. On the one hand, sometimes they 
are distinguished syntactically, in terms of the position of a term in a proposition. 
On the other hand, sometimes they are distinguished in terms of an elaborate the-
ory of “descent and ascent,” which we will look at in a moment. 
The syntactical rules are complex. They tell you, for instance, that a com-
mon name has a certain one of these three kinds of personal supposition depend-
ing on whether the term is subject or predicate in one of the standard A-, E-, I- or 
O-forms,9 whether it falls within the scope of a quantifier or negation or certain 
other operators, etc. The possibilities are endless, of course, and so it is not sur-
prising that the rules one finds are never really adequate to cover all the cases one 
actually encounters. Perhaps the most extensive list may be found in Albert of 
Saxony’s Perutilis logica.10 I quote them at some length here, just to give you 
idea of how complex things can get. Here we go: 
1. The subject of any singular proposition supposits dis-
cretely. 
2. In an indefinite proposition the subject supposits determi-
nately. 
3. The subject of any particular proposition supposits deter-
minately, just as the subject of an indefinite proposition 
does. 
                                                                                                                                     
6 Understand that we are confining ourselves to personal supposition throughout this 
chapter. Also, just to simplify things, let’s agree to confine ourselves to cases where the predicates 
are common names. If the predicate is a discrete term, it will of course have discrete supposition. 
7 Sometimes you will see this shortened to simply ‘distributive supposition’. 
8 The Latin here is ‘suppositio confusa tantum’. Literally, ‘tantum’ is ‘only’, not 
‘merely’. But the translation “merely confused” is universally used in the literature. 
9 See Ch. 2, p. 14, above. 
10 Albert of Saxony, Perutilis logica, Tract. 2, ca. 6–7, fols. 12vb–14ra. See also the pres-
entation in Boehner, Medieval Logic, Appendix II, pp. 103–109. 
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4. Every common term that immediately follows a universal 
affirmative quantifier without a negation put in front of it 
supposits confusedly and distributively. 
5. A negation confuses confusedly and distributively a com-
mon term that follows it mediately or immediately. There-
fore, the predicate of any negative proposition, no matter 
what its quantity is, whether it is common,11 singular or 
particular, supposits confusedly [and] distributively — 
unless the predicate there is a singular term or some other 
syncategorema blocks it.12 
6. A term is confused distributively by a negation that infini-
tizes it.13 
7. A relative of diversity14 confuses distributively a term fol-
lowing it. 
8. A term that includes a negation in itself15 confuses confus-
edly and distributively a term that follows it. 
9. Syncategoremata whereby a comparison of equality oc-
curs16 … confuse terms that follow [them] confusedly [and] 
distributively — always understanding “unless another 
syncategorema blocks [it].” 
10. Syncategoremata whereby a comparison by excess17 occurs 
… confuse terms that follow them … confusedly and dis-
tributively. 
11. Whatever mobilizes immobility immobilizes mobility.18 
For merely confused supposition, we have the rules: 
1. For any universal affirmative proposition the predicate of 
which is a common term, the predicate supposits merely 
confusedly. 
2. The subject of any exclusive affirmative proposition19 sup-
posits merely confusedly. 
                                                 
11 I conjecture this should read ‘universal’, but I am translating what I see, fol. 12vb. 
12 For example, in ‘Socrates is not every man’, the quantifier ‘every’ prevents ‘man’ 
from having confused and distributive supposition. 
13 That is, by a negation that operates on the term, not on the whole proposition. For ex-
ample, the ‘non-’ in ‘Socrates is a non-stone’. 
14 The example given is ‘other than’ (aliud ab’) in ‘An ass is other than a man’. 
15 For instance, ‘different’. 
16 For instance, ‘as … as’ (‘ita … sicut’). 
17 For instance, ‘than’ (‘quam’). 
18 This concerns mobile and immobile supposition, and I said we weren’t going to talk 
about that. 
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3. A [syncategorematic] term that is equivalent to an expres-
sion put together out of a universal affirmative quantifier 
and a common term20 confuses an expressed common term 
following it in the proposition merely confusedly. 
4. There are certain verbs that have the power of confusing 
the terms following them merely confusedly.21 
Obviously one could go on indefinitely to ever deeper and more extensive 
analyses. But what good is it? Surely this complicated schema of classification is 
not just for the fun of it. There must be some reason for grouping certain kinds of 
contexts together as producing, for instance, merely confused supposition, and 
others as producing confused and distributive supposition. Presumably the reason 
for such grouping is that terms in contexts belonging to the same group behave 
similarly in logically relevant ways. What are those ways? 
Well, the logically relevant ways are given by the rules of “descent and 
ascent” I mentioned earlier.22 Those rules will be what define these various kinds 
of supposition. So let us turn to them. 
2.  Descent and Ascent 
a.  Determinate Supposition 
We begin with determinate supposition. Ockham tells us (Summa of Logic 
I.70, §§ 4–5) that in determinate supposition it is possible to “descend to singu-
lars” by means of a disjunction. Burley agrees (Purity, § 82), although he doesn’t 
actually use the phrase ‘descend to singulars’. 
How does this work? Consider the singular affirmative proposition ‘Soc-
rates is a man’. (Here I am underlining the word we are going “descend under.”) 
From that proposition, we can infer: 
Therefore, Socrates is this man or Socrates is that man, or Socrates 
is that other man — and so on for all men. 
Similarly for the subjects of indefinite and particular propositions, af-
firmative or negative: 
A man is running (alternatively, some man is running); ∴ This 
man is running or that man is running, or … 
                                                                                                                                     
19 For instance, ‘Only an animal is a man’. 
20 For example, ‘always’, which is equivalent to ‘at every time’. 
21 For example, ‘promise’ in ‘I promise you a dime (denarium)’. 
22 See p. 279 above. 
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A man is not running (alternatively, some man is not running). ∴ 
This man is not running or that man is not running, or … 
Again, the predicates of indefinite or particular affirmatives: 
A man is a runner (alternatively, some man is a runner).23 ∴ A 
man (respectively, some man) is this runner, or a man (respec-
tively, some man) is that runner, or … 
In each case, we can infer from the original proposition a disjunction of 
propositions each of which is exactly like the original except that the common 
term under which we are “descending,” together with its quantifier (if any), is re-
placed by a discrete term that supposits for one of the supposita of the original 
common term.24 The disjuncts in such a disjunction are called the “singulars” of 
the original proposition.25 Determinate supposition then occurs when this kind of 
inference — called a “descent to singulars by a disjunction” — is valid.26 
Is that all there is to it? For Burley (Purity, § 82), apparently so. But for 
Ockham there is more to say. In addition to this “descent”-requirement, Ockham 
(Summa of Logic I.70, § 5) also gives what we might call an “ascent”-
requirement. Not only must it be valid to descend from the original proposition to 
a disjunction of all its singulars. It must also be valid to infer the original proposi-
tion from any one of those singulars individually — that is, from any of the dis-
juncts. Thus: 
Socrates is this man.27 ∴ Socrates is a man. 
This man is running. ∴ A man is running (alternatively, some 
man) is running. 
This man is not running. ∴ A man (alternatively, some man) is not 
running. 
A man (alternatively, some man) is this runner. ∴ A man (alterna-
tively, this man) is a runner. 
                                                 
23 I have changed from ‘running’ to ‘runner’ since I want to be able to put demonstrative 
pronouns on the word without adding anything else. Otherwise, I’d have to say something like 
‘this running [person]’. 
24 See Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” pp. 191–192, for a discussion of complica-
tions that arise over the universal negative quantifier ‘no’ and over descending under vacuous 
terms like ‘chimera’ or ‘unicorn’. 
25 Do not be confused. This is not quite the same as the notion of a “singular proposi-
tion” described in Ch. 2, p. 14, above. That was just any old categorical proposition with a dis-
crete term in subject position. Here, in the notion of a “singular of a proposition,” the discrete term 
may occur in other positions as well. 
26 Note that these descents conform to Albert of Saxony’s rules, pp. 279–281, above, ex-
cept that Albert’s rules say nothing at all about the predicates of singular, indefinite or particular 
affirmatives. 
27 Here I am underlining the term we are going to ascend from. 
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Buridan’s account (Text (55)) agrees with Ockham’s. 
b.  Confused and Distributive Supposition 
Let us look now at confused and distributive supposition. Burley’s ac-
count here (Purity, §§ 99–137) is obscured by the fact that, although he discusses 
in considerable detail the subdivision of confused and distributive supposition 
into mobile and immobile, and again into absolute and respective, and so on, he 
never gets around to telling us what confused and distributive supposition itself is. 
But it appears that for the kinds of propositions we are considering, confused and 
distributive supposition occurs whenever it is possible to descend from the origi-
nal proposition to any arbitrary singular.28 
Ockham (Summa of Logic I.70, § 8) gives the following criterion: a com-
mon term is in confused and distributive supposition when one can descend to a 
conjunction of all the singulars, but cannot ascend from any one singular. 
Note for future reference how he puts the “ascent”-rule: not in terms of 
what you can do, but in terms of what you cannot do. For example, from ‘Every 
man is running’, we can infer ‘This man is running and that man is running and 
…’ But we obviously cannot infer: ‘This man is running; therefore, every man is 
running’.29 
Buridan (Text (56)) in effect agrees with Ockham. He does not explicitly 
require that ascent from any arbitrary singular fail. But he does say30 “Now in 
every [kind of] confused supposition one of these conditions [for determinate 
supposition31] is lacking.” In confused and distributive supposition it cannot be 
the requirement of descent to a disjunction of all the singulars that is lacking, 
since Buridan says descent to a conjunction of all the singulars holds for confused 
and distributive supposition, from which it follows that descent to a disjunction of 
all the singulars holds there as well. Thus it must be ascent from an arbitrary sin-
gular (the other requirement Buridan gives for determinate supposition) that fails 
for confused and distributive supposition. 
Albert of Saxony’s fourth and fifth rules provide that the subjects of uni-
versal propositions, affirmative or negative, have confused and distributive sup-
position, as do the predicates of any negative categorical whatever (as long as that 
predicate is a common term). I just gave you an example for the subject of a uni-
versal affirmative. Here are examples for the other cases: 
                                                 
28 See the discussion in Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” p. 215, n. 29. 
29 Don’t say “Well, yes we could, if this man happened to be the only man in existence.” 
The kinds of inferences involved in descent and ascent were regarded as necessary ones; their 
validity or invalidity does not depend on which contingencies happen to be realized and which do 
not. See Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” p. 192. See also p. 303 below. 
30 John Buridan, Tractatus de suppositionibus, Reina ed., p. 323.361–362; King trans., p. 
130 § 3.5.7. 
31 See Text (55). 
Chapter 9: The Ups and Downs of Personal Supposition 
 
284
(SUBJECTS OF UNIVERSAL NEGATIVES:) No man is running. ∴ This 
man is not running and that man is not running, and … BUT NOT: 
This man is not running. ∴ No man is running. 
(PREDICATES OF UNIVERSAL NEGATIVES:) No man is a runner. ∴ 
No man is this runner and no man is that runner, and … BUT NOT: 
No man is this runner.32 ∴ No man is a runner. 
(PREDICATES OF PARTICULAR NEGATIVES:) Some man is not a 
Greek. ∴ Some man is not this Greek, and some man is not that 
Greek, and … BUT NOT: Some man is not this Greek. ∴ Some man 
is not a Greek. 
With respect to the failure of ascent for predicates of particular negatives, 
consider: If Socrates and Plato were the only human beings, then it would be true 
to say that some man (namely, Socrates) is not this Greek (pointing to Plato). But 
it would be false to say that some man is not a Greek at all, since by hypothesis 
Socrates and Plato are the only two human beings there are and they are both 
Greek. We shall have occasion to return to the predicates of particular negatives 
later on, and will look at this example in more detail then.33 
Finally: 
(PREDICATES OF SINGULAR NEGATIVES:) Socrates is not a runner. ∴ 
Socrates is not this runner, and Socrates is not that runner, and … 
BUT NOT: Socrates is not this runner.34 ∴ Socrates is not a runner. 
Let us summarize what we have so far by putting it in a table of subject 
and predicates for the various categorical forms: 
                                                 
32 Pointing, let’s say, to a race horse. 
33 See p. 292 below. 
34 Again, let us say, pointing to a race horse. 
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Figure 19: Personal Supposition in Categorical Propositions 
Obviously, there is a conspicuous gap in the table: What about the predi-
cates of universal affirmatives (A-Forms)? For example, what about ‘animal’ in 
‘Every man is an animal’? 
Well, plainly you cannot infer “Every man is an animal; therefore, every 
man is this animal, or every man is that animal, or …”35 So ‘animal’ cannot be in 
determinate supposition. 
Still less can you infer “Every man is an animal; therefore, every man is 
this animal, and every man is that animal, and …” So ‘animal’ is not in confused 
and distributive supposition either. 
The descent fails in either case. On the other hand, you can validly ascend 
from any singular. For suppose it were true that the human race were reduced to a 
single individual, so that indeed every man is this animal (pointing to the sole 
surviving person). Nevertheless, it would still be true that every man is an animal. 
This peculiar case of the predicate of universal affirmatives shows the 
need for a yet third kind of common personal supposition. This is what is called 
“merely confused” supposition. 
c.  Merely Confused Supposition 
Ockham and Burley give slightly different accounts of how this third kind 
of common personal supposition works. Burley (Purity, § 86) says three things 
are necessary for merely confused supposition: 
(a) The term must supposit for several things. In effect, all this 
means is that is it not a discrete term. 
                                                 
35 Not even if there happens to be only one animal in existence, and it turns out to be a 
human being. See n. 29 above. 
 Subject Predicate 
A-Form Confused & 
distributive ? 




I-Form Determinate Determinate 
O-Form Determinate Confused & 
distributive 
Indefinite affirmative Determinate Determinate 
Indefinite negative Determinate Confused & 
distributive 
Singular affirmative Discrete Determinate 
Singular negative Discrete Confused & 
distributive 
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(b) Ascent must be possible from any singular. 
(c) No descent can be made, either by a conjunction or by a 
disjunction. 
In other words, for Burley you have merely confused supposition when 
you can make no descent at all, but you can ascend. Note that he clearly does 
have an ascent-rule here; he did not have one for determinate supposition, as you 
recall. 
Ockham (Summa of Logic I.70, § 7) gives in effect the same three re-
quirements, but adds a fourth: 
(d) One can validly descend to a “disjoint predicate.” 
Buridan (Text (57)) defines merely confused supposition simply by the 
failure of descent to an arbitrary singular and of descent to a disjunction of all the 
singulars. But he does mention that descent to a “disjoint extreme” is allowed. 
Thus, while you cannot validly infer “Every man is an animal; therefore, 
every man is this animal, or every man is that animal, or …,” and you cannot val-
idly infer “Every man is an animal; therefore, every man is this animal, and every 
man is that animal, and …,” you can validly infer “Every man is an animal; there-
fore, every man is this animal or that animal or that other animal or …” and so 
on for all the animals. 
In this case what we are descending to is not a complex proposition with 
several categorical disjuncts, but rather a single categorical proposition with a 
“disjoint predicate.” 
Now this is very odd, isn’t it? What are we supposed to make of a “dis-
joint predicate”? What are the truth conditions for propositions with complex 
terms in them like that? The logic of disjunctive and conjunctive propositions is 
fairly clear, but it is not at all clear how we are to treat disjoint terms. 
I think this appeal to disjoint terms is something of a mark of desperation. 
I suspect it was done only because people felt a need to be able to make some 
kind of descent in every case. And since with merely confused supposition de-
scent by means of the familiar conjunctive or disjunctive propositions was not 
possible, another kind of descent was contrived to fill the gap. 
It is important that this move be recognized for what it is: a move one 
adopts because one is pressured into it, not because it is an attractive one on the 
face of it. I think it is only if we view it in this way that we can make sense of 
what happened historically with the theory of modes of personal supposition. We 
will return to this point later on. 
i.  Horse-Promising 
Before we go on, let me add that Ockham used the notion of merely con-
fused supposition in cases besides the predicates of universal affirmative cate-
goricals. For example (Summa of Logic I.72, §§ 4, 22–26), in the traditional soph-
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ism or puzzle proposition ‘I promise you a horse’ Ockham thinks the term ‘horse’ 
has merely confused supposition. For although I promise you a horse, I don’t 
promise you this horse in particular, and I don’t promise you that horse in particu-
lar either, and so on. Hence we cannot validly descend from the original proposi-
tion under the term ‘horse’ to either a conjunction or a disjunction of singulars. 
But if I did promise you this particular horse, say, it would validly follow that I 
promise you a horse. Finally, although I cannot descend to a conjunction or a dis-
junction of singulars, I can descend to a “disjoint term”: “I promise you a horse; 
therefore, I promise you this horse or that horse or …,” and so on for all the 
horses there are. Thus the term is in merely confused supposition. 
Horse-promising turns out to have been a hot topic of debate in mediaeval 
logic. John Trentman motivates the question nicely36: 
Suppose someone says: “I promise you a horse”. When no horses 
are forthcoming, you investigate and are met with the reply: “It’s 
true I promised you a horse, but the only horses I have are Blackie, 
Goldie, and Old Dobbin. But surely I did not promise you Blackie; 
nor did I promise you Goldie, nor Dobbin. And certainly you 
would not have the gall to claim more than one of those horses. So 
while it’s true that I promised you a horse, I do not owe you any of 
these horses, and these are all the horses I have.” Something seems 
to have gone wrong with the reference of “a horse” to prevent you 
from getting your dues in this matter. Blackie, Goldie and Old 
Dobbin are all horses so they should be included in the extension 
of “horse”; yet “horse” in this context does not seem to admit a 
reference to any particular horse. 
Then, no doubt for the sake of the pure scholarship of the matter, Trent-
man adds the delightful footnote37: 
Lest anyone think this is a typical medieval sophism with no appli-
cation in the real world, I think it is worthwhile to note that a simi-
lar problem arose only a few years ago in the town of Etobicoke, 
Ontario, Canada. It seems that in a flush of patriotism during the 
second world war the town fathers promised a lot to each man 
honourably discharged from His Majesty’s armed services. One 
man, unfortunately, waited twenty five years or so to claim his lot, 
and, owing to the fact that by this time the only lots owned by the 
town were very expensive real estate indeed, he met responses not 
unlike those in our story. 
Because of these difficulties, some authors took the line that ‘horse’ in ‘I 
promise you a horse’ doesn’t have personal supposition at all, but rather simple 
                                                 
36 See Trentman’s “Introduction” to his edition of Vincent Ferrer, Tractatus de supposi-
tionibus, p. 41. 
37 Ibid., n. 1. 
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supposition.38 That view, however, is not without problems of its own. For if you 
had promised me a horse, I would not feel you had kept your promise if you gave 
me only the simple suppositum of the term ‘horse’ without giving me any indi-
vidual horse. And that would be so whether, with Ockham, we think of simple 
supposition as a case of supposition for a concept or whether, with Burley and the 
realists, we think of simple supposition, at least for common terms, as supposition 
for a universal or common nature. 
Burley himself raises this objection. “For,” he says (Purity, § 51), “neither 
a concept in the soul nor a common thing is promised to you.” But he apparently 
thinks he has answered the objection by observing (Purity, § 59): 
… because a universal cannot exist by itself, and consequently 
cannot be delivered [in fulfillment of the promise] except [as 
found] in some singular, therefore he who promises you a horse is 
bound to deliver to you some horse. Otherwise he cannot deliver 
you what was promised. 
I am not convinced. Burley’s argument shows that you cannot fulfill your 
promise without giving me some individual horse or other. But it still seems that, 
on Burley’s view, it is your giving me horsehood39 that constitutes the fulfillment 
of your promise; the individual horse is just a necessary accompaniment. If, by 
some ontological miracle, you were able to give me the universal nature without 
giving me any individual horse, I would marvel at your powers but I still would 
not think you had paid off your debt. 
d.  Conjoint Terms 
Now you may think there is something oddly asymmetrical about the 
situation as it has developed so far. After all, we have descent to conjunctive 
propositions and to disjunctive propositions, and also descent to propositions with 
disjoint terms. But what about descent to propositions with conjoint terms? 
Doesn’t our sense of order require some fourth kind of common personal supposi-
tion — to balance things out? Yet, in the table in Figure 1840 all the places are 
now filled in, all the subjects and predicates. 
Well, it is true. If we confine ourselves to only the subjects and predicates 
of standard categorical propositions, we need go no further. But if we allow not 
only whole subjects and predicates to have supposition, but also the categorematic 
parts of subjects and predicates, then things get very interesting indeed. And, as I 
                                                 
38 See, for example, Burley, Purity, §§ 51, 59. But note that in §§ 60–61, Burley also 
seems to allow Ockham’s response. 
39 Don’t say ‘horseness’. In standard, uncorrupted English, the suffix ‘-ness’ is used to 
form abstract nouns out of adjectives, but never out of nouns. It is only philosophers — and at that 
only English speaking ones who haven’t thought very hard about the facts of their own language 
— who think they can form abstract nouns by just sticking ‘-ness’ promiscuously onto nouns and 
adjectives alike. 
40 See p. 285 above. 
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observed earlier,41 although many authors seemed to think there was something 
slightly illegitimate about allowing the parts of subjects and predicates to have 
supposition in their own right, they regularly ignored their scruples in practice.42 
If we allow the parts of subjects and predicates — and indeed any 
categorematic term occurring in a proposition — to have supposition, then we can 
contrive cases where we cannot descend either to a conjunctive proposition or to a 
disjunctive proposition, or even to a disjoint term, but where we can descend to a 
“conjoint term.” For example, Peter Tartaret, who was Rector of the University of 
Paris at the very end of the fifteenth century, gives the curious example ‘No head 
does every man have’ (Text (81)).43 
The idea here is that we don’t all share a common head, as the Norns of 
the old sagas were said to have shared a single eye among the three of them, so 
that they had to pass it around. No, each of us has his or her own head.44 In that 
sense, then, it is true: no head does every man have. But we cannot infer from 
that: “therefore, no head does this man have or no head does that man have or, 
…,” since we all have heads. Still less can we infer: “therefore, no head does this 
man have and no head does that man have and, …,” for the same reason. And in 
this case, we cannot even infer: “therefore, no head does this man or that man or 
that man … have,” since, once again, we all have heads. 
But we can infer: “no head does this man and that man and that man … 
have.” And in fact that “descent” seems to capture exactly the sense of the origi-
nal proposition: we do not all share a common head; each of has his or her own. 
Again, ascent is possible in this case from any singular. If, alas, no head 
does this man have, then a fortiori no head does every man have. 
So apparently we need yet a fourth kind of common personal supposition, 
one in which ascent from an arbitrary singular is valid, and descent is not valid to 
a disjunctive or conjunctive proposition, or to a disjoint term, but is valid to a 
conjoint term. 
While we’re at it, I should remark that conjoint terms were also sometimes 
used in cases of plural terms taken collectively. For example, ‘The Apostles are 
twelve’. One cannot infer: “therefore, Peter is twelve or James is twelve or …,” 
or “therefore, Peter is twelve and James it twelve and …,” or even “therefore, Pe-
ter or James or … is twelve.” But one can infer: “therefore, Peter and James and 
… are twelve.” 
But mediaeval logic had no fully developed theory of the plural, and al-
though a few authors gave examples like the one I just did, nothing more was 
done about them. 
                                                 
41 See Ch. 8, p. 252, above. 
42 As we have just seen in ‘I promise you a horse’. There ‘horse’ is only part of the 
whole predicate, which is ‘promise you a horse’. 
43 Note that Tartaret includes this kind of supposition under merely confused supposi-
tion. It would indeed go there under Burley’s definition, but not under Ockham’s. 
44 For the sake of the example, ignore decapitations. 
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By this point, a question has surely suggested itself to you: Just where 
does this stop? Are there other, even stranger kinds of descents that may be re-
quired if we just use a little ingenuity? We’ll come back to this later on. 
e.  Modes of Personal Supposition as a Theory of 
Analysis or Truth Conditions 
But before we do that, let us pause to try to figure out what is going on in 
this theory. We have seen enough by now to begin to get the flavor. And I sup-
pose our initial impulse is to take it that what we have here is a mediaeval theory 
of generality — a theory of quantification. In fact, Michael Loux treats the theory 
this way in a paper called, significantly, “Ockham on Generality.” He is by no 
means the only one to have done so. 
On this view, the expanded propositions one generates by descent are 
meant to give a kind of “analysis” of the original proposition, in much the same 
way as, for example, when we teach elementary logic we sometimes treat univer-
sally quantified propositions heuristically as “infinite conjunctions,” and existen-
tially quantified ones as “infinite disjunctions.” 
Ultimately, on this view, the analysis reduces propositions that contain 
common terms, whether explicitly quantified or not, to conjunctions and disjunc-
tions of affirmative or negative identity statements. And for this reason, the theory 
is sometimes thought to be connected with the so called “identity”-theory of the 
copula, as we find it, for instance, in Abelard.45 
How would this go? Well, consider the traditional proposition 
(1) Every man is an animal. 
The subject term there is in confused and distributive supposition, so that 
we can descend (using ‘m’ with a subscript for individual men) to: 
(2) m1 is an animal & m2 is an animal & … 
Now while the term ‘animal’ in the original proposition was in merely 
confused supposition, the same term in each of these conjuncts is in determinate 
supposition, since there it is the predicate of a singular affirmative. Hence, from 
each of these conjuncts we can in turn descend to a disjunction of propositions. 
Take, say, the conjunct ‘m1 is an animal’. We can descend under ‘animal’ (using 
‘a’ with a subscript for individual animals) to: 
(3) m1 is a1 or m1 is a2 or … 
Here the ‘is’, since it links two singular terms, amounts to the “is of identity,” so 
that (3) amounts to: 
                                                 
45 On early theories of the copula, see De Rijk’s “Introduction” to Peter Abelard, Dialec-
tica, pp. xli–xliv, and De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. II.1, pp. 105–108, 183–186, 203–206. 
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(4) m1 = a1 or m1 = a2 or … 
Proposition (1), therefore ultimately reduces to a conjunction of disjunc-
tions of affirmative identity statements, in which each term is a singular term and 
so has discrete supposition. That is, (1) implies: 
(5) (m1 = a1 or m1 = a2 or …) and (m2 = a1 or m2 = a2 or …) 
and … 
Similarly, if you work it all out, universal negative propositions reduce to 
conjunctions of conjunctions of negative identity statements. Particular and in-
definite affirmatives reduce to disjunctions of disjunctions of affirmative identity 
statements. And particular and indefinite negatives reduce to disjunctions of con-
junctions of negative identity statements. Singular affirmatives reduce to simple 
disjunctions of affirmative identity statements. And finally, singular negatives 
reduce to simple conjunctions of negative identity statements. 
On the view we are considering here, the fully expanded propositions you 
descend to like this are meant to be analyses of the propositions you started with. 
Now note that such full expansions will be available, they are consequences of the 
machinery of the theory, no matter what we think the theory as a whole was try-
ing to accomplish. What the present view does, then, is simply to take advantage 
of the obvious fact that these expansions certainly look like good analyses, and to 
suppose that this was the intention of the theory all along. A simple and attractive 
approach. 
We may express the same view slightly differently by saying that the the-
ory of modes of common personal supposition in effect provides a theory of truth 
conditions for propositions with common terms in them in personal supposition, 
truth conditions that are expressed ultimately in terms of the truth values of singu-
lar identity statements (affirmative or negative). 
i.  Objections to This Interpretation. 
Now I said our “initial impulse” is perhaps to agree with this plausible in-
terpretation. But if so, the theory is in trouble — because it won’t work. Here I 
have three main lines of argument. 
First, no mediaeval author I know of every actually says this is what the 
theory is trying to do. In fact, no mediaeval author I know of ever says what the 
theory is trying to do at all! 
Second, some authors, as we have already seen,46 do have an explicit the-
ory of truth conditions for quantified propositions, and it doesn’t look anything at 
all like the theory of descent and ascent we have just seen. If the latter is supposed 
to be a theory of truth-conditions too, why do we have two such theories in these 
authors? And why does no mediaeval author comment on this striking situation? 
                                                 
46 See Ch. 8, pp.270–271, above. 
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Related to this, some later authors reject earlier theories of truth based on 
supposition. But when they do so, they always talk about the explicit theories we 
have already discussed, not the theory of descent and ascent.47  
But third and most important, if the theory of descent and ascent is meant 
to be a theory of analysis or of truth conditions, it simply won’t work. It just 
doesn’t give the right results! 
The problem I have in mind here was first pointed out by John Swiniarski 
in 1970,48 and was pointed out again by Gareth Matthews in 1973.49 The problem 
is this: According to all our authors, the predicates of particular negatives 
(O-forms), like the predicates of all negative categoricals,50 stand in confused and 
distributive supposition (provided only that the predicates are common terms). 
And in fact, if you test it, this is quite correct according to the descent and ascent 
rules our authors provide. 
Consider therefore the particular negative categorical ‘Some man is not a 
Greek’.51 The predicate term, ‘Greek’, has confused and distributive supposition 
there, so that we can descend to: ‘Some man is not this Greek and some man is 
not that Greek, and …’ But note that this expanded conjunction in no sense gives 
an analysis of the original. It does not give us its truth conditions. It is not neces-
sarily even equivalent to it. The expanded conjunction can be true when the origi-
nal proposition is false — as would happen, for example, if Socrates and Plato 
turned out to be the only human beings. For the original proposition ‘Some man is 
not a Greek’ would be false in that case, but the expanded conjunction would be 
true: ‘Some man [namely Plato] is not this Greek [pointing to Socrates] and some 
man [namely Socrates] is not this Greek [pointing to Plato]’.52 
What has happened here is that confused and distributive supposition has 
been defined in such a way that the conjunction to which you descend is not 
equivalent to the original proposition. Look, for example, at Ockham’s definition 
once more (Summa of Logic I.70, § 8). You descend to a conjunctive proposition. 
But when it comes to ascent, Ockham doesn’t say that you can ascend from that 
same conjunction, as you would have to be able to do if the descent gave you an 
equivalent proposition. He says instead only that you cannot ascend from any one 
conjunct by itself. And that is not at all the same thing. In short, the theory of de-
scent and ascent cannot be a theory of analysis or truth conditions, since the the-
ory does not always give sufficient conditions and necessary conditions that 
match.53 
                                                 
47 For example, see Peter of Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, pp. 45–46, §§ 144–147. 
48 Swiniarski, “A New Presentation of Ockham’s Theory of Supposition.” 
49 Matthews, “Suppositio and Quantification in Ockham.” 
50 Compare Albert of Saxony’s Rule 5, p. 280, above. 
51 I said (p. 284 above) I would return to this. 
52 Compare p. 284 above. 
53 In Spade, “Priority of Analysis and the Predicates of O-Form Sentences,” p. 268, I 
conjecture that the same lack of equivalence will arise whenever a term that would otherwise be in 
merely confused supposition is inserted within the scope of a negation. Consider, for instance, ‘I 
do not promise you a horse’. 
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ii.  Suggested Answers to These Objections 
Swiniarski and Matthews draw quite different morals from this curious 
situation.54 Swiniarski concludes that there is something seriously wrong with the 
theory, whereas Matthews concludes that there is something seriously wrong with 
our view of what the theory was. Although I have disagreed with Matthews in 
print over this point,55 I have subsequently changed my mind. I no longer think 
that what we have in the theory of modes of personal supposition is an attempt to 
give analysis or truth conditions at all.56 
What else might the theory have been trying to do then? One other possi-
bility I have suggested goes like this57: The various kinds of common personal 
supposition are defined by descent and ascent rules in the way we have seen. 
Then certain additional rules are formulated for checking various kind of infer-
ences by means of the supposition of the terms in the premises and the conclu-
sion. For example, to take a disgusting example Burley discusses (Purity, §§ 93–
98), in the proposition ‘Twice you ate a loaf of bread’ the term ‘loaf of bread’ has 
merely confused supposition, whereas in ‘A loaf of bread you ate twice’ it has 
determinate supposition. (You can verify these claims for yourself by checking 
the descent and ascent rules.) Now Burley gives us the rule (Purity, § 94): “… 
whenever there is an argument from a term suppositing merely confusedly to a 
term suppositing determinately with respect to the same multitude, there is a fal-
lacy of figure of speech.” Hence, we cannot validly infer: “You ate a loaf of bread 
yesterday, and you ate a loaf of bread today; therefore, twice you ate a loaf of 
bread; therefore, a loaf of bread you ate twice.” The last step fails because of the 
rule just quoted.58 
Of course in this particular case we would probably not be tempted to 
draw the inference in the first place. But there are other inferences where the fal-
lacy is not so obvious. Consider: “Than every integer there is some greater inte-
ger; therefore, there is some integer greater than every integer.” Greater minds 
than yours or mine, gentle reader, have been fooled by inferences like that! 
Thus the theory of modes of personal supposition, together with the rules 
linking those modes to the theory of inference, provides a way of checking infer-
ences for fallacy even in non-obvious cases. 
It is certainly true that the theory of modes of personal supposition was 
used in this way; indeed, I have just given you an example from Burley. But that 
                                                 
54 No modern interpreter I know of has suggested an answer to my first two objections. 
55 See Spade, “Priority of Analysis and the Predicates of O-Form Sentences.” 
56 Nevertheless, some later authors — for instance, Albert of Saxony, Ralph Strode, and 
Paul of Venice (or whoever wrote the Logica magna) — do explicitly require ascent from a con-
junctive proposition for confused and distributive supposition. For them, descent and ascent do 
yield equivalences, so that the theory by that time may well have been intended to provide an 
analysis or a specification of truth conditions. See Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” p. 220 
n. 78, and the texts quoted ibid., pp. 223–224. I do not know when this development first oc-
curred. 
57 See Spade, “The Semantics of Terms,” p. 195. 
58 It is perhaps best not to think too hard about this example right before lunch. See also 
Ch. 8, n. 34 (p. 252), above. 
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can hardly be the whole story, and I doubt very much if it was the main purpose 
of the theory all along. For first of all, the “linking”-rules that connect the theory 
of modes with the theory of inference were never very fully developed, and were 
certainly never developed systematically. If this is what the theory was trying to 
do, it never got beyond the germinal stage. Besides, it fails to explain certain pe-
culiar facts about the rules of descent and ascent. 
For example,59 why are confused and distributive supposition and merely 
confused supposition grouped together as “confused”? What do they have in 
common? Ascent from an arbitrary singular fails for confused and distributive 
supposition, but holds for merely confused supposition. Descent to a conjunctive 
proposition and for that matter to a disjunctive proposition both hold for confused 
and distributive supposition, but both fail for merely confused supposition. It is 
true that descent to a disjoint term holds for confused and distributive supposi-
tion60 as much as it does for merely confused supposition, but no mediaeval au-
thor ever makes the point. 
In terms of descent and ascent, merely confused supposition would seem 
to have more in common with determinate supposition than with confused and 
distributive supposition; for the first two, both ascent from an arbitrary singular 
and descent to a disjoint term hold.61 Yet merely confused supposition is termino-
logically grouped with confused and distributive supposition, not with determi-
nate supposition. Why? 
I have another proposal about what the theory of modes of personal sup-
position was trying to do. There is some historical evidence for the proposal, al-
though it is far from decisive. And I emphasize that I do not want to push this 
proposal very hard; I am not at all convinced by it. Nevertheless, I present it to 
you for your consideration.62 
Earlier,63 I remarked that the first part of supposition theory, the theory of 
supposition proper, answered the question what a term supposits for on a given 
occasion. The second part of the theory, I said, did not affect the answer to that 
question at all. By saying that a term is in, for example, personal supposition — 
and by taking into account certain considerations of tense and modality that we 
will consider in Ch. 10 below — we have fixed the supposita of that occurrence 
of the term once and for all. The further subdivision of personal supposition into 
its various modes does not pertain to the question what a term supposits for, but 
presumably to some other question, the nature of which is still a mystery. 
I also said that this is true at least for the fourteenth century. It is implicit, 
for example, in Ockham. For first, his definitions of material, simple and personal 
supposition make no sense, or at least none that I can find, unless a term in per-
sonal supposition is taken to supposit for all its significates. That was the import 
                                                 
59 See Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” p. 204. 
60 Thus “Every man is an animal; therefore, this man or that man or … is an animal.” 
61 “Some man is running; therefore, this man or that man or … is running” is just as valid 
as is “Some man is running; therefore, this man is running or that man is running or …” 
62 For a full discussion, together with a more complete assessment of the evidence, see 
Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” pp. 208–212. 
63 See Ch. 8, p. 244, above. 
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of Ockham’s phrase ‘taken significatively’.64 Second, the explicit account of truth 
conditions Ockham gives in Summa logicae II (Texts (43)–(45)), an account quite 
distinct from the theory of descent and ascent, seems to presuppose that a person-
ally suppositing term supposits for all its significates. Third, even in the theory of 
descent, the singulars to which one descends involve discrete terms suppositing, 
one after another, for each of the significates of the term descended under. Thus, 
to say a term is in personal supposition is to say it supposits for all its significates 
— and this is true even before we start dividing and subdividing personal suppo-
sition into its various “modes.” 
Buridan, in fact, states the point explicitly65: 
Now “supposition,” as it is taken here, is the taking of a 
term in a proposition for some thing or for some things in such a 
way that, when that thing or those things are indicated by the pro-
noun ‘this’ or ‘these’, or their equivalents, the term is truly af-
firmed of the pronoun by means of the copula of the proposition. 
For example, in the proposition ‘A horse runs’, the term ‘horse’ 
supposits for every horse that exists, because, whichever one is in-
dicated, it would be true to say ‘This is a horse’. 
There is some implicit funny business here about the tenses of the copula, 
but we needn’t worry about that right now.66 The point is that in the proposition 
‘A horse runs’, which is an indefinite categorical and so is treated as amounting to 
‘Some horse runs’, the term ‘horse’ supposits for all horses, not just for some 
horses — not just, say, for the ones that are running. 
Now I think this point is pretty much worked out by the time we get to 
Burley and Ockham. But certainly it was not always that way. Earlier it was not 
so clear. 
I propose for your consideration, therefore, that the theory of modes of 
common personal supposition originally grew up as part of the attempt to answer 
the question what a term supposits for. Originally, to say the term ‘man’ supposits 
personally was only to say that it supposits for men, rather than for the common 
nature man, or for the concept “man” or for the term ‘man’ itself. But how many 
men it supposited for remained to be settled, and that was the point addressed by 
the theory of “modes.” 
You can find more or less firm suggestions of this in De Rijk’s Logica 
Modernorum and elsewhere,67 but the most explicit text I can find is from Lam-
bert of Auxerre (Text (25)): 
Determinate [supposition] is what a common term has when it can 
be taken indifferently for one thing or for several, as when one 
                                                 
64 See Ch. 8, p. 254, above. 
65 John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 3, Scott ed., p. 50; Scott trans., p. 100. 
66 On tense, see Ch. 10, below. 
67 See the references and discussion in Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” pp. 209–
211. 
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says ‘A man runs’. In this case ‘man’ has determinate supposition. 
For it is true when one man runs or several. Now it is called “de-
terminate” because for the truth of a proposition in which there oc-
curs a common term having such supposition, it suffices that the 
common term be taken of necessity for some suppositum. Neither 
is it required that it be taken of necessity for several, although it is 
able to be taken in such supposition for several. Therefore, it is 
necessary that a common term in such supposition be taken for one 
thing determinately. If [it is taken] for several, that is accidental. 
There are some obscure things in this passage, but note what the question 
is. It is “Does the term supposit for one or for several?” That is, the question is a 
“how many” question. And the answer is: For determinate supposition, it can go 
either way. Lambert then goes to say (Text (25) again): 
Confused [supposition] is what a common term has when of neces-
sity it is taken for all its supposita or for several. Now it is called 
‘confused’ from the multitude of the supposita for which a term 
having such supposition is taken. For where there is multitude, 
there there is confusion. One kind of confused supposition is 
strong [and] mobile, another is weak [and] immobile. The strong 
[and] mobile kind is what a common term has when it is taken of 
necessity for all its supposita, and a descent can be made under it 
… Weak [and] immobile [supposition] is what a common term has 
when of necessity it is taken for several supposita contained under 
it, yet not for all. Neither can a descent be made under it. 
Lambert then goes on to say that the latter kind of supposition is had, for 
instance, by the predicates of universal affirmatives — that is, by terms that in the 
more standard terminology have “merely confused” supposition. 
Here once again the question is how many things the term supposits for. In 
what other people called confused and distributive supposition, the term supposits 
for all its “supposita”68 — that is, for all its “inferiors” or, on Ockham’s theory of 
signification, for all its significates. In what other people called merely confused 
supposition, it is taken for several of its inferiors, although not for all of them — 
and that is why you cannot descend to all of them. 
The basis of this theory, perhaps, is the old “identity”-theory of the cop-
ula,69 according to which the copula indicates some kind of literal identity be-
tween the semantic correlate of the subject term and the semantic correlate of the 
predicate term. Thus, in the true proposition ‘Every man is an animal’, if the sub-
ject term supposits for every man, the predicate term there must supposit for ex-
actly the same things. That is to say, the predicate there does not supposit for 
every animal, but only for some of them: the ones that are men. That is why you 
                                                 
68 On what this term means in such contexts, see Ch. 8, p. 246, above 
69 See n. 15, p. 290, above. 
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cannot descend to all the singulars under the predicate. You are not talking there 
about all the individual animals, either conjunctively or disjunctively; you are 
talking about only some of them. Hence the failure of descent in cases of merely 
confused supposition. 
Incidentally, if this kind of theory is indeed at the origin of the doctrine of 
modes of personal supposition, it goes a long way toward explaining the other-
wise mysterious fact that confused and distributive supposition is grouped with 
merely confused supposition, even though they have less in common than do de-
terminate supposition and merely confused supposition.70 In both kinds of “con-
fused” supposition, merely confused as well as confused and distributive, a term 
has to supposit for several of its inferiors — that is, for more than one. In merely 
confused supposition it supposits for several but not for all (so that a descent to all 
the singulars is not possible), whereas in confused and distributive supposition it 
does supposit for all of them (so that a descent to all the singulars is possible after 
all). In determinate supposition, by contrast, the term does not have to supposit 
for several of its inferiors (although it can); one will suffice. 
Perhaps in fact the “identity”-theory of the copula, and the question what a 
term supposits for, really are at the origins of the theory of modes of personal 
supposition. But whether they are or not, such an approach is utterly confused. 
Look for instance at what Lambert says about determinate supposition (Text 
(25)). He there seems to be mixing two quite different considerations: (a) the 
question of “aboutness” — what you are talking about — so that when you say 
‘Some man is running’, you may be talking about some one man or some more 
than one (it could go either way); and (b) the question of truth conditions, so that 
the truth of any one singular is sufficient for the truth of the original proposition, 
and hence all the singulars get into the act insofar as any one of them all will do. 
Lambert does not seem to separate these two issues. 
But things are worse than that. What about false propositions? What does 
the term ‘ass’ supposit for in ‘Every man is an ass’, which is false? As the predi-
cate of a universal affirmative, as well as according to the rules of descent and 
ascent, the term has merely confused supposition there. So, on the approach we 
are now considering, it supposits for several but not all asses. Which ones then? 
The asses that are men? There aren’t any of those. Does it then supposit for zero 
asses? In that case, it would not be in merely confused supposition after all, would 
it? To be in merely confused supposition, it would have to supposit for several 
asses (although not for all). 
What may have happened, then, in the history of supposition theory is 
something like this. The two parts of the theory distinguished by Scott,71 which 
were quite distinct by the fourteenth century, were perhaps originally not all that 
disconnected from one another. They both began as attempts to answer the ques-
tion “What are you talking about” — that is, what does a given term supposit for? 
The theory of supposition proper answered the question “What kind of thing are 
you talking about?” And then, if the answer to that question was that you are talk-
                                                 
70 See p. 294 above. 
71 Once again, Scott, “Introduction” to Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, p. 30. 
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ing about the “inferiors” of the term (that the term is in personal supposition), 
then the theory of modes of personal supposition went on to ask the question 
“How many of them are you talking about? 
As the difficulties and problems with this approach came to be realized 
and cleaned up,72 the question what a term supposited for came to be confined to 
the first part of supposition theory, the theory of supposition proper, together with 
the theory of ampliation that we have still to discuss.73 One symptom, perhaps, of 
the rejection of this approach is the introduction of disjoint terms into the theory 
of merely confused supposition. This is a move that allows terms in merely con-
fused supposition to supposit for exactly the same things they would supposit for 
in confused and distributive supposition, the only difference being in the different 
styles of descent and ascent that are permitted. 
But once the question what a term supposits for had been confined to the 
first half of supposition theory, the theory of modes of personal supposition was 
left with nothing to do! It was no longer part of a theory of reference; it was not 
quite suitable for a theory of truth conditions or analysis. And although there was 
some potential for the theory to be used as a device for checking inferences and 
detecting fallacies, that potential was never fully realized. 
In short, the theory of modes of personal supposition became an idle the-
ory. Although people continued to discuss it at great length and to tinker with the 
details of it, it was — oddly — a theory without a topic any more. As I have said 
elsewhere74: 
No wonder it has proved so hard for scholars to agree about what 
[the theory of modes of personal supposition] was trying to ac-
complish. By the early fourteenth-century it was longer trying to 
accomplish anything at all! 
This is indeed a hard pill to swallow. I do not entirely accept it myself, 
and I do not expect you or anyone else to do so either, at least not as it stands. I 
have deliberately presented my “proposal” in what I hope is a provocative form, 
because I would genuinely like for some bright reader among you to be goaded 
into coming up with a better account. But be sure it really is better, and that it ac-
commodates at least most if not all of the evidence available. 
3.  The Logical Structures of the Theory 
You may think that, having got to that point, there is nothing more to be 
said, at least not without coming up with an answer to the interpretive challenge I 
just posed. But no! There is a lot more to be said. For, whatever purposes the the-
                                                 
72 Certainly by the time of Ockham, although he was by no means the first. Some authors 
realized the difficulties and avoided talking this way from very early in the history of supposition 
theory. See Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” pp. 209–211. 
73 See Ch. 10 below. 
74 Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” p. 212. 
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ory of modes of personal supposition did or did not serve, whatever questions it 
did or did not answer, there is still the question of the actual mechanics of the 
theory, how the descents and ascents actually worked and how the various kinds 
of descents and ascents are related to one another. By examining these, we can 
shed a great deal of light on the theory, and perhaps even make some progress in 
figuring out what its purpose was. 
Let us then step back from the actual history of the theory for a moment, 
and look at it in a more or less ideally theoretical, abstract state. I recognize the 
dangers of doing this, but nevertheless, by doing so I think we shall find some 
very interesting things. 
Fair warning: the remainder of this chapter is more technical than you 
have seen up to now in this book. If you don’t understand all the lingo, just ignore 
it and keep reading. I have tried to keep it to a minimum, and in any case to use it 
only where you can safely skip over it and still get the main points.75 
a.  Some Preliminary Conclusions 
Setting aside for the moment descent to complex (conjoint or disjoint) 
terms, we have so far encountered (a) descent to conjunctions and (b) descent to 
disjunctions of all the singulars, and (c) ascent from any one arbitrary singular. 
We have not talked about the notion of (d) descent to any one arbitrary singular, 
but some early treatises do talk about it — and in fact sometimes it is the only 
kind of “descent” they mention.76 Again, although the authors we are primarily 
concerned with discuss ascent only in terms of ascent from any one arbitrary sin-
gular, we can obviously ask about the notion of ascent (e) from a conjunction and 
(f) from a disjunction of all the singulars. Some late authors do discuss ascent 
from a conjunction of all the singulars,77 but — curiously — I do not know of 
anyone who ever talked about ascent from a disjunction of all the singulars. Nev-
ertheless, by turning the crank of propositional logic a few times, we can make 
the following observations: 
(1) Since conjunctions imply their conjuncts, therefore whenever descent 
from the original proposition to a conjunction of all its singulars is valid, descent 
to any one arbitrary singular will be valid as well. 
(2) If ascent to the original proposition from any one arbitrary singular is 
valid, then (since conjunctions imply their conjuncts) ascent from the conjunction 
of all the singulars will likewise be valid. 
(3) Since disjunctions are implied by any one of their disjuncts, therefore 
whenever descent from the original proposition to any one arbitrary singular is 
valid, descent to the disjunction of all the singulars will be valid as well. 
                                                 
75 The material I am about to present is based on Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” 
§§ V–VII, pp. 197–204. 
76 See Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” p. 209. 
77 See n. 56 above. 
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(4) If ascent to the original proposition from the disjunction of all the sin-
gulars is valid, then (since disjunctions are implied by any one of their disjuncts) 
ascent from any one arbitrary singular is valid as well. 
(5) If ascent to the original proposition is valid from each of its singulars 
separately, then it is likewise valid from their disjunction, in virtue of what is 
called “constructive dilemma” (if p → r and q → r, then (p ∨ q) → r). 
(6) Finally, if descent from the original proposition is valid to each of its 
singulars separately, then descent is likewise valid to their conjunction, in virtue 
of “conjunction introduction” (if p → q and p → r, then p → (q & r)). 
Putting all this together, we can conclude some interesting things. First of 
all, from (1) and (6), descent to a conjunction of all the singulars is valid iff de-
scent to any arbitrary singular is valid. Again, from (4) and (5), ascent from a dis-
junction of all the singulars if valid iff ascent from any arbitrary singular is valid. 
We can perhaps see therefore, why descent to an arbitrary singular is not 
mentioned after the early literature, and why ascent from a disjunction of all the 
singulars is not mentioned at all. They are already implicitly covered by descent 
to a conjunction of all the singulars and by ascent from an arbitrary singular, re-
spectively. 
b.  Restrictions on the Propositions We Are 
Considering 
Before we go on, I want to narrow down our focus to consider only certain 
kinds of propositions. After all, things are more manageable if we don’t try to do 
everything at once. Besides, the theory of modes of personal supposition seems to 
be most “at home” in the relatively narrow context I am about to describe. In fact, 
I think the theory was probably designed with these propositional contexts mainly 
in mind. Its application to other propositional contexts was in effect an extension 
of the theory, and either worked well or not, depending on the case. 
Please understand that the restrictions I am going to impose are restric-
tions only on the propositions from which we descend or to which we ascend, not 
on the propositions to which we descend or from which we ascend. It will be im-
portant to bear this in mind for restrictions (3) and (4) below. That said, here we 
go: 
(1) First, we exclude all hypothetical propositions.78 
(2) Next, we exclude all so called “exponible” propositions.79 
(3) We also exclude propositions with plural terms in them. In 
short, we are not talking about propositions like ‘The Apos-
tles are twelve’. 
                                                 
78 On the relevant sense of ‘hypothetical’ here, see Ch. 4, p. 126, n. 139, above. On the 
rationale for this restriction, see Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” pp. 216–217 n. 41. 
79 For “exponible” propositions, see Ch. 4, p. 115, n. 95, above. On the rationale, see 
Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” p. 217 n. 42. 
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(4) We temporarily exclude all propositions containing con-
joint or disjoint terms.80 
(5) We exclude all propositions with “funny” quantifiers like 
‘many’ or ‘most’. All the quantifiers in propositions we 
will be considering will be of the form ‘every’ or ‘some’. 
The universal negative quantifier ‘no’ will be treated, in 
accordance with the laws of equipollence, as ‘not some’. 
(6) We exclude what are nowadays called “opaque contexts,” 
including not only so called “propositional attitudes” in-
volving such things as “horse-promising,”81 but also de 
dicto modalities.82 
c.  Facts of Mediaeval Usage 
Next, for the record, let’s just agree to accept the following facts of medi-
aeval usage: 
(a) Universal affirmatives have existential import.83 
(b) Medieval authors quantified over terms. They did not use 
“bare variables.” They said ‘Every man is an animal’, not 
‘For all x, if x is a man then x is an animal’. This doesn’t 
really make the slightest difference for us in the end, but I 
call it to your attention anyway. 
(c) Indefinite propositions were treated as amounting to im-
plicit particulars propositions.84 That is, an unquantified 
common term in subject position was regarded as implicitly 
quantified by a particular (existential) quantifier. So too — 
although the point was not usually made — for the predi-
cate. Thus ‘Some man is Greek’ amounts to ‘Some man is 
some Greek’, and so on for the other categorical forms. For 
the sake of regimenting our procedure, we will treat all 
common names as quantified, implicitly or explicitly. 
(d) We shall follow mediaeval logicians’ practice rather than 
their preaching,85 and allow all categorematic terms in a 
                                                 
80 This restriction is temporary, because in virtue of the results to be described below, we 
can ignore it without affecting anything. But we’re not yet in a position to see that. 
81 See pp. 286–288 above. 
82 On why we want to exclude the latter, see Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” p. 
218 n. 47. 
83 See Ch. 2, p. 17, above. 
84 See Ch. 2, p. 15, above. 
85 See Ch. 8, p. 252, above. 
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proposition to have supposition, not just the whole subject 
and the whole predicate. 
(e) Lastly, we shall follow the mediaeval convention that logi-
cal scope extends to the right, not to the left. It extends to 
the end of the relevant categorical, and not beyond. 
d.  A Partial Logic of Complex Terms 
So far in our discussion we have encountered both disjoint terms and, in a 
few exotic cases, even conjoint terms. What are we going to do with them? What 
is their logical behavior? 
I suspect the general answer to that question is not easy or clear. But for-
tunately, we don’t need the general answer. It will be enough to consider disjoint 
and conjoint terms that are not within the scope of a negation, a quantifier or any 
other operator. For those cases, I make the following substantive but I hope un-
controversial claim: 
A proposition that contains a conjoint term not within the scope of 
any operator is equivalent to the conjunction of the corresponding 
singulars. A proposition that contains a disjoint term not within the 
scope of any operator is equivalent to the disjunction of the corre-
sponding singulars. 
For example, ‘Jane and her husband have arrived’ is equivalent to ‘Jane 
has arrived and her husband has arrived’. Again, ‘John or his wife left the keys on 
the table’ is equivalent to ‘John left the keys on the table or his wife left the keys 
on the table’. 
That much seems all right. In other contexts more generally, this doesn’t 
always hold, of course. Thus (speaking of the key-leaver), ‘It was not John or his 
wife’ is decidedly not equivalent to ‘It was not John or it was not his wife’. But 
that doesn’t matter. We only need to talk about the cases described, where the 
conjoint or disjoint term is not within the scope of an operator.86 
Because of all the above restrictions and conventions, it follows — or if it 
doesn’t, we’ll just add some more restrictions until it does87 — that whenever it is 
valid to descend under a common term in a proposition to some given singular of 
that proposition, it is equally valid to descend to any other given singular as well. 
                                                 
86 Compare Aristotle, De interpretatione 8, 18a19–23. Aristotle is not using discrete 
terms there, but the idea is obviously the same. 
87 This move may look as if it undermines the whole significance of what I will be doing 
in the next section. After all, if you are free to stipulate whatever you want, you can get all sorts of 
amazing “results” to come out true! But I don’t think that general fact is really a problem in this 
case. I think what I am claiming here was genuinely intended by the people who came up with the 
theory of modes of personal supposition, and is not a mere artifact of a spurious narrowing of con-
text by me. Or, to put in another way, I think the context in which the theory grew up was one in 
which the claim I am making here was always satisfied. 
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So too for ascent: if it is valid to ascend from some given singular of a proposition 
to that proposition, then it will be just as valid to ascend from any other singular 
of that proposition. In other words, logically speaking, all the singulars of a given 
proposition are on a par. 
e.  Important Results 
With all these preliminaries in place, let us draw some important conclu-
sions. 
i.  First Important Result 
First of all, I claim, in the contexts we have confined ourselves to, the “na-
tive habitat” of the doctrine of modes of personal supposition, it is never possible 
to have both descent to any arbitrary singular and ascent from any arbitrary singu-
lar valid at once. 
I do not have anything so rigorous as a formal proof of this claim, but I do 
have what I think is a good argument for it. If, contrary to my claim, it were ever 
possible to have both descent from the original proposition to any arbitrary singu-
lar and at the same time ascent to it from any arbitrary singular, then from any one 
singular we could infer the original proposition (by ascent) and from that we 
could in turn infer any other singular (by descent), so that each singular of the 
original proposition would be equivalent, in a very strong sense, to each other 
such singular. 
But that doesn’t seem to be so. To be sure, everything here rests on just 
what kind of inference is supposed to be involved in descent and ascent. We have 
not talked very much in this book about the various theories of inference or “con-
sequence” that were current in the Middle Ages, and I do not plan to do so now.88 
But note this much: Descent and ascent must be necessary inferences at least. 
Even if Socrates happens to be the only surviving human being, we don’t want 
‘Socrates is a Greek; therefore, every man is a Greek’ to be a correct ascent. The 
subject of the consequent is supposed to be in confused and distributive supposi-
tion there (since it is the subject of an A-form categorical), and ascent from one 
singular is supposed to fail for confused and distributive supposition.89 
But necessary inference (strict implication) is not enough. We need a 
“tighter” notion yet. ‘Every person of the Trinity exists’ is a necessary truth (let 
us say), and so necessarily follows from ‘The Father exists’. But ‘The Father ex-
ists; therefore, every person of the Trinity exists’ should not count as a correct 
ascent, since the subject of the consequent is in confused and distributive supposi-
tion, and, as before, ascent from one singular is supposed to fail for confused and 
distributive supposition. 
                                                 
88 For a survey of such theories, see Boh, “Consequences,” and Stump, “Topics.” 
89 See n. 29 above. 
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If therefore, ascent to the original proposition from any arbitrary singular 
and descent from that proposition to any arbitrary singular ever both held at the 
same time, all the singulars of the original proposition would be “equivalent” in a 
very strong sense indeed — stronger even than ‘The Father exists’ and ‘The Son 
exists’ are equivalent! Now despite the lingering obscurity in the notion of infer-
ence involved in descent and ascent, I am confident that the singulars of a propo-
sition were never taken as equivalent in so strong a sense. And that is all I need 
for this “First Important Result.” Further precision here will have to wait until 
more research is done.90 
ii.  Second Important Result 
Although we never have both ascent to the original proposition from any 
arbitrary singular and descent from it to any arbitrary singular at the same time, 
nevertheless we always have the one or the other. 
Here we can give something closer to an actual proof.91 Take any cate-
gorical term t in any categorical proposition p of the kinds we are restricting our-
selves to. That term will be (explicitly or implicitly) quantified by either a univer-
sal or an existential (particular) quantifier.92 
Now in virtue of our scope convention,93 let’s translate p into a kind of ar-
tificial and regimented form by moving all the common names in p, along with 
their quantifiers and negations (if any), out to the front, keeping their original or-
der. In order to do this, we need to use variables. For example, if our original 
proposition p is ‘Every guest gave Mary a birthday present’ (it’s a party, say), we 
get: ‘For every guest g there is a birthday present b such that g gave b to Mary’. 
Again, ‘No man is an island’ yields: ‘It is not the case that there is some man m 
and some island i such that m = i.94 
This is not something that fits mediaeval style, of course. But that’s all 
right for now. I am not claiming that they did this. I am claiming that we can do it 
without distorting the logic of the situation. I am not saying that anyone in the 
Middle Ages ever actually derived the result I am aiming at now (certainly no one 
ever said so); I am claiming only that the result holds, whether anyone realized it 
or not. 
Note two things about this translation. First, I do not claim it is synony-
mous with the our original proposition p. It may well be, but I don’t need to say 
so. All I need is logical equivalence.95 Second, as you can verify for yourself, the 
                                                 
90 See Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” Theorem 1, p. 199, and especially pp. 
218–219, n. 52. Note also (ibid., p. 218, n. 50) that restriction (1) above, whereby we excluded 
hypotheticals, is needed in order to get this result. 
91 I owe the idea for this proof to Professor Michael J. Pendlebury. Compare Spade, “The 
Logic of the Categorical,” Theorem 2, pp. 199–201. 
92 See (c), p. 301, above. 
93 See (e), p. 302, above. 
94 Note the handling of the quantifier ‘no’, and compare (5), p. 301, above. 
95 But see the caution in Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” p. 219, n. 54. 
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logical moves I am about to make are not at all affected by the fact that the medi-
aevals quantified over terms, not over bare variables.96 
All right, now let’s do a little juggling with quantification theory. Move all 
the negations inside, reversing the quantifiers as needed as we go. Thus ‘not every 
… is’ becomes ‘some … is not’, and ‘it is not the case that some … is’ becomes 
‘every … is not’. 
Let’s call the proposition we end up with p′. It will consist of a string of 
quantified terms, followed by a propositional matrix (with perhaps some nega-
tions sprinkled around in the latter). Thus ‘For every man m and every island i, 
m ≠ i’. Proposition p′ will be equivalent with p. 
Proposition p′ is what I was aiming at with all these logical manipulations. 
For there are some well known facts about propositions that begin with a string of 
quantifiers. First, if all the quantifiers are of all the same kind (all universal or all 
particular/existential), their order makes no difference. They can be shuffled 
around any way you please, and the result will always be equivalent with what 
you started with. But if the quantifiers are not all of the same kind, order is impor-
tant. ‘Everybody loves somebody’ (that is, ‘For everybody h there is somebody j 
such that h loves j) is not at all the same as ‘Somebody everybody loves (‘There is 
somebody j such that everybody h loves j’). 
Nevertheless, even in those “mixed” cases, an existential (particular) 
quantifier can be validly moved to the right across a universal quantifier, or (what 
amounts to the same thing) a universal quantifier can be validly moved to the left 
across an existential (particular) one, although not in general the other way 
around. ‘Somebody everybody loves’ implies ‘Everybody loves somebody’, but 
not conversely. 
All right, we’re finally ready. Recall that we are inquiring about term t in 
proposition p. Form p′ from p, as instructed above. Now — basic move — take p′, 
pull out term t (with its quantifier), and stick it unchanged at the extreme left of 
p′. Call the resulting proposition p′′. 
Term t is either universally or existentially quantified in p′′. If it is univer-
sally quantified, then p′ implies p′′, since universal quantifiers can always be 
valid moved to the left. Therefore, since p is equivalent to p′, p also implies p′′. 
And since p′′ has the universally quantified t at the extreme left, in the position of 
greatest scope, we can infer from it any arbitrary singular by universal instantia-
tion. Therefore, since p implies p′′ and since p′′ implies any arbitrary singular, 
descent to any arbitrary singular holds for term t in proposition p. 
On the other hand, if t is existentially quantified in p′′, then p′′ implies p′, 
since existential quantifiers can always be validly moved to the right. And since, 
p′ is equivalent to p, therefore p′′ also implies p. Since p′′ has the existentially 
quantified t at the extreme left, in the position of greatest scope, we can infer p′′ 
from any arbitrary singular by existential generalization. Therefore, since any ar-
bitrary singular implies p′′ and since p′′ implies p, ascent from any arbitrary sin-
gular holds for term t in proposition p. 
                                                 
96 See (b), p. 301, above. 
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Since t is either universally or existentially quantified in p′′, it follows that 
we always have either descent from the original proposition to any arbitrary sin-
gular or else ascent to it from any arbitrary singular. And that is what we were 
aiming to show. 
iii.  Consequences of the First Two Results 
Combining our first two results, we get the extremely important conclu-
sion that for any term in any categorical proposition of the kinds we are consider-
ing, either descent to an arbitrary singular or ascent from any an arbitrary singular 
holds, but not both. 
I emphasize that this is our result. I know of no one who actually stated 
this conclusion in the Middle Ages. But I also want to emphasize that the result is 
a genuine one. And it has important consequences of its own. For it means that, 
the variations we find in the definitions of the various main kinds of personal 
supposition are usually variations that don’t matter. 
For example, consider confused and distributive supposition. Burley 
seems to think of it merely in terms of descent to an arbitrary singular. Ockham 
requires both descent to a conjunction of all the singulars and the failure of ascent 
from an arbitrary singular. Buridan seems to require with Ockham the failure of 
ascent from an arbitrary singular, but he doesn’t come right out and say so.97 
But it all comes to the same thing. Descent to an arbitrary singular holds 
exactly when descent to a conjunction of all the singulars holds as well.98 And 
whenever that happens, ascent from an arbitrary singular will automatically fail in 
virtue of the results we have just derived. So Ockham’s explicitly stipulating it as 
a separate clause of his definition is really unnecessary; it is already implied by 
the rest of his definition. And Buridan can likewise be implicit about the require-
ment; there is no need to say it given the rest of what he says. 
Likewise, we have seen99 that Burley omits the ascent requirement from 
his definition of determinate supposition. But again, it doesn’t matter. If ascent 
from an arbitrary singular did not hold, then we know that descent to an arbitrary 
singular would, and therefore so would descent to a conjunction of all the singu-
lars. But that would be confused and distributive supposition. Unless therefore 
determinate supposition is going to turn out to be exactly the same thing as con-
fused and distributive supposition, ascent from an arbitrary singular will have to 
be possible, and there is no need to make a big deal out of it by specifying it as a 
separate clause of the definition. 
Again, for merely confused supposition, Buridan neglects any mention of 
the possibility of ascent from an arbitrary singular, although he does say that de-
scent to an arbitrary singular fails.100 But since we now know that we never have 
both, there was really no need for him to belabor the point. 
                                                 
97 See p. 283 above. 
98 See p. 300 above. 
99 See p. 282 above. 
100 See p. 286 above. 
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By and large, therefore, our authors’ differences in their definitions of the 
various branches of personal supposition are differences of style only, not of sub-
stance. This explains why, although their definitions differ, they nevertheless usu-
ally end up agreeing about which kind of personal supposition a term has in any 
given case. 
iv.  Third Important Result 
I said that authors’ differences in the various kinds of personal supposition 
“usually” don’t matter. But there is one case where it does. Ockham differs from 
Burly and Buridan by requiring descent to a disjoint term in the case of merely 
confused supposition, whereas the other two in effect require only the failure of 
descent to either a disjunction or conjunction of all the singulars.101 Now we have 
already seen that there are cases where determinate or confused and distributive 
supposition will not work, and yet descent to a disjoint term fails as well.102 In 
such cases, descent to a conjoint term will hold. Indeed, there is an interesting re-
sult that I will mention but not try to prove here103: It is always possible to replace 
a universally quantified term (with its quantifier) by a conjoint term, and to re-
place an existentially quantified term (with its quantifier) by a disjoint term, pre-
serving equivalence in the process. In other words, quantified terms may be 
viewed in the theory of descent and ascent as merely a kind of shorthand abbre-
viation for the corresponding complex terms, conjunctive or disjunctive as the 
case may be. 
Therefore, the fact that Ockham (and others) appealed to disjoint terms 
only in the case of merely confused supposition, and the fact that others appealed 
to conjoint terms only in especially troublesome cases, must be viewed as a mark 
of desperation, as I suggested earlier.104 For such devices, it turns out, were avail-
able all along. If it is legitimate to appeal to complex terms in these special cases, 
it was also legitimate to appeal to them all along, even in cases where other kinds 
of descent were available as well. Yet they were not appealed to except when 
other kinds of descent failed. 
                                                 
101 I say “in effect” because Burley does require ascent from an arbitrary singular, even 
though that clause is redundant since he also requires that descent to a conjunction of all the sin-
gulars (and so to any arbitrary singular) fail. Again, Buridan requires only that descent to a dis-
junction of all the singulars and descent to any arbitrary singular fail. But this comes to the same 
thing, as we now see. 
102 See pp. 288–290 above. 
103 For the proof, see Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical,” Theorem 3, pp. 201–202. 
The proof proceeds by mathematical induction in a way I don’t for a moment suppose any medi-
aeval author ever articulated. But, let me say it again, I am here concerned not with what mediae-
val authors actually did, but with the logical structures exhibited by what they did, whether they 
realized it and said so or not. 
104 See p. 286 above for disjoint terms. All the more so for conjoint terms. 
Chapter 9: The Ups and Downs of Personal Supposition 
 
308
B.  Additional Reading 
For additional reading on the material covered in this chapter, see: Paul Vincent Spade, “The 
Logic of the Categorical.” (That paper is crucial for this chapter.) See also John J. Swiniarski, “A 
New Presentation of Ockham’s Theory of Supposition”; Gareth D. Matthews, “Suppositio and 
Quantification in Ockham.” My “The Logic of the Categorical” disagrees strongly with certain 
conclusions in Graham Priest and Stephen Read, “Merely Confused Supposition,” which means 
you should read it as well, for purposes of this chapter. John Corcoran and John Swiniarski, 
“Logical Structures of Ockham’s Theory of Supposition,” is an outstanding paper, although I dis-
agree with certain claims in it. Despite the disagreements, reflection on those claims led to some 
of the results in this chapter. 
 Chapter 10:  Ampliation 
he last topic I want to talk about in this book is the theory of “ampliation.” 
Ampliation may be regarded as the intersection of the theory of time and 
modality with the theory of supposition. Questions of time and modality lead 
quickly into enormously interesting and deep metaphysical issues, but I am not 
going to pursue those in this book.1 Instead, I will confine myself to time and mo-
dality only insofar as they affect the theory of supposition. 
They affect only the first half of supposition-theory, the theory of “suppo-
sition proper.”2 That is, they affect supposition theory with respect to the question 
what — or “what all” — a term supposits for in a given occurrence. They do not 
affect the theory of “modes of personal supposition” (the theory of descent and 
ascent), except insofar as what a term supposits for determines what the “singu-
lars” are that are available for a possible descent or ascent. 
I will concentrate in this chapter primarily on Ockham,3 although I will 
also be making frequent observations about other authors too. In some authors, 
the details of the theory are quite different than they are in Ockham’s, but Ock-
ham’s version was at least a fairly standard one in the fourteenth century, and will 
suffice for introducing the themes I want to talk about in this chapter. 
A.  Modality 
Let’s begin with the theory of modality. At the beginning of Part II of his 
Summa logicae (Text (42)), Ockham in quite standard fashion divides categorical 
                                                 
1 For introductions to some of these problems, see Knuuttila, “Modal Logic”; Normore, 
“Future Contingents”; and William of Ockham, Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge and Future 
Contingents. This is just the beginning, though. 
2 See Ch. 8, p. 243, above. 
3 There is some irony in this, since Ockham very rarely actually uses the term ‘amplia-
tion’ or its cognates. But he certainly does have the doctrine others call by that name. I will com-
ment more on this odd fact below. 
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propositions into those that are “assertoric”4 and those that are “modal” or “about 
a mode.”5 
1.  Assertoric vs. Modal Propositions 
The distinction between assertoric and modal propositions can be drawn 
as follows — and this was a fairly standard way of doing it: An assertoric cate-
gorical proposition just states a connection between subject and predicate — or, if 
it is negative, states a disconnection. Just what kind of connection or disconnec-
tion is involved here depends of course on your semantic theory for categorical 
propositions. But on any such theory, the connection or disconnection stated may 
turn out to be one of several kinds of “modes.” For example, it may be necessary, 
impossible, contingent or possible. 
These four are the main traditional “modes.” But Ockham lists others as 
well in Text (42), and other authors sometimes allowed at least some of these oth-
ers as legitimate “modes” too. The connection or disconnection, Ockham says, 
may be: true or false (these were generally regarded as rather odd, limiting cases 
of modes). It may be: known, unknown, spoken, written, conceived, believed, 
opined6 or doubted. All of these are “modes” or “ways”7 in which the connection 
or disconnection of subject and predicate may turn out. 
Now a modal proposition is one in which one of these modes is explicitly 
expressed or asserted. Thus ‘Every man is an ass’ is an impossible proposition, 
but is not thereby a “modal” proposition. Nothing is said to be impossible in it. 
The proposition is only assertoric, because the fact that it is impossible for every 
man to be an ass is not what the proposition asserts — and neither is any other 
modal claim. 
On the other hand, ‘For every man to be an ass is impossible’ is a modal 
proposition because there the impossibility is explicitly asserted. So too, for that 
matter, ‘For every man to be an ass is possible’ is also modal, although it is false. 
It is modal because it too explicitly asserts a “mode.” 
The point then is this: Modal descriptions can be applied to any proposi-
tion whatever. But only propositions that themselves actually assert some kind of 
modal description are “modal propositions”; the rest are assertoric. 
                                                 
4 “assertoric” = “de inesse,” literally “about being in.” This terminology was quite stan-
dard, although it perhaps suggests an inherence theory of the copula that Ockham emphatically 
did not accept. 
5 Note that Ockham does not here distinguish “modal” propositions from those that are 
“about a mode,” as other authors do. See p. 313 below. 
6 I do not know what if any distinction Ockham intends here between ‘believed’ and 
‘opined’. 
7 ‘Modus’ is just one Latin way of saying “way.” 
Chapter 10: Ampliation 
 
311
2.  Two Syntactical Constructions for Modal 
Propositions 
In Text (47), Ockham distinguishes syntactically between two kinds of 
modal propositions, corresponding roughly to the modern notions of de dicto and 
de re modality.8 The correspondence is only rough, though, so I prefer not to use 
the modern terminology and to do things Ockham’s way. 
The first kind of modal proposition is formed from a dictum — that is, 
from one of those accusative-plus-infinitive expressions9 — plus a copula and one 
of the modal words. Thus, for example, ‘For every man to be an animal is neces-
sary’, ‘For a man to run is contingent’. The examples Ockham gives all have the 
modal word at the end, in predicate position. And although what he says does not 
strictly require that, it will nevertheless be clear when it comes to truth conditions 
for such propositions that Ockham interprets the modal word in them as the predi-
cate no matter where it actually occurs. 
In the second kind of modal proposition, the modal word is not attached to 
a dictum. Instead the proposition has some other construction. Whereas in modal 
propositions of the first kind what we have is a modal predicate (a noun or adjec-
tive), in modal propositions of the second kind what we have is a model operator 
that generally takes an adverbial or verbal form, but may take other forms as well. 
Thus, ‘Every man necessarily is an animal’, ‘Every man of necessity is an ani-
mal’, ‘A man can run’. 
Ockham claims (Text (47)) that modal propositions of the first kind, those 
formed from a dictum plus a modal predicate, are ambiguous or equivocal, and so 
have to be “distinguished” into various senses.10 The distinction is made, Ockham 
says, according to “composition and division.” 
Mediaeval logicians developed an elaborate theory of “composition and 
division,” and distinguished a “composite sense” and a “divided sense” for a wide 
range of cases. Whole treatises were written De sensu composito et diviso — for 
example, Heytesbury’s.11 The distinction has its ultimate origins in Aristotle’s 
Sophistic Refutations 4, 166a23–38, and 20, 177a33–b34, but mediaeval authors 
developed it in ways that had little to do with what Aristotle had in mind. 
The general theory need not detain us here. Ockham applies it to this par-
ticular case as follows: A modal proposition of the first kind, one formed from a 
dictum plus a modal predicate, may be taken (a) in the “divided” sense — in 
sensu divisionis — and then, he says, it is equipollent to the corresponding modal 
proposition of the second kind, the corresponding proposition formed without a 
dictum. For example, ‘For every man to be an animal is necessary’, when taken in 
the divided sense, amounts to the same as ‘Every man necessarily is an animal’. 
                                                 
8 If you are not familiar with these notions, a good, brief introduction may be found in 
LePore, “De dicto.” 
9 See Ch. 6, p. 171, above. 
10 He explicitly allows this kind of equivocation in mental language, where it poses prob-
lems, in my view. See Ch. 4, above, and Spade, “Synonymy and Equivocation in Ockham’s Men-
tal Language.” 
11 See William Heytesbury, “The Compounded and Divided Senses.” 
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We will look at modal propositions of the first kind taken in this “divided” sense 
later on, when we consider the second kind of modal proposition, with which they 
are equipollent. 
Alternatively, a modal proposition of the first kind, one with a dictum, 
may be taken (b) in the “composite” sense — in sensu compositionis — and in 
that case, Ockham says, the proposition just predicates the modal predicate of the 
proposition of which the dictum is the dictum. For example, ‘For every man to be 
an animal is necessary’, when taken in the composite sense, just means that 
‘Every man is an animal’ (the proposition from which the dictum ‘for every man 
to be an animal’ is formed) is a necessary proposition. 
We have then the following arrangement: 
 
Figure 20: Ockham on Modal Propositions 
Notice something here. When read in the composite sense, the dictum in 
modal propositions of the first kind is a term in material supposition, suppositing 
for the proposition from which the dictum was formed. We saw this kind of thing 
when we discussed material supposition earlier.12 In such a case the modal word 
is a predicate noun or adjective. What we have then is really just a special in-
stance of the standard subject/predicate form of proposition. Furthermore, in the 
composite sense the proposition ‘For every man to be an animal is necessary’ is 
true iff what the subject (‘for every man to be an animal’) supposits for — 
namely, the proposition ‘Every man is an animal’ — is one of the things the 
predicate ‘necessary’ supposits for. 
                                                 
12 See Ch. 8, p. 259–260, above. 
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In other words, modal propositions with a dictum and read in the compos-
ite sense require no new account of truth conditions. The truth conditions Ockham 
already gave for standard subject/predicate categoricals in Summa logicae, II.2–4 
(Texts (43)–(45)) — truth conditions in terms of the subjects’ and the predicates’ 
suppositing for all or for some or for none of the same things, and so on — will 
apply just as well when the subject is a dictum in material supposition and the 
predicate is a modal term as they do in any other case. 
For just this reason, some authors were not willing to call such proposi-
tions “modal” at all. William of Sherwood, for instance, says13: 
To this it must be said that expressions like this, [both] according 
to the form of speech and according to the construction,14 have the 
dictum itself as subject and the mode as predicate. And so they 
ought not to be called “modal.” Neither does Aristotle call them 
“modal,” but rather “about a mode.” 
Here Sherwood is saying that such propositions are “about a mode” — de 
modo — but they are not strictly “modal.” The idea for him is that a categorical 
proposition is modal only if the connection or copula in it is explicitly “modified” 
— that is, governed by a modal word. And furthermore, not just any copula will 
do; it has to be the main copula (if there are more than one). Now in ‘For every 
man to be an animal is necessary’, the copula that is modified by the modal word 
‘necessary’ is not the main copula, the ‘is’, but rather the subordinate copula, to 
‘to be’ in the dictum. That is the connection this proposition says is necessary. 
Hence, Sherwood says, propositions like this are not strictly “modal” at all, but 
rather “about a mode.” He attributes this distinction to Aristotle, but that seems to 
be stretching things a bit. 
Burley too does not want to allow such propositions to be called “mo-
dal.”15 Ockham (Text (47), first paragraph) recognizes that there is some distinc-
tion to be made here, but he himself doesn’t seem to think it makes much differ-
ence. And so he is willing to call all these kinds of propositions equally “modal,” 
provided we make the necessary distinctions and are not confused. 
a.  Truth Conditions for Modal Propositions with a 
Dictum and Read in the Composite Sense 
Let’s now look more closely at the truth conditions for modal propositions 
containing a dictum and read in the composite sense. Such a proposition in which 
the predicate is the word ‘necessary’, for example, is true in the composite sense 
iff the proposition from which the dictum is formed is in fact “necessary.” And 
                                                 
13 Lohr ed., § 1.7.3, p. 234.94–97 (= Grabmann ed., p. 42.27–30). See Kretzmann trans., 
pp. 44–45. 
14 Don’t worry about this distinction. 
15 See Burley, De puritate, pp. 235.14–237.6; Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic: 
The Shorter Treatise, Spade, trans., §§ (218)–(227). 
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when is that? Well, Ockham doesn’t really go into the details, but what he does 
say is odd. For example (Text (48)): 
a proposition is not called “necessary” because it is always true but 
because it is true if it exists, and cannot be false. 
Don’t be put off by the apparent circularity of the “cannot be false” 
clause; I’ll get to that in a moment. But first notice the “if it exists”-clause. The 
basis for this if of course the notion that the bearer of truth and falsehood is the 
sentence-token (the individual utterance, inscription or propositional thought-act), 
not some kind of sentence–type, much less some kind of proposition in the mod-
ern sense (that is, something “expressed” by the sentence-token). That much is 
just standard nominalist doctrine by the fourteenth-century.16 Also standard doc-
trine is the claim that these proposition-tokens, these individual utterance, inscrip-
tions or thoughts, are not the bearers of truth value unless they exist. Individual 
utterances are gone as soon as they are completed, and inscriptions can be written 
and then erased. So too thoughts stop being thoughts once we’re done thinking 
them. The existence of one of these bearers of truth value, therefore, is a very 
contingent affair. And, as Ockham says (Text (48)), “if it does not exist, it is not 
true.” 
The idea then is this. The proposition (-token) ‘God exists’, say, is neces-
sary not because it is always true, or because it “has” to be true. For the token 
need not exist at all, in which case it has no truth value, either truth or falsehood. 
Rather, it is necessary, he says, because “it is true if it exists, and cannot be false.” 
The ‘if’ here is almost certainly to be read in a fairly strong sense, so that 
the second conjunct, the “cannot be false”-clause, is redundant. If the proposition 
has to be true whenever it exists, then of course it cannot be false, since in order 
to be false it has to exist, and then, we said, is isn’t false but true. This conjecture 
is confirmed by the way Ockham gives a correlative account of impossibility. An 
impossible proposition, he says in analogous manner (Text (48)), is one that “is 
false if it exists.” Nothing is said here about not being able to be true. This sug-
gests that the corresponding clause in the account of necessity, about not being 
able to be false, is strictly idle. 
Since the contingent is that which is neither necessary nor impossible, this 
account of necessity and impossibility will also give us an account of contin-
gency; we simply deny the two conditionals ‘if it exists it is true’ and ‘if it exists 
it if false’. Ockham in fact explicitly says (Text (48)) that we can get an account 
of contingency along these lines.17 
                                                 
16 See Ch. 6, pp. 178–180, above. Note that there is nothing inherently nominalist about 
this view. Realists could hold it too, and some did. 
17 Note that this confirms my claim that these conditionals are to be read in a fairly 
strong sense. If they were merely material conditionals, denying both of them would mean that the 
proposition-token did not exist at all, since (assuming bivalence, as Ockham did) if it did exist it 
would have to be either true or false. On material implication in Ockham, see Adams, “Did Ock-
ham Know of Material and Strict Implication?,” an excellent paper that definitively answers this 
old question. 
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Ockham recognizes in this same passage that we are going to need more 
resources than this to get an account of the epistemic and doxastic modalities.18 
But he apparently thinks it is sufficient to give an adequate account of the “ale-
thic” modalities.19 And here he is dead wrong. 
i.  Problems for this Account 
There are merely apparent problems with this account of modality, and 
then there are real problems.20 Let me give you the apparent problems first. 
Consider the account of necessity. According to it, the proposition-token 
‘Some proposition exists’ is necessary. For if it exists, it is true. And it cannot be 
false, since in order to be false it would have to exist, and then it would be true. 
Similarly, consider the proposition-token ‘This proposition-token exists’, indicat-
ing itself. It too is necessary, for the same reason. 
Now the very basis for Ockham’s account of necessity is the realization 
that the existence of proposition-tokens is a transient and contingent affair, not a 
matter of necessity. So this account of necessity seems to have consequences that 
are in danger of violating the very basis of the theory. 
Those same consequences also seem to be skirting outright heresy. The 
claim that the proposition-token ‘This proposition-token exists’ is necessary ap-
pears at least to conflict with the doctrine of creation, according to which the exis-
tence of that proposition-token ought to be contingent and not necessary, insofar 
as it is a creature. 
These problems are more apparent than real. They can no doubt be 
cleaned up by making suitable distinctions. After all, we haven’t really changed 
our views about the metaphysical status of proposition-tokens. 
More serious, however, is the problem of trying to define possibility in a 
way that preserves the usual modal relations, when necessity and impossibility are 
treated as Ockham does. Shall we say that a proposition-token is possible iff it is 
not impossible? That is, 21 
(1) ◊p ↔ ~Ip. 
Or shall we say that a proposition-token is possible iff its contradictory (its nega-
tion) is not necessary? That is,22 
(2) ◊p ↔ ~□~p 
 
                                                 
18 That is, modes like “known,” “unknown,” “believed,” “disbelieved,” etc. 
19 The four traditional modalities, “necessary,” “impossible,” “possible,” “contingent.” 
20 With this section, see Spade, “Les modalités aléthiques selon Ockham.” 
21 The diamond (‘◊’) is the standard piece of logical notation for ‘possible’. The “tilde” 
is for negation. I use ‘I’ for ‘impossible’. 
22 The square (‘□ ’) is the standard piece of notation for ‘necessary’. 
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Both of these relations are perfectly standard ones in modal logic, rela-
tions we surely want to continue to maintain. A modal logic in which one of these 
failed would be very odd indeed. But let’s see what happens. 
If we adopt (1), then to say p is possible is to say it might exist and yet not 
be false, since an impossible proposition is just one that “is false if it exists.” That 
is, it might be true. But if we adopt (2), then to say p is possible is to say that its 
contradictory opposite is not necessary. That is, its contradictory opposite might 
exist and yet not be true — in short, its contradictory might be false. 
Unfortunately, these two formulae do not give the same results. According 
to (1), the proposition ‘No proposition is negative’ is not possible but rather im-
possible. It cannot be true, since in order to be true it would have to exist, and 
then it would be false, since it is itself negative. According to (2), however, the 
proposition ‘No proposition is negative’ would indeed by possible, since its con-
tradictory ‘Some proposition is negative’ might very well be false. It would be 
false, for example, if all other sentence-tokens were destroyed and it were the 
only one in existence. 
But matters are even worse than this. It is not just that these two formulae, 
which ought to give the same results if we are to preserve the usual relations 
among the modal notions, do not in fact give the same results. Each of these for-
mulae is incoherent all by itself, without taking account of the other. According to 
(1), the proposition ‘No proposition is affirmative’ is possible, since it would be 
true if it turned out, for instance, to be the only existing proposition-token. Yet 
‘Some proposition is affirmative’ is necessary, since if it exists it is true (and it 
cannot be false). So here we have a necessary proposition the contradictory oppo-
site of which is possible, not impossible. And that is not what we want at all. 
On the other hand, formula (2) fares no better. On that approach, the 
proposition ‘No proposition is negative’ is possible, as we just saw, since its con-
tradictory opposite ‘Some proposition is negative’ might well be false. Yet the 
proposition ‘No proposition is negative’ is also impossible, since if it exists it is 
surely false. (It is a negative proposition itself.) So, on this account, the same 
proposition is both possible and impossible, which is a hopeless mess. 
It seems to me, therefore, that Ockham simply had not thought this 
through very carefully. And because of this failure, he really has no full and ade-
quate account of the truth conditions for modal proposition with a dictum and 
taken in the composite sense. Fortunately, Ockham doesn’t abide by his own 
definitions very carefully, and continues to say things that conform to the stan-
dard modal relations we want to keep, even though his “official” view doesn’t 
allow them. 
Buridan has a theory that is much better on this score. He adopts a view 
that avoids these difficulties, even though he too holds that the bearer of truth 
value, the proposition-token, must exist in order to do its job. 
Buridan adopts an account that divorces the modal notions entirely (at 
least the alethic ones) from the question of truth value. For Buridan, a proposition 
is necessary iff what it says to be so — and that is cashed out in terms of the sup-
posita of the subject and the supposita of the predicate — has to be so. Similarly, 
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a proposition is possible iff what it says to be so can in fact be so. Here is what he 
says23: 
The third conclusion [is] that some proposition is possible 
that cannot be true. This is proved because from a possible antece-
dent an impossible consequent never follows, as I assume from the 
Prior Analytics.24 And yet from the [proposition] ‘Every proposi-
tion is affirmative’, which is possible, there follows the [proposi-
tion] ‘No proposition is negative’; therefore, the latter is possible. 
And yet it cannot be true. So it is plain that a proposition is not 
called possible from the fact that it can be true, or impossible be-
cause it cannot be true. Rather it is called possible because as it 
signifies, so the case can be (taking these words in the good sense, 
according to the lessons that were given in the second chapter25), 
and impossible because so the case cannot be, and so on. 
Note that nothing is said here about the truth of falsehood of the proposi-
tion. On this account, then, the proposition ‘No proposition is negative’ is possi-
ble, since what that proposition says to be the case might very well be the case, if 
all negative proposition-tokens are destroyed. But while it is possible, it is not 
possibly true. For in order to be true, it has to exist, and if it exists, then what it 
says is not so.26 
b.  Truth Conditions for Other Modal Propositions 
So much then for modal propositions with a dictum and taken in the com-
posite sense. What about such propositions taken in the divided sense? Well, as 
we saw (Text (47)), Ockham says these are equivalent in sense to modal proposi-
tions without a dictum. So we can treat them together. 
First of all, Ockham observes (Text (49)) that the truth conditions for this 
kind of modal proposition are not the same as those for the propositions we have 
just been considering. For example, ‘For everything true to be true is necessary’ is 
true in the composite sense.27 But ‘Everything true necessarily is true’28 is not 
true, since some truths are contingent. 
                                                 
23 Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 8, Scott ed., pp. 124–125; Scott trans., p. 182. 
24 Aristotle, Prior Analytics I.13, 32a18–21, and II.2, 53b7–8. 
25 That is, as being really about supposition and not about signification at all. See Texts 
(70), conclusion 14, and (71). 
26 On Buridan’s theory of these things, see Prior’s very elegant paper, “The Possibly-
True and the Possible.” 
27 Strictly, this isn’t so unless it is necessary that some true proposition-token exists. We 
can take perhaps this as an indication of Ockham’s carelessness about his own definitions of the 
modal notions (see p. 316 above). Alternatively, we can recall that, for some authors, God himself 
is a true mental proposition (see Ch. 4, pp. 125–126, above). 
28 Ockham’s Latin here is strictly ambiguous, but it is clear that he takes the ‘necessarily’ 
as modifying the ‘is’, not the first ‘true’. 
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What then are the truth conditions for such propositions — that is, for mo-
dal propositions without a dictum, or modal propositions with a dictum but taken 
in the divided sense? Here is what he says (Text (49)): 
For this reason, you need to know that for the truth of such propo-
sitions it is required that the predicate, under its proper form, be 
applicable to what the subject supposits for, or to a pronoun indi-
cating what the subject supposits for, so that, in other words, the 
mode expressed in such a proposition is truly predicated of an as-
sertoric proposition in which the very same predicate is predicated 
of a pronoun indicating what the subject supposits for, analogously 
to what was said about for propositions about the past and [those] 
about the future. 
The business about the past and the future we’ll look at later on. Ockham 
goes on to give an example. Go back to the proposition ‘Everything true necessar-
ily is true’, which we said is false. The truth conditions for that proposition run 
like this: 
‘Everything true necessarily is true’ is true iff each proposition of 
the form ‘This is true’ is necessary, where the ‘this’ indicates one 
of the supposita of the subject term (that is, of the first ‘true’ in 
‘Everything true necessarily is true’). 
Ockham gives another interesting example in the same passage: The 
proposition ‘The creator is able not to be God’ is false, since the proposition ‘This 
is not God’, indicating the creator (namely, God), is not a possible proposition. 
(God can’t help but be God!) On the other hand, the converse of that proposition, 
namely ‘God is able not to be the creator’, is true, since the proposition ‘This is 
not the creator’, indicating God, is a possible proposition, even though fortunately 
for us it is in fact false. (Creation is contingent, after all.) 
The general rule of truth that can be extracted from this passage (Text 
(49)) runs like this. Consider a standard categorical proposition p of the sub-
ject/predicate form, in which the copula is modified by some modal verb or ad-
verb corresponding to the modal predicate m (as for example ‘can’ corresponds to 
‘possible’, and ‘necessarily’ to ‘necessary’). Let σ be the subject of p, and let π be 
the predicate of p. (In other words, p fits the general form “(Every, some) σ  m-ly 
is (not) π.”29) Then form all propositions p1, p2, …, of the form ‘This is a π’, 
where the demonstrative ‘this’ is taken as indicating one by one each of the sup-
posita of σ. Then, p is true under the following conditions: 
(for p a universal affirmative) m is truly predicable of every pi.30 
(for p a particular affirmative) m is truly predicable of some pi. 
                                                 
29 See Ch. 2, p. 13, above, on the general form of categorical propositions. 
30 This has to be taken with existential import. 
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(for p a universal negative) m is truly predicable of no pi. 
(for p a particular negative) there is some pi of which m is not truly 
predicable, or else σ  supposits for nothing at all, so that there are 
no propositions pi.31 
In order to apply Ockham’s truth conditions here, we have to have propo-
sitions ‘This is a π’, indicating each of the supposita of σ. So we are brought 
around to the question: just what does the subject term supposit for in these 
propositions? 
B.  Ampliation 
This brings us to that part of supposition theory called “ampliation.” It is 
part of the theory of “supposition proper,” since it pertains to the question what 
(or “what all”) a term supposits for in a given occurrence. 
What then is ampliation? Well, in general, ampliation occur when the sup-
position of a term is extended in some way, so that it supposits for more than it 
ordinarily does. Peter of Spain defines it like this (Text (23): 
Ampliation is the extension of a common term from a lesser sup-
position to a greater one. 
He goes on to give an example that indicates he is thinking of cases in 
which a term supposits not only for presently existing things but also for things 
that do not exist at present. Hence, in practice, ampliation for Peter extends the 
supposition of a term so that it supposits not only for present things, but for other 
things as well. The point is that you start from the present. 
Lambert of Auxerre has essentially the same idea (Text (26)), but says 
more or less explicitly that ampliation involves extending the supposition of a 
term beyond the present. Buridan also says this (Text (58). Albert of Saxony 
gives perhaps the clearest statement32: 
Hence ampliation is the taking of a term for one or more things be-
yond what actually exists, for which thing or things [the term] is 
denoted to be taken, by the proposition in which [the term] occurs. 
                                                 
31 The second alternative is messy, but is required since the universal affirmative contra-
dictory of the particular negative has existential import. 
32 Albert of Saxony, Perutilis logica II.10, fol. 15rb. Since this text is not readily avail-
able, here is the Latin: “Unde ampliatio est acceptio alicujus termini pro aliquo vel pro aliquibus 
ultra hoc quod actualiter est pro quo vel pro quibus accipi denotatur per propositionem in qua po-
nitur.” 
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1.  Rules for Ampliation 
Now there are certain rules that govern when and how this ampliation can 
occur. By the fourteenth century, the rules were fairly standard, with some dis-
agreements I shall mention later. Albert of Saxony, for example, gives fairly clear 
versions of them.33 
In general, ampliation occurs in two kinds of contexts: modal contexts 
(which is how we got to this topic in this book) and tensed contexts. Tense and 
modality were almost always treated together in the Middle Ages; they were inti-
mately connected. This is not to say that all mediaevals reduced modality to tem-
porality, as for example Diodorus Cronus did.34 It is only to say that they did not 
think the linkage of time and modality was anything odd and calling for special 
justification. 
There is one last point you have to know about before we get started. For 
many authors (not Ockham or Burley, as we shall see), discrete terms cannot be 
ampliated. Peter of Spain says this, for example, shortly after giving the definition 
of ampliation I quoted earlier (Text (23): “Now I say ‘a common term’ because a 
discrete term like ‘Socrates’ is neither restricted nor ampliated.” And Buridan 
says the same thing35: 
But there is no ampliation, because the subject is a singular term, 
the supposition of which cannot be ampliated, since it cannot sup-
posit except for one [thing] only. 
Again36: 
Hence, indicating Socrates, the term ‘this man’ supposits for Soc-
rates and cannot supposit for anyone else in accordance with this 
indicating. Therefore it cannot be ampliated by any verb or predi-
cate to supposit for [anything] else. 
Thus ampliation, at least according to some prominent authors, applies 
only to general terms. (File that fact away for future reference.) How then does it 
all work? 
For Ockham, the key text here is Summa of Logic I.72, from which we can 
extract several principles. For subject terms: 
(1) With respect to any verb whatsoever, a subject term in per-
sonal supposition can supposit for its present significates 
— that is, for those things it can be truly predicated of by 
                                                 
33 Quoted in Bocheński, A History of Formal Logic, p. 174. 
34 Recall from Ch. 2, p. 29, above, that Diodorus held that the possible is what is or will 
be.  
35 Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 5, sophism 3, Scott ed., p. 93; Scott trans., p. 147. 
36 Ibid., sophism 10, Scott ed., p. 101; Scott trans., p. 157. 
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means of a present tensed copula. It can supposit for other 
things only in special cases. 
Note the bias here. It is very much like the bias in favor of personal sup-
position we saw earlier,37 according to which a term can always supposit person-
ally, but can supposit materially or simply only in special circumstances. In those 
special circumstances, you will recall, the proposition was ambiguous or equivo-
cal, and had to be “distinguished” according to its various senses. The same thing 
happens here in tensed and modal contexts, with the same difficulties about 
equivocation in mental language.38 
(2) A subject term can supposit for its future significates only 
with respect to a future-tensed verb, a future participle, 
etc.39 In such a case, the proposition has to be distin-
guished, since the subject may be taken either for present 
things or for future ones. 
(3) Similarly for the past. A subject term can supposit for its 
past significates only with respect to a past-tensed verb or a 
perfect participle, etc. In those cases the proposition has to 
be distinguished. 
(4) Similarly for modality. A subject term can supposit for all 
its possible significates (including the past and future ones) 
only with respect to a modal verb, participle, etc. In those 
cases the proposition has to be distinguished. 
(Note, with respect to (4), that it doesn’t make any difference what kind of 
modality we’re talking about. The term ‘man’ supposits for exactly the same 
things in ‘Every man can run’ and in ‘Every man necessarily runs’, although of 
course other features of the truth conditions will be different.) 
Thus, for example, the proposition ‘Every man will run’ must be distin-
guished. It can either mean (in effect) “Every presently existing man will run,” in 
which case the descent to singulars goes: “Man1 will run and man2 will run and 
…,” for all present men. Or else it can mean “Every future man will run,” in 
which case the descent goes: “Man1 will run and man2 will run and …,” for all 
future men. 
Notice that for Ockham, past- or future-tensed propositions and all modal 
propositions (except those with a dictum and read in the composite sense) are 
strictly equivocal. He says that the subject term supposits either for the one group 
of supposita or for the other group. He definitely does not say it supposits for the 
sum or union of the two groups. That is, he does not say that in our example the 
subject term ‘man’ supposits for all presently existing men and all future men to-
                                                 
37 See the discussion of Ockham’s “Rule of Supposition,” Ch. 8, pp. 269–270, above. 
38 Ibid. 
39 And also with respect to a modal verb, participle, etc. Modality trumps all tenses. See 
(4) below. 
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gether. On this point, Burley agrees (Purity, §§ 199–225), and so does William of 
Sherwood (Text (29)). It is perhaps significant to note that all these authors are 
English, and that none of them actually uses the word ‘ampliation’ to describe 
what is going on here. 
On the other hand, continental authors often disagreed with Ockham and 
the others on this point. Albert of Saxony, for instance, had a doctrine according 
to which in our proposition ‘Every man will run’, the subject term supposits for 
all present and all future men together, so that one would descend to singulars like 
this: Man1 will run and man2 will run and …,” for all present and future men.40 
This is quite a different theory altogether. On this view, the proposition is not am-
biguous, and there is no need to distinguish senses, as there was for Ockham. 
Buridan too has a theory like Albert’s (Text (59)),41 which is probably not surpris-
ing, since Albert was Buridan’s student.42 
It is perhaps worth noticing that both these people are continental, and 
both do use the term ‘ampliation’ explicitly. It begins to appear, therefore, subject 
to further research, that the actual term ‘ampliation’ (and its cognates) is for the 
most part a piece of continental, not English, vocabulary, and that going along 
with this little difference, the continentals tended to avoid making ampliative con-
texts ambiguous or equivocal, whereas Englishmen did just that. I can’t say that 
this is an especially important difference, or even that it’s definitely true, but if it 
is, it will perhaps help in narrowing down some otherwise anonymous treatises. 
Let’s pause now and review how we got here. We started with modality. 
Ockham divided modal propositions into those with a dictum and those without 
one. Those with a dictum admitted of both a composite and a divided sense. In the 
composite sense, such a proposition is true iff the modal predicate is truly predi-
cable of the proposition for which the dictum supposits. In the divided sense the 
proposition is equivalent to a modal proposition without a dictum. Such a proposi-
tion is true iff the predicate (-adjective) corresponding to the modal verb or ad-
verb is truly predicable of all or some or none or not all — depending on the cate-
gorical form of the original modal proposition —propositions of the form ‘This is 
a π’, where π is the predicate of the original proposition and ‘this’ indicates one 
of the supposita of the subject of the original proposition. 
We now have a theory — and in fact two theories, an English and a conti-
nental theory — of what those supposita are. 
C.  Tense 
It is obvious that exactly the same structure might have been applied to 
tensed propositions. That is, we might have divided propositions with tenses other 
than the plain present into those with a dictum and those without. Thus ‘For every 
man to run is future’ (alternatively: ‘will be the case’, ‘will be true’) vs. ‘Every 
                                                 
40 See Bocheński, A History of Formal Logic, p. 174, §§ 28.02–28.12. 
41 See also the diffuse discussion in John Buridan, Sophismata IV, 4th remark, Scott ed., 
pp. 62–64; Scott trans., pp. 113–115. 
42 See Ch. 2, p. 45, above. 
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man will run’. Those with a dictum might then have been distinguished according 
to a composite and a divided sense. In the composite sense, such a proposition 
would be true iff the temporal predicate is truly predicable of the proposition the 
dictum supposits for. In the divided sense the proposition would be equivalent to a 
temporal proposition without a dictum — for example, ‘Every man will run’. And 
the latter would be true iff every proposition of the form ‘This runs’ will be true, 
indicating one by one each of the supposita of the subject term ‘man’ in ‘Every 
man will run’. 
I say this might have been done. Nevertheless, for the most part, it wasn’t. 
The only part of this structure that was developed was the part dealing with tem-
poral propositions without a dictum. There the theory goes exactly the way we 
have described, and in fact it is noteworthy that this much of the theory of tense is 
completely parallel to the corresponding part of the theory of modality. For Ock-
ham, the relevant passages are from Summa of Logic I.72, and Text (47). The fol-
lowing passage is from the former, §§ 13–14: 
Yet it must be understood that this distinction [with respect 
to the supposition of the subject term] does not fall on the part of 
the predicate, but only on the part of the subject. Thus, ‘Socrates 
was white’ [or] ‘Socrates can be white’ does not have to be distin-
guished. This [is] because “the predicate appellates its form”. This 
is to be understood not in the sense that [the predicate] supposits 
for itself or for a concept, but [in the sense] that by such a proposi-
tion [P] it is denoted that [another] proposition [Q] in which the 
very same predicate, under its own form (that is, it itself and none 
other), is predicated of that for which the subject [of P] supposits, 
or of a pronoun pointing precisely to that for which the subject [of 
P] supposits, was true if the proposition [P] is about the past, or 
that it will be true if the proposition [P] is about the future, or that 
it is possible if the first proposition [P] is about the possible, or 
[that it is] necessary if the first proposition [P] is about the neces-
sary … 
For example, for the truth of ‘A white was black’ it is not 
required that ‘A white is black’ was ever true. Rather, it is required 
that ‘This is black’ was true, pointing to something the subject 
supposits for in ‘A white was black’. 
Here Ockham is saying that for the truth of the past-tensed proposition ‘A 
white was black’, the corresponding present-tensed proposition ‘A white is black’ 
need not ever have been true, because of course that would be impossible. You 
never have something white and black (all over) at the same time. But what you 
do need is for a present-tensed proposition of the form ‘This is black’ to have 
been true, where the ‘this’ indicates either something that is now white (although 
it may well have been black in the past) or else something that was white in the 
past (although of course not at the same time it was black). Burley has an alto-
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gether similar doctrine (Purity, §§ 198–203), and so for he most part does Buri-
dan, although I will say something more about that in a moment.43 
It follows from this account that it is not always the case that a future-
tensed proposition is true just in case the corresponding present-tensed proposi-
tion will be true, or that a past-tensed proposition is true just in case the corre-
sponding present-tensed proposition was true, or likewise for modality. This does 
not hold in general. But it does hold for propositions with discrete subject terms. 
For example, the proposition ‘This will run’ is true iff the proposition ‘This runs’ 
will be true, where the ‘this’ indicates the same thing in both cases. 
Furthermore, it follows from this that the distinctions between proposi-
tions with and without a dictum, and among propositions with a dictum between 
those in the composite sense and those in the divided sense — all these distinc-
tions collapse for singular propositions, those with a discrete term as subject. 
Thus, the proposition ‘This can run’ (without a dictum) is true iff the proposition 
‘This runs’, indicating the same thing, is a possible proposition. But that also pro-
vides the truth conditions for the proposition ‘For this to run is possible’, taken in 
the composite sense. The distinctions all collapse.44 
D.  Some Conclusions 
The theory of tense I have just presented to you is basically Ockham’s 
theory. Burley’s seems to be the same in all essential respects. Buridan’s seems to 
be very similar, although there may be some differences. Let’s review and sum-
marize the main points: 
(1) The theory of temporal propositions is not developed for 
propositions with a dictum, but only for propositions with-
out a dictum — that is, for explicitly tensed propositions. 
The theory of modality, however, is developed for both 
propositions without a dictum and for those with one. 
(2) The distinctions between propositions with a dictum and 
those without, and among those with a dictum between the 
composite and the divided senses, are distinctions that 
make no difference when it comes to singular propositions, 
with discrete terms as subject. But they do make a differ-
ence for all other propositions.45 
(3) The idea that in order to evaluate a future-tensed proposi-
tion, say, you “go” into the future and evaluate the corre-
sponding present-tensed proposition, and that in order to 
                                                 
43 See the references in n. 41 above. 
44 Strictly speaking, I should add that that this is so only for certain kinds of discrete sub-
ject terms: proper names or pure demonstratives. Discrete descriptions, such as ‘this white thing’, 
won’t work here. Our mediaeval authors were quite aware of this point. 
45 With the proviso just noted in n. 44 above. 
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evaluate a past-tensed proposition, you “go” into the past 
and evaluate the corresponding present-tensed proposition, 
and that in order to evaluate a modal proposition, you con-
sider various modal alternatives to the actual state of affairs 
and evaluate the corresponding assertoric proposition in 
those alternatives — this overall idea works only for singu-
lar propositions, those with discrete terms.46 
Clearly, this theory of tense and modality reduces the question of the truth 
values of tensed and modal propositions to the question of the truth values of pre-
sent assertoric singular propositions, evaluated in the past or the future or in vari-
ous modal alternatives. But we already know how to handle present assertoric 
singular propositions. Their truth conditions are unproblematic: if they are af-
firmative, the subject must supposit for something the predicate supposits for too, 
and if they are negative, the subject must fail to do that. And that is all there is to 
it. 
1.  An Inconsistent Triad 
Before we leave the topic of tensed and modal propositions, and with it 
our book, there is one other point I should like to raise. I said just a moment ago 
that for Ockham, a future-tensed singular proposition, for example, is true just in 
case the corresponding present-tensed proposition will be true, where the discrete 
term that is the subject of the present-tensed proposition will supposit then for the 
same thing it supposits for now as subject of the future-tensed proposition. Simi-
larly for the past tense and for modality. 
This will work, and will give the results we want, only if a discrete term 
can supposit now, as the subject of a tensed or modal proposition, for the same 
thing it will or did or can supposit for as the subject of a present-tensed assertoric 
proposition. 
Putting all this together, we see that the following three claims constitute 
an inconsistent triad: 
(a) Ockham’s theory of truth conditions for tensed and modal 
propositions, as we have described. 
(b) The claim that discrete terms cannot be ampliated. 
(c) The notion of ampliation as the extending of the supposita 
of a term to include things besides those it can now be truly 
predicated of by means of a present-tensed, assertoric cop-
ula — in short, the notion that ampliation begins from the 
actual present. 
                                                 
46 Ditto. 
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That these three claims really are inconsistent is clear. Consider the propo-
sition ‘Antichrist will run’. The subject ‘Antichrist’ (which we regard here as a 
proper name, not a job description) cannot now be truly predicated of anyone, 
since we cannot now truly say of anyone ‘This is Antichrist’ (we hope). Now if 
discrete terms cannot be ampliated (claim (b)), and if ampliation is what claim (c) 
say it is, then it follows that the term ‘Antichrist’ does not now supposit for any-
thing at all in any proposition in which it occurs in personal supposition. But if it 
does not now supposit for anything, then when it comes to evaluating future- or 
past-tensed or modal singular propositions according to claim (a), by looking to 
the corresponding present-tensed propositions in which the term ‘Antichrist’ is 
supposed to supposit for the same thing it does now, there is nothing for it to sup-
posit for. Thus it would follow that not only does Antichrist not exist, but he will 
not exist and in deed cannot exist. Similarly, Antichrist will not run, Adam did 
not sin, and so on. In short, the theory breaks down. 
The interesting thing about the three claims in this inconsistent triad is that 
I cannot find anyone who maintains all three. Ockham, of course, does not use the 
term ‘ampliation’ at all. But if we apply that term to what he says is going on in 
the subjects of tensed and modal propositions, then it is clear that nothing Ock-
ham says gives us reason to affirm (b). For him, discrete terms can be ampliated. 
Indeed, they had better be ampliated, or else his theory of truth conditions breaks 
down. The same thing holds for Burley. Buridan, on the other hand, explicitly 
says that discrete terms cannot be ampliated (claim (b)), and that ampliation is the 
adding of supposita to the present-tensed supposita of a term. But, curiously, I do 
not find that he ever explicitly says anything that would require that ‘Antichrist’ 
in ‘Antichrist runs’, which will be true (let us say), will supposit then for the same 
thing it supposits for now in ‘Antichrist will run’. Indeed, he had better not say so, 
or he is in trouble, as we have just seen. What he does say indicates that ‘Anti-
christ will run’ amounts to, or may be analyzed as, “What is or will be Antichrist 
will run’. But it is not clear that this will yield the same problem. 
Now of our inconsistent triad, Ockham and Burley hold both (a) and (c), 
but not (b). And Buridan holds (b) and (c), but not, as far as I can tell, (a). This 
suggests that there is yet a third way to avoid the difficulty, by perhaps holding 
(a) and (b), but denying (c) — that is, by not defining ampliation in terms of add-
ing to the present-tensed supposita of a term, but in some other way. 
I bring this up because, although the details are still obscure (at least to 
me), there is a remark in Ashworth’s Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval 
Period that is most suggestive in this connection. For Peter of Spain, Buridan, Al-
bert of Saxony and other continental authors who take the trouble to say so ex-
plicitly, ampliation amounts to adding past or future or merely possible supposita 
to the presently existing supposita of a term. An unampliated term, then, supposits 
only for presently existing things. But, according to Ashworth, in the “post-
medieval” period, certain authors — Ashworth cites Carbo, Campanella, John of 
St. Thomas and Breitkopf47 — said that a term is ampliated when it “signifies48 
                                                 
47 We’ve not talked about any of these people in this book, so don’t worry about them. 
48 I take it this must be “supposita for.” 
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things existing not only at the time designated by the verb of the proposition in 
which it appears, but also at other times.”49 
If this is correct, it means that ampliation for these people does not add 
other supposita to the presently existing ones; instead, it adds other supposita to 
the ones existing at the time consignified by the verb, whether that time is the pre-
sent or not. Unampliated terms, therefore, need not supposit only for existing 
things; they supposit only for things existing at the time consignified by the verb. 
On this approach one could hold — although I do not know whether these authors 
did so — a theory of truth conditions like Ockham’s for tensed and modal propo-
sitions (that is, claim (a)), and also hold claim (b), that discrete terms are not am-
pliated. No problems would arise. 
I mention this possibility only as an area for further research. I’m not go-
ing to pursue it here. In fact, I’m not going to pursue anything more here, because 
this is the end of this book. 
E.  Additional Reading 
For further reading on the material covered in this chapter, see: Paul Vincent Spade, “Les modali-
tés aléthiques selon Ockham;” William of Ockham, Summa of Logic I.72; Freddoso and Schuur-
man, “Ockham’s Theory of Truth Conditions” (= their introduction to William of Ockham, Ock-
ham’s Theory of Propositions, pp. 1–76); John Buridan, Sophismata, Ca. 5; John Buridan, Soph-
isms on Meaning and Truth, Ch. 5. 
 
 
                                                 
49 Ashworth, Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period, p. 90. 
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 Appendix 1: Chronological Table 
of Names 
Date Name and Notes 
5th c. BC Parmenides (Greek). First to argue for his views. 
” Zeno the Eleatic (Greek). Zeno’s Paradoxes. Reduc-
tio. 
c. 470–399 BC Socrates. Greek, although he didn’t write. Of little 
importance for our purposes (although of course of 
immense importance generally). 
c. 430–c. 360 BC Euclides of Megara (Greek). Founder of “Megarian” 
school of logic. 
428/7–348/7 BC Plato (Greek). Of no great importance for us. (But of 
enormous importance generally.) 
4th c. BC Eubulides (Greek). Pupil of Euclides of Megara. Re-
puted discoverer of the Liar Paradox. 
” Diodorus Cronus (Greek). Diodorean modality. The 
“Master Argument.” 
” Philo of Megara (Greek). Philonean implication. 
384–322 BC Aristotle (Greek). “Inventor of logic.” 
c. 371–c. 286 BC Theophrastus (Greek). Successor of Aristotle in the 
Lyceum. 
c. 336–c. 265 BC Zeno of Chition (Greek). Founder of the Old Stoics. 
3rd c. BC Cleanthes (Greek). Stoic. Successor of Zeno of 
Chition. 
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c. 279–206 BC Chrysippus (Greek). Perhaps the equal of Aristotle, or 
even better. The five indemonstrables. 
116–26 BC Varro (Latin). Roman Eclectic. Cited by Augustine. 
106–43 BC Cicero (Latin). Translator of Greek technical terms. 
Source for information on the Stoics. Wrote a Topics. 
1st c. BC Andronicus of Rhodes (Greek). Compiler of Aris-
totle’s works. 
c. 50–c. 130 AD Epictetus. Our best source for Diodorus’ Master Ar-
gument. 
2nd c. AD (all dates 
are AD from now 
on) 
Apuleius (Latin). Wrote a De interpretatione. 
129–c. 199 Galen (Greek). Medical man. Write an Introduction to 
Logic. Linked logic with medicine. 
late 2nd–early 3rd c. Sextus Empiricus (Greek). Our best source for the 
Stoics. 
c. 200 Alexander of Aphrodisias (Greek). Important com-
mentator on Aristotle. 
3rd c. Diogenes Laertius (Greek). Doxographer. Wrote a 
Lives of the Philosophers. 
c. 232–before 306 Porphyry of Tyre. Pupil and biographer of Plotinus. 
Author of Isagoge (= Introduction) to Aristotle’s 
Categories. 
4th c. Marius Victorinus (Latin). Translator of Aristotle’s 
Categories, De interpretatione, and Porphyry’s Isa-
goge. 
354–430 Augustine (Latin). De dialectica. 
late 5th c. Martianus Capella (Latin). On the Marriage of Philol-
ogy and Mercury. 
480–524/5 Boethius (Latin). Important translator and commenta-
tor. The “Old Logic.” 
c. 500 Priscian. Famous Latin grammarian. 
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6th c. John Philoponus. Greek commentator. 
d. 749 John Damascene (John of Damascus). Greek author 
of a Dialectica, translated (probably by Robert Gros-
seteste) sometime between 1235 and 1242. 
b. 1020 Michael Psellus (Greek). Was not the source for Peter 
of Spain’s Summulae logicales. 
1033–1109 Anselm (Latin — everything will be in Latin from 
now on unless otherwise specified). Use of dialectic 
in theology. De grammatico. 
1079–1142 Peter Abelard. Last before the new translations of 
Greek works. 
1096–1141 Hugh of St. Victor. Didascalicon (written in late 
1120s). 
c. 1115–1180 John of Salisbury. Metalogicon (1159). Important 
source for information on 12th c. logic. 
1126–1198 Averroes (= Ibn Rushd, ﺪﺷر ﻦﺑا Great Muslim phi-
losopher and commentator on Aristotle. Wrote in Ara- 
bic, although some of his works survive only in He-
brew or Latin (and translations therefrom). Known to 
Scholasticism as simply “the Commentator.” Lived in 
Moorish Spain. Born at Cordoba. 
mid-12th c. Burgundio of Pisa. Translation of John Damascene’s 
Dialectica attributed (probably falsely) to him. 
1235–1253 Episcopacy of Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, 
probably the one really responsible for the translation 
of John Damascene’s Dialectica. 
c. 1230s–1277 Peter of Spain. Summulae logicales. Later Pope John 
XXI. Probably best known of the “summulists.” 
d. 1264 Vincent of Beauvais. Encyclopedist. 
c. 1214–1292 Roger Bacon. Wrote a Summulae dialectices, c. 1250. 
One of the “summulists.” 
c. 1250 Lambert of Auxerre. Wrote a Logica. One of the 
“summulists.” 
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” William of Sherwood. Introduction to Logic, Syncate-
goremata. Another one of the “summulists.” 
1224/5–1274 Thomas Aquinas. Wrote a few logical works, of no 
great importance for us. 
c. 1265–1308 John Duns Scotus. Interesting logical works. 
late 13th c. “Pseudo-Scotus.” Very interesting writings, by sev-
eral people. 
1275/80–1322 Peter Aureoli. French philosopher and theologian. 
Some influence on Ockham. Held a version of the fic-
tum-theory of concepts. 
c. 1275–1344/5 Walter Burley (= Burleigh). Realist opponent of Ock-
ham. Extremely important figure. One of the first to 
revive terminist logic. 




John Buridan. Extremely important nominalist. Many 
influential students. 
c. 1295–1349 Thomas Bradwardine. Mertonian. Author of an In-
solubilia and other works. 
c. 1298–1358 Adam Wodeham. Ockham’s one-time personal secre-
tary. “Originator” of the theory of complexe sig-
nificabilia. Very important in the transmission of 
English ideas to France. 
c. 1300–1358 Gregory of Rimini. Theory of complexe significabilia. 
early 14th c.–d. 1361 Richard Kilvington. Mertonian, author of important 
Sophismata. 
fl. before 1335–d. c. 
1365 
Roger Swyneshed (= Swineshead). Mertonian, author 
of Insolubilia and Obligationes. 
Before 1313–d. 
1372/3 
William Heytesbury. Mertonian, author of De sensu 
composito et diviso, Sophismata, Regulae solvendi so-
phismata. 
1335 Probable date of Buridan’s Consequentiae. Date of 
Heytesbury’s Regulae solvendi sophismata. 
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fl. 1340–1342 William of Crathorn 
fl. mid-14th c. Richard Billingham. Mertonian, author of Speculum 
puerorum. 
fl. 1357 Henry Hopton. Author of a treatise On the Truth and 




Robert Fland. Three short logical texts. 
d. 1390 Albert of Saxony. Pupil of Buridan’s. Author of 
Sophismata and Perutilis logica. 
c. 1330–1396 Marsilius of Inghen. Pupil of Buridan’s. 
fl. 1360s John of Holland. Author of logical treatises. Master 
and Dean of Faculty of Arts at Prague. 
fl. 1360s–d. 1399 or 
after 
Richard Lavenham. Derivative author of many logical 
writings. 
fl. 1360s Ralph Strode. Author of a Logica, parts of which 
were used in later universities. 
c. 1350–1419 Vincent Ferrer. Of the more or less Thomist persua-
sion. 
1350–1420/1 Peter of Ailly. Wrote Concepts and Insolubles (1372). 
fl. 1387–1400 Peter of Mantua. Early source for English logic in It-
aly. Author of a Logica. 
fl. 1395–1402 Angelo of Fossombrone. Author of Insolubilia show-
ing influence of Heytesbury. 
1369–1429 Paul of Venice. Studied in Oxford 1390–c. 1393. 
Very important in transmission of English logic to 
Italy. Author of Logica parva and perhaps of Logica 
magna. 
d. 1451/1455 Paul of Pergula. Student of Paul of Venice. Wrote a 
Logica and a De sensu composito et diviso. 
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1387–1465 Cajetan (= Gaetano) of Thiene. Student of Paul of 
Venice. Commented on Heytesbury and other English 
authors. 
d. 1446 Battista da Fabriano. Later Italian author. 
1400–1464 George Scholarius. Greek translator of Peter of 
Spain’s Summulae logicales. 
d. 1486 Alexander Sermoneta. Italian author, commentator. 
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he following is a compilation of primary texts frequently quoted or cited 
in the above pages. The idea was to gather them here so that you would 
not have to keep little markers at various places in the above chapters and 
keep flipping back and forth to find texts that are discussed in several 
places. This way you only have to keep one such marker. I have also included 
several passages that were just too long or for some other reason could not be in-
cluded gracefully in the chapter where they are discussed. The texts are arranged 
here in more or less chronological order. All translations are my own, and were 
made especially for this volume. Where the Latin is not readily available for you 
to look up for yourselves, I have included it in the notes. 
(1) Aristotle, Categories 1, 1a12–15: Whatever get from something the 
names by which they are called, but differ in ending, are called “paronyms.” For 
example, a grammarian [is so called] from grammar, and a brave [person is so 
called] from bravery. 
(2) Aristotle, Categories 10, 12b6–15: Neither is what grounds negation 
and affirmation [itself] negation and affirmation. For an affirmation is an affirma-
tive proposition, and a negation is a negative proposition. But none of what 
ground negation and affirmation is a proposition. These [grounds] are neverthe-
less said to be opposed to one another as affirmation and negation are. For it is the 
same kind of opposition in these cases too. For just as affirmation is opposed to 
negation — for example, ‘He is sitting’ [is opposed] to ‘He is not sitting’ — so 
too the thing underlying each one is opposed [to the thing underlying the other], 
sitting [is opposed] to not sitting. 
(3) Aristotle, De interpretatione 1, 16a3–8: Therefore, things in speech are 
symbols of passions in the soul, and things written [are symbols] of those that are 
in speech. And just as letters are not the same for all [people], neither are utter-
ances the same. But the things of which these [utterances] are primarily signs are 
the same for all [people, namely] passions of the soul. And what the latter are 
likenesses of — [namely,] real things — are also the same. 
(4) Aristotle, De interpretatione 3, 16b19–21: Therefore, verbs spoken by 
themselves are names, and signify something. For the speaker halts his thinking 
and the listener pauses. 
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(5) Augustine, On the Customs of the Catholic Church I.4, 61: Therefore, 
let us ask what is better than man. That of course will be hard to find out, unless 
we first consider and discuss what man himself is. I do not think a definition of 
man is now demanded of me. What seems to be asked of me at this point is rather 
the following: since there is almost universal consensus — or at least it is agreed 
on between me and those I am now dealing with, and that suffices — that we are 
put together out of soul and body, what [then] is the man himself? Is he both of 
the things I [just] mentioned, or the body alone, or the soul alone? 
For although soul and body are two things, and neither would be called a 
“man” if the other did not exist (for neither would the body be a man if the soul 
did not exist, nor in turn would the soul be a man if a body were not animated by 
it), nevertheless it can happen that one of these should be regarded as the “man” 
and called [such]. 
Therefore, what do we call the “man”? [Is he] soul and body, like a 
“team” [of horses] or a centaur2? [Is he] the body alone, which is being used by a 
soul that rules it, like a “lantern,” [which is] not the flame and the container to-
gether but only the container, although we call it [a lantern] because of the flame? 
[Or] do we call nothing but the soul the “man,” but on account of the body it 
rules, just as we call a “rider” not the horse and the man together but only the 
man, yet [only] insofar as he is suited to governing the horse? 
It is hard to decide this issue. Or if it is easy to figure out, [in any case] it 
requires a long explanation. We do not have to accept and take on that job and 
delay [here]. For whether both, or only the soul, takes the name ‘man’, the best 
thing for the man is not what is best for the body. Rather what is best for the soul 
and body together, or for the soul alone, that is best for the man. 
(6) Augustine, De trinitate XV.10.19: Thus whoever is able to understand 
the word, not only before it sounds but also before the images of its sounds are 
pondered in thought — for this is what pertains to no language (namely, none of 
those that are called national languages, of which ours is Latin) … 
(7) Augustine, De trinitate XV.11.20: Consequently, the word that sounds 
outwardly is a sign of the word that shines within. 
(8) Augustine, On the City of God XIX.33: Now [Varro] tries to convince 
[us] which of these three is true and ought to be followed, as follows: First, since 
in philosophy the highest good, not of a tree, not of cattle, not of God, but of man 
is sought for, he thinks one must ask what is man himself. He feels there are two 
[factors] in [man’s] nature: body and soul. And he does not doubt at all that of 
these two the soul is the better and much the more preeminent. Rather [what he 
doubts is] whether (1) the soul alone is the man, in such a way that the body is to 
                                                 
1 Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae I.4.6, in Migne, PL 32, col. 1313.  
2 The point seems to depend on the rather odd view that a centaur is not half horse and 
half man, but rather a combination of a complete horse and a complete man.  
3 Augustine, De civitate dei XIX.3.1–24. 
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him as the horse to the rider.4 For the rider is not the man and the horse, but is 
only the man. Nevertheless, he is called a “rider” because he is somehow related 
to the horse. Or (2) is the man the body alone, somehow related to the soul, like 
the cup to the drink? For the chalice and the drink the chalice contains are not to-
gether called the “cup,” but only the chalice, yet [only] because it is adapted to 
containing the drink.5 Or finally (3) is neither the soul alone nor the body alone 
the man, but both together, [in such a way that] the soul or the body is one part of 
him, but he as a whole consists of both in order to be a man? Thus we call two 
conjoined horses a “team.” Either the right one of them or the left one is a part of 
the team. But we do not call [either] one of them [alone] the “team,” no matter 
how it is related to the other, but [only] both together. [Varro] chooses the third of 
these three [alternatives] and supposes that man is neither the soul alone nor the 
body alone, but the soul and the body together. Hence the highest good of man, 
by which he is made happy, he says consists of the goods of both things, that is, 
of the soul and of the body. 
(9) Boethius, his translation of Text (3)6: Therefore, things in speech are 
marks of passions in the soul, and things written [are marks] of those that are in 
speech. And just as letters are not the same for all [people], neither are utterances 
the same. But the things of which these [utterances] are primarily marks are the 
same for all [people, namely] passions of the soul. And what the latter are like-
nesses of — [namely,] real things — are also the same. 
(10) Boethius, his translation of Text (4)7: Indeed verbs, when uttered by 
themselves, are names and signify something. For he who says [a verb] estab-
lishes an understanding, and he who hears it rests. 
(11) Boethius, First Commentary on De interpretatione8: Now the whole 
reasoning has the following sense. There are three things out of which every con-
versation and argument is made complete: real things, understandings, utterances. 
Real things are what we perceive by the mind’s reason and distinguish by an un-
derstanding. Understandings, on the other hand, [are] that by means of which we 
learn about the things themselves, while utterances [are] that by means of which 
we signify what we grasp by an understanding. 
                                                 
4 ‘rider’ = ‘eques’ = ‘horseman’. In Latin, ‘eques’ is etymologically related to ‘horse’ = 
‘equus’, but does not have the word ‘man’ built into it as ‘horseman’ does in English. Hence I 
prefer to translate it as ‘rider’ for the sake of the point the passage is making. 
5 Like ‘horse’ = ‘equus’ and ‘rider’ = ‘eques’, ‘cup’ = ‘poculus’ and ‘drink’ = ‘potio’ are 
etymologically related in Latin. 
6 Boethius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, Meiser ed., I, p. 3.5–
11. 
7 Boethius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, Meiser ed., I, p. 5.5–
7. 
8 Boethius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, Meiser, ed., I, p. 
37.4–22 (on De interpretatione 1, 16a3–8). There is a similar passage in the second commentary, 
II, p. 20.12–31. 
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But besides these three, there is another kind of thing, which signifies ut-
terances. These are letters. For the writing down of these [letters] is a signifying. 
Since therefore these things are four — the real thing, the understanding, the ut-
terance, the letter — the understanding conceives the real thing, utterances desig-
nate the understanding, but letters signify those utterances. 
Now an understanding of the soul is a kind of passion. For unless someone 
suffers in his soul’s reason a certain likeness of the thing that he understands, 
there is no understanding. For when I see a globe or a square, I conceive its shape 
in my mind, and a likeness of it is formed for me, and [my] soul suffers a likeness 
of the understood thing. Thus, it becomes an understanding, and is a likeness of 
the thing and a passion of the soul. 
(12) Boethius, First Commentary on De interpretatione9: “And just as let-
ters are not the same for all [people], so neither are the utterances the same.”10 
This suffices to show that utterances and letters are established by “position,”11 
not by nature. In fact, utterances and letters are different among different people. 
And just as the same letters are not found among all men, so too neither are [the 
same] utterances. Hence these are according to “position,” about which [Aristotle] 
says nothing, as it if were plain. For it is manifest that what is changed by indi-
vidual nations cannot be established by nature, but rather by “position.” 
Now what he added — “But the first things of which these [utterances] are 
the marks are the same for all [people, namely] passions of the soul. And what the 
latter are likenesses of — [namely,] real things — are also the same”12 — this 
serves to make clear that the real things and the understandings are natural. For 
the “passions of the soul” and the “likenesses of things” are the same thing, as has 
been said. Therefore, now he says, “what the latter” (that is, utterances, about 
which he had said above, “so neither are the utterances the same”), the things 
therefore of which these utterances are significative (that is, the passions of the 
soul), “are the same for all people.” 
Now utterances signify the things that are in the understandings. There-
fore, an understanding is a passion of the mind, not differing among all men. 
Therefore, the conception of the mind and passion of the soul is natural among all 
men, and what are counted as utterances are the marks of them. 
But we are told that the things of which the understandings and passions 
of the soul are likenesses are not established by “position,” but rather naturally, 
for the reason that those things, the likenesses of which are understandings, which 
understandings are passions of the soul, are the same for all people. 
(13) Boethius, Second Commentary on De interpretatione13: For Aristotle 
does not think the subject things are [what are] signified by names and verbs, and 
                                                 
9 Ed. cit., I, p. 39.2–40.7. 
10 This is the “lemma,” the quotation being commented on. For the context, see 
Boethius’ translation of De interpretatione, 1, 16a3–8, in Text (9). 
11 Boethius’ term for what other authors called “imposition” or “institution.” Etymologi-
cally, ‘position’ = a “setting up,” a “positing.” 
12 See Boethius’ translation of De interpretatione, 1, 16a3–8, in Text (9) above. 
13 Ed. cit., II, p. 27.10–29.16. 
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neither are sense impressions or fantasy images. That names and verbs are not 
utterances significative of sense impressions he makes clear in his work on jus-
tice, where he says, “φύσει γὰρ εὐθὺς διῄρηται τά τε νοήματα καὶ τὰ 
αἰσθήματα,”14 which can be translated into English15 as “For understandings and 
sensations are by nature immediately divided [from one another].” Therefore, he 
thinks a sensation is something different from an understanding. 
But he16 who says that passions of the soul are signified by utterances is 
not talking about sensations. For sensations are passions of the body, [not of the 
soul]. Therefore, if he had said that passions of the body are signified in this way 
by utterances, then we would rightly understand [that he meant] sensations. But 
because he stated that names and verbs signify passions of the soul, he must be 
supposed to mean, not sensations, but rather understandings. 
Now because a fantasy image is also a thing in the soul, someone might 
doubt whether perhaps ‘passions of the soul’ means fantasy images, which the 
Greeks call φαντασίας. But he quite correctly and painstakingly distinguishes 
these [two kinds of things] in his books On the Soul, where he says17: 
ἔτιν δὲ φαντασία ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως; 
συμπλοχὴ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐστὶν τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ 
ψεῦδος. τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τί διοίσει τοῦ μὴ 
φαντάσματα εἴναι; ἢ οὐδὲ ταῦτα φαντάσματα, ἀλλ᾿ 
οὐχ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων. 
which we translate as: 
Now a fantasy image is different from an affirmation and a nega-
tion. For truth and falsehood18 is19 a putting together of under-
standings. But how will primary understandings be different, so 
that they are not fantasy images? Or rather, [is it not the case that] 
they certainly are not fantasy images, but they do not occur with-
out fantasy images? 
This statement shows that fantasy images are one thing, understandings 
are another. Indeed, affirmations and negations come about from the putting to-
gether of understandings. 
Therefore, he raised this doubt too20: Are primary understandings a kind 
of fantasy images? Now we call “primary understandings” the ones that conceive 
                                                 
14 Meiser’s edition refers to Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VIII, 12 (not 11, as Meiser 
says), 1162a22. But the text there is not about the objects of intellect and sense at all, but instead 
about differences between men and women: “εὐθὺς γὰρ διῄρηται τά ἔργα καὶ ἔστιν 
ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός.” 
15 Boethius, of course, says “Latin.” 
16 Namely, Aristotle. See De interpretatione 1, 16a3–8, and Text (11) above. 
17 Aristotle, De anima III, 8, 432a10–14. 
18 Which apply only to affirmations and negations. 
19 Boethius has the singular here, despite the compound subject. 
20 In the penultimate sentence of the above quotation. 
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a simple thing — for instance, if someone says only ‘Socrates’ and wonders 
whether such an understanding,21 which contains in itself nothing of the true or 
the false, is an understanding [of Socrates] or a fantasy image of Socrates. But in 
this case too he clearly shows what would seem [to be the answer]. For he says, 
“Or rather [is it not the case that] they certainly are not fantasy images, but they 
do not occur without fantasy images?” That is, what the word ‘Socrates’, or [any] 
other simple [word], signifies is not a fantasy image but rather an understanding, 
which understanding cannot come about without a fantasy image. 
For sense impressions and fantasy images are certain primary shapes on 
which the intelligence leans, being superimposed on them as on a kind of founda-
tion. Just as painters are wont to sketch a body in outline as a foundation when 
they express the features of anything in colors, so [too] the sense impression and 
fantasy image are a foundation in the case of the soul’s perceiving. For when 
some thing falls under a sense [faculty] or under thought, there must first be born 
a certain fantasy image of it, and then a fuller understanding supervenes that ex-
plicates all [the object’s] parts that were confusedly taken for granted by the fan-
tasy image. 
Therefore, a fantasy image is something imperfect. But names and verbs 
do not signify any broken-off things, but rather complete22 ones. Hence Aris-
totle’s correct view is: Whatever are counted as verbs and names, they do not sig-
nify sense impressions or fantasy images, but only the quality of understandings. 
(14) Boethius, Second Commentary on De interpretatione23: Hence the 
Peripatetics, who come from Aristotle, were absolutely correct to claim that there 
are three kinds of discourse, one that can be written with the elements [of writ-
ing],24 another that can be pronounced by the voice, and a third that can be linked 
together in thought. One is contained in understandings, the other in speech, and 
the third in letters. 
(15) Boethius, Second Commentary on De interpretatione25: It was said 
that for the Peripatetics there are three kinds of discourse, one that is written with 
letters, another that is pronounced by the voice, and a third kind that is joined to-
gether in the mind. Now if there are three kinds of discourse, no doubt the parts of 
speech are of three kinds too. Hence, because the verb and the name are the prin-
cipal parts of speech, there will be one kind of verbs and names that will be writ-
ten, another kind that will be spoken, and another, silent kind that will be treated 
by the mind. 
                                                 
21 That is, the understanding expressed by the utterance. 
22 ‘complete’ = perfecta. The contrast here is between fantasy images, which are “imper-
fect” or “cut off” (and so “incomplete”), and understandings, which are “perfect” (that is, “com-
plete”). 
23 Ed. cit., II, p. 29.16–21. 
24 That is, the letters of the alphabet. 
25 Ed. cit., II, p. 30.3–10. 
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(16) Boethius, from On the Differences in the Topics26: A proposition is 
an expression signifying the true or the false. 
(17) Anselm, De grammatico, §§ 4.231–4.234127: Surely the name ‘man’ 
signifies per se and as one the [things] of which the whole man consists. Among 
these, substance stands in the first place, because it is the cause of the others and 
has them, not as needing them but [them] as needing it. For there is no differ-
ence28 of substance [such that] substance cannot be found without it, [but] none of 
its differences can exist without [substance]. Hence, even though all these [things] 
together, as a single whole, are called29 “man” by one name under one significa-
tion, nevertheless [this occurs] in such a way that the name is principally signifi-
cative and appellative of substance. As a result, although it is correct to say a sub-
stance is a man, and man is a substance, yet no one says rationality is a man, or 
man is rationality. Rather [we say man] has rationality. 
But ‘grammaticus’ does not signify man and grammar30 as one. Rather it 
signifies grammar per se and man per aliud. The name [‘grammaticus’], even 
though it is appellative of man, nevertheless cannot properly be called significa-
tive of him; and although it is significative of grammar, nevertheless it is not ap-
pellative of it. I am now calling an “appellative name” of any thing [that] by 
which the thing itself is appellated [= called] in common usage. For [there is] no 
common usage by which it is said that grammar is grammaticus, or a grammati-
cus is grammar. Rather, a man is grammaticus, and a grammaticus a man. 
(18) Anselm, De grammatico, § 4.241331: M If man is [contained] in 
grammaticus, it is not predicated together with [grammaticus] of anything, just as 
animal is not predicated [together] with man because it is contained in man. For it 
is not correct to say Socrates is a man-animal. 
D That cannot be contradicted. 
M But it is well-formed to say Socrates is a grammaticus man.32 
D [Yes, that is] well-formed. 
M Therefore, man is not in grammaticus. 
D I see that that follows. 
(19) Anselm, De grammatico, §§ 4.4210–4.423433: M If there is a white 
horse confined in some house without your knowledge, and someone asks you “Is 
there is a white34 in that house?,” do you thereby know there is a horse there? 
                                                 
26 Boethius, De differentiis topicis, col. 1174B. See Stump trans., p. 30. 
27 Henry, The De Grammatico of St. Anselm, pp. 36–37. The “Master” in the dialogue is 
speaking. 
28 The reference is to the traditional method of definition by genus + difference. Here the 
genus is substance. 
29 called = “appellentur.” 
30 Correcting Henry’s ‘grammaticum’ to ‘grammaticam’ in accordance with the Schmitt 
edition of Anselm’s Opera omnia, vol. 1, p. 157.2. 
31 Henry, The De Grammatico of St. Anselm, p. 38. M = the “Master” in the dialogue; D 
= the “Disciple.” 
32 ‘Grammaticus’ is here used as an adjective, a perfectly normal usage. 
33 Ibid., pp. 40–41. Again, M = the “Master” in the dialogue; D = the “Disciple.” 
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D No. For whether ‘white’ means whiteness or what whiteness is in, I do 
not conceive in my mind the being of any definite thing but this color. 
M Even if you do understand something besides this color, nevertheless it 
is certain that you do not understand through this name the being of what the 
color itself is in. 
D Certainly. For even if a body or a surface occurs to the mind, which 
only happens because I have experienced that whiteness is likely to be in [bodies 
and surfaces], nevertheless the name ‘white’ itself does not signify any of these 
[things], as was shown for ‘grammaticus’. But I am still waiting for you to show 
[how35] it does signify. 
M What if you see a white horse and a black ox standing next to one an-
other, and someone says of the horse “Strike it!,” without showing by any sign 
which one he is talking about? Do you know he is talking about the horse? 
D No. 
M But if he replies to you “The white”36 when you do not know and ask 
“Which one?,” do you understand which he is talking about? 
D I understand the horse by the name ‘white’. 
M So the name ‘white’ signifies the horse to you. 
D It does [so] signify. 
M Do you not see that [it does this] in a way other than the name ‘horse’ 
[does]? 
D I do see. Surely the name ‘horse’, even before I know the horse is white, 
signifies to me by itself (per se), and not through [anything] else (per aliud), the 
substance of the horse. But the name ‘white’ does not signify [it] by itself (per 
se), but rather through [something] else (per aliud) — that is, through the fact that 
I know the horse is white. For since the name ‘white’ does not signify anything 
else than does the expression ‘having whiteness’, [therefore] just as the expres-
sion by itself (per se) establishes an understanding37 of whiteness for me, and not 
of the thing that has whiteness, so does the name. But because I know whiteness 
is in the horse, and [I know this] through [something] other (per aliud) than 
through the name ‘white’ — say, by [the sense of] sight) — [therefore] I under-
stand the horse through the fact that I know whiteness is in the horse, that is, 
through [something] other (per aliud) than through the name ‘white’. Yet the 
horse is called (appellatur) by that [name]. 
M So do you see how ‘white’ is not significative of what it does somehow 
signify, and how it is appellative of what it is not significative of? 
                                                                                                                                     
34 white = “albus sive album.” Anselm gives both the masculine and neuter forms to 
lend a certain additional ambiguity to the question. 
35 how: The Latin is ‘quia’, which in Anselm’s Latin would normally be translated in 
such a context “to show that it signifies.” But that is not in fact what is going on. 
36 English virtually requires one to say “the white one” here, but Latin does not require a 
noun. And since that is the whole point of Anselm’s discussion here, I have translated with a bare 
adjective. 
37 establishes an understanding: constituit … intellectum. See Ch. 3, p. 61, above, on this 
phrase. 
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D I see that too. For it [both] signifies and does not signify the horse. For 
it does not by itself (per se) signify it, but through [something] else (per aliud). 
And yet the horse is called (appellatur) white. 
(20) Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, Tract. I38: Therefore a sound is 
whatever is properly perceived by hearing. I say ‘properly’, because even if a man 
or a bell is heard, this does not occur except through sound. Among sounds, one 
kind is an utterance, another kind is a non-utterance. 
An utterance is a sound brought forth by the mouth of an animal, [and] 
formed by natural instruments. The instruments by which an utterance is formed 
are called natural [instruments, namely]: lips, teeth, tongue, palate, throat and 
lungs. 
A non-utterance sound is one that is generated by the collision of inani-
mate bodies. For example, the breaking of trees, the stamping of feet. 
Among utterances, some are significative, others are non-significative. A 
significative utterance is one that represents something to hearing. For example, 
‘man’, or the groans of the sick. A non-significative utterance is one that repre-
sents nothing to hearing. For example, ‘buba’.39 Among significative utterances, 
one kind is significative by convention, another kind [is significative] naturally. 
A naturally significative utterance is one that represents the same thing to 
all men. For example, the groans of the sick, the barking of dogs. 
A conventionally significative utterance is one that represents something 
according to the will of the institutor. For example, ‘man’. Among conventionally 
significative utterances, one kind is simple or incomplex. For example, the name40 
and the verb. Another kind [is] composite or complex. For example, an expres-
sion.41 
(21) Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, Tract VI42: One kind of acciden-
tal supposition is simple and another kind is personal. Simple supposition is the 
taking of a common term for the universal thing signified by it. For instance, 
when ‘Man is a species’ or ‘Animal is a genus’ is said, the term ‘man’ supposits 
for man in general and not for any of its inferiors, and the term ‘animal’ [suppos-
its] for animal in general and not for any of its inferiors. And likewise for any 
other common term. For example, ‘Risible is a property’, ‘Rational is a differ-
ence’, ‘White is an accident’. 
                                                 
38 Translated from Peter of Spain, Tractatus (= Summulae logicales), De Rijk, ed., Trans. 
I.2–3, pp. 1–2. Compare the translation in Peter of Spain, Language in Dispute, pp. 1–2. 
39 This is supposed to be a pair of nonsense syllables. Unfortunately, ‘buba’ can mean 
“swellings” in late Latin, as for example the swellings that came with “bubonic” plague. Some-
times authors will give ‘bu ba blitrix’ as their example instead. It really doesn’t mean anything, in 
Latin any more than in English. 
40 name = nomen. In mediaeval grammatical theory, “names” included more than we call 
nouns. They also included adjectives. 
41 expression = oratio. This is meant to include any word-group. 
42 De Rijk ed., Trans. VI, § 5, p. 81.11–18. Compare Dinneen trans., p. 70. 
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(22) Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, Tract VI43: Personal supposition 
is the taking of a common term for its inferiors. For instance, when ‘Man runs’ is 
said, the term ‘man’ supposits for its inferiors. 
(23) Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, Tract IX44: Ampliation is the ex-
tension of a common term from a lesser supposition to a greater one. For instance, 
if one says ‘A man is able to be Antichrist’, the term ‘man’ supposits not only for 
the [people] who exist, but for those who will exist. Hence it is ampliated to future 
[men]. Now I say ‘a common term’ because a discrete term like ‘Socrates’ is nei-
ther restricted nor ampliated. 
(24) Lambert of Auxerre, Logica45: One kind of accidental supposition is 
simple and another kind is personal. Simple supposition is that according to 
which a term is taken for itself or for its thing, without having any relation to the 
supposita contained under it. Now the supposition is called “simple” because it is 
in a term by reason of its form. And because the form is of itself simple and indi-
visible, therefore the supposition that is in a term from its form is called “simple.” 
That form is simple and indivisible may be gathered from the book Six Princi-
ples.46 But note that not to have a relation to supposita may be such that there is 
in no way a relation to them, either determinately or indeterminately, or such that 
it can be said that there is no relation to them determinately but rather indetermi-
nately. In accordance with this, it can be said that there is one kind of simple sup-
position in which a term in no way refers to supposita but is only taken for its 
form. This kind the term ‘man’ has when ‘Man is a species’ is said. And this is 
properly simple supposition. But there is another kind of simple supposition in 
which a common term does not refer to its supposita determinately, but yet has a 
relation to them indeterminately. This supposition the term ‘man’ has when ‘I 
know there is a man in England’ is said. Likewise, ‘pepper’ when ‘Pepper is sold 
here and in Rome’ is said. For this is less properly called simple supposition that 
is the first kind. Personal supposition is that according to which a term is taken for 
its suppositum or for its supposita. 
(25) Lambert of Auxerre, Logica47: Determinate [supposition] is what a 
common term has when it can be taken indifferently for one thing or for several, 
as when one says ‘A man runs’. In this case ‘man’ has determinate supposition. 
For it is true when one man runs or several. Now it is called “determinate” be-
cause for the truth of a proposition in which48 there occurs a common term having 
such supposition, it suffices that the common term be taken of necessity for some 
                                                 
43 De Rijk ed., Trans. VI, § 7, p. 82.10–12. Compare Dinneen trans., p. 71. 
44 De Rijk ed., Trans. IX, § 2, p. 194. Compare Dinneen trans., p. 172. 
45 Alessio ed., p. 209. Compare Kretzmann and Stump, The Cambridge Translations of 
Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, p. 110. 
46 The pseudo-Aristotelian Liber de sex principiis (= Book of Six Principles), which dis-
cusses the six categories about which Aristotle says relatively little in his genuine Categories. 
Don’t worry about it. 
47 Alessio ed., pp. 210–211. Compare Kretzmann and Stump, The Cambridge Transla-
tions of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, pp. 111–112. 
48 Conjecturing ‘qua’ for the edition’s ‘una’. 
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suppositum. Neither is it required that it be taken of necessity for several, al-
though it is able to be taken in such supposition for several. Therefore, it is neces-
sary that a common term in such supposition be taken for one thing determinately. 
If [it is taken] for several, that is accidental. Confused [supposition] is what a 
common term has when of necessity it is taken for all its supposita or for several. 
Now it is called ‘confused’ from the multitude of the supposita for which a term 
having such supposition is taken. For where there is multitude, there there is con-
fusion. One kind of confused supposition is strong [and] mobile, another is weak 
[and] immobile. The strong [and] mobile kind is what a common term has when it 
is taken of necessity for all its supposita, and a descent can be made under it … 
Weak [and] immobile [supposition] is what a common term has when of necessity 
it is taken for several supposita contained under it, yet not for all. Neither can a 
descent be made under it. 
(26) Lambert of Auxerre, Logica49: Ampliation is the extension of the 
range of a common term insofar as the common term can be taken for more sup-
posita than its actual supposition requires. This is clear when one says ‘A man is 
able to be Antichrist’. ‘Man’ is ampliated by ‘is able’. For although ‘man’, sup-
positing with respect to a present-tensed verb, by its actual supposition is taken 
for present [men], nevertheless through the nature of the verb ‘is able’, ‘man’ is 
ampliated so that it is taken for the future. And so its supposition is extended. 
(27) William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic, from Ch. 550: Now sig-
nification is the presentation of the form of something to the intellect. 
(28) William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic, from Ch. 551: [Formal 
supposition] is divided as follows: one kind is simple, another personal. It is sim-
ple when a word supposits its significate for its significate.52 For example, ‘Man 
is a species’. But [formal supposition is] personal when it supposits its significate 
not for [its] significate but for a thing that is under it. For instance, ‘Man runs’.53 
For running inheres in man in virtue of some singular. 
(29) William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic, from Ch. 554: It must be 
said that such statements, where a verb in the past or future tense is predicated, 
are twofold. For example, ‘A man ran’. For the statement can be said [as] com-
                                                 
49 Alessio ed., p. 228. Compare Kretzmann and Stump, The Cambridge Translations of 
Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, pp. 137–138. 
50 Lohr ed., § 5.0.1, p. 265.8–9 (= Grabmann ed., p. 74.16–17). See Kretzmann trans., p. 
105. 
51 Lohr ed., § 5.1.3, p. 266.11–15 (= Grabmann ed., p. 75.14–18). See Kretzmann trans., 
p. 107. 
52 The construction ‘supponere’ + the accusative is unusual but not unique. The more 
common construction, and the universal one in the fourteenth century, has ‘supponere’ + a ‘pro’-
clause (= “supposits for,” “refers to”). Here Sherwood combines both constructions. For specula-
tion about the sense, see Kretzmann trans., p. 107 n. 16. 
53 Latin has no indefinite article. So this proposition can be read quite naturally as “A 
man runs.” 
54 Lohr ed., § 5.3.5, pp. 273.82–274.97 (= Grabmann ed., p. 84.14–30). See Kretzmann 
trans., pp. 126–128. 
Appendix 2: A Collection of Texts 
 
346
posite or divided. If [it is] composite, then it should be uttered continuously, and 
the continuity of the subject with the predicate signifies that [the subject’s] suppo-
sition should be discerned from the predicate. Accordingly, ‘man’ supposits for 
past [men] and not for present ones (except insofar as they are past). If [the 
proposition is said as] divided, then it should be uttered discontinuously as fol-
lows: “A man, runs.” And the discontinuity of the expression signifies that the 
[subject’s] supposition is not discerned from the predicate. The rule is to be un-
derstood in this sense. 
Thus it does not follow: “[Something] white was seen by Socrates; there-
fore, Socrates saw [something] white. For example, if a shield is white now, but 
was black when it was seen by Socrates. I say [this] does not follow if the antece-
dent is divided. But it does follow if [the antecedent] is composite. 
We have to understand [the situation] in this way too for a verb about the 
future, that is, that a common term in the earlier part [of the proposition]55 sup-
posits for present [things] or future ones by composition and division. In the later 
part,56 however, [it supposits] only for future ones. 
(30) Roger Bacon, Summulae dialectices57: One kind of supposition is 
simple, another personal. Simple supposition occurs when a term does not stand 
for another person58 or for some inferior, but for an utterance (for example, ‘Man 
is an utterance’), for [its] significate (for example, ‘Man is the worthiest of crea-
tures’), for a significant utterance (for example, ‘Man is a name’), for some prop-
erty of an utterance (for example, ‘Man is a monosyllable’, ‘Man is a trochaic 
foot’,59 or, as far as the properties of the significate are concerned, [for one of 
those] (for example, ‘Man is a universal’, ‘Man is a species’), and many other 
things like that. 
Augustine plainly demonstrates at the end of his Dialectic60 that a name 
can be so taken in different ways, and in many other ways. We shall treat this 
later. 
Personal supposition occurs when a term supposits for individuals and for 
its inferiors (for example, ‘A man runs’, ‘A man argues’. 
(31) John Duns Scotus, Questions on the First Book of the De interpreta-
tione, q. 261: Does a name signify a real thing or a species in the soul?62 … That 
                                                 
55 That is, in subject position. 
56 In predicate position. 
57 Roger Bacon, Summulae dialectices, Libera ed., p. 266, §§ (420)–(422); Steele ed., p. 
269. 
58 I am not sure of the exact sense of the word here, but it probably connected with the 
notions of personal supposition and of grammatical “person.” 
59 In Latin meter, a trochee is a metrical foot made up of a long syllable followed by a 
short one. The Latin word ‘homo’ (= man) is such a trochee. 
60 Augustine, De dialectica, Pinborg ed., pp. 112–114. 
61 John Duns Scotus, In primum librum Perihermenias quaestiones, in his Opera omnia, 
q. 2, Wadding ed., vol. 1, pp. 186–187. 
62 This is the statement of q. 2. 
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it signifies a species is seen here in the text,63 “The things in speech are marks” — 
that is, signs — “of passions in the soul.” Those passions are not real things, be-
cause real things are not in the soul64 … 
To the contrary, further down in the first part of the De interpretatione,65 
at the end of the chapter on the verb, in the sixth text,66 Aristotle says that a verb 
signifies something: “For he who utters them establishes an understanding.” From 
this it follows that to signify is to establish an understanding of something. There-
fore, that is signified an understanding of which is established by the utterance. 
But when an utterance is pronounced, an understanding of the species is not es-
tablished, but rather [an understanding] of the real thing, as is clear in the case of 
anyone hearing a significative utterance … 
To the question, it is said that the intelligible species is immediately signi-
fied by the utterance, but it is considered in two ways: either insofar as it is an ac-
cidental something in itself, namely, informing the soul, or insofar as it represents 
a real thing. In the first way, it is not signified by the utterance, for the reason 
given to the contrary. But in the second way, it is. For since every sign insofar as 
it is a sign is a sign of the signed, it follows that an utterance signifying a likeness 
insofar as it is a sign of a real thing signifies the real thing itself — but mediately, 
because, that is, it immediately signifies what is the sign of the real thing, insofar 
as it is a sign. 
(32) John Duns Scotus, Second Work on the De interpretatione, q. 167: We 
must say, as Aristotle says here in Chapter 1,68 that a name first signifies passions 
of the soul, that is, conceptions of the understanding. As evidence for this, we 
must know that there are three things related in order: (a) The first is the intel-
ligible species, according as it is in act, as first act in its proper nature69 … (b) 
The second is that the notion70 of a thing is the what it was to be,71 which is set 
before the intellective power, insofar as it is an act that is the intelligible species, 
according to which act the knowing power is brought to the what it is of the 
                                                 
63 Aristotle, De interpretatione 1, 16a3–8, Boethius trans., in Text (9). 
64 At least not the kinds of real things we are talking about here. 
65 The Latin here says "Posterior Analytics,” which is obviously wrong. See Boethius’ 
translation of De interpretatione 3, 16b19–21, Text (10), the second sentence. 
66 This is an appeal to a common mediaeval way of dividing up the text, much as we to-
day divide it up into chapters. 
67 John Duns Scotus, Opus secundum, q. 1, in his Opera omnia, Wadding ed., vol. 1, pp. 
212–213. The passage is very dense and involves a lot of technical vocabulary. But note the first 
sentence and the conclusion drawn in the last sentence of the passage. 
68 That is, De interpretatione 1, 16a3–8, Boethius trans., in Text (9). 
69 All this in effect just means an occurrent concept, as distinguished from a habitual or 
dispositional one. 
70 notion = ratio, a notoriously difficult word to translate. Do not read it here in too psy-
chological a sense. Here it means roughly the essential aspects of the thing. (See n. 71 below.) 
71 That is, the “τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι,” one of Aristotle’s phrases for the essence of a thing.  
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thing.72 (c) The third is the thing existing as a particular, under individuating con-
ditions. The first [alternative, (a),] is not signified first by an utterance, because 
what a thing is is first understood, before the species of the thing is understood. 
And what is first understood is first signified. The assumption73 is clear, because 
the understanding does not understand intelligible species except by reflection, as 
[by] its act.74 But the third [alternative, (c)], that is, the things existing as indi-
viduals under their own notions, cannot be first signified,75 because the under-
standing is in first act through its proper object, which is the what it is of a thing; 
the understanding does not understand the singular first.76 But it can consider 
what the thing is without material conditions, even though [the thing] does not 
exist without them. And a name is imposed on [a thing] just as it is understood. 
Hence a name signifies a passion of the understanding, that is, the thing as con-
ceived.77 
(33) John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 27, q. 1, obj. 2 and reply78: Again, 
Augustine in the fifteenth book of On the Trinity, Ch. 11 or 2679: “the word that 
sounds outwardly is a sign of the word that shines within.” But the exterior word 
is a sign of a real thing, and not of an act of understanding. Otherwise, any af-
firmative [proposition] in which the same thing is not predicated of itself would 
be false, because the act of understanding the subject is not the act of understand-
ing the predicate, even though the one reality is the other.… 
To the second argument,80 although there is a great debate about the utter-
ance, whether it is a sign of the real thing or of the concept, nevertheless briefly I 
grant that what is signified by an utterance is properly the real thing. Nevertheless 
the letter, the utterance and the concept are signs ordered to the same significate, 
just as there are many effects ordered to the same cause, none of which is a cause 
of another, as is clear in the case of the sun illuminating the several parts of the 
medium.81 And where there is such an order among things caused without the 
one’s being a cause of another, any one of them is “immediate” with respect to 
                                                 
72 That is, the “τὸ τί ἐστιν,” another Aristotelian phrase. Note: In this sentence I am 
violating the first cardinal rule of translating: Never translate a text you do not thoroughly under-
stand.  
73 That is, the premise that “what a thing is is first understood …,” etc. 
74 I am not sure what the last clause is doing here. 
75 Reading ‘significari’ in the text.  
76 Scotus has a theory according to which we acquire knowledge of individuals only de-
rivatively; the intellect first knows “common natures” (= loosely speaking, “universals”). Hence, 
he is arguing here, individuals cannot be what is immediately (“first”) signified by names. 
77 Not all of the difficulties in this passage are problems of translation. The text is just 
plain obscure. I did the best I could. The upshot is that Scotus is here interpreting Aristotle’s 
phrase ‘passion of the soul’ as referring to the essential nature of a thing. It is not individual, but 
neither is it a concept in the sense of a psychological entity that can be known only by reflection. 
78 From his Opera omnia, Vatican edition, vol. 6, pp. 63–64 (§ 2) and p. 97 (§ 83). 
79 Text (7). The odd phrase ‘Ch. 11 or 26’ refers to alternative mediaeval ways of divid-
ing up the text. 
80 The one just quoted in the preceding paragraph. I’m skipping quite a bit here. 
81 That is, the air.  
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the same cause [in the sense of] excluding [any] other in the aspect of a cause, but 
not [in the sense of] excluding [any] other in the aspect of a more immediate ef-
fect. In that case, it would be granted that in some way a closer effect is a “cause” 
with respect to the remoter effect, not properly [speaking], but because of the pri-
ority that obtains between such effects in relation to the cause. So [too] it can be 
granted in the case of many signs ordered to the same significate that one is in 
some way a sign of another, because it gives one to understand it. For the remoter 
would not signify unless the more immediate in some way signified beforehand. 
Yet because of this the one is properly not a sign of the other, just as in the other 
case of a cause and the caused things. 
(34) Walter Burley, On the “Old Art” of Porphyry and Aristotle82: Sec-
ond, you have to understand that for a name and a verb to signify passions of the 
soul can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that the name and the verb 
signify passions of the soul as the things they are first imposed to signify. It can 
be understood in another way [too], so that they signify passions of the soul as the 
things by means of which [the names and verbs] are imposed to signify. In the 
first way it is not necessary that a name and a verb signify passions of the soul … 
In the second way, I say that names and verbs do signify passions of the soul … 
And I say the above when speaking about names of first intention, since they are 
not imposed first to signify passions of the soul. Yet it is quite possible that some 
name does signify a passion of the soul — for instance, names of second inten-
tion, and also utterances like ‘passion of the soul’, ‘thing’s likeness in the soul’, 
and so on. Nevertheless, Boethius says here that an utterance does not first signify 
an external thing but rather something in the soul, and as a consequent signifies 
an external thing. But I believe this should not be understood in the sense that the 
utterance is not first imposed [to signify an external thing]. For if it first signifies 
something in the soul, it is not necessary that it signify that thing as that on which 
it is first imposed. Rather [it suffices that it signify that thing] as that which first 
moves the understanding to impose the name on the understood thing. 
                                                 
82 Walter Burley, Burlei super artem veterem Porphirii et Aristotelis, (Venice: Otinus [de 
Luna] Papiensis, 11 May 1497). Copy at Lilly Library, Indiana University. There are no folio 
numbers, but the passage is in Burley’s commentary on De interpretatione 1, 16a3f.: “Secundo est 
intellegendum quod nomen et verbum significare passiones animae dupliciter potest intellegi. Uno 
modo quod nomen et verbum significant passiones animae tanquam illa quae imponuntur primo 
ad significandum. Alio modo potest intellegi quod significent passiones animae tanquam illa me-
diantibus quibus imponuntur ad significandum. Primo modo est necessarium nomen et verbum 
significare passiones animae … Secundo modo dico quod nomina et verba significant passiones 
animae … Et dico illud loquendo de nominibus primae intentionis, quod illa non imponuntur 
primo ad significandum passiones animae. Bene tamen est possibile quod aliquod nomen sig-
nificet passiones animae, ut nomina secundae intentionis, etiam hujusmodi voces ‘passio animae’, 
‘similitudo rei in anima’, et sic de similibus. Boethius tamen dicit hic quod vox non significat 
primo rem extra sed aliquid in anima et ex consequenti significat rem extra. Sed credo quod non 
sic intellegitur quod vox non primo imponitur. Si vero primo significat aliquid in anima non est 
necesse quod significet illud tanquam illud cui imponitur primo sed tanquam illud quod primo 
movet intellectum ad imponendum nomen rei intellectae.” 
Appendix 2: A Collection of Texts 
 
350
(35) William of Ockham, Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione I, 
Prologue, § 2 (on 16a3–6)83: Here it is to be noted first that the Philosopher84 does 
not mean that all utterances properly and primarily signify passions of the soul, as 
if they are principally imposed to signify passions of the soul. Rather many utter-
ances and names of first intention85 are imposed to signify primarily things. For 
instance, the utterance ‘man’ is imposed primarily to signify all men — and only 
when they are men, so that when they cease to be men,86 they cease to be signified 
by the utterance ‘man’. 
Now the Philosopher says that an utterance is “a mark of a passion of the 
soul” because of a certain order between them in signifying. For the passion pri-
marily signifies things, and the utterance secondarily signifies not the passion of 
the soul but rather the same things that the passion signifies, so that if the passion 
[of the soul] changed its significates, the utterance would at once by that very 
fact, without any new imposition or institution, change its significates [too]. 
This is plainer in the case of an utterance and an inscription. For we can 
institute the utterance ‘man’ to signify such [and such] a thing. Afterwards we can 
so institute the written word ‘man’, saying the following: “I institute this written 
word not to signify the spoken utterance ‘man’ but to signify this same thing that 
the spoken utterance signifies and nothing else, so that whatever is signified by 
the utterance, and at whatever time, that same thing and not [something] else at 
the same time is signified by the written word.” Given that, the written word will 
not signify the utterance but only the thing. And if the utterance changed its sig-
nificate, at once by that very fact the written word would change its significate 
[too]. 
This appears [to be so] in fact.87 Hence if all men imposed anew the utter-
ance ‘man’ to signify the same thing that is signified by the utterance ‘whiteness’, 
without any change being made in writing, he who afterwards wrote the [proposi-
tion] ‘Man is an animal’ — [someone] else would say to him that he wrote a 
falsehood.88 [The written word ‘man’] would not signify the utterance [‘man’] but 
rather the thing. This is because of an order in signifying, because namely the 
written word is not imposed to signify except the same thing that is signified by 
                                                 
83 Translated from William of Ockham, Expositionis in libros artis logicae …, pp. 347–
348. I have omitted a short paragraph from the beginning, where Ockham simply divides up the 
text he is commenting on in the section. 
84 Aristotle was often referred to in the Middle Ages simply as “the Philosopher,” much 
as St. Paul is still referred to sometimes as just “the Apostle.” 
85 On names of first or second intention, see William of Ockham, Summa of Logic I.11. 
86 I suppose this means when they die. But according to the second sense of ‘signify’ dis-
tinguished in Summa of Logic I.33, they would still be signified by the term ‘man’ even then. Ock-
ham is here talking about signification in the first of the four senses distinguished in Summa of 
Logic I.33. 
87 I’m not sure what this means here. It doesn’t seem to mean that the hypothetical case 
just discussed actually occurs in fact, since Ockham goes on to give another hypothetical case in 
the immediately following lines. It might mean (although I doubt it) that what has gone before is 
not just Aristotle’s personal opinion, it also seems to be actually true. 
88 Something appears to have gone wrong with the syntax in this part of the text. I trans-
late as best I can. 
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the utterance, and nothing else. Now this is [done] only at the pleasure of the in-
stitutor. 
Just as there is such an order in signifying between the utterance and the 
inscription, so there is such an order in signifying between the utterance and the 
passion of the soul.89 Because of this order the Philosopher says that utterances 
are “marks” of passions [of the soul]. All the authoritative [texts] of the philoso-
phers and others that sound like this should be understood in this way. 
(36) William of Ockham, Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione I, 
Prologue, § 6 (still on 16a3–690): And if it is said that an act of apprehending or 
knowing one proposition is not some one simple act, but rather is an act [made 
up] of many acts, which acts all [together] make up one proposition, [I argue] 
against this [as follows]: In that case, the propositions ‘Every man is an animal’ 
and ‘Every animal is a man’ would not be distinguished in the mind. For if the 
latter proposition in the mind is only an act of understanding made up of these 
particular91 intellections, [then] since here there cannot be any particular act in the 
one proposition unless it is in the other one [too], and the difference of word-
order does not block [the conclusion] as it blocks it in speech, there doesn’t seem 
to be any way [for the latter proposition] to be distinguished [from the former] in 
the mind. 
(37) William of Ockham, Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione I, 
Prologue, § 6 (on 16a3–6)92: To the first [objection], it can be said that by such a 
confused intellection singular external things are understood. For example, to 
have a confused intellection of a man is nothing else than to have a cognition by 
which one man is no more understood than another, and yet by such a cognition a 
man is more cognized or understood than [is] an ass. This is nothing else than for 
such a cognition to be more similar, in some way of being similar, to a man than 
to an ass, and no more [similar] to this man than to that one. 
In that respect, it seems it has to be said as a consequence that an infinity 
[of things] can be cognized by such a confused cognition. This seems no more un-
thinkable than the fact that by the same love or desire an infinity [of things] can 
be loved or desired. But the latter does not seem unthinkable. For someone can 
love all the parts of some continuum, which are infinite. Or he can long for all the 
parts of the continuum to endure in being. Yet by such a longing, nothing is 
longed for except some part of the continuum — and not one any more than an-
other. They all have to be longed for, and yet they are infinite [in number]. Like-
wise, one can long for there to be all the men who can be, and yet they are infi-
nite, because an infinite [number of men] can be generated. 
                                                 
89 Better: between the passion of the soul and the utterance. 
90 Translated from William of Ockham, Expositionis in libros artis logicae … , p. 354. 
91 The sense here is “partial.” 
92 Translated from William of Ockham, Expositionis in libros artis logicae …, pp. 
354.88–355.105. 
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(38) William of Ockham, Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione I, 
Prologue, § 6 (still on 16a3–693): To the second [argument] many things can be 
said. One is that a proposition in the mind is one [thing] composed of many acts 
of understanding. For example, the proposition in the mind “A man is an animal” 
is nothing other than (a) the act by which all men are confusedly understood, and 
(b) the act by which all animals are confusedly understood; and (c) there is an act 
that corresponds to the copula. Alternatively, it can be said that this proposition is 
one act equivalent to three such acts existing simultaneously in the intellect. In 
that case, according to this way of talking, a proposition is not something really 
composite, but only by an equivalence — that is, it is equivalent to such a com-
posite. 
But in that case it is hard to save the fact that these propositions are distin-
guished in the mind: “Every animal is a white [thing]” and “Every white [thing] is 
an animal,” and [other pairs of propositions] like this. For they are not distin-
guished in the mind because of a different word-order in the way they can be dis-
tinguished in speech. For conjoining the quantifier to one spoken utterance or to 
the other plainly results in a different proposition. But this cannot be maintained 
in the mind. For such acts of understanding in the mind, since they exist simulta-
neously and in the same subject (because [they exist] in the intellect), cannot have 
such a different word-order. Neither is the same act of understanding able to be 
combined with one [act] more than with another. 
To this [argument], it can be said that a proposition can be an act of under-
standing equivalent to one whole proposition composed of really distinct [compo-
nents] if they were to have an order such as they have in speech.94 And in that 
case there will be distinct propositions, according as the corresponding [spoken] 
propositions would be distinguished if their terms or parts were ordered in one 
way or the other … 
(39) William of Ockham, Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione I, 
Prologue § 7 (yet again on 16a3–6)95: But it could be maintained that such [things] 
are not true qualities of the mind, and are not real beings existing subjectively in 
the soul, but are only certain [entities] known by the soul, in such a way that their 
being is nothing other than their being cognized. They can be called “specters,”96 
according to some [people’s] way of speaking, certain “ficta,” according to other 
[people’s] way of speaking. 
In this fashion it can be said that the intellect, when it apprehends a singu-
lar, fashions a similar singular [in the mind], and the singular so fabricated does 
not exist anywhere really, any more than the fort the artisan fashions [in his mind] 
exists really before he produces it. Yet it is such in fictive being as the other is 
externally… 
                                                 
93 Translated from William of Ockham, Expositionis in libros artis logicae …, pp. 
355.110–356.133. 
94 That’s pretty badly put, but it’s what the Latin says. 
95 Translated from William of Ockham, Expositionis in libros artis logicae …, p. 
359.28–360.17. 
96 specters = idola. 
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(40) William of Ockham, Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione I, 
Prologue, § 7 (on 16a3–6)97: I do not think there is anything very weighty against 
this opinion, except that it is hard to imagine that something can be understood in 
a real intellection and yet neither it nor any part of it nor anything that belongs to 
it can be in reality, and it cannot be either a substance or an accident. The fictum 
would be supposed to be like this. 
(41) William of Ockham, Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione I, 
Prologue, § 7 (on 16a3–6)98: Likewise, such a fictum would differ more from any 
thing than any thing [does] from another [thing]. For a real being and a being of 
reason differ more than [do] any two real beings. Therefore, such a fictive being 
is less similar to the thing … 
(42) William of Ockham, from Summa logicae II.199: Another division of 
the proposition is that one kind of proposition is assertoric and another kind is 
about a mode, or “modal.” A modal proposition is one in which a mode occurs; an 
assertoric proposition is one that is without a mode. 
It needs to be known that, even though all sophists100 as it were agree that 
only four modes (‘necessary’, ‘impossible’, ‘contingent’ and ‘possible’) make a 
proposition modal —this is because the Philosopher did not touch on more modes 
[than those], and did not discuss more [modes] in the book Prior [Analytics], 
when he was dealing with the conversion of such [modal] propositions and with 
syllogisms put together out of them — nevertheless, because he did not deny 
other [modes], therefore, speaking more generally, it can be said that there are 
more modes that make propositions modal than those four. 
On this point, you need to know that a proposition is called “modal” be-
cause of a mode added in the proposition. But not just any mode suffices for mak-
ing a proposition modal. Rather it has to be a mode predicable of the whole 
proposition. Therefore, it is properly called a “mode of the proposition,” as 
[something] that can be verified of the proposition itself. The proposition is called 
“modal” from such a mode, or [from] the adverb of such a predicable [mode], if it 
has an adverb, or [from the corresponding] verb. But there are more modes like 
that than the four mentioned above. 
For just as one kind of proposition is necessary, another impossible, an-
other possible, and another contingent, so [too] one kind of proposition is true, 
another false, another known, another unknown, another spoken, another written, 
another conceived, another believed, another opined, another doubted, and so on. 
Therefore, just as a proposition in which there occurs the mode ‘possible’, ‘neces-
sary’, ‘contingent’ or impossible’, or the adverb of one of these [modes], is called 
“modal,” so a proposition in which one of those just mentioned occurs can be 
                                                 
97 Translated from William of Ockham, Expositionis in libros artis logicae …, p. 
360.30–34. 
98 Translated from William of Ockham, Expositionis in libros artis logicae …, pp. 
360.35–361.38. 
99 Translated from Gál et al., ed., pp. 242.33–243.66. 
100 This doesn’t mean “sophists” in the pejorative sense. It means people who argue by 
means of “sophismata.” In Ockham’s day, it in effect just meant “those who do logic.” 
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called “modal” with equal reason. Therefore, just as ‘For every man to be an ani-
mal is necessary’ is modal, and likewise ‘Every man of necessity is an animal’, so 
too ‘For every man to be an animal is known’ [and] ‘Every man is known to be an 
animal’ are modal, and likewise [propositions] such as ‘For every man to be an 
animal is true’, and so on. 
If someone asks why the Philosopher did not deal with these, and did not 
count them among the modal propositions, it must be said that the Philosopher, 
who was seeking brevity, because what he said about the other [modes] can be 
applied to these, did not want to deal with these at length… 
(43) William of Ockham, from Summa logicae II.2101: On this point, it has 
to be said that for the truth of such a singular proposition that is not equivalent to 
many propositions102 it is not required that the subject and the predicate be really 
the same, or that the predicate on the part of reality be in the subject, or be really 
in the subject, or that, on the side of the thing outside the soul, it be united with 
the subject.103 For example, for the truth of ‘He is an angel’ it is not required that 
the common [name] ‘angel’ be really the same as what occurs in subject position, 
or that it be really in it, or anything like that. Rather it suffices and is required that 
the subject and the predicate supposit for the same. Therefore, if in ‘He is an an-
gel’ the subject and the predicate supposit for the same, the proposition will be 
true. Therefore, it is not denoted that he has “angelity” or that “angelity” is in 
him, or anything like that. Rather it is denoted that he is truly an angel. Not that 
he is that predicate, but that he is what the predicate supposits for. 
Likewise too it is not denoted by propositions like ‘Socrates is a man’ 
[and] ‘Socrates is an animal’ that Socrates has humanity or animality, and it is not 
denoted that humanity or animality is in Socrates, or that man or animal is in Soc-
rates, or that man or animal belongs to the essence or quiddity of Socrates, or to 
the quidditative notion of Socrates. Rather it is denoted that Socrates truly is a 
man and truly is an animal. Not that Socrates is the predicate ‘man’ or the predi-
cate ‘animal’. Rather it is denoted that he is some thing for which the predicate 
‘man’ and the predicate ‘animal’ stand or supposit. For both of those predicates 
stand for Socrates. 
(44) William of Ockham, from Summa logicae II.3104: Now that we have 
seen what suffices for the truth of a singular proposition, we have to see what is 
required for the truth of an indefinite and a particular proposition … For the truth 
of such [propositions] it is sufficient that the subject and the predicate supposit for 
something the same, if it an affirmative proposition and a universal quantifier is 
not added on the side of the predicate. (I say that on account of such [proposi-
tions] as ‘Some animal is every man’, ‘Some angel is every angel’.) But if such [a 
proposition] is negative, it is required that the subject and the predicate not sup-
                                                 
101 Translated from Gál et al., ed., pp. 249.8–250.31. 
102 That last clause in effect means “that is not an ‘exponible’ proposition.” Don’t worry 
about it. 
103 The last three clauses are simply alternative ways of saying the same thing. 
104 Translated from Gál et al, ed., p. 255.3–16. 
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posit for everything the same. In fact, it is required that the subject either suppos-
its for nothing or else supposits for something the predicate does not supposit for. 
(45) William of Ockham, from Summa logicae II.4105: Therefore, first it 
has to be known that for the truth of such a universal proposition it is not required 
that the subject and the predicate be really the same. Rather it is required that the 
predicate supposits for all those [things] the subject supposits for, so that it is 
verified of them. If that is so, then unless some special cause prevents it,106 the 
universal proposition is true. This is what is commonly said, that for the truth of 
such a universal proposition, it is sufficient that each singular be true. 
(46) William of Ockham, from Summa logicae II.7107: First you need to 
know that any proposition about the past or about the future in which a common 
term is the subject, or a demonstrative pronoun with a common term, or a discrete 
term conveying something composite, has to be distinguished insofar as the sub-
ject can supposit for what is or for what was, if it is a proposition about the past, 
or for what is or for what will be, if it is a proposition about the future. And 
whether it is the one or the other, if it is an affirmative proposition it is required 
that the predicate under its proper form — that is, that the predicate itself — be 
truly predicated by such a verb of what the subject supposits for, so that, in other 
words, a proposition in which the predicate is predicate of a pronoun indicating 
precisely what the subject supposits for was at one time true, if it is a proposition 
about the past, or that it will be at one time true, if it is a proposition about the fu-
ture. 
(47) William of Ockham, from Summa logicae II.9108: After assertoric 
propositions, we must talk about modal propositions. You need to know first that 
a proposition is sometimes said [to be] “about a mode” because the dictum of a 
proposition is taken with such a mode. This is clear, for example, with ‘For every 
man to be an animal is necessary’, ‘For a man to run is contingent’, ‘For every 
man to be colored is true’,109 ‘For every man to be an animal is per se in the first 
mode’,110 ‘For everything necessary to be true is known’, ‘For Socrates to run is 
unknown’, and so on. But another kind of proposition is called “modal” in which 
the mode occurs without such a dictum of a proposition. 
A modal proposition said in the first sense always has to be distinguished 
according to composition and division. In the sense of composition it is always 
denoted that such a mode is verified of the dictum’s [corresponding] proposition. 
For example, it is denoted by ‘For every man to be an animal is necessary’ that 
the mode ‘necessary’ is verified of the proposition ‘Every man is an animal’, the 
dictum of which is the stated [expression] ‘for every man to be an animal’. For 
                                                 
105 Translated from Gál et al., ed., p. 260.54–60. 
106 Let’s not go into the special causes that might arise. 
107 Translated from Gál et al., ed., p.p. 269.3–270.15. 
108 Translated from Gál et al., ed., p. 273.2–25. 
109 This has no racial overtones at all. He just means that every man has some color or 
other. 
110 This refers to a certain distinction in the Posterior Analytics. Don’t worry about it. 
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[an expression] is called a “dictum of a proposition” when terms of the proposi-
tion are taken in the accusative case and the verb in the infinitive mood. 
But the sense of division of a proposition like that is always equipollent to 
a proposition taken with a mode [but] without such a dictum. For example, ‘For 
every man to be an animal is necessary’, in the sense of division, is equipollent to 
‘Every man of necessity (or necessarily) is an animal’. Likewise, ‘For Socrates to 
be an animal is known’ is equipollent to ‘Socrates is known to be an animal’. And 
so on. 
(48) William of Ockham, again from Summa logicae II.9111: From these 
[facts], it is plain that to know what is required for the truth of such propositions it 
suffices to know what is required for a proposition to be necessary and for it to be 
contingent, impossible, known, unknown or believed, and so on. It would take too 
long to treat all of these in detail. 
Nevertheless, as for a necessary proposition, you need to know that a 
proposition is not called “necessary” because it is always true but because it is 
true if it exists, and cannot be false. For instance, the proposition in the mind 
‘God exists’ is necessary, not because it is always true (for if does not exist it is 
not true) but rather [because] if it exists it is true, and it cannot be false. Likewise 
the spoken proposition ‘God exists’ is necessary, and yet it is not always true. For 
when it does not exist, then it is neither true nor false. But if it is spoken it is true, 
and it cannot be false unless the terms are instituted to signify in some other way. 
It ought to be said analogously for an impossible proposition, that it is one 
that is false if it exists. Yet it is not false unless the proposition exists. And so 
analogously for a contingent proposition. But in order for a proposition to be 
known or believed, and so on, more is required. Now what is required, that is a 
matter belonging to the Posterior Analytics and to other books. 
(49) William of Ockham, from Summa logicae II.10112: As for modal 
propositions without a dictum of a proposition, which are entirely equipollent to 
propositions taken with a dictum in the sense of division, you need to know that 
they are not converted with the first kind. In fact, the one of them can be true 
while the other is false, and conversely. For example, according to Aristotle ‘For 
every man to be an animal’ is necessary’ is true in the sense of composition, and 
yet ‘Every man of necessity is an animal’ is false. Likewise, ‘For everything true 
to be true is necessary’ is true according to Aristotle’s view, and yet ‘Everything 
true necessarily is true’ is false. And so on for many other cases. 
For this reason, you need to know that for the truth of such propositions it 
is required that the predicate, under its proper form, be applicable to what the sub-
ject supposits for, or to a pronoun indicating what the subject supposits for, so 
that, in other words, the mode expressed in such a proposition is truly predicated 
of an assertoric proposition in which the very same predicate is predicated of a 
pronoun indicating what the subject supposits for, analogously to what was said 
                                                 
111 Translated from Gál et al., ed., p. 275.67–84. 
112 Translated from Gál et al., ed., pp. 276.2–277.49. 
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about for propositions about the past and [those] about the future.113 For example, 
for the truth of ‘Every truth of necessity is true’ it is required that each proposi-
tion be necessary in which the predicate ‘true’ is predicated of anything for which 
the subject ‘truth’ supposits — in other words, that each [proposition] like ‘This is 
true’, ‘That is true’, be necessary, indicating anything the subject supposits for. 
And because not just any such [proposition] is true, therefore ‘Every truth of ne-
cessity is true’ is simply false. 
Likewise, it is not denoted by ‘The creator114 is able not to be God’ that 
‘The creator is not God’ is possible, because in that case it would be a true 
[proposition] about the possible.115 Rather it is denoted that ‘This is not God’ is 
possible, indicating what the ‘creator’ supposits for in ‘The creator is able not to 
be God’. And this is simply impossible, since ‘creator’ in ‘The creator is able not 
to be God’ supposits for God. And certainly ‘This is not God’ is impossible, indi-
cating God. 
Likewise, it is denoted by ‘The creator necessarily is God’ that ‘This is 
God’ is necessary, indicating what ‘creator’ supposits for in the proposition just 
mentioned about the necessary. And that is true. Therefore, that proposition about 
the necessary is true. Nevertheless, it is not necessary. Rather it is contingently 
true, because assuming that God would cease to create, then it would be false, just 
as the corresponding assertoric [proposition] would be false, namely ‘The creator 
is God’. 
It is not something inconsistent that a true proposition about the necessary 
should be contingent, as is clear in the example above. And just as a true proposi-
tion about the necessary can be contingent, so a proposition true about what is per 
se116 can be true per accidens117 and contingently. So too in many other cases. 
Yet notwithstanding that such [propositions] are true, nevertheless [propo-
sitions] like ‘God necessarily is a creator’ are false, and [propositions] like ‘God 
contingently is a creator’, ‘God is able not to be a creator’, ‘God is able to be not 
a creator’, and so on, are true. This is because no proposition in which the predi-
cate ‘creator’ is predicated of a pronoun indicating what the term ‘God’ supposits 
for is necessary but rather contingent. For every proposition like ‘This is a crea-
tor’, ‘This is not a creator’, is contingent, indicating God. 
(50) William of Ockham, again from Summa logicae II.10118: Second, you 
need to know that such propositions about a mode are related in the same way to 
their singulars as are assertoric propositions. Therefore, it is impossible that such 
a universal [proposition] be true or necessary or contingent unless each singular 
be true or necessary or contingent. 
                                                 
113 See Text (46) above. 
114 “creator” = “creans,” literally “the creating,” the present active participle. 
115 If God exercised his free choice not to create, there would be no creator, so that the 
subject term would not have anything to supposit for, and the proposition would be true in virtue 
of being a negative categorical with a non-denoting subject. 
116 Following a variant reading in the edition at line 40. 
117 Don’t worry about these. They come from the Posterior Analytics. 
118 Translated from Gál et al., ed., p. 278.87–90. 
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(51) William of Ockham, Quodlibet 5, q. 8119: 
(1) Do all the grammatical accidents of spoken terms belong to mental 
terms [too]? 
(2) Yes. For the term in the mind and the [corresponding] one in speech 
are subordinated signs120 of the same thing. Therefore, everything [that is] an ac-
cident of the one is an accident of the other. 
(3) To the contrary, gender and declension121 are accidents of spoken 
names and not of mental ones. Therefore, etc. 
(4) Here, I first assume a preliminary conclusion. Second, I shall speak to 
the question. 
(5) As for the first point, I say that just as among spoken and written terms 
some are names, [while] others [are] verbs, others pronouns, others participles, 
others adverbs, others conjunctions, [and] others prepositions, so [too] among 
mental concepts some concepts are names, others [are] verbs, others adverbs, oth-
ers conjunctions, [and] others prepositions. This is clear from the fact that for 
every spoken expression, true or false, there corresponds some mental proposition 
put together out of concepts. Therefore, just as the parts of the spoken proposition 
that are imposed to signify things on account of the necessity of signification or 
expression (for it is impossible to express all [things] by means of verbs and 
names alone that can be expressed by means of [them together with] the other 
parts of speech) are distinct parts, so [too] the parts of the mental proposition that 
correspond to utterances are distinct, to make distinct true and false propositions. 
(6) As for the second point, I say that the accidents of spoken names and 
[spoken] verbs are of two kinds. For some are common accidents, others proper 
ones. In accordance with this, I set out some conclusions: 
(7) The first [conclusion] is that the common accidents of spoken names 
belong [also] to mental names. This is proven inductively. For the first common 
accident is case, the second one number, [and] the third one comparison.122 It is 
plain that, just as the spoken propositions ‘A man is a man’ [and] ‘A man is a 
man’s’ have distinct predicates that vary only in case,123 [and] on account of this 
variation the one proposition is true and the other one false, so [too] the proposi-
tions in the mind corresponding to the spoken propositions ‘Socrates124 is a man’ 
[and] ‘Socrates is a man’s’ have distinct predicates that vary only in case. 
(8) [Here is] an example of the second [common accident]. The spoken 
propositions ‘A man is an animal’ [and] ‘A man is animals’ have distinct predi-
cates that vary only in number, [and] on account of this variation the one [propo-
                                                 
119 Translated from Wey ed., pp. 508.2–513.136 (compare Freddoso and Kelley, trans., 
pp. 424–429. The passage contains the entire question. Since I sometimes refer small parts of this 
text, I have divided it into numbered paragraphs. 
120 That is, the spoken one is subordinated to the mental one. 
121 That is, not the property of being declined, but rather, for example, belonging to the 
first declension, or belonging to the second declension. 
122 That is, being of positive, comparative or superlative degree. 
123 The predicate of the former is in the nominative, and of the latter in the genitive. 
124 The switch from ‘a man’ to ‘Socrates’ is not significant. Ockham just lost track of his 
example. 
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sition] is true and the other one false. So [too] the corresponding propositions in 
the mind have distinct predicates that vary only in number. This variation makes 
the one proposition true and the other one false. 
(9) [Here is] an example of the third [common accident]. Just as the spo-
ken propositions ‘A man is white’, ‘A man is whiter’, [and] ‘A man is whitest’ 
have distinct predicates that vary only in [degree of] comparison, [and] on ac-
count of this variation the one [proposition] can be true while the other is false, so 
analogously for the corresponding propositions in the mind. 
(10) But there is a doubt about whether the quality of the spoken name125 
belongs to the mental name. 
(11) The second conclusion is that the proper accidents of names only be-
long to spoken names and not to mental ones. These are gender and declension. 
The reason for this is that these accidents do not belong to a name on account of 
the necessity of signification, as the others do, or because of the necessity of ex-
pression, but rather for the sake of decorating [one’s] speech and for well-formed-
ness. This is clear from the fact that these two accidents belong to synonymous 
names. For example, ‘stone’ and ‘rock’, which belong to different genders and de-
clensions.126 Therefore, one should not attribute the multitude of accidents that 
belong to synonymous names to natural signs [too], such as concepts, just as there 
is no plurality of concepts corresponding to synonymous names. 
(12) Therefore, in order to see which proposition is true and which one [is] 
false in the mind, you do not have to look at which gender or which declension 
the subject or predicate is in. But you do have to consider which case and which 
number and which degree [of comparison] the subject and predicate are in, as was 
said above.127 
(13) Neither do you have to look to these accidents of the subject or predi-
cate for the sake of the truth and falsity of a spoken proposition, but only for [its] 
well-formedness. For ‘A man is he-white’ is well-formed, and ‘A man is she-
white’ is ill-formed.128 And this arises from the difference in gender. Therefore, 
although the spoken propositions ‘A man is he-white’ and ‘A man is she-white’ 
have distinct predicates, nevertheless the corresponding predicate in the mind is 
the same for both [of them]. 
(14) Thus, assuming the well-formedness of speech, it makes no differ-
ence which gender or declension the subject or predicate is in. For just as ‘A dia-
mond is a stone’ is true, so [too] ‘A diamond is a rock’ is true, where there is dif-
ference in the predicate with respect to gender and declension.129 Nevertheless, in 
                                                 
125 I do not know what this is. ‘Quality’ sometimes refers to the mood of a verb, but we 
are not talking about verbs here. 
126 The point cannot be made in English which has no declensions and (except for pro-
nouns) no gender. The Latin words are ‘lapis’ (third declension, masculine) and ‘petra’ (a Greek 
loan-word, first declension, feminine). 
127 See §§ 7–9, above. 
128 Can you translate them any better? The Latin of these two propositions is ‘Homo est 
albus’ and ‘Homo est alba’. ‘Homo’ is a masculine noun, and so requires the masculine adjective 
‘albus’, not the feminine adjective ‘alba’. 
129 On ‘stone’ and ‘rock’, see n. 126 above. 
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the mind there are no corresponding distinct predicates, as [there are] in speech. 
Neither can the one [proposition] be true, even in speech, unless the other one is 
true [as well]. 
(15) The third conclusion is that the common accidents of verbs belong to 
mental verbs [as well as to spoken ones]. They are five, namely, mood, voice, 
number, tense, and person. For the following are distinct propositions in speech 
[and] have distinct predicates that vary only with respect to these accidents (on 
account of which variation sometimes the one is true and the other one not): For 
example, in ‘Socrates reads’, [and] ‘Socrates, read!’, where there is a variation 
only in mood. Likewise, in ‘Socrates loves’ [and] ‘Socrates is loved’, where there 
is a variation only in active and passive voice. Likewise, in ‘Thou readest’ [and] 
‘You read’, where there is a variation only in number. Likewise, in ‘You read’ 
[and] ‘You have read’, where there is a variation only in tense. Likewise, in ‘He 
reads’ [and] ‘I read’, where there is a variation only in person. So too, there corre-
spond to these [propositions] distinct mental expressions having distinct predi-
cates that vary in [their] accidents in the same way. This variation causes [a varia-
tion] in truth or falsehood in the proposition, because a proposition in speech is 
never true or false unless there corresponds to it a similar130 one in the mind. 
(16) The fourth conclusion is that the proper accidents of verbs only be-
long to spoken and written verbs. (For there is the same verdict in all cases for 
terms in speech and [terms] in writing.) They are conjugation131 and inflection.132 
The reason [for this conclusion] is that sometimes verbs in different conjugations 
and of different inflections can be synonymous. Consequently, such a diversity 
[of conjugation and inflection] does not have to correspond to them in the mind. 
(17) And what was said for the accidents of names and verbs must be said 
analogously for the other parts of speech. 
(18) But there is one doubt. Do intentions in the mind, distinct from verbs, 
correspond to spoken participles? 
(19) I reply: There is no necessity to posit such a plurality in the mind. For 
a verb and the participle of the verb taken together with the verb ‘is’ are always 
equipollent in signifying and are synonymous. Thus, synonymous names were not 
invented on account of the necessity of signification, but for the sake of the deco-
ration of speech. (For whatever is signified and expressed by all the synonymous 
names could be expressed well enough by one of them. Hence a plurality of con-
cepts does not correspond to several synonymous names.) So too, since spoken 
verbs and their participles were not invented because of the necessity of significa-
tion or expression, therefore such a multitude of concepts does not correspond to 
them in the mind. 
(20) To the principal argument,133 I say that everything that is an accident 
of a mental term is an accident of a spoken term, but not the other way around. 
                                                 
130 That is, with the same truth value. 
131 That is, not being conjugated, but rather belonging, for example, to the first conjuga-
tion, or belonging to the second. English does not have conjugations in this way. 
132 ‘inflection’ = figura. I am not sure what grammatical feature this is. The distinctions 
of person, number, tense, etc., are all preserved in mental language, as Ockham has just argued. 
133 In § 2, above. 
Appendix 2: A Collection of Texts 
 
361
For some [things] are accidents of spoken terms because of the necessity of signi-
fication and expression, and they belong to mental names. Others are accidents of 
spoken terms for the sake of the decoration of speech (like synonyms) and for the 
sake of well-formedness, and they do not belong to mental terms. 
(52) William of Ockham, from Quodlibet 5, q. 9134: 
(1) Are mental names distinguished into concrete and abstract [ones] as 
spoken names [are]? 
(2) Yes. For it is impossible that the same proposition at one and the same 
time be [both] true and false. But the mental proposition ‘A man is white’ is true, 
and ‘A man is a whiteness’135 is false. Therefore, it is not the same proposition in 
the mind. But the subject is the same, and [so is] the copula. Therefore, the predi-
cate is different [in the two mental propositions]. And [the predicate differs] only 
as concrete and abstract. Therefore, etc. 
(3) To the contrary, some concretes and abstracts are synonymous, like 
‘cold’136 and ‘coldness’. But there is no plurality in the mind corresponding to the 
multitude of synonymous names in speech. Therefore, etc. 
(4) Here I shall first [set out as] a premise a distinction concerning the 
concrete and the abstract. Second, [I shall respond] to the question. 
[The distinction is the division of concrete and abstract 
terms into four kinds. The discussion exactly parallels the treat-
ment in Summa of Logic I.5–6 & 8–9. I have not translated it here.] 
(5) As for the second point, I say that [the distinction between] concrete 
and abstract in the first, third and fourth modes belongs to mental names just as [it 
does] to spoken ones. Consequently, such mental names are varied with respect to 
these [ways of being] concrete and abstract. 
(6) The reason for this is that the same mental proposition cannot be true 
and false together, whatever the case is for a spoken proposition.137 But the 
proposition ‘A man is white’ is true in the mind, and ‘A man is a whiteness’ is 
false. And there is no variation here except in the predicates, with respect to con-
crete and abstract in the first mode. Likewise, ‘A man runs’ is true in concept,138 
and ‘Humanity, or man inasmuch as he is man, runs’ is false. Here there is only a 
variation of concrete and abstract in the third mode. Likewise, ‘A people is many 
                                                 
134 Translated from Wey ed., pp. 513.2–514.14, 517.101–518.127 (compare Freddoso 
and Kelley, trans., pp. 429, 432). Again, I have numbered the paragraphs. 
135 For Ockham, there is no one universal quality “whiteness.” There are only individual 
whitenesses, the whiteness of Socrates and the whiteness of Plato, etc. I have included the indefi-
nite article here only because English requires it if it is to preserve the sense of Ockham’s Latin. 
Latin has no indefinite article, so that the two Latin propositions do not differ in this respect. 
136 The noun, not the adjective. 
137 An equivocal spoken proposition can be true in one sense and false in another. But 
there is no equivocation in mental language. 
138 That is, in the mind. 
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men’ is true in concept, and ‘A popular139 is many men’ is false, with respect to 
the fourth mode. Therefore, etc. 
(7) Moreover, a concept of a concrete in the first mode signifies one 
[thing] in the nominative and another in an oblique [case]. The [corresponding] 
concept of an abstract only signifies in the nominative. Therefore, etc. 
(8) But [the distinction between] concretes and abstracts in the second 
mode varies only spoken names, and not mental ones. The reason for this is that it 
is impossible that a proposition be true in which there occurs a concrete [term in 
the second mode] unless the [proposition] is true in which there occurs its [corre-
sponding] abstract [term]. Likewise, whatever grammatical or logical mode the 
one signifies in, the other one signifies in [too]. Consequently, even though there 
is such a plurality in speech, [it does] not [exist] in concept, because a multitude 
of concepts does not correspond to the multitude of synonymous names. 
(9) To the main argument,140 [the reply] is clear enough from what has 
been said. 
(53) William of Ockham, from Quodlibet 5, q. 10141: As for the first point, 
I say that the name ‘synonym’ is taken in two ways, namely strictly and broadly. 
In the strict sense, those names are called “synonyms” which all users intend to 
use simply for the same thing and in the same mode of signifying. For example, 
‘Marcus’ and ‘Tully’ are synonyms.142 In the broad sense, those names are called 
“synonyms” which simply signify the same thing in all ways and in the same 
mode of signifying, in such a way that nothing is in any way signified by the one 
unless it is signified in the same mode of signifying by the other, even though not 
all users believe them to signify the same thing but, being deceived, they think 
something is signified by the one that is not signified by the other. For example, if 
someone believed that the name ‘God’ conveyed a whole and ‘deity’ its part.143 
(54) John Buridan, Treatise on Supposition144: Supposition is divided in 
another way into material and personal. Supposition is called personal when the 
subject or predicate of a proposition supposits for its ultimate significates or for 
its ultimate significate, as the term ‘man’ supposits for men in the proposition ‘a 
man runs’. But supposition is called material when an utterance supposits for it-
self or for its like145 or for its immediate significate, which is the concept accord-
                                                 
139 That is, a popular thing. I am reading ‘populare’ with several manuscripts, against the 
edition’s ‘popularis’. 
140 In § 2, above. 
141 Translated from Wey ed., p. 519.17–28 (compare Freddoso and Kelley, trans., pp. 
433–434. 
142 For the non-classicists among you, ‘Marcus’ and ‘Tully’ are both names for Cicero.  
143 ‘Deity’ here means the divine nature. The point is that God is supposed to be simple 
and so does not have parts. Thus God does not consist of the divine nature (= deity) plus some-
thing else. People who have the wrong metaphysics might think otherwise, but their mistake does 
not prevent ‘God’ and ‘deity’ from being synonyms anyway, in the “broad” sense.  
144 John Buridan, Tractatus de suppositionibus, Reina ed., p. 201.34–41; King trans., p. 
118 § 3.2.1. 
145 That is, for another token of the same type. 
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ing to which it is imposed to signify. For instance, the term ‘man’ in the proposi-
tion ‘Man is a species’, ‘Animal is a genus’. 
(55) John Buridan, Treatise on Supposition146: Yet I say that in determi-
nate supposition the truth does not have to be for one suppositum alone. In fact, 
sometimes it is true for each [suppositum]. Rather it is required and sufficient that 
it be true for some one [suppositum]. Thus it must be noted at once that there are 
two conditions for the determinate supposition of some common term. The first is 
that from each suppositum of that term the common term can be inferred, the 
other [factors] in the proposition remaining as they stand. For example, because 
the term ‘man’ in ‘A man runs’ supposits determinately, therefore it follows: 
“Socrates runs; therefore, a man runs,” “Plato runs; therefore, a man runs,” and so 
on for each singular contained under ‘man’. 
The second condition is that from a common term that supposits in this 
way all the singulars can be inferred disjunctively according to a disjunctive 
proposition. For example, it follows: “A man runs; therefore, Socrates runs or 
Plato runs, or John runs,” and so on. 
(56) John Buridan, Treatise on Supposition147: Confused supposition is di-
vided into distributive and non-distributed. The latter we usually call “merely 
confused.” The distributive kind is that according to which from a common term 
each of its singulars can be inferred separately or even all together copulatively 
according to a copulative proposition. For example, ‘Every man runs’. It follows: 
‘Therefore, Socrates runs’, ‘Therefore, Plato runs’, or even ‘Therefore, Socrates 
runs and Plato runs’, and so on. 
(57) John Buridan, Treatise on Supposition148: But merely confused sup-
position is that according to which no singular follows separately, when the other 
[factors] in the proposition are retained as they stand. Neither do the singulars fol-
low disjunctively according to a disjunctive proposition, although perhaps they do 
follow according to a proposition with a disjoint extreme. 
(58) John Buridan, Treatise on Consequences149: But the subject of a 
proposition is not determined in this way by the tense of the verb. Indeed, it al-
ways retains supposition for the things of the present, and further, if the verb has 
another tense, it is ampliated to the things of the time of the verb, together with 
present things. 
(59) John Buridan, Treatise on Consequences150: Note that a proposition 
with the subject ampliated by the predicate is to be expounded by a disjunction on 
the part of the subject, between the present time and the time or times the amplia-
tion is made to. For example, (a) ‘B will be A’: ‘What is or will be B will be A’, 
(b) ‘A man has died’: ‘He who is or was a man has died’, (c) ‘Antichrist is able to 
                                                 
146 Reina ed., p. 323.348–361; King trans., pp. 129–130 §§ 3.5.3–6. 
147 Reina ed., p. 324.367–372; King trans., p. 130 § 3.6.1. 
148 Reina ed., p. 324.373–376; King trans., p. 130 § 3.6.1. 
149 Hubien ed., I.6.15–18, p. 27; King trans., p. 189, §§ 1.6.3–1.6.4. 
150 Hubien ed., I.8.363–369, p. 43; King trans., pp. 210–211, § 1.8.64. 
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be a man’: ‘He who is or is able to be Antichrist is able to be a man’, and (d) ‘A 
rose is understood’: ‘What is or was or will be or can be a rose is understood’. 
(60) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 1, from his discussion of sophism 
4151: For “to signify” is described as being “to establish the understanding” of a 
thing. Hence a word is said to signify that the understanding of which it estab-
lishes in us. 
(61) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 1, conclusion 1152: And the first con-
clusion is that written letters signify utterances [that are] spoken or will be spo-
ken. And they do not signify any things outside the soul, such as asses or rocks, 
except by means of the signification of utterances. 
(62) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 1, conclusion 2153: The second con-
clusion: significative utterances signify passions (that is, concepts) of the soul and 
not other things, except by means of the signification of concepts. 
(63) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 1, from his discussion of conclusion 
8154: Hence it is to be noted further that although an utterance immediately signi-
fies a concept, nevertheless by means of the concept it is imposed to signify the 
[things] that are conceived by that concept. 
(64) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 1, from his discussion of conclusion 
8155: And so too a written term, if it does not supposit materially, neither suppos-
its for itself nor for the utterance it immediately signifies nor for the concept it 
signifies consequently, by means of the utterance … 
(65) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 2, from the statement of sophism 5156: 
… If you say that [the proposition ‘A man is an ass’] not only signifies a man and 
an ass, but [also] signifies a man to be an ass, I prove that this is false, because 
for a man to be an ass neither is nor was nor is able to be anything. And so in the 
proposition ‘For a man to be an ass is signified by a proposition like [‘A man is 
an ass’]’, the subject — namely, ‘for a man to be an ass’ — supposits for nothing. 
Therefore, the proposition is false, since it is an affirmative the subject of which 
supposits for nothing. 
Again, if you say that the proposition is an affirmative one signifying [the 
case] to be somehow157 then I ask whether for [the case] to be somehow is [real] 
                                                 
151 Scott ed., p. 22; Scott trans., p. 67. 
152 Scott ed., p. 24; Scott trans., p. 70. 
153 Scott ed., p. 25; Scott trans., p. 70. 
154 Scott ed., p. 28; Scott trans., p. 75. 
155 Scott ed., p. 28; Scott trans., p. 75. 
156 Scott ed., p. 37; Scott trans., p. 85. Note that these arguments occur in the statement 
of the sophism. Buridan is not here committing himself to them. The last sentence of the quotation 
is probably unintelligible out of context, but I needed to include it to fill out the two-case argu-
ment. 
157 [the case] to be somehow: aliqualiter esse. Literally: “a being somehow.” The idea is 
that the proposition signifies “such and such to be the case.” The words ‘the case’ have no corre-
late in the Latin, and are added in an attempt to make the English a little smoother. If you want, 
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or is not. If you say it is not, then what you say is false, namely that for the case 
to be somehow is signified by that proposition. For, as I said, the proposition is af-
firmative and [its] subject supposits for nothing. If you say that it is [real], then 
we have [established] the point, that however [the proposition] signifies so [the 
case] is. 
(66) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 2, from conclusion 3158: The third 
conclusion is that the proposition ‘A man is an ass’ does not signify a man to be 
an ass. Or also, [put another way,] for a man to be an ass is not signified by the 
[proposition] ‘A man is an ass’. For for a man to be an ass neither is nor will nor 
is able to be [real]. For just as for a man to run, if it is [real], is a running man, 
and [just as] for a man to be white, if it is [real], is a white man, so [too] for a man 
to be an ass, if it is [real], is an existing man-ass. And that is for the impossible to 
be [real]. Therefore, the proposition ‘For a man to be an ass is signified’ is af-
firmative, and yet its subject supposits for nothing. ([This follows] from the fact 
that for a man to be an ass cannot be anything else [than an existing man-ass].) 
Therefore, [the proposition] is false. From this it follows that this is true ‘For a 
man to be an ass is not signified by a proposition like that’. 
In the same way it is [also] proved that for a man to be an ass cannot be 
imagined or understood or opined, and so on. 
But you ask “Isn’t it false for a man to be an ass?” I reply that it is neither 
true nor false literally — that is, taking the whole [expression] significatively and 
not according to material supposition. Yet it is to be granted that often such ex-
pressions in the infinitive mood are taken materially, and [then] they supposit for 
some propositions. For example, ‘for a man to run’ [can supposit materially] for 
the proposition ‘A man runs’, and ‘for a man to be an ass’ for the proposition ‘A 
man is an ass’. And in that case it is to be granted that for a man to be an ass is 
false — that is to say, that the proposition ‘A man is an ass’ is false. [And] so [in 
that sense] it is to be granted that for a man to be an ass is not nothing, but rather 
is a false proposition. 
On this point, note that some people, in order to run away from the diffi-
culty, want to say that such expressions in the infinitive mood do not supposit for 
anything except for propositions — for example, ‘for a man to run’ for the propo-
sition ‘A man runs’, and ‘for a man to be an ass’ for the proposition ‘A man is an 
ass’, and so on. 
[But] this is not true. For according to Aristotle in the Categories,159 to cut 
is to act, and to be cut is to be acted on. So too, for a man to cut is for a man to 
act, and for wood to be cut is for wood to be acted on, and for a man to be white 
is for a man to be colored. Therefore, such propositions are to be granted, and yet 
they all would be false if [the infinitival expressions] supposited for propositions. 
For the proposition ‘A man cuts’ or ‘A man is white’ is not the proposition ‘A 
                                                                                                                                     
think of the whole expression ‘[the case] to be somehow’ as meaning a state of affairs or situa-
tion. 
158 Scott ed., p. 39; Scott trans., p. 87. 
159 Scott ed., p. 41, cites Categories 9, 11b1–4, but Aristotle does not use the example 
there. See instead Categories 4, 2a2–4. 
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man acts’ or ‘A man is colored’. Again, everyone grants that it is very good to 
love God and very bad to hate God. And [yet] these [propositions] would not be 
true [if the infinitival expressions are taken as] suppositing for propositions. For I 
could without any malice form in my mind the proposition ‘A man hates God’.160 
(67) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 2, from conclusion 4161: … for a man 
to be is signified by the term ‘man’. For every man is signified by this term 
‘man’; but every man is for a man to be, as should be seen in Metaphysics 4.162 
And also it is made clear elsewhere, in Physics 1,163 that for a man to generate is 
a generating man, and for a man to be white is a white man. Therefore, it follows 
by Darapti in the third figure [of the syllogistic] that for a man to be is signified 
by the term ‘man’ and for an ass to be is signified by the term ‘ass’, and likewise 
for a man to be an animal or for an ass to be an animal [is signified by the term 
‘man’ or ‘ass’]. 
Indeed [it is] also [the case that] if a man runs, [then] for a man to run is 
signified by the term ‘man’. For every man is signified by the term ‘man’, and yet 
some man is for a man to run. Therefore, the conclusion follows in the third [syl-
logistic] figure by Datisi. 
(68) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 2, conclusion 5164: The fifth conclu-
sion: for a man to be is signified by the proposition ‘A man is an ass’. For every-
thing that is signified by the terms, or by some [one] term, of a proposition is sig-
nified by that proposition [itself]. Indeed, the proposition is not imposed to signify 
as a whole [taken] together in addition to its terms, which the intellect puts to-
gether affirmatively or negatively as it wishes. Therefore from the signification of 
[its] terms a proposition has the means to signify externally the things it signifies. 
Therefore, if for a man to be is signified by the term ‘man’ and for an ass to be [is 
signified] by the term ‘ass’, it follows that this is signified by the proposition ‘A 
man is an ass’. 
(69) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 2, from conclusion 6165: A sixth con-
clusion seems to me has to be posited, that for a man to have been is signified by 
the term ‘man’, and consequently by the proposition ‘A man is an ass’. For every 
man, present, past or future, is indifferently signified by the term ‘man’, because 
it signifies without tense. Therefore, Aristotle is signified by the term ‘man’ … 
                                                 
160 And if the infinitival expression ‘for a man to hate God’ referred to that, the proposi-
tion ‘It is very bad [for a man] to hate God’ would therefore be false. 
161 Scott ed., p. 40; Scott trans., pp. 88–89. 
162 Aristotle, Metaphysics 4, 2, 1003b26–29. 
163 Scott trans., p. 88 n. 11, cites Physics 1, 7, 190a10–12, but if the point is there at all, it 
is certainly not explicit. In Scott ed., p. 41, he cites Burley’s commentary on the Physics I, q. 8, 
but I have not verified the reference. 
164 Scott ed., 40; Scott trans., p. 89. There are some textual complications in this passage. 
See the variants listed in Scott’s edition, p. 41. 
165 Scott ed., p. 41; Scott trans., p. 89. 
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(70) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 2, from conclusions 10–14166: The 
tenth conclusion is that for the truth of an affirmative categorical it is required that 
the terms, namely, the subject and the predicate, supposit for the same thing or 
things. Therefore too, for its falsehood it is sufficient that they do not supposit for 
the same thing or things … 
The eleventh conclusion: that for the truth of a negative categorical it suf-
fices that the subject and the predicate do not supposit for the same thing or for 
the same things, even though some [such proposition] is true in which the subject 
and the predicate do supposit for the same thing or things, as ‘An animal is not a 
man’. So too, for the falsehood of a negative it is required that the subject and the 
predicate supposit for the same thing, although it does not follow: “The subject 
and the predicate supposit for the same thing; therefore, the negative is false”… 
The twelfth conclusion: that for the truth of an affirmative indefinite or 
particular categorical it is required and is sufficient that the subject and the predi-
cate supposit for the same thing … 
The thirteenth conclusion: that for the truth of a universal affirmative, it is 
required and is sufficient that whatever thing or things the subject supposits for, 
the predicate supposits for that or for those things … 
Therefore, in review, this fourteenth conclusion is posited, that every true 
particular affirmative is true because the subject and the predicate supposit for the 
same thing or things. And every true universal affirmative is true because what-
ever thing or things the subject supposits for, the predicate supposits for the same 
thing or things. And every false particular affirmative is false because the subject 
and the predicate supposit for nothing of the same thing or things. And a false 
universal affirmative is false because the predicate does not supposit for all that or 
all those things for which thing or things the subject supposits. And every true 
particular negative is true in virtue of that whereby the universal affirmative con-
tradictory to it is false. (It has been said how that comes about.) And every false 
universal negative is false in virtue of that whereby the particular affirmative con-
tradictory to it is true. 
(71) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 2, from conclusion 14167: But finally, 
it must be noted that we can use names at will. When several people generally use 
this way of speaking, so that we say of every true proposition that “it is the case,” 
and of every false one that “it is not the case,” I have no intention of abolishing 
this way of speaking. Rather, for the sake of speaking more briefly, I will perhaps 
use it [myself], always meaning by it not what [the clause] signifies by [its] pri-
mary imposition, but rather the causes of truths or falsehoods given above, [which 
are] different for different [kinds of] propositions, as had been said [above]. 
(72) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 4, the first remark168: For first it must 
be known that a term [that is] naturally apt to supposit for something is said to ap-
                                                 
166 Scott ed., pp. 42–45; Scott trans., pp. 90–93. 
167 Scott ed., p. 45; Scott trans., pp. 93–94. 
168 Scott ed., p. 61; Scott trans., p. 112. 
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pellate everything it signifies or consignifies besides what it supposits for, unless 
it is restricted … 
(73) John Buridan, Sophismata, Ch. 8, from sophism 7169: For some peo-
ple have said, and so it seemed to me elsewhere, that even though the proposition 
[‘Every proposition is false’], according to the signification of its terms, does not 
signify or assert [otherwise] than that every proposition is false, still every propo-
sition by its form signifies or asserts itself to be true. Therefore, every proposition 
asserting itself to be false, whether directly or consecutively, is false. For, granted 
that it is the case as [the proposition] signifies insofar as it signifies itself to be 
false, nevertheless it is not so that it is the case as [the proposition] signifies inso-
far as it signifies itself to be true. Therefore, [the proposition] is false and not true, 
because for its truth it is required not only that how it signifies so it is the case, 
but that howsoever it signifies, so it is the case. 
(74) Robert Fland, Consequences, §§ 8–10170: A proposition is called 
“copulative” when a mark like ‘and’ joins propositions to one another, like ‘You 
run and you are at Rome’. A proposition is called “of coupled extreme” when the 
mark ‘and’ joints terms to one another, like ‘You are a man and an animal’, or 
‘Socrates and Plato run’. For a copulative to be true when imposition is with-
drawn,171 it is required that every part be true. But, by means of an imposition,172 
a copulative is true when every part of it is false. For instance, if the copulative 
‘You are an ass and you are a nanny goat’ is imposed to signify precisely that 
God exists, and every part of it principally signifies nothing beyond its primary 
signification, then that copulative is true and every part of it is false. Likewise, a 
copulative is false and every part of it is true, and this by means of an imposi-
tion.173 For instance, if the copulative ‘You are a man and you are an animal’ is 
assumed to signify precisely that you are an ass, and each of its categoricals has 
its primary signification, then the copulative is false and every part of it is true. 
(75) Richard Lavenham, Summulae logicales, § 12–13174: Now it remains 
to treat of spoken and written terms. And first it is to be known that there are four 
different [kinds] of utterance, namely: articulate, inarticulate, literate, illiterate. 
An articulate utterance is one that represents something to the intellect of the 
speaker. For example, the utterance ‘man’ and the utterance ‘animal’. An inar-
ticulate utterance is one that represents nothing to the intellect of the speaker. For 
instance, the utterance of the jay and other birds. A literate utterance is one that 
can be written. An illiterate utterance is one that cannot be written. For instance, 
the hissing of snakes and the groans of the sick. 
                                                 
169 Scott ed., p. 135; Scott trans., p. 194. Hughes ed., p. 66.94–104; Hughes trans., § 
7.7.1, p. 67 (paperback p. 48). I am translating from Hughes’ Latin text. 
170 Spade, “Robert Fland’s Consequentiae,” p. 59. 
171 This refers to a special, new imposition, apart from the normal imposition usually in 
force. 
172 Ditto.  
173 Double ditto.  
174 Translated from Spade, “Notes on Richard Lavenham’s So-Called Summulae logi-
cales,” pp. 380–381. 
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Thus one kind of utterance is articulate and literate. For instance, the utter-
ance ‘man’ and the utterance ‘(I) love’.175 Another kind is an articulate and illiter-
ate utterance. For instance the hissing of snakes and the groans of the sick. An-
other kind is a literate and inarticulate utterance. For instance, ‘choax’, the utter-
ance frogs [make],176 and ‘caw’, the utterance crows [make]. Another kind is an 
illiterate and inarticulate utterance. For instance, the sound of trees177 and the 
mooing of cows. Now the literate and articulate utterance is divided into the name 
and the verb. Discourse arises out of these parts [of speech].178 
(76) Peter of Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, Part I “Concepts,” §§ 34–
38179: It is to be noted further that, just as mental terms properly so called 
categorematic by signification naturally signify something or some things, so too 
mental terms syncategorematic by signification naturally signify no thing and no 
things. 
Again, among mental terms properly so called some naturally signify 
nominally, and they are naturally names. Some signify naturally verbally, and 
they are naturally verbs. And so on for other parts of speech. Mental terms, there-
fore, are not properly said [to belong] to this or that part of speech through some 
“modes of signifying” added on.180 Instead they belong to this or that part of 
speech by themselves, from their own nature. 
Again, one mental term properly so called naturally signifies adjectivally. 
And so it naturally is an adjective. And another naturally signifies substantivally. 
And so it naturally is a substantive. 
                                                 
175 (I) love = diligo. It is one word, not two, in the Latin. The point is merely to give one 
example of a noun and one example of a verb. 
176 That’s what Richard thinks frogs sound like. 
177 This is surprising. Normally, an “utterance” was regarded as having to be made by 
the vocal apparatus of an animal. (See Peter of Spain in Text (20), above.) What kind of tree-
sound is Richard thinking of here? 
178 Presumably Richard doesn’t mean to exlude the other parts of speech here. He is 
merely being elliptical. 
179 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fols. 3vb–4ra; Spade trans., p. 23. The Latin 
is: “Notandum est ulterius quod sicut termini mentales proprie dicti categorematici significatione 
naturaliter significant aliquid vel aliqua sic [correcting the edition’s sicut] etiam termini mentales 
syncategorematici significatione nihil naturaliter significant nec aliqua. 
“Item terminorum mentalium proprie dictorum aliqui naturaliter significant nominaliter, 
et tales naturaliter sunt nomina. Aliqui naturaliter significant verbaliter, et tales sunt naturaliter 
verba. Et sic de aliis partibus orationis. Non ergo termini mentales dicti sunt proprie huius vel 
illius partis orationis per aliquos modos significandi superadditos sed se ipsis ex natura sua sunt 
istius vel illius partis orationis. 
“Item aliquis terminus mentalis proprie dictus naturaliter significat adjective, et sic natu-
raliter est adjectivus. Et aliquis naturaliter significat substantive, et sic naturaliter est substantivus. 
“Item aliquis terminus mentalis naturaliter est nominativi casus, alter genitivi, et sic de 
aliis. 
“Item aliquis actus intellegendi sive conceptus naturaliter est primae personae, alter 
secundae et alter tertiae. Et sic de aliis accidentibus partium orationis, licet non de omnibus. Vide 
de hoc Ockham.” 
180 Peter is rejecting the theory of the “modists” or “speculative grammarians.” On 
“modism,” see Ch. 2, p. 43, above. 
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Again, one mental term naturally is in the nominative case, and another is 
in the genitive, and so on. 
Again, one act of understanding (or concept) naturally is in the first per-
son, another in the second and another in the third. And so on for the other acci-
dents of parts of speech. But not for all [of them]. See Ockham on this. 
(77) Peter of Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, Part II “Insolubles,” §§ 94–
95181: Second, note that among mental propositions like this, some signify purely 
naturally, [and] some signify not only naturally but [also] by convention, just as 
all spoken or written [propositions] always signify by convention. Hence mental 
propositions that are not likenesses of utterances or inscriptions that signify by 
convention are not different among men according to the diversity of those [utter-
ances or inscriptions]. Instead, they are the same in species for all [people] insofar 
as they naturally signify and are naturally propositions, not by convention. For 
example, the mental proposition that corresponds to the spoken ‘Man is an ani-
mal’. 
But there are other mental propositions that are the images or likenesses of 
spoken or written propositions, drawn into the soul from exterior utterances or 
inscriptions or else made up by [the soul] itself.182 These are not of the same kind 
in all men. Instead, some are in Greek and others are in Latin, signifying the same 
thing, just as the spoken or written propositions that a Greek utters outwardly183 
are other than those a Latin utters or writes. Anyone can notice propositions like 
this if he keeps quiet with his mouth and speaks in his heart by forming likenesses 
which, if he were to speak with his mouth, he would utter outwardly. Such propo-
sitions, therefore, even though they are naturally representations of utterances or 
inscriptions, yet conventionally represent that which is signified by convention 
                                                 
181 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 7va; Spade trans., pp. 36–37. The Latin 
is: “Secundo, nota quod hujusmodi propositionum mentalium quaedam significant pure natu-
raliter, quaedam significant non solum naturaliter sed ad placitum, sicut omnes vocales aut scrip-
tae semper significant ad placitum. Unde propositiones mentales quae non sunt similitudines 
vocum aut scripturarum ad placitum significantium non secundum illarum diversitatem diversifi-
cantur in hominibus, sed eaedem secundum speciem apud omnes tales inquantum significant natu-
raliter et sunt naturaliter propositiones et non ad placitum. Verbi gratia de propositione mentali 
correspondente huic vocali ‘Homo est animal’. 
“Sed alia sunt propositiones mentales quae sunt propositionum vocalium aut scriptura-
rum imagines aut similitudines ab exterioribus vocibus vel scriptis in animam derivatae vel per 
ipsam fictae. Et istae non sunt eiusdem rationis in omnibus hominibus. Sed aliae sunt in graeco, 
aliae vero sunt in latino idem significantes, sicut aliae sunt propositiones vocales aut scriptae quas 
profert exterius graecus ab his quas profert [corr. from the edition’s profer] aut scribit latinus. Et 
in hujusmodi propositiones potest quilibet advertere cum tacens ore loquatur corde formando 
similia quae si ore loqueretur proferret exterius. Tales igitur propositiones licet sint naturaliter 
repraesentationes vocum aut scripturarum tamen ad placitum repraesentant illud quod per scriptu-
ras aut voces hujusmodi ad placitum significatur, et ita ad placitum significant sicut voces aut 
scripturae, et sunt ad placitum propositiones sicut et ipsae. Verbi gratia de propositione mentali 
quae est naturalis representatio huius vocalis ‘Homo est animal’, et cum ad placitum representat 
quicquid significat illa vocalis, sicut patet cuilibet intuenti.” There are some minor textual prob-
lems here. See Spade trans., p. 115 nn. 280, 283–284. 
182 That is, they are either in memory or in imagination. 
183 He certainly doesn’t utter a written proposition, but you get the point. 
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through such inscriptions or utterances. And so they signify by convention just as 
utterances or inscriptions do, and they are propositions by convention just as the 
latter are. For example, the mental proposition that is a natural representation of 
the spoken ‘Man is an animal’, when it conventionally represents whatever the 
spoken [proposition] signifies. This is intuitively plain to anyone. 
(78) Peter of Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, Part II “Insolubles,” from § 
102184: For the mental proposition to which the spoken [proposition] ‘Every 
whiteness is a quality’ is subordinated is possible and in fact true. But the [mental 
proposition] to which the spoken [proposition] ‘Every quality is a whiteness’ is 
impossible.185 But if they were composed in the way stated above, then the parts 
of the one [proposition] would be altogether like the parts of the other [proposi-
tion], and of the same species.186 And they would be in the same first, indivisible 
subject.187 As a consequence, those parts in the one [mental proposition] could not 
be varied any more than [the parts] in the other with respect to word-order or to 
[any] other relation among themselves or to their wholes. Thus the propositions 
would have the same specific kind. Now it is unintelligible that there be two 
wholes, each part of the one of which is like some part of the other and vice versa, 
and however one [part] is related to its whole or to the other parts of its whole so 
[too] the [part] similar to it in the other whole is related to its whole and the 
[other] parts of [its whole], unless those wholes are alike and of the same kind. 
(79) Peter of Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, Part II “Insolubles,” §§ 105–
106188: But perhaps it would be said to these [arguments] that although the parts 
are alike in such propositions, and in the same first subject, yet different proposi-
                                                 
184 Ed. cit., fol. 8ra–rb; Spade trans., p. 38. The Latin is: “Nam propositio mentalis cui 
subordinatur haec vocalis ‘Omnis albedo est qualitas’ est possibilis et de facto vera. Illa vero cui 
subordinatur ista vocalis ‘Omnis qualitas est albedo’ est impossibilis. Sed si illae componerentur 
modo praedicto tunc partes unius cum partibus alterius essent omnino similes et eiusdem speciei, 
et essent in eodem subiecto primo et indivisible. Et per consequens nulla situatione aut alia habi-
tudine inter se vel ad sua tota possent variari partes illae in una plusquam in alia. Quare illae pro-
positiones essent eiusdem rationis specificae. Modo non intellegibile est quod sint duo tota quo-
rum quaelibet pars unius sit similis alicui parti alterius et econverso, et qualitercumque una se ha-
beat ad suum totum vel ad alias partes sui totius taliter se habeat sibi similis in alio toto ad suum 
totum et suas partes, quin illa tota sint similia et eiusdem rationis.” I have emended the text in a 
few places. For a discussion, see Spade trans., p. 117 nn. 311–312. 
185 This is the reading in the edition cited. A manuscript copy has ‘entity’ for ‘quality’ 
both here and in the preceding sentence, and that seems to be perhaps the better reading. See the 
discussion in Spade trans., p. 116 nn. 307–309. 
186 That is, they would differ only numerically. 
187 That is, the intellect. But in fact this is not implied by anything Peter has said so far. 
On the other hand, it’s not needed for his argument either, so we can simply ignore it. 
188 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 8rb; Spade trans., p. 39. The Latin is: 
“Sed forte diceretur ad ista quod quamvis sint similes partes talium propositionum et in eodem 
subjecto primo, tamen propter ordinem diversum productionis earum diversae propositiones resul-
tant. Et non est eadem pars secundum speciem subjectum in una et praedicatum in alia. Sed in una 
est subjectum, similis est in altera praedicatum. Nam unius subjectum secundum speciem est sim-
ile praedicato alterius et e contra. Similiter ejus propositionis pars prius producta est subjectum, 
pars vero posterius producta est praedicatum.” 
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tions result on account of the different order of their production. And the same 
part in species is not subject in the one [proposition] and predicate in the other. 
Instead it is subject in one [proposition, and] its like is predicate in the other 
[proposition]. For the subject in the one [proposition] is like the predicate of the 
other [proposition] in species, and vice versa. Similarly, the part of the proposi-
tion produced earlier is the subject, but the part produced later is the predicate. 
(80) Peter of Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, Part II, “Insolubles,” § 
127189: First, because many people maintain, and it is quite arguable, that the con-
cept the utterance ‘white’ corresponds to is a simple act of knowing. Neverthe-
less, it is equivalent in signifying to several acts of knowing. For it signifies what-
ever its nominal definition and any part of [its nominal definition] signifies. Thus 
it is usually granted that [the concept] amounts to no more than does the expres-
sion ‘thing having inhering in it enough whiteness for its denomination’.190 
(81) Peter Tartaret, from his On Descent191: This coupled descent also oc-
curs under a term that supposits merely confusedly by reason of two quantifiers, 
the first of which is negative and the second affirmative. For instance, ‘No head 
does every man have’. ‘Man’ there supposits merely confusedly, and a coupled 
descent can be made under it, as was seen earlier. 
                                                 
189 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et insolubilia, fol. 9rb; Spade trans., p. 42. The Latin is: 
“Tum quia multi ponunt et valde probabile est quod conceptus cui correspondet ista vox ‘album’ 
est notitia simplex, et tamen aequivalet in significando pluribus notitiis, quia significat quicquid 
significat suum quid nominis et quaelibet pars eius. Unde communiter conceditur quod valeat tan-
tum sicut haec oratio ‘res habens albedinem sibi inhaerentem sufficientem ad suam denomina-
tionem’. I have emended the first word of the text.” See Spade trans., p. 121 n. 360. (The phrase 
‘Ed2 and the MS’ there should read ‘Ed1 and the MS’.) 
190 That is, enough whiteness to warrant calling it “white.” 
191 Peter Tartaret, De descensu, fol. 195ra. The Latin is: “Fit etiam iste descensus copula-
tus sub termino supponente confuse tantum ratione duorum signorum quorum primum est negati-
vum et secundum affirmativum, ut ‘Nullum caput habet omnis homo’. ‘Homo’ ibi supponit con-
fuse tantum, et sub eo licet fieri descensus copulatus, ut prius visum est.” 
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